THE CLASSICAL TRIVIUM

THE PLACE OF THOMAS NASHE IN THE LEARNING OF HIS TIME

MARSHALL McLUHAN

EDITED BY W. TERRENCE GORDON

GINGKO PRESS

Published in April 2006

Gingko Press, Inc.
5768 Paradise Drive, Suite J
Corte Madera, CA 94925
Phone (415) 924-9615, Fax (415) 924-9608
email: books@gingkopress.com
www.gingkopress.com

ISBN: 1-58423-067-3

© 2005 Corinne McLuhan

Editor's Introduction, Chapter Introductions,
© 2005 W. Terrence Gordon

Marshall McLuhan Project, General Editors
Eric McLuhan, W. Terrence Gordon

With very special thanks to Corinne McLuhan
and Eric McLuhan

Book Design: Anne Burdick, Los Angeles,
www.burdickoffices.com
Trivium Icon Design: Andrea Tinnes, Berlin,
www.typecuts.com
Text set in HTF Requiem and DIN

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, mechanical or electronic, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data:
McLuhan, Marshall, 1911–
The classical trivium : the place of Thomas Nashe in the learning of his time / Marshall McLuhan ; edited by W. Terrence Gordon.
p. cm.
Originally presented as the author's thesis (Ph.D.)—Cambridge University, 1943, entitled: The place of Thomas Nashe in the learning of his time.
Includes bibliographical references (p.) and index.
ISBN 1-58423-067-3
1. Nash, Thomas, 1567–1601—Knowledge and learning. 2. Education—England—History—16th century. 3. Classical education—History—16th century. 4. England—Intellectual life—16th century. I. Gordon, W. Terrence, 1942– . II. Title. III. Title: Place of Thomas Nashe in the learning of his time.
PR2326.N3Z76 2005
828'.309—dc22

2005027994

THE CLASSICAL TRIVIUM

This work is an edition of the Cambridge University doctoral dissertation of Herbert Marshall McLuhan, entitled The Place of Thomas Nashe in the Learning of his Time. *With the exception of pages 192 to 197 of this edition, published as "Cicero and the Renaissance Training for Prince and Poet" in* Renaissance and Reformation Studies *VI, 3 (1970), pages 38–42, none of the material has appeared in print previously. The principal text of this work was established by correcting typographical and spelling errors in the typescript version of the dissertation, submitted and approved in 1943. Material quoted by McLuhan has been corrected, where necessary, by verification against the text sources, and passages inadvertently omitted from the holograph manuscript have been restored.*

—(Editor)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Editor's Introduction
viii

Introduction
3

CHAPTER ONE
THE TRIVIUM UNTIL ST. AUGUSTINE

A. GRAMMAR *13*
B. DIALECTICS *37*
C. RHETORIC *59*

CHAPTER TWO
THE TRIVIUM FROM ST. AUGUSTINE TO ABELARD

A. GRAMMAR *79*
B. DIALECTICS *101*
C. RHETORIC *109*

CHAPTER THREE
THE TRIVIUM FROM ABELARD TO ERASMUS

A. GRAMMAR *129*
B. DIALECTICS *167*
C. RHETORIC *185*

CHAPTER FOUR
THOMAS NASHE

A. GRAMMAR *207*
B. DIALECTICS *227*
C. RHETORIC *233*

Bibliography
255

Index
266

All antique hystories you must haue at your fingers-end.

—THOMAS NASHE

The reason why authors which are yet read, of the sixteenth century, are so little understood is that they are read alone; and no help is borrowed from those who lived with them, or before them.

—SAMUEL JOHNSON TO
THOMAS WARTON

Logic [is the] source of eloquence, through which the wise who understand the aforesaid principal sciences and disciplines may discourse upon them more correctly, truly, and elegantly; more correctly, through Grammar; more truly, through Dialectic; more eloquently, through Rhetoric.

—ST. VINCENT OF BEAUVAIS

So effectively does Nashe's writing convey a sense of the intractable materiality of words and the unpredictable nature of his own stylistic enterprise that we come to imagine him continually present ... engaging even as we read with the animated unreliability of his own linguistic creations.

—LORNA HUTSON,
THOMAS NASHE IN CONTEXT

In the beginning is the void, in the muddle is the sound-dance, and thereinafter you're in the unknown again, and vice versa.

—JAMES JOYCE, *FINNEGANS WAKE*

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

Marshall McLuhan was always concerned with the big picture. In the present work, written more than twenty years before his broad-ranging study of media thrust him on the world stage, he is a historian of classical culture, a reader of Thomas Nashe (1567–1601) heeding Johnson's words, an architect with a blueprint for the education of future generations. And he is a gardener, cultivating seedlings—hybrids of stock with ancient philosophical roots—seedlings that would mature in his media analysis of the 1960s and 70s. Whenever McLuhan pondered his study of Nashe during those later years, never having abandoned the perpetually deferred project of publishing it, he recorded copious notes—many linking what he had written about Nashe to his more recent work. He outlines correspondences between his laws of media, Aristotle's typology of causes, and the divisions of classical rhetoric. His notes yield the phrase "multimedia exegesis of both Scripture and the Book of Nature." *Multimedia exegesis* is vintage McLuhan, offering a convenient working definition of both the dynamics and the purpose of the integrated classical trivium that grounds his study of Thomas Nashe.

Nashe had scarcely come to McLuhan's attention as he searched out a dissertation topic. His impulse to cast his net as widely as possible, to range over as much as possible of what he had learned of English literature at Cambridge, drew him at first to consider using Raymond Wilson Chambers's *On the Continuity of English Prose* (1932) as a starting point. McLuhan planned to expand Chambers's coverage beyond Thomas More to the end of the sixteenth century, bringing Thomas Stapleton, Cardinal William Allen, Robert Parsons, Edmund Campion, and others within the compass of the survey that Chambers had made. McLuhan relished the task of examining a daunting amount of material from the pens of theologians, preachers, pamphleteers, historians, romancers, annalists, as well as authors of newsletters and broadsides, including Thomas Nashe.

Chambers provided inspiration and a model by the scope of his work, but the convenient assumptions grounding the thesis and the title of his work soon proved troubling to McLuhan. On Chambers's view, the rich variety displayed in the prose writers of the sixteenth century was nothing more than an anomaly in relation to a longer tradition in English literature. It was only after McLuhan had narrowed the scope of his dissertation proposal to a study of Thomas Nashe that he discovered the source and the significance of multiple traditions in Nashe's writings and recognized the myopia of Chambers's perspective. Ezra Pound had already published *How to Read*, Mortimer Adler would soon publish *How to Read a Book*, and one of McLuhan's Cambridge mentors, I. A. Richards, was about to offer a corrective to Adler's approach with his *How to Read a Page*. By then, McLuhan, with

his dissertation at an advanced stage, had a corrective of his own to offer and must have been tempted to subtitle his work *How to Read Thomas Nashe.*

During the nineteenth century, scholars of Elizabethan literature had regarded Nashe as marginal, useful for documenting and illustrating editions of stage plays and historical research. By the time McLuhan began his study, the prevailing view of Nashe had made him the journalist *par excellence* of his day and little, if anything, more. McLuhan could not reconcile this view with the richness and deftness of his subject's style. While the majority of commentators had seen Nashe in a trivial light, McLuhan would soon see him in light of the trivium.

In the dazzling prose of such works as *The Anatomie of Absurditie* and *Pierce Penilesse,* McLuhan suspected, there was more than a dash of *sprezzatura.* His suspicion was confirmed when he read Morris Croll's work on Nashe's contemporary John Lyly, and this led him to investigate patristic and medieval writers as sources for enduring models of rhetoric. In the meantime, the evidence that Nashe had received unduly short shrift continued to accumulate as McLuhan turned to the standard edition of Nashe's work by Ronald McKerrow, only to discover the editor impatient with Nashe's pirouettes and unwilling to set them in any larger context. McLuhan undertook a systematic study of the theory and practice of rhetoric in Nashe's time. This was the first of the three-part framework he needed to give Nashe his due.

McLuhan made a high and wide survey of rhetoric as it was conceived and practiced in every form of literature in the sixteenth century. His investigation covered not only English writers but teachers and practitioners in Italy, France, Spain, and Germany. The sheer breadth of the study assured repeated confirmation of the conclusion that began emerging early on, namely that the sixteenth century was an age of rhetoric. In itself, this discovery did nothing to rescue Nashe from eclipse. But McLuhan widened the scope of his inquiry once again, moving beyond the history of the whole rhetorical canon to encompass the modes of education over the centuries from Cicero to Nashe. This expansion inevitably brought in another: the complementarity of rhetoric, dialectic, and grammar, the three components of the trivium since classical antiquity. This framework for the study of the arts became the full framework for McLuhan's dissertation.

Building the mammoth apparatus required to examine Nashe threatened to sideline him, as McLuhan candidly admits. But he saw no alternative to offering an analysis in which consciousness of the internal dynamics of the trivium played the same role for an educated reader as it had for Nashe in composing his works. This was the Practical Criticism that McLuhan had absorbed at Cambridge, wed to the mandate of the intellectual historian. The combination ensured that the shortcomings blemishing the work of Chambers, McKerrow, and others would be rectified and that Nashe could enjoy the reputation he deserved.

McLuhan aimed at more than illuminating Nashe. The blueprint for education at which he continued to work for years afterward was already set out in essence in his dissertation. It was McLuhan the author of *Understanding Media,* the director of the University of Toronto's Center for Culture and Technology, the calm and detached observer of the social upheavals of the

1960s who wrote "I think it can be shown that the general cultural confusion and merging of the past century or so has been favorable to the rebirth of *grammatica* in its ancient sense—a sense even wider than that in which Vives or Bacon understood it and a sense more profound than current semantic studies provide." He continued: "The pursuit of psychological order in the midst of a material and political chaos is of the essence of *grammatica*. Thus, modern symbolism in art and literature corresponds to ancient allegory." These reflections conclude on a note that reverts to the groundwork of the Nashe dissertation: "Of course, the weakness of *grammatica* is that it never seems able to avail itself of the aids of dialectics and philosophy." Here is an unequivocal call for a program of education based on the ambitious and lofty ideal of reintegrating the classical trivium.

Grammatica, or grammar, as will become clear in the pages of this work, is not to be understood in the sense of parts of speech, sentence structure, or any other narrow sense belonging to either prescriptive grammar or modern linguistics. In the widest meaning of the term, and particularly in its relation to dialectics and rhetoric, with which it constitutes the three dimensions of the classical ideal of learning, grammar is the art of interpreting not only literary texts but all phenomena. Above all, grammar entails a fully articulated science of exegesis, or interpretation. Dialectics is, variously, a way of testing evidence or the study of kinds of proofs for an argument, a method of dialogue, or simply logic. Rhetoric, of course, includes the rhetorical devices such as alliteration that are most commonly associated with it in general usage today, but as set out by McLuhan in the following pages, it proves to be a very complex feature of discourse, involving five divisions. These are *inventio* (discovery), *dispositio* (arrangement), *memoria* (memory), *elocutio* (style), and *pronunciatio* (delivery). The dynamics of the classical trivium both presuppose a science of exegesis, or interpretation, and predispose authors to engaging in the historical controversies surrounding the dynamics in question. All of this is elaborated in *The Place of Thomas Nashe in the Learning of his Time*.

Above all, McLuhan stresses the intertwining of the trivial arts, setting out every phase in the complex history of the subject. Dialectics is described in grammatical terms from a rhetorical point of view by the Greek Sophists; dialecticians subordinate grammar and rhetoric to their art; rhetoricians subordinate dialectics to *inventio* and *dispositio*. But harmony marks certain periods: the physics of the Stoics is so closely linked to grammar as to make it virtually inseparable from dialectics.

Such cases are exceptional. More often, polemics deliberately undermine the integral operation of the trivium. Or misunderstandings unwittingly split it apart. McLuhan carefully traces one such instance in which the major European historians of rhetoric after the Renaissance unknowingly impoverished their studies by retaining the bias of that period and skipping over the Middle Ages. McLuhan redresses the balance here by demonstrating that the Ciceronian ideal of the Renaissance did not spring from a sudden impulse to retrieve the great orator's teachings but from a tradition that had continued throughout medieval times. On the evidence for this enduring tradition, McLuhan can recast the so-called quarrel between the

ancients and the moderns as the continuation of Cicero's clash with philosophers and the medieval conflict between dialecticians and grammarians.

From the earliest pages of the work one detects the themes McLuhan would continue to evoke throughout his career: "The great alchemists ... were grammarians. From the time of the neo-Platonists and Augustine to Bonaventure and to Francis Bacon, the world was viewed as a book, the lost language of which was analogous to that of human speech. Thus the art of grammar provided not only the sixteenth century approach to the Book of Life in scriptural exegesis but to the Book of Nature as well." Here McLuhan articulates for the first time what would become the core idea, more than four decades later, in his posthumously published *Laws of Media*.

Similarly, in developing his revisionist view of intellectual history, McLuhan articulates the observation he will eventually use as a cornerstone in his media analysis: "A consideration of the Ciceronian ideal and tradition ... has claims to being one of basic importance in the history of western culture, and its comparative neglect must be ascribed to impercipience of the ubiquitous, rather than to mere indifference on the part of scholars." *Impercipience of the ubiquitous.* The donnish rhetoric of the phrase belongs to the McLuhan of the 1930s and gave way over the years to a style that favored aphorisms; the grammar was retained by the McLuhan of *The Mechanical Bride* and through to *Laws of Media*.

As McLuhan builds his vast backdrop for the sixteenth-century humanism of Nashe, he incorporates a full account of the role of the late medieval church in maintaining the ideals of classical learning: "Grammar and classical culture had been preserved by the Church after the fall of the Empire because grammar was then the indispensable mode of theology. The advent of dialectics was, therefore, sheer gain for theology but almost a total overthrow for grammar." Here too McLuhan is obliged to provide rereadings of the patristic scholars from the perspective of an integrated trivium. Thus, for example, Hugh of St. Victor, if seen as belonging to a tradition of grammar that spans the ages from Plato to Francis Bacon, can be read coherently as an opponent of radical scholasticism.

McLuhan constantly hunts out critical bias and seeks to redress errors

that have arisen from distorted perceptions of the legacy of friction and opposition between those who were partisans of grammar or dialectics to the exclusion of the other. "The modern view that allegory is a product of medieval scholasticism is the precise contrary of the facts. The modern distrust of allegory and parable is demonstrably rooted in the prevalence of the mathematical modes of abstraction which becomes general in the seventeenth century but is no less typical of Abelard and the dialecticians. It is the Cartesians who distrust fancy with its metaphors, allegories, and similes. Just as the grammarians distrusted abstraction, so the dialecticians contemned the concrete models of language."

If McLuhan's dissertation is intended to provide a new tool for scholars, it also challenges them to undertake very large tasks. By facilitating the understanding of the full implications of the basic distinction between grammar and dialectics, it opens the way to recasting the histories of European literature from the fifteenth century onward. So, for example, the entire

golden age of Spanish literature can be reinterpreted as an expression of patristic rhetoric and exegesis. Such a revision requires looking beyond questions of style to more fundamental issues of method and undertaking an entirely new study in the broad perspective offered by McLuhan.

With his history of the trivium in place, McLuhan gives his full attention to describing Nashe's writings. But the description also serves as a test of the critical apparatus that McLuhan's revisionist history entails. He begins by reviewing sources for Nashe's method and style, an issue opening onto the larger one of his aims as a member of the patristic party in the Anglican church. Nashe's opponents prove to be the Calvinist partisans within the church, armed with scholastic method in theology and defending the territory staked by Peter Ramus in dialectics and rhetoric. McLuhan quickly establishes correctives for the conventional interpretation of the antagonism between Nashe and Gabriel Harvey: "It is a mistake to suppose that, in opposing Harvey, Nashe appeared reactionary to his contemporaries; for in the sixteenth century Harvey seemed to be tied to the scholastic Ramus, whereas Nashe belonged to the party of the ancients who were defending the cause of the reformed grammatical theology of Erasmus."

McLuhan offers a solution to one conundrum: the link between Nashe and the Parnassus plays proves to be their anti-Ramistic view of the arts. Another so-called puzzle he dismisses: Nashe's disavowal of the pseudo-eloquence that he himself called "bragging blank verse" is no anomaly when the principal themes of his writing are seen as part of an overarching commitment to the union of poetry, eloquence, and theology. For McLuhan, Nashe is a "fully enlightened protagonist in an ancient quarrel," namely the battle for supremacy between dialectics and grammar—the central narrative of McLuhan's history of the trivium.

In this battle, as McLuhan makes clear, doctrine was not at issue, rather methods of interpretation in theology and preaching. Some Catholics and some Protestants held patristic views, while others took up scholastic positions. As a consequence, Nashe could align himself with Erasmus, More, and Rabelais, for example, without opening himself to the charge of holding Catholic views. At the same time, and with complete consistency to his patristic position, Nashe could decry the "drifat duncerie" and "dunsticall inkhornism" of Harvey as vestiges of medieval scholastic philosophy.

McLuhan returns repeatedly in the final section of his work to the elaborate framework he erected to study Nashe, demonstrating how it clarifies his writings and how, in turn, the writings consolidate the framework: "Nashe's defence of Aristotle is always with reference to Ramus. It never commits Nashe to the monopoly which Aristotle held in some of the late medieval schools... The responsible historian should guard himself from repeating the opinion that the 'authority of Aristotle' was absolute at any time in the history of European thought." Even in specific textual commentary, McLuhan's scrutiny of Nashe is rooted in the trivium and its place in intellectual history. And the variety of Nashe's writing styles are also explained in historical terms. So, for example, McLuhan views *The Unfortunate Traveller* as a satire on medieval romances, forming part of Nashe's attack on Duns Scotus and the Calvinists.

It becomes clear that Nashe simultaneously validates McLuhan's history of the trivium and personifies the case for its indivisibility. This conclusion stems not from any argument developed by McLuhan but from the cogency of his close reading of Nashe's texts. McLuhan sensed that Nashe's power as a writer extends beyond simple mastery of a deliberate variety of styles to skill in remolding his array of verbal tools. In this respect, Nashe may have provided at least part of the early inspiration for the aphoristic formulations that the later McLuhan would call his *probes*. At any rate, as McLuhan's dissertation draws to a close, amid illustrations of Nashe's allegory, hyperbole, paradox, metaphors, and dramatic devices, the echo of McLuhan's Cambridge mentor I. A. Richards is strong: "Perhaps more than enough has been said to indicate that the locus of any solution for the problem of the professional and artistic status of Nashe must be sought in the character and purpose of his rhetoric."

The dialogue between art and scholarship which McLuhan considered to be both inevitable and indispensable is clear as he summarizes the prospects he has facilitated for transcending conventional views of Nashe and the literary production of his day: "It required, perhaps, the advent of such a successful devotee of the rhetoric of the second sophistic as James Joyce to prepare the ground for a scholarly understanding of Elizabethan literature." Armed with his doctoral dissertation on Thomas Nashe, McLuhan went on to prepare the ground for a scholarly understanding of James Joyce and much more.

Whether McLuhan's interest in Nashe and the unique approach of studying him in the context of the patristic legacy coincides by chance with McLuhan's then recent conversion to Catholicism must remain a matter of speculation. But it is clear from archival material relating to the dissertation that McLuhan had a massive study of rhetoric underway before Nashe became the focus of his attention. Scores of names for figures of speech, their Latin-derived names carefully cross-referenced with their Greek-derived counterparts, form part of this material. Only a handful of the cumbersome terms eventually found their way into the Nashe dissertation. But a large amount of potential material for a study of Sir Philip Sidney is assembled and arranged in essentially the same format that McLuhan retained when he settled on Nashe.

The references to Sidney in the following pages suggest that a dissertation centered on him would have given little opportunity to go beyond rhetoric to grammar and dialectics. Nashe fairly demanded a three-part study and set a massive intellectual challenge of the type that instinctively appealed to McLuhan. (The authors mentioned in the introductory chapter as being equally suitable as Nashe for McLuhan's purpose are Bacon and Donne, not Sidney.) His focus on the history of the church and its role in education over the centuries, whether incidental or the primary motivation for the final choice of the dissertation topic, was, from the beginning, as central to it as Nashe himself. Archival material indicates that by the time McLuhan drafted his dissertation, he had assembled far more material on all aspects of the patristic heritage than he has was able or willing to use.

Among the most important material to be retained and reworked in

the text of the dissertation was the mass of reading notes on the writings of Catholic philosopher Etienne Gilson (see page 81n.5 for a note of historical interest). All of Gilson's books published by the time McLuhan had completed writing his dissertation are carefully annotated in his resource files, and all but *Reason and Revelation* (New York: Scribner's, 1938) are referred to in the dissertation. Gilson and McLuhan would eventually become faculty colleagues for over thirty years at St. Michael's College, University of Toronto. Their mutual respect and admiration did not prevent McLuhan from badgering Gilson in the same way that he might prod a hapless undergraduate student into thinking, nor did it prevent Gilson from becoming exasperated with McLuhan's rhetoric.

The influence of Gilson on McLuhan the doctoral candidate is perhaps most clearly seen in the realm of the Logos, or universal reason, which placed grammar at the center of both Stoic physics and the earliest Christian theology. In discussing the dynamics unifying grammar, dialectics, and rhetoric, McLuhan stresses that while the reception of the doctrine of the Logos into Christianity was regularly noted by scholars, the intermediate stages of that reception through training in the grammatical arts was, for the most part, overlooked. He also stresses the metaphysical character of the Logos, and it is in this respect that Gilson's work influenced him, as he readily acknowledges. The fundamental difference between the grammatical and dialectical schools, for example, begins to emerge in McLuhan's presentation with the help of a key quotation from Gilson on the the philosophy of St. Bonaventure.

Gilson observes that the role of things as sign in the order of revelation sanctions the same role for them in the order of nature. Once this transfer is in place, it functions by a method distinguishing it radically from dialectics. McLuhan characterizes the contrast: "M. Gilson proceeds to show that these guiding principles of interpretation are managed in their application not by the logic of dialectics of Aristotle, which are adapted to the analysis of a world of natures and leave us 'without the means to explore the secrets of a symbolic world such as that of the Augustinian tradition,' but by the reasoning of analogy." Here one can detect a source of both McLuhan's principle of the probe and his preference for the analogical over the logical, as well as a worldview demanding the investigative technique of closure based on relationships—a worldview shared by McLuhan and the ancients of the grammatical school. He freely acknowledges this link in noting that the history of the trivium is essentially a history of the rivalry amid practitioners of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectics, adding that it cannot be written without adopting the viewpoint of one of them. The analogists viewed words and phenomena as interrelated by proportions and etymologies—a view retained and reworked by McLuhan long after he wrote his Cambridge dissertation.

W. Terrence Gordon
HALIFAX, 2004

HERBERT MARSHALL McLUHAN

APRIL 1943

THE PLACE OF THOMAS NASHE IN THE LEARNING OF HIS TIME

McLuhan's brief introductory chapter scarcely requires any commentary. The emphasis it lays on modes of education and educational traditions clearly signal the purpose of his work as going beyond an analysis of Nashe's writings. He evokes the integrity of the trivium and pinpoints the period during which it broke down: "In the eighteenth century there still persisted a significant remnant of those disciplines, sufficient to make Nashe more comprehensible to [Thomas] Warton than to [Nashe's twentieth century editor, Ronald] McKerrow; but the rapid displacement of the linguistic disciplines by the mathematical, and those related to mathematics, has been carried on so much in an atmosphere of controversy that even scholars have come to the point of patronizing sixteenth-century writers and sixteenth-century education." At one point, McLuhan's words apply as much to himself as to his subject: "Nashe has never been considered on his own terms, and today he is praised for reasons which would have baffled and annoyed him."

—(Editor)

INTRODUCTION

In the first stage of this study Nashe had not even emerged to my attention. Once he had emerged, he tended to submerge himself again and again in what at first appeared to be a welter of conflicting objects of interest. Gradually some order began to appear in the multiple traditions and interests of the age which he reflects, and from those strengthening perceptions the figure of Nashe began to assume some definition. A brief history of this process will best serve to focus the objectives of the present study.

The first objective envisaged was to extend Professor R. W. Chambers' *On the Continuity of English Prose* beyond the period of More to the end of the sixteenth century. The proposed dissertation was given the title of "The Arrest of Tudor Prose." Faithful to Chambers' conviction that English humanism had been severely jolted by Henry VIII's headsman, I surveyed the prose writers from [Thomas] More and [Hugh] Latimer through [Thomas] Stapleton, Cardinal [William] Allen, [Robert] Parsons and [Edmund] Campion. None of the recognized writers were overlooked. The theologians, the preachers, the pamphleteers, the letter and memoir writers, the historians, romancers, annalists and anonymous authors of newsletters and broadsides were examined in turn. At the end of two years I had lost all interest in Chambers' thesis for the reason that it seemed to imply that the wealth of prose in this period, the devotional writers and translators of the Bible apart, was a mere aberration from the main tradition of English prose. Abandoning, therefore, my original thesis, I turned to consider "Nashe the Journalist."

Nashe, for reasons which I hope to clarify, has attracted the fascinated attention of more than one class of readers in recent years, but he

has received no serious study. In the nineteenth century Nashe was a main resource of the Elizabethan scholar who sought in him the means of documenting and illustrating editions of plays and other historical research. The great edition of R. B. McKerrow (1904–1910) concluded that phase of Nashe scholarship, and prepared the new phase on which this study hopes to enter. The entrance into a task, however, can seldom be as impressive as the conclusion which may be many years off, and to which many scholars must contribute.

Today Nashe is viewed as the journalist par excellence of his time. So I considered that my task was to relate Nashe's prose techniques to those employed by less known and less successful writers. Investigation of this approach leads nowhere. The more one considers the variety and virtuosity of Nashe's styles, the less one can seriously derive them from the journalistic practice of his or any other time. Nashe's sophisticated awareness of the precise nature of his activity and function as a writer gradually impressed itself on me. His pretense of drawing only on his "extemporall vein," his appearance of unstudied coruscation is not only a pose, but a conventional pose, as will appear. Morris W. Croll's Preface to *Euphues*[1] had already suggested the need for an extensive investigation of the medieval and patristic models of euphuism; and the connection with Nashe became more and more clear as the study of medieval and ancient rhetoric proceeded. McKerrow states[2] that Nashe, like "almost all the prose writers of his time, set himself deliberately to produce a kind of artistic composition, following in some measure the accepted precepts of rhetoric." McKerrow's impatience with this side of Nashe, and his deliberate refusal to consider it further, perfectly express the limits which not only he but many scholars since his time have set for themselves. Were nothing more implied by Nashe's obvious rhetorical techniques than a willful artificiality, they would still deserve scholarly investigation; for no sound evaluation of a writer can be given in terms which exclude his basic assumptions as an artist. Nashe has never been considered on his own terms, and today he is praised for reasons which would have baffled and annoyed him.

---

1. Lyly, *Euphues*, Morris W. Croll and Harry Clemons, eds.
2. *Cf.* 5.111.

The study of Nashe's style involved a survey of the rhetorical theory and practice of the sixteenth century. For reasons which should be evident in the following pages, Nashe began to appear insignificant at this point. I was scarcely prepared for the wealth of rhetorical doctrines and the varied and self-conscious exemplification of those doctrines at every level of expression which the sixteenth century exhibits, not only in England, but, perhaps, more fully in Italy, France, and Spain, and Germany. Not only as regards prose but equally with regard to poetry, it became evident that the sixteenth century was nothing if not an age of rhetoric. The impact of this new realization made Nashe look very trivial for some length of time.

The rhetorical handbooks of the sixteenth century were nearly all derived from the medieval favorites: Hermogenes, *Ad Herennium*, Cicero, and Quintilian. Many of the innumerable medieval redactions and compendia of these treatises remained almost as popular as the originals became in the sixteenth century. This imposed the task of reading all the available texts, and of tracing the history of their vogue and mode of transmission from ancient to medieval to modern times. Numerous scattered monographs have made this possible, and it is to the great advance in medieval scholarship, particularly in France, that any student of the Renaissance will find himself indebted today.

A study of the rhetorical canon from Cicero to Nashe became a study of the modes of education in those centuries. The rhetorical treatises make very little sense apart from the whole tradition of ancient and medieval education. Since it is the nature of the material to be investigated which properly imposes the methods and limits of a task, the further step was taken of investigating grammar and dialectics, in addition to rhetoric. Neither Nashe nor his age is comprehensible without a considerable understanding of the disciplines of the trivium which were then so eagerly cultivated. In the eighteenth century there still persisted a significant remnant of those disciplines, sufficient to make Nashe more comprehensible to Warton than to McKerrow; but the rapid displacement of the linguistic disciplines by the mathematical, and those related to mathematics, has been carried on so much in an atmosphere of controversy that even scholars have come to

the point of patronizing sixteenth-century writers and sixteenth-century education. This attitude has not advanced understanding. Dryden's education was not comparable in scope to that of Donne, but it was little different in kind. Historians of literature are still a long way from understanding the wide implications of the observation of A. F. Leach in 1911 that "It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the subjects and the methods of education remained the same from the days of Quintilian to the days of Arnold, from the first century to the mid-nineteenth century of the Christian era."[3] Dryden's rejection of Donne was based on full understanding of Donne's deliberate dialectics and his conscious imitation of Tertullian, and Dryden knew more about Donne than his present-day admirers, for we have still to discover the full resources in the education of his time on which Donne drew to achieve his effects and his popularity. What the present study tries to do directly for Nashe, it does incidentally for his contemporaries; so that if Nashe appears to be a kind of appendix to a chapter in the history of education, he is really intended to be a focal point. Bacon or Donne would have served this function better in some ways than Nashe. It would have been possible to relate them more complexly to their age, in so far as they were more complex and comprehensive writers. This study will achieve its end if it can indicate the lines along which further enlightenment concerning Bacon and Donne and their age is possible.

The problem of understanding Thomas Nashe is the same problem as that of discovering the main educational traditions from Zeno, Isocrates, and Carneades through Cicero, Varro, Quintilian, Donatus, Priscian, Jerome, and Augustine. Once one has established the main traditions as they are formulated by St. Augustine, one knows how to tackle the Middle Ages. Medieval culture was to be grammatical and not rhetorical because St. Augustine, though himself a Ciceronian, determined the mode at once of science and theology as that of grammar. The Carolingian renaissance is a renaissance of grammar. The renaissance of the twelfth century is the renaissance of dialectics and is a period of strife between dialectics and grammar, with dialectics achieving complete ascendancy in all places save Italy.

---

3. Leach, *Educational Charters and Documents*, page ix.

The Grand Renaissance which traditionally is associated with Petrarch is, in the first place, the reassertion of the claims of grammar against the goths and huns of learning at Paris. From the point of view of the medieval grammarian, the dialectician was a barbarian. Thus it was Petrarch the grammarian glaring at the dialectical triumphs of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries who provided the modern journalist with his cliché, "the barbarism of the Middle Ages." The Grand Renaissance was in the matter of the revival of grammar, both as the method of science and of theology, not fully achieved until the sixteenth century. Erasmus' great work was to restore patristic theology—that is, grammatical theology. His significance in his own eyes, as well as in the eyes of his age, was that of the man who cast out the streamlined grammars of the dialecticians of the schools and who restored the full discipline as understood by St. Jerome, the great pupil of the great Donatus. "Humanism" was thus for [John] Colet, More, and Erasmus, a deliberate return to the Fathers. But that which equally marks the modern Renaissance and lends to it a character which has been much misunderstood is its "science." The great alchemists, the Paracelsans from Raymond Lully to Cornelius Agrippa, were grammarians. From the time of the neo-Platonists and Augustine to Bonaventura and to Francis Bacon, the world was viewed as a book, the lost language of which was analogous to that of human speech. Thus the art of grammar provided not only the sixteenth-century approach to the Book of Life in scriptural exegesis but to the Book of Nature, as well.

Finally, the Ciceronian concept of rhetoric as the art of practical politics which Cicero had taken from Isocrates is accounted for. The Ciceronian concept of the orator won St. Augustine entirely. St. Augustine's ideal theologian is described in the words which Cicero uses of his ideal orator—*vir doctissimus et eloquentissimus*. The Ciceronian ideal of the orator as one versed in the encyclopedia of the sciences and as one exercising the science of civil prudence, the supreme science, was an ideal for a world of educated laymen. Throughout the centuries from Alcuin to Petrarch we shall trace how this great conception survived in the medieval passion for encyclopedias of the

Seven Liberal Arts. Not until the return of an opulent commerce to Western Europe and the growth of an educated laity did the full Ciceronian concept of the secular orator or statesman emerge once more. Cicero dominates all the Renaissance handbooks on the education of princes and the nobility. It is the ideal of the practical life, the service of the state and the exercise of all one's faculties for the achievement of glory and success. When we have witnessed the extraordinary anti-Ciceronian movement which emerges in Machiavelli, Vives, Ramus, Montaigne, Muret, Lipsius, Descartes, and which gives us our post-Renaissance world, we shall have completed the survey of the revolutions in education and culture which carry us from Isocrates to Nashe. Thus, this study offers merely one more testimony that there is finally no way of studying Western society or literature which does not consider, and constantly reconsider, the entire tradition from its Greek inception. "In the history of Western culture, every chapter begins with the Greeks."[4]

A note of explanation concerning the present form of this study is necessary. The historical discussion is frequently interrupted by excursions into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Usually these anticipations have been put into notes and sometimes these notes are of considerable length. Certainly, if I have the good fortune to get this work published I should wish these excursions and notes to be banished to their chronological position at the end of the study. Their present position is owing first to my desire to make manifest the validity of the historical approach by immediate focussing of antiquity and the Middle Ages onto the later Renaissance. A second reason is that by dealing with various aspects of the Renaissance while elucidating their ancient origins, it has been possible to proceed directly from Erasmus to Nashe without gathering together the entire implications of the study after reaching the sixteenth-century stage. Not less important has been the imminent possibility of being interrupted, in the course of writing down these matters, by a special opportunity to engage in wartime activity. Had I been so interrupted I hoped that some of the bearings of the study on the understanding of the Renaissance would have been perceived, no matter how early the matter was broken off.

4. Gilson, *God and Philosophy*, page 1.

CHAPTER ONE

THE TRIVIUM UNTIL ST. AUGUSTINE

CHAPTER ONE

A. GRAMMAR

THE TRIVIUM UNTIL ST. AUGUSTINE

McLuhan begins this chapter by offering a compressed history of intellectual inquiry from Plato's Cratylus *to Korzybski's* Science and Sanity, *as it bears on the grammatical component of the trivium. The survey reinforces the observations from the introductory chapter regarding the negative effects of the "displacement of the linguistic disciplines by the mathematical." No less important than the evidence offered in support of this, a key component in McLuhan's overarching thesis, is the evidence his argument structure provides for his own method. Between Plato and Korzybski, McLuhan ranges comfortably over the domains of philosophy, linguistics, and semiotics, as a grammarian, rather than shuttling back and forth among them, as among territories staked out in dialectic mode. What linguist then or now would set aside the label of* general semantics *that Korzybski himself attached to his work and simply call it "linguistic study?" But then, what linguist has ever positioned himself as McLuhan does with the qualifier "grammar in the old sense?"*

When McLuhan points out that until Descartes "language was viewed as simultaneously linking and harmonizing all the intellectual and physical functions of man and of the physical world as well" he is evoking the empty language of mathematics, the language of pure form, to underscore the eclipse of grammar as method, but without implicitly denying the grammar of forms. The McLuhan of Understanding Media *would later define language as "mankind's first technology for letting go of the environment in order to grasp it in new ways" and fully explore the grammar of pure forms, the message of media as media, in a fashion which remains consonant and consistent with McLuhan the expositor of the classical trivium.*

Much space is devoted in this chapter to the concept of the Logos. It is inseparable from the continuum of natural causes and the order of nature; it is indispensable in understanding the ancient world's concept of the connection between language and physics; it is universal reason; it is the counterpart in the philosophy of antiquity to the Trinity of Christian theology; it is simultaneously the life and order in all things and in the human mind. From McLuhan's perspective, understanding the Logos in all its dimensions provides a corrective for the misconception, all too popular among scholars, that ancient grammarians regarded language as a product of nature and onomatopoeia as the origin of language. Such a misreading of ancient texts regularly entails the wholesale dismissal of science in the grammatical mode as a primitive world view. But metaphysics rescues grammar-based science from mere animism, and for this reason McLuhan can say of the Stoics that their doctrines stood to mythology not in a relation of derivation but application. (One could say of the later McLuhan that his observations on media effects did not derive from disciplines as diverse as philosophy and psychology but rather applied them to his purpose.)

As this chapter draws to a close, its orientation and emphasis are decidedly semiotic. St. Augustine is cited in the matter of the vestigial signs in nature and their translation into simple signs and formulae by the liberal arts governed by grammar. St. Bonaventure too is cited on the question of things as signs in the order of nature. The discussion provides McLuhan with a transition to the first of his chapters on dialectics by way of reference to Gilson, who demonstrates how the principles of interpretation are impoverished by the dialectician's denial of the symbolic world whereas ancient grammarians made that world accessible by reasoning from analogy.

—(Editor)

The reason for beginning this study with a consideration of the nature and objectives of the ancient art of the *grammaticus* is sufficiently indicated by M. Marrou's recent conclusion that "la culture chrétienne, augustinienne, emprunte moins à la technique du rhéteur qu'à celle du grammarien."[1] Throughout this challenging work, M. Marrou has conclusively indicated the precise and technical modes in which St. Augustine manipulated the entire *egkuklios paideia*, or encyclopedia, of the established arts, adapting them to the business of sacred eloquence, of scriptural exegesis, and theology. For reasons to be stated, grammar assumed pre-eminence in the new order of the arts and became the basis of medieval culture. Seriously challenged by the great renaissance of dialectics in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, grammar recovered its prestige in the age of Petrarch and regained ascendancy in the exegetical work of Erasmus. At least these are positions which I hope to establish in the following pages. M. Marrou does not proceed beyond St. Augustine; and his survey of the art of grammar prior to St. Augustine attempts no more than an evaluation of the literary character of the art. Its claim to be viewed as an important basis of scientific method, both during antiquity and continuously throughout medieval times, and in the work of Francis Bacon, has, I think, never been indicated before the present study.

In the dialogue named for Cratylus, the follower of Heraclitus, Plato has this exchange between Socrates and Cratylus:

> SOCRATES: But if these things are only to be known through names, how can we suppose that the givers of names had knowledge, or were legislators before there were names at all, and therefore before they could have known them?
>
> CRATYLUS: I believe, Socrates, the true account of the matter to be, that a power more than human gave things their first names, and that the names which were thus given are necessarily their true names.[2]

1. Marrou, *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique*, page 530.
2. Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato*, I, page 678.

Obviously, with this kind of importance associated with the names of things, and of gods, heroes, and legendary beings, etymology would be a main source of scientific and moral enlightenment. And such was the case. The prolific labors of the etymologists reflected in Plato's *Cratylus*, but begun centuries before and continued until the seventeenth century, are as much the concern of the historian of philosophy and of science as of the historian of letters and culture. Indeed, it was not only in antiquity but until the Cartesian revolution that language was viewed as simultaneously linking and harmonizing all the intellectual and physical functions of man and of the physical world as well.

At any time from Plato to Francis Bacon the statement of Cratylus would have made sense, and would have evoked respect even when its wider implications were rejected. With the opening of the Christian era, the doctrine of Cratylus gained new significance from scriptural exegesis, and especially from Genesis 2.19:

> And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air; and brought *them* unto Adam to see what he would call them: and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof.

The doctrine of names is, of course, the doctrine of essence and not a naïve notion of oral terminology. The scriptural exegetists will hold, as Francis Bacon held, that Adam possessed metaphysical knowledge in a very high degree. To him the whole of nature was a book which he could read with ease. He lost his ability to read this language of nature as a result of his fall; and Solomon alone of the sons of men has ever recovered the power to read the book of nature. The business of art is, however, to recover the knowledge of that language which once man held by nature. The problem as to which of the arts should have priority in the work of explaining man and nature had arisen among the pre-Socratic philosophers. Grammar, or allegorical exegesis of natural phenomena, as well as of folk myths and even

the works of Homer and Hesiod, enjoyed many advantages for the task. In the *Cratylus*, however, Plato asserts the superior claims of dialectics for the same work, but, as a philosopher who habitually employed the grammatical modes of poetry and myth to express his own most significant and esoteric teaching, he is far from confident that grammar can be or ought to be entirely superseded. Shortly afterwards, however, Aristotle established the nature of non-grammatical scientific method in the *Posterior Analytics*. His achievement bore no fruit until the twelfth century. Until the twelfth century, therefore, grammar reigned unrivalled as the prime mode of science, and, from the patristic period, of theology as well. But grammar was far from forgotten during the great age of dialectics. In the thirteenth century, with the triumph of Aristotle in St. Thomas Aquinas, came simultaneously the consummate achievement of the grammatical method in St. Bonaventura. (The great grammarians are, for reasons to be made clear, also alchemists.) There is thus not the least incongruity in the fact that eminent humanists like Pico della Mirandola and Cornelius Agrippa are also alchemists. The grammatical method in science, therefore, persists as long as alchemy, which is to say, well into the eighteenth century. But from the time of Descartes the main mode of science is, of course, mathematical. In our own time the methods of anthropology and psychology have reestablished grammar as, at least, a valid mode of science. Full justification for this statement is found in Count Korzybski's *Science and Sanity*, which makes claims for linguistic study (grammar in the old sense) which extend far beyond the modest position of Cratylus.

Obviously, the above abstract of the history of grammar is one which requires documentation. So far as the period from Homer to St. Augustine is concerned, it is necessary to say at the outset that with the exception of M. Marrou's focussing of the grammar of St. Augustine's day on his theology, nothing has been done. Classical scholars have been indifferent to the extraordinary role of classical grammar in medieval science and theology, and, therefore, confused about the nature of the Renaissance. The eclipse of grammatical method by mathematics after Descartes reduced the art of

grammar to mere matters of accidence and syntax, and has served to reflect the same insignificance upon ancient grammar. Thus Sandys in his *A History of Classical Scholarship* takes pains to explain that the term means "a 'student of literature', especially of poetical literature" and that *grammatike* "in this new sense of the term is sometimes said to have begun with Theagenes of Rhegium (*floruit* 525 B.C.), who was the earliest of the allegorical interpreters of Homer."[3] Beyond this, the light which Sandys, or any other classical scholar whom I have been able to consult, has to shed on the subject, is almost entirely adventitious.

The allegorical exegesis of Homer, nevertheless, offers one of the best clues to the problem of the origins of the art of grammar as the method of science. With the rise of philosophic speculation, Homer, the educator of Greece, was necessarily a focal point of controversy. Since Homer contained nothing which could immediately be construed as scientific or philosophical, philosophers were forced either to enlist him in their ranks by means of ingenious exegesis and symbolization, or else by radical means to reject him. His banishment from Plato's *Republic* can be seen in this aspect to be a consequence of Plato's preference in ethics for dialectic, as well as his hostility to that use of the grammatical method for the systematization of ethics by which the Stoics had accommodated Homer to the cause of science and morality.[4]

Among the pre-Socratic sects, the symbolical interpretation of Homer varied according to the doctrinal emphasis of the school, so that some stressed his moral significance, while others pointed to his cosmology, psychology, and physics. Sandys cites some of the few examples of this early interpretation which are extant:

> Thus Apollo was, in his [Theagenes'] view opposed to Poseidon, as fire to water; Pallas to Ares, as wisdom to folly.... Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (c. 500–428 B.C.) saw the rays of the sun in the arrows of Apollo.... [H]e is said ... to have found in the web of Penelope an emblem of the rules of dialectic, the warp being the premises, the woof the conclusion, and the

3. Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship*, I, page 7.
4. Marrou, *op. cit.*, pages 495–6; Sandys, *op. cit.*, I, pages 29–30; Bérard, *Introduction à l'Odyssée*, II, pages 315–316; Stern, *Homerstudien der Stoiker.*

> flame of the torches, by which she executed her task, being none other than the light of reason.[5]

It was by such means as these that the Stoics salvaged for science and ethics, not only Homer, but the symbols of popular religion and traditional mythology. In this they differed sharply from the Epicureans, who were strongly iconoclastic. At the same time, they had competitors, especially in Roman times, when, as Seneca tells us in his *Letter to Lucilius*, the exponents of the four classic schools of philosophy equally claimed the text of Homer to buttress their positions. M. Bréhier[6] indicates in passing how the Stoics stressed physics in their exegesis of Homer while the Cynics and Neo-Pythagoreans were mainly concerned with ethics. It was, for example, owing to the Cynic exegesis and popular teaching of Homer that the figure of Ulysses assumed an important role in education; for the allegorical exegesis rapidly became part of the ordinary business of the instruction of youth in poetry and morals.

Virgil underwent the same process almost within his own lifetime. We can see in the *Saturnalia* of Macrobius how he has become for the Roman the same source of scientific and ethical lore that Homer had already become for the Greek. Thus for Macrobius the grammarian "it is Virgil's learning that appeals to men rather than his poetry."[7] As grammarian, Macrobius applied the method of etymology not only to Virgil but to mythology, and astronomy, and the music of the spheres[8]; for one relation between grammar and astronomy in antiquity was music, or harmony and rhythm. In medieval times Macrobius as grammarian and scientist had a very great prestige; and no better indication of the need for study of the method of grammar as the accepted mode of ancient and medieval science could be adduced than the complete lack of comprehension of the aims and objectives of Macrobius which continues to prevail. Earlier than Macrobius, Servius and Donatus afford instances of the grammatical-scientific exegesis of Virgil; but the full and systematic realization of this method as applied to Virgil comes later, at the end of the fifth century, in the work of Fulgentius,

5. Sandys, *op. cit.*, I, page 30.
6. E. Bréhier, *Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie*, pages 42–43.
7. Glover, *Life and Letters in the Fourth Century*, page 181.
8. Sandys, *op. cit.*, I, page 227.

the mythographer, who had, perhaps, an even greater medieval vogue than Macrobius.[9] It is necessary, therefore, to banish the gratuitous and flattering assumptions that the intense interest sustaining the vast allegorical commentaries which grew up around Homer and Virgil can be regarded as a curious aberration of the human mind. These assumptions have stultified historical study at least since the eighteenth century; and they have probably prevented an adequate approach to Reuchlin, Erasmus, Rabelais, and the entire Renaissance.

A brief consideration of Stoic philosophy will serve to indicate how the study of language and poetry could become completely wedded to the study of physics and ethics. Vernon Arnold's fine study of Roman Stoicism points out the influence of the Chaldeans, who "in or about the year 2800 B.C., mapped out the constellations as we now know them, traced the orbits of the planets, and predicted their future movements," and whose work was "stimulated by the belief that the skies displayed a written message to mankind."[10] From the Chaldean teaching, Arnold goes on to say, citing the authority of Cicero and Seneca, "two principles seem to have survived, those of the inexorable tie between cause and effect called 'fate,' and of the interdependence of events in heaven and on earth."[11] For the Stoics, however, the doctrine of fate is quite reconcilable with the doctrine of the Providential government of the world, and "[f]urther, beside the personal and material conceptions of the deity, they adopted and developed a conception which exercised an extraordinary influence over other systems, when they attributed the exercise of all the powers of deity to the divine Word, which from one point of view is the deity, himself, and from another is something which emanates from him and is in some way distinct."[12] Confronted with the great doctrine of the Logos, it is perhaps easier to understand how grammar and etymology should have been esteemed as means of investigating both the nature of deity and the natures of phenomena.

Inseparable from the doctrine of the Logos is the cosmological view of the *rerum natura*, the whole, as a *continuum*, at once a network of natural causes and an *ordo naturae* whose least pattern expresses analogically a divine

9. Mandonnet, *Dante le théologien*, pages 171–174.
10. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, page 5.
11. *ibid.*
12. *ibid.*, page 19.

message. This notion, already implicit in the Chaldean cosmology, is the very basis of Plato's *Timaeus*, the work of his which had the greatest influence of any of his works, both in antiquity and in the medieval times. If its full influence is to be explained, this dialogue should be seen as a statement of a cosmology already many centuries old, and one which had, long after Plato's own day, exponents as different as the Pythagoreans and the Stoics. Jowett's impatience with the *Timaeus* as "most obscure and repulsive to the modern reader" is owing to his supposition that Plato's knowledge represents "the infancy of physical science," and to Plato's "desire to conceive the whole of nature without any adequate knowledge of the parts." Finally, he cannot forgive Plato's grammatical exegesis "of similarities which lie on the surface" and his neglect "of differences which are hidden from view."[13] For example, Plato gives an elaborate allegorical interpretation of the parts and functions of the human body. Thus,

> the creative powers were aware of our tendency to excess. And so when they made the belly to be a receptacle for food, in order that men might not perish by disease, they formed the convolutions of the intestines, in this way retarding the passage of food through the body, lest mankind should be absorbed in eating and drinking, and the whole race become impervious to the divine philosophy.[14]

Similarly, "sight is the source of the greatest benefits to us; for if our eyes had never seen the sun, stars, and heavens, the very words which we are using would not have been uttered." But "God gave us the faculty of sight that we might behold the order of the heavens, and create a corresponding order in our own erring minds. To the like end the gifts of speech and hearing were bestowed upon us;..."[15] Nothing could make more clear than this the relationship which was held to exist between the order of speech and language and the order of nature. If this point can be emphasized sufficiently without pursuing the complexities of this unexplored subject, it will be that much the easier to keep grammar focussed before our attention.

13. Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato*, page 455.
14. Jowett, *op. cit.*, page 478.
15. Jowett, *op. cit.*, page 469.

For the sake of stressing the continuity of acceptance of the general cosmology of the *Timaeus*, it is almost sufficient to mention Philo of Alexandria, whose great exegetical labors established the modes of patristic theology; Pliny the Elder, whose *Naturalis Historia* is the work of a grammarian and the greatest single monument to the grammatical method in the interpretation of nature; and, finally, St. Augustine, himself, whose Platonism is proverbial.[16]

The doctrine of the Logos, so important for understanding the interfusion of language and physics in the mind of antiquity, seems to have been adopted by the Stoics from Heraclitus of Ephesus, who propounded it in the early part of the fifth century. "For the opinions of the crowd, who are misled by their senses, he had no respect; but even learning does not ensure intelligence, unless men are willing to be guided by the 'Word', the universal reason. The senses show us in the universe a perpetual flowing:... Behind these changes the Word points to that which is one and unchanging."[17] The Logos or universal reason is at once the life and order which are in all things, and in the mind of man. When the Romans found it impossible to translate Logos by any single word "they therefore adopted the phrase *ratio et oratio* (reason and speech); in modern language it seems clearly to include also the broad notion of 'Universal Law' or the 'Laws of Nature'."[18] It has often been pointed out how profoundly this doctrine of the Logos was received by Christianity; but it has not been seen that the intermediate stages by which the transference of influence occurred was the grammatical art or discipline, which was common both to Stoic physics and to the earliest Christian theology.[19]

Seen in the light of the doctrine of the Logos, the Stoic interest in etymology as a source of scientific and philosophic knowledge, is perfectly natural. Thus it is somewhat misleading to accept the suggestion of Sandys that the Stoics were interested in etymology because "they regarded language as a product of nature, and 'onomatopoeia' as the principle on which words were first formed."[20] In the same place Sandys seems not to have any notion of the import of his remarks when he tells us that "their grammatical theories were known to Varro, who (as he tells us) combined

16. It is hardly necessary to cite particular texts for St. Augustine's cosmology. Obvious instances are in the *De Civitate Dei*, chap. XII, page 8; chap. XIV, page 11. In the *Enchiridion*, page 9, he discusses the investigation of the *rerum natura*. In the *De Trinitate*, chap. III, page 2, he expresses his admiration for the investigators of nature's secrets.
17. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, page 35.
18. Arnold, *op. cit.*, page 37.
19. Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship*, I, page 144.
20. Sandys, *op. cit.*, page 146.

the study of Cleanthes with that of Aristophanes of Byzantium." Cleanthes, the successor of Zeno of Citium, was one of the most important allegorizers[21] and etymologists; and it is no accident that of the six extant books of Varro's great *De Lingua Latina*, three are devoted to etymology. One could write an accurate account of the intellectual character of the medieval period in terms of the books of antiquity which were permitted to survive. For the multiplication of manuscripts of ancient works is a precise index of the vogue which they enjoyed. The corollary, unwelcome for some, is that there is none of the extant texts of antiquity which was not more or less widely read throughout the Middle Ages.

Zeno of Citium (336–264), often spoken of as the founder of the Stoics, in tone and doctrine "is revolutionary and atheistic; he contemplates the entire subversion of existing religious practices to make room for a purer system."[22] Nevertheless, he wrote on poetry "together with five books on 'Homeric problems', full of allegorical interpretations.... He regarded Zeus, Hera, and Poseidon as representing aether, air, and water respectively; and, in interpreting Hesiod's *Theogony*, he gave free play to his etymological fancy."[23]

With Cleanthes of Assos (331–232), the successor of Zeno, Sandys notes the same application of "playful etymologies and fanciful allegories to the interpretation of the poet,"[24] missing the entire significance of what was not only a serious activity, but one which had most important consequences for literature and science. Sandys goes on to report that "with Cleanthes the Eleusinian mysteries are an allegory; Homer, if properly understood, is a witness to truth; the very names given to Zeus, Persephone, Apollo, and Aphrodite are indications of the hidden meaning which is veiled but not perverted by the current belief, and the same is true of the myths of Heracles and Atlas."[25]

By comparison with Chrysippus (c.280–c.208–204) Zeno and Cleanthes were rigidly critical in temper and hostile to popular mythology. However, "with Chrysippus there sets in a tide of reconciliation; the ingenuities of etymology and allegorical interpretation are set to work to prove that the

21. Sandys, *op. cit.*, page 147.
22. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, page 217.
23. Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship*, I, page 147.
24. Sandys, *ibid.*
25. Sandys, *ibid.*

old religion contains, at least in germ, the substance of the new."[26] Arnold notes how this was the beginning of that struggle between dogmatic philosophy and vague religious sentiment which ended in the triumph of the latter in Marcus Aurelius. Even in Marcus Aurelius, however, there stands out clearly the basic cosmological doctrine which inspired the scientists to apply the methods of grammar:

> All things intertwine with one another, in a holy bond; scarce one thing is disconnected from another. In due co-ordination they combine for one and the same order. For the world-order is one made out of all things, and god is one pervading all, and being is one, and law is one, even the common reason of all beings possessed of mind, and truth is one: seeing that truth is the one perfecting of beings one in kind and endowed with the same reason.[27]

Nothing has been said of Hesiod (eighth century) nor of the 'Orphic' movement belonging to the sixth century, although both have very obvious bearings on the cosmology which later becomes a recognized part of philosophy.[28] It is important, however, to explain that the use and continuance of the allegorical and etymological methods by the Stoics and Plato, as well as by Philo, St. Augustine, and St. Bonaventura, is not a carry-over from a primitive world-view. So considered, it is temptingly easy to conclude, as it has commonly been concluded, that the 'poetic' cosmology and the grammatical 'science' of antiquity and of medieval times still carried a considerable infusion of uncritically-held mythology. This primitive magic was finally ejected during the Renaissance and the period of the Enlightenment. However much this account may satisfy the emotional needs of the modern world, it certainly does not satisfy the needs of historical explanation. The Stoic interpreters of poetry and mythology knew very well what they were doing, and did not derive their doctrines from, but applied them to, these matters. The doctrine of the Logos, far from being a piece of naïve animism, is metaphysical in character. And, as M. Gilson says in a recent work which

26. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, page 217.
27. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, page 123.
28. Arnold discusses them, pages 31–32.

has put many of these familiar matters in a new perspective, "We are now beginning to realize why it was not so easy for a Greek philosopher to deify his first universal principle of all things."[29] The same point is made in another way by Arnold when he says that "the whole atmosphere of Stoic religion was alien to that in which the gods of Greek and Roman mythology had taken root. The nominal absorption of these gods into the Stoic system ... was a work of political adaptation."[30] The bearings of this fact are not altered by the Stoic claim to be restoring the original and true meanings of words and myths.

> The Stoics proposed to make the myths symbols of scientific truths, and the ritual an incentive to honest living. Their interpretation was in the main physical; the gods represent respectively the heavenly bodies, the elements, the plants; the amours of the gods represent the continuous work of the great creative forces of nature. To a lesser extent explanations are found in society and in history. These interpretations are greatly assisted by etymologies...[31]

The importance of the influence which Stoicism had on education and literature in Roman and medieval times may be gathered from a glance at L. Annaeus Cornutus (c. 20–66 A.D.), who became the teacher of the two poets Persius and Lucan (both medieval favorites). His book *On the Nature of the Gods* is extant, and in it he develops the method "which we see followed by Cicero in the *De Natura Deorum* (based on Posidonius), by which a reconciliation is effected between the Stoic physics and the popular mythology. By means of etymology and allegory, all that is incredible or offensive in the old legends of the gods is metamorphosed into a rationalistic explanation of the phenomena of the universe."[32] Again, it should be noted that rationalism did not gradually emerge from mythology, but, having been fully achieved, its methods were applied to traditional mythology. Wherever one turns among the great grammarians of antiquity, one is likely to find them characterized by the formula which serves for Cornutus. Thus Sandys says

29. Gilson, God and Philosophy, page 13.
30. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, page 229.
31. Arnold, *op. cit.*, page 230; *cf.* also 39–40.
32. Arnold, *op. cit.*, page 112.

of Stilo (c. 154–c. 74 B.C.), the teacher of Varro, that "[h]is grammatical and especially his etymological inquiries were partly inspired by his devotion to the Stoic philosophy."[33]

M. Terentius Varro (116–27 B.C.), with whom we shall be more concerned in the section on rhetoric, gave an elaborate account of the great grammatical dispute between the analogists and the anomalists. Books VIII–XVI were devoted to the subject, and, of these, three books are extant. The analogists argued for the view that there is a universal grammar, since language is the effect of reason, which is the analogy of the universal Logos. At the level of conjugations and declensions, this view tended to strengthen the notion of regularity. The anomalists, one might suppose, were Epicureans who denied the doctrine of the Logos, though I have been able to find no evidence for this. They asserted that in speech there is no order. All is based on arbitrary custom.[34] Plato's *Cratylus* broaches the question of analogy and anomaly in such a way as to indicate that the dispute was of ancient origin even in his day, but the issues, of course, are drawn on a plane loftier than that of conjugations and declensions. Socrates refutes the superficial anomalist doctrine of Hermogenes at great length. Hermogenes says, "I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus and others, and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of correctness in names other than convention and agreement;..." Socrates replies that "I should say that this giving of names can be no such light matter as you fancy, or the work of light or chance persons; and Cratylus is right in saying that things have names by nature, and that not every man is an artificer of names; but he only who looks to the name which each thing by nature has, and is, will be able to express the ideal forms of things in letters and syllables."[35] The general incredulity concerning Socrates' seriousness in this dialogue[36] is an adequate measure of the modern failure to apprehend the nature of grammar in the ancient and medieval worlds; and much of Plato's power over St. Augustine's and the medieval mind is owing to his great, though not exclusive, respect for the method of grammar in philosophy. It is quite impossible to make any sense of the scope and intensity of the strife between the

33. Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship*, I, page 172.
34. Sandys, *op. cit.*, pages 175–176.
35. Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato*, I, pages 622 and 629.
36. *ibid.*, pages 589–590.

analogists and anomalists unless the philosophic implications are perceived. The Stoics, of course, are analogists to a man, although Varro, himself, as well as Cicero, Caesar, Pliny, and Quintilian, freely admit the influence of custom or usage on language.[37]

So far as I have been able to discover, this subject has received no attention from historians of philosophy, to whose province it belongs; and I merely indicate its bearings here as a means of showing that grammar and science were inseparably linked in their origins. The fullest treatment which the claims of universal language as based on universal reason ever received was during the late Middle Ages in the numerous works on speculative grammar which were written by dialecticians. But there is an uninterrupted tradition through Francis Bacon, Thomas Urquhart, and the Cambridge Platonists, to James Harris, to say nothing of Condillac, Comte, and, today, Count Korzybski and the Chicago University school of encyclopedists.

So far I have tried to indicate, in a large and unexplored field, how science and grammar were quite naturally united by the concept of language as the expression and analogy of the Logos. It is now time to proceed to the business of considering grammatical exegesis proper; and here there can be no testimony more authoritative than that of Varro. Having indicated the province of etymology and semantics as defined by the Greeks, he says:

> Now I shall set forth the origins of the individual words, of which there are four levels of explanation. The lowest is that to which even the common folk has come.... The second is that to which old-time grammar has mounted, which shows how the poet has made each word which he has fashioned and derived.... The third level is that to which philosophy ascended, and on arrival began to reveal the nature of those words which are in common use.... The fourth is that where the sanctuary is, and the mysteries of the high priest: if I shall not arrive at full knowledge there, at any rate I shall cast about for a conjecture ..."[38]

37. For full details of this controversy see F. H. Colson's *Quintilian* Book I, page 175; "... The analogist argues from the unchanging order which prevails in the heavenly bodies, in the tides, in the continuity of species ... language is conceived as a world in itself, much as we conceive of the visible world ... he [the analogist] is as confident ... as the scientific man today ... as impatient of the suggestion of disorder ... the world of words had a glamour and a wonder for them which it cannot have for us."
38. *De lingua latina*, Loeb translation, Book V, vii–viii.

This doctrine of the four levels of interpretation had prevailed among grammarians for centuries, and, even as Varro states it, is closely connected with the pursuits of physics, ethics, politics, and religion. Only a few years after Varro, Philo of Alexandria (c. 20 B.C.–54 A.D.) carried out his great labor of grammatical exegesis of the Old Testament. He it was who established the basic modes and techniques of patristic theology—that is, of theology as it was practiced from the time of Origen until the time of Abelard, and as many, including Colet, Fisher, More, and Erasmus, continued to practice it until the time of the Cambridge Platonists.[39] "He was the direct master of what is known as the Patristic school, which sought to combine the intellectual conceptions of Plato with the religious ideas of the Gospels."[40] Like Origen, who followed him, Philo was a professional grammarian, and brought the various levels of signification from the art of grammar to bear on the Scriptures:

> His most representative works are "a triple cord" with which he binds the Jewish Scripture to Greek culture. For the Greek-speaking populace he set out a broad statement of the Mosaic law; for the cultured community of Alexandria, Jew and Gentile, a more elaborate exegesis, in which each character and each ordinance of the Pentateuch received a particular ethical value; and, finally, for the esoteric circle of Hellenic-Jewish philosophers, a theological and psychological study of the allegories of the law.[41]

It is not only Platonism which Philo accommodates to Scriptural terminology, "but Philo is of still more direct service to the study of Stoicism, because he had so completely absorbed the system that, where other authorities fail us, we may often trust to his expositions for a knowledge of details of the Stoic system," and the place of the word "wisdom" in the anonymous Wisdom of Solomon "is taken in his works by the Logos or 'Word'."[42] It is certainly not without significance for medieval civilization that the grammarian who was the preceptor of Clement and Origen should also have understood the full scientific and philosophic utility of the

39. Fairweather, *Origen and Greek Patristic Theology*, page 3.
40. Bentwich, *Philo-Judaeus of Alexandria*, page 195.
41. Bentwich, *op. cit.*, page 76.
42. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, page 23.

allegorical method as it had long been practiced by the Stoics and by the Academics. Philo's allegorical treatment of the Bible was not intended so much as an adaptation of Scripture to Hellenic culture as it was to direct the minds of highly cultivated Alexandrian Jews to the philosophical riches of the Bible. There was, of course, nothing new for them in this attitude. "The idea that the words of the Bible contained some hidden meanings goes back to the earliest Jewish tradition and is one of the bases of the oral law."[43] But they had never sought there a systematic theology and ethic such as Philo first, and then the Fathers, began to develop. In general, therefore, one must say that it is not puzzling that "Philo himself passed out of Jewish tradition within a short time, to become a Christian worthy."[44]

Though very important and much misunderstood, Philo need not keep us very long because he modifies nothing which preceded himself, and his methods will be seen to be reflected in Patristic theology. One specifically Hebraic contribution to allegorical exegesis must, however, be mentioned, since it could never have come from the pagan world and because it was to develop into a study of the greatest scope. Whereas the Greeks and the Romans studied the analogy of deity in the forms of nature and the character of reason itself, Philo "regards history as a theodicy, vindicating the ways of God to man ... philosophy as the inner meaning of the Scriptures, revealed by God in mystic communion with His holy prophets ..."[45] Thus the very events of history are a gigantic and complex statement to which the methods of grammatical exegesis are applicable; and this point of view is as helpful for the understanding of Dante as of Milton, not to mention subjects of greater extent.[46]

For the historian of grammar the first century A.D. is a plateau which offers easy access to the student and a multiplicity of points from which to view the preceding and succeeding periods. It is for these reasons that I have postponed to this point the giving of a brief account of "classroom" grammar as it was practiced in the ancient world, and as in large measure it continued to be practiced until long after the Renaissance.[47] In describing the aims and methods of grammar as taught to youth under the Roman

43. Bentwich, *op. cit.*, page 36.
44. Bentwich, *op. cit.*, page 72.
45. Bentwich, *op. cit.*, page 77.
46. For examples of Philo's exegesis, see Bentwich, pages 81–103.
47. The account which S. T. Coleridge gives us of the grammatical methods of the Reverend James Bowyer, in the first chapter of his *Biographia Literaria*, is a testimony to the vitality of this great tradition at the end of the eighteenth century.

empire it is unnecessary to consider the earlier Greek phases of this instruction, first, because the two are very much alike, and second, because the transition to medieval grammar is via Latin rather than Greek.

In his authoritative study of *Roman Education*, Aubrey Gwynn says that

> The type of education which Quintilian describes in his *Institutio Oratoria* remained for centuries the sole education known to the Graeco-Roman world. Poor men continued to send their children to the elementary schools of the *ludi magister* and the *calculator*; but the rich, the well-to-do, and the professional classes sent their sons to the schools of literature and rhetoric, and were content with the "liberal arts" of the "*egkuklios paideia*".... From the days of Isocrates to the fall of the Roman Empire no other form of education was known to Europe; and when the Church became the inheritor of the Graeco-Roman civilization, she used the *artes liberales* as a convenient framework for the new Christian education taught in her schools.[48]

Apart, then, from the utilitarian schools of the *ludi magister* and the *calculator* the instruction of youth was left to the grammarians. Concerning the general character of grammar schooling, there is a great variety of consonant evidence which shows that it corresponds to a simultaneous application of the disciplines which today are associated with literary research and criticism. Etymology and semantics, the study of the figures of speech, of thought, and emotion, prosody, textual criticism, historical *explication de texte*, and practical criticism were all brought into play in a word by word, line by line reading of the poets. M. Marrou[49] mentions that from the time of Varro it was conventional to divide this study into four phases: *lectio, emendatio, enarratio, judicium*. His full explanation of these aspects of teaching is the best so far, and makes any full account unnecessary here.

As Gwynn shows,[50] prose authors were seldom read in these schools of literature, although Suetonius in his *De Grammaticis* says that *litteratus* was once the accepted Latin equivalent for *grammatike*; and Quintilian[51] offers *litteratura* as a translation for the same word.[52]

48. Gwynn, *Roman Education from Cicero to Quintilian*, page 246.
49. Marrou, *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique*, page 20.
50. Pages 102–103.
51. *Inst. Orat.*, ii,1,4; 14,3.
52. *Cf.* Gwynn, pages 91ff. For further discussion and evidence. The fact that Aristotle in his *Poetics* [19.1456h20–1459a23] discusses formal grammar has often puzzled the commentators; but it is no more than an indication that he assumed that the reading of poets was immediately related to the study of the figures and the parts of speech; for such was the common practice.

To our minds, accustomed to frequent revolutions and experiments in education, the stability which one encounters in grammar instruction, both in the Graeco-Roman and the medieval worlds, is scarcely credible. It immediately arouses a suspicion that poverty of facts must produce the appearance of continuity. Such, however, is not the case, for facts are plentiful. The explanation must rather be sought in the long prevalence of the doctrine of analogy, discussed above, which reigned until Ramistic nominalism and Cartesian mathematics dethroned it decisively. Observing this fact of the strangely unmodified character, not only of grammar but of the other arts between Cicero and St. Augustine, M. Marrou (page 6) says, "Considérée de façon très générale la conception romaine de la culture frappe par sa stabilité, son identité foncière..." Having established this position, M. Marrou proceeds to a detailed account of how, as a child and youth, St. Augustine studied literature (pages 11ff.). The age of Augustine was the golden age of grammar—the age of Donatus, of Charisius, of Servius; and one can still consult their manuals. Priscian comes a century later; but Donatus, the teacher of St. Jerome, has, along with Priscian, the title of the grammar instructor of the Middle Ages.

In the course of the *enarratio* or commentary on a poet, the grammarian was expected to offer general instruction in all of the arts: agriculture, medicine, architecture, history, rhetoric, logic, music, astronomy, geometry, and the rest. "Education in general subjects was thus acquired by the accident of this literary exegesis,"[53] says de Labriolle in building up the background of the fourfold exegesis of Scripture. And Quintilian, although jealous of the habitual trespassing of the grammarians in the province of rhetoric, says: "The elementary stages of the teaching of literature must not therefore be despised as trivial.... But as the pupil gradually approaches the inner shrine of the sacred place, he will come to realize the intricacy of the subject, an intricacy calculated not merely to sharpen the wits of a boy but to exercise even the most profound knowledge and erudition."[54] If I may be permitted a rather considerable leap in time and circumstances, I should like to point out how Quintilian's ideal grammarian is for St. Augustine the ideal

53. de Labriolle, *History and Literature of Christianity*, page 6.
54. *Inst. Orat.*, i, 4, 6. *Cf.* also II, i, 4–7.

theologian. Confronted with the inexhaustible riches of a passage of Scripture, St. Augustine cries: "O utinam doctissimum aliquem, neque id tantum, sed etiam eloquentissimum de hoc ambo interrogare possemus!"[55] The importance of "eloquentissimum," which amounts to the frank acceptance of Cicero's ideal orator, must be discussed in the first section on rhetoric; but the striking implications of this statement, as regards the assimilation into the Church of the basic modes of ancient culture, have been worked out by M. Marrou with a thoroughness which inspires the hope that many comparable monographs may be forthcoming on the numerous phases of ancient and medieval culture, which have so far been neglected. Not until this work has been done will it be possible to produce a fully intelligible account of the Renaissance.

The special study of M. Marrou is in its turn based on the more general patristic studies of M. de Labriolle. His *History and Literature of Christianity from Tertullian to Boethius* provides the indispensable general background for the various stages by which the Church accepted and modified the ancient disciplines of the liberal arts. That this process began very early, and soon reached very extensive proportions, seems not to be generally recognized; although M. Roger's *L'enseignement des lettres classiques d'Ausone à Alcuin* had, as early as 1905, pointed the way to a complete revaluation of current ideas on the subject. Keeping in mind, then, the basic fact emphasized by M. Marrou [*Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique*] (page 530) that St. Augustine, in his *De Doctrina Christiana* and elsewhere, laid the foundations of medieval culture along grammatical lines, what remains to be pointed out in this section is a further implication of this fact concerning ancient and medieval science.

It has already been shown above how much and how inevitably ancient physics employed the methods of grammatical exegesis; and it would have been strange, indeed, had patristic exegetists in adopting the methods of grammar not likewise carried over the interest in mythology and science. At this point in our study, M. Marrou fails us, although M. de Labriolle (page 283) is very close to this significant relationship when he points out how the exegetical *Exameron* of St. Ambrose "became the model and

1A

55. *De Quantitate animae*, 33 (70), Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, [henceforth *P. L.*] vol. xxxii, column 1073.

principal source of those *Mirrors* from nature in which the theologians of the Middle Ages represent the picture of the universe even in the order of the creation." He adds that while the exegetical outlook is very different from the procedure we associate with science today, yet "the genius of the Middle Ages was already breathing in the exegetic work of St. Ambrose." This may seem a strange place to cite the authority of Erasmus, but there have been few men so devoted to the exegetical methods of Origen and St. Jerome, of the former of whom he wrote in his preface to the *New Testament*: "nor does he apply any other method to the Holy Scriptures than that which Donatus applies to the comedies of Terence when elucidating the meaning of the classics."[56] Similarly, with regard to the cycle of the arts, Erasmus' advice chimes perfectly with that of St. Jerome and St. Augustine:

> It would be well too were the student tolerably versed in the other branches of learning [besides languages]—dialectics, rhetoric, arithmetic, music, astrology, and especially in knowledge of the natural objects—animals, trees, precious stones—of the countries mentioned in the Scriptures.[57]

The sermons and exegetical commentaries of the Fathers, from Clement of Alexandria to St. Augustine, are crowded with that "scientific" lore of "animals, trees, precious stones" which we associate with the name of Pliny but which was universally cultivated as scientific knowledge in antiquity and the Middle Ages, the great Renaissance vogue of which will be seen to be directly owing to the revival of patristic theology by Erasmus and his followers in the art of grammatical exegesis.[58]

M. de Labriolle tells us[59] that while they were much interested in pagan mythology the Christian apologists added nothing to the pagan techniques of interpreting and criticizing it. While the Voltairian *Adversus Nationes* of Arnobius is the most complete repertory of the Christian criticism of pagan legends, Cicero's *De Natura Deorum* was a major source of matter. It is, perhaps, Firmicius, author of the *De errore profanarum religionum*, who provides the best example of the critical method of Euhemerist exegesis applied to

56. Quoted by F. Seebohm, *The Oxford Reformers*, page 446.
57. Seebohm, *op. cit.*, page 329.
58. For fully illustrated studies of the prevalence of Pliny's sort of "unnatural science" in the Fathers, see *Nature-Imagery in the Works of St. Ambrose* by Sr. M. Theresa [Springer]; and *Nature-Imagery in the Works of St. Augustine* by Sister Mary John [Holman], which are Vols. xxx and xxxiii respectively in Catholic University of America Patristic Studies.
59. Page 196.

pagan beliefs, especially those coming from the East, which were particularly dear to pagan religious sentiment, and whose work M. de Labriolle notes[60] stands in need of a commentary based on current anthropology.

The scope of classical grammar having been indicated as fully present in patristic exegesis, it remains to describe the specific aims and objectives of the Christian exegetes, and thus to point to the path which must be followed throughout succeeding centuries. There is no need for such purposes to insist upon the difference in stress between, for example, the exegesis of St. Jerome and that of St. Augustine. A better opportunity for this sort of comment will offer itself in the sixteenth century, in the dispute between the Augustinian Luther and the Hieronymian Erasmus. Common to both is the position of St. Ambrose, who states that "Holy Scripture is a sea which has in itself deep meanings and all the mystery of prophetic riddles," and who employed the allegorical method, and whose view was, like Origen's, that

> allegory should serve to exclude from Scripture any contradictions, improbabilities, and those "stumbling-blocks"... which it had pleased the Spirit of God to sow "in the faith and records," and consequently it should distinguish the real intentions of the inspired authors from appearances, and render clear the substance of their teaching.[61]

Thus, although St. Jerome urged the provision of positive historical information to elucidate the text, he was far from rejecting allegorical exegesis.[62] In his treatise on the immortality of the soul, St. Augustine shows how the formal arts are employed under the direction of grammar in the anagogic functions of theology.

> The *natural arts* are concerned with the orderly repetitive changes of nature. These are veiled or vestigial signs. The task of the liberal arts is to translate them into simple signs and formulae of such signs, namely, into steady and luminous symbols of thought... By means of the liberal arts, things manipulated by the exterior man are formulated by the interior man, with

60. pages 236–237.
61. de Labriolle, *op. cit.*, page 282.
62. de Labriolle, *op. cit.*, page 361.

the help of analytic reflection ordered to truth as regulated by the formal modes of language and mathematics.[63]

Concerning the application of the doctrine of the levels of signification, both by pagan grammarians and by the exegetists of Scripture, only general indications have been offered in this section, since the matter must be considered in greater detail later on. However, on the Aristotelian principle that "[h]e who considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them,"[64] it has been considered advisable to indicate the origins of grammar so far as the present writer found possible. But in accordance with a further principle of Aristotle that "what each thing is when fully developed we call its nature,"[65] one has to look to the thirteenth century for the nature of the art of grammar whose origins and development have been here traced from the eighth century B.C. to the time of St. Jerome and St. Augustine. What one finds in their extensive exegesis one finds more perfectly in that of St. Bonaventura:

> Since the universe was offered to his eyes as a book to read and he saw in nature a sensible revelation analogous to that of the scriptures, the traditional methods of interpretation which had always been applied to the sacred books could equally be applied to the book of creation. Just as there is an immediate and literal sense of the sacred text, but also an allegorical sense by which we discover the truths of faith that the letter signifies, a tropological sense by which we discover a moral precept behind a passage in the form of an historical narrative, and an anagogical sense by which our souls are raised to the love and desire of God, so we must not attend to the literal and immediate sense of the book of creation but look for its inner meaning in the theological, moral and mystical lessons that it contains. The passage from one of these two spheres to the other is the more easily effected in that they are in reality inseparable. If things can be considered as signs in the order of nature, it is because they already play this part in the

63. G. G. Leckie, preface to St. Augustine's *De Magistro*, page xxvii. For St. Augustine on the four levels, see his *De Utilitate Credendi* 3,5; Migne, *P. L.*, Vol. 42, col. 68.
64. *Politics*, 1252a.
65. *Politics*, 1252b.

order of revelation. The terms employed by any science designate things; those which Scripture employs also designate things, but these things in their turn designate truths of a theological, moral, or mystical order. We have then done nothing but apply to the sensible world the ordinarily accepted methods of Scriptural exegesis in treating bodies and souls as allegories of the creative Trinity, and it is only in this way that the universe has revealed its true meaning: et sic patet quod totus mundus est sicut unum speculum plenum luminibus praesentatibus divinam sapientiam, et sicut carbo effundens lucem.[66]

M. Gilson proceeds to show that these guiding principles of interpretation are managed in their application not by the logic or dialectics of Aristotle which are adapted to the analysis of a world of natures and leave us "without the means to explore the secrets of a symbolic world such as that of the Augustinian tradition,"[67] but by the reasoning of analogy. By returning us to the camp of the ancient grammatical analogists, M. Gilson leaves us at a point from which we may conveniently turn to investigate another province of the trivium.

1A

66. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, pages 229–230. [1965:208]
67. *ibid.*, page 230.

CHAPTER ONE

B. DIALECTICS

THE TRIVIUM UNTIL ST. AUGUSTINE

Preliminary working definitions of dialectics here as reasoning or probable argumentation come from Aristotle. As the chapter progresses, the full concept of dialectics proves to be substantially more complex than this. McLuhan stresses the inseparability of dialectics from rhetoric with respect to the origins and history of both in the early pages of this exposition and later gives prominence to quotations from Aristotle explicitly characterizing rhetoric as the counterpart of dialectics and as an outgrowth of dialectics. This is so because inventing and discovering all the arguments for or against any position (the inventio *and* dispositio *of rhetoric) were subordinate not to the discovery of truth but to rhetorical persuasion. To the extent that dialectics functioned as a technique of argument and discourse, it was automatically subsumed under rhetoric—by rhetoricians. But dialecticians rigorously subordinated rhetoric* and grammar *to their art.*

These are not simply statements of historical facts about the trivium; they have explanatory value from the standpoint of literary analysis, in particular with respect to the principles of composition to which the writers of antiquity adhered. McLuhan cites (footnote 14) the dialectic basis of early rhetoric as explaining the dynamics of the highly patterned form of prose known as gorgianics. The discourse of the Sophists developed certain features such as commonplaces *(general themes) and* mnemonics *that became standard in dialectics* and *rhetoric throughout the Middle Ages and Renaissance.*

McLuhan states plainly that he is writing his history of the trivium from a grammatical point of view, because *the analysis and interpretation of the doctrines under discussion are a grammatical problem. He points out that with the exception of Aristotle's fragmented account, there is no history of dialectics written from a dialectical point of view. Aristotle and Plato are bracketed as McLuhan continues to demonstrate both the inherent inseparability of the components of the trivium and the inseparability of its history from the rivalry among them: "Plato and Aristotle were the greatest enemies of the rhetoricians, not so much in rejecting rhetoric, as in asserting that as an art it had no power to control dialectics."*

Thomas Nashe, waiting in the wings until McLuhan can train his spotlight on him, takes his place here in a thumbnail sketch of the great battle at the center of the pageant of the trivium:

DIALECTICS <····> RHETORIC
MACHIAVELLI <····> CASTIGLIONE
GABRIEL HARVEY <····> THOMAS NASHE

There is much rich material in this chapter touching in varying degrees on perennial topics in philosophy and in particular the philosophy of language: nominalism, word magic ("words condensing and translating the most ancient effect of things upon us"), the relation of logic to syntax, formalism, Francis Bacon on keeping knowledge in a state of emergent evolution (a concept that McLuhan himself embraced and privileged through the use of the aphoristic formulations he called probes*). Relegated to the extensive footnotes are such vital questions as the distinction between figures of language and figures of thought.*

As for the massive documentation from which McLuhan quotes so abundantly, a passage from Léon Robin on the fundamental question of defining dialectics is of particular interest: "With reference to a given question, from a 'probable' answer—that is, one approved by an imaginary interlocutor, or by some philosopher, or by common opinion—you deduce the consequences which it entails, and you show that these consequences contradict each other and the initial thesis, and lead to an opposite thesis, no less 'probable' than the first...." The passage suggests that the foundational premise of deconstruction can be traced to classical antiquity. As such, it opens an avenue for "translating" the quarrel between Nashe and Harvey into the framework of deconstructive discourse and, *following McLuhan's lead, making an attempt at a fresh interpretation of the Nashe-Harvey affair as a test-case for deconstruction.*

—(Editor)

At the conclusion of the *De Sophisticis Elenchis* Aristotle offers what is still one of the few accounts of the history of dialectics. That he was not entirely happy about the results of his inquiry one can easily judge:

> Moreover, on the subject of Rhetoric there exists much that has been said long ago, whereas on the subject of reasoning we had nothing else of earlier date to speak of at all, but were kept at work a long time in experimental researches. If, then, it seems to you after inspection that, such being the situation as it existed at the start, our investigation is in a satisfactory condition compared with the other inquiries that have been developed by tradition, there must remain for all of you, or for our students, the task of extending us your pardon for the shortcomings of the inquiry, and for the discoveries thereof your warm thanks.[1]

The difficulties which Aristotle encountered in developing a history of probable argumentation or dialectics prior to his own time have not become less for us. Moreover, the history of the art after his time is hardly less obscure, and scholars have steered around the subject. For the period before St. Augustine, however, it is necessary to indicate the character of dialectics in order to render the subject of rhetoric intelligible; but if less cannot be attempted, one may reasonably fear that less may be achieved.

In a very distinguished work, the French scholar Léon Robin cites a fragment of Aristotle to the effect that Zeno the Eleatic (fl. 465 B.C.) was the "inventor" of dialectics.[2]

> Zeno's method, defined with such exact precision, is what, since Aristotle, has been called the "dialectical." With reference to a given question, from a "probable" answer—that is, one approved by an imaginary interlocutor, or by some philosopher, or by common opinion—you deduce the consequences which it entails, and you show that these consequences contradict each other and the initial thesis, and lead to an opposite thesis, no less "probable" than the first.... To his method we owe, if not the application

1. Aristotle, *De Sophisticis Elenchis* (Translated by W.A. Pickard-Cambridge), 184a–b.
2. Léon Robin, *Greek Thought and the Origins of the Scientific Spirit*, page 92.

> of dialogue to philosophical inquiry, at least a certain way of disentangling and debating questions, which is equally found in the rhetoric of the Sophists and in Socratic philosophy.[3]

The close relation between dialectics and the origins of rhetoric is again seen in Empedocles of Acgragas (*floruit* 450 B.C.).[4]

> Timon called him the "rattle of the market-place." Perhaps this is the origin of the tradition that Empedocles was the inventor of rhetoric and the master of the other Sicilians who are credited with such an important part in the creation of that art—Corax, Tisias, and, lastly, Gorgias, who was certainly influenced by Empedocles. He [Empedocles] was trained in the dialectic of the Eleatics, and to develop a technique of speaking from it he had only to adapt it to wider purposes, with other methods.[5]

From this point, the history of dialectics and the rise of the Sophists coincide. Critical reason and techniques of investigation, once having been discovered, were soon applied indifferently to all kinds of questions whether metaphysical and speculative, or prudential and practical. Thus it is necessary to modify that view of the Sophists sponsored by the dialogues of Plato, since both Socrates and Plato are recognizable products of sophistic dialectics. Plato is apart from the tradition as much by the magnitude of his achievement as by reason of his methods of inquiry. The Sophists were like Socrates in refusing to commit their discussions to writing. Most of our evidence about them comes from their professed enemies Plato and Aristotle. "According to Plato, the first man to think of calling himself a 'Sophist,' meaning that he was a teacher of wisdom, that wisdom was his 'art' or specialty, was Protagoras of Abdera."[6] Protagoras was about twenty years younger than Socrates, as were the equally celebrated Gorgias, Prodicus of Ceos and Hippias of Elis. Referring to Plato's account of Hippias, Robin observes that "he was an encyclopædic virtuoso of the picturesque type produced by the Italian Renaissance..."[7]

3. *ibid.*
4. *Acgragas* is the modern *Agrigento*.—ed.
5. Robin, *op. cit.*, page 99.
6. Robin, *op. cit.*, page 135.
7. Robin, *op. cit.*, page 136. It is one of the principal objects of this study to show how the sophistic ideal of encyclopædic learning and attainment having once been taken up by Cicero as the pattern for the ideal orator and statesman, enters the Christian tradition through St. Augustine, is persistently cultivated throughout the centuries prior to the Renaissance, until the recurrence of a milieu in which a numerous, educated laity reconstituted the aims and objectives of secular eloquence. Werner Jaeger also points out the resemblance between the Sophists and the men of the Renaissance in *Paideia*, page 294 (translated by Highet; New York, 1939).

Since M. Robin's account of the Sophists is by far the best that I have been able to discover, I shall simply resume those parts of his description which are relevant to an understanding of the influence of dialectics on rhetoric. Significant in this regard is the bearing of dialectics on the matter of political and judicial causes; for

> the Sophistic movement of the Vth century represents a sum of independent attempts to satisfy the same needs by similar methods. The needs are those of a time and a country in which every citizen can have a share in the management of the business of his city, and can obtain personal predominance by words alone; where the competition of individual activities gives rise to numerous conflicts before the popular law-courts; where every man wants to assert, in the eyes of all, the superiority of his "virtue" (*arete*)—that is, of his talents and his ability to rule his own life and that of others.[8]

The products of this milieu looked about them to discover means of commanding success and wealth and power; and they found the "Sophists" who taught the science of "virtue" in the sense of the means to surpass one's rivals.

The Sophists advertised for pupils by displaying their wares at great festivals. They spoke on general themes, or, impromptu, developed and embellished topics which were proposed to them: the praise of Helen or pots or lice or sickness. They demonstrated on themes from all the arts and sciences; and from this activity two main features emerged: "commonplaces" and mnemonics. In order to manipulate encyclopædic knowledge, it became necessary to organize it around basic themes or "places" of argumentation; and in order to retain this knowledge "Hippias' system of mnemonics was of great importance."[9] These two features of early Sophistic development continued to contribute basically to the character of dialectics and rhetoric throughout medieval and Renaissance times.

In studying the history of dialectics and rhetoric, as, indeed, of grammar, it is unavoidable that one adopt the point of view of one of these arts; and

8. Robin, *op. cit.*, page 138.
9. Robin, *op. cit.*, page 139.

the history of the trivium is largely a history of the rivalry among them for ascendancy. Ancient grammar was at odds with the dialectics of Plato and, especially, of Aristotle, as the art of interpreting phenomena. As the method of patristic theology, grammar enjoyed uninterrupted ascendancy until the revival of dialectics by Gerbert, [Johannes] Roscellinus, and Abelard in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. With the decadence of dialectical or scholastic theology in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries both grammarians and rhetoricians surge forward again, finally triumphing in the work and influence of Erasmus, the restorer of patristic theology and of the grammatical humanistic discipline on which it rests. On the other hand, the war between the dialecticians and rhetoricians began as soon as the Sophists attempted to make dialectics subordinate to the art of persuasion. Plato and Aristotle were the greatest enemies of the rhetoricians, not so much in rejecting rhetoric, as in asserting that as an art it had no power to control dialectics. The Stoics, however, are the main defenders of dialectics against rhetoric after Aristotle. It was they who made Cicero very uncomfortable on many occasions, and against them he, as rhetorician, directs the main force of his attack. It is in terms of the Stoic contempt of persuasion and their love of cryptic and compressed utterance that one is able to understand the ancient rivalry between the Attic and Asiatic styles—later, between the Senecans and Ciceronians. The war between these literary camps is basically the opposition between dialectics and rhetoric to control the modes of literary composition; and the ramifications of this opposition stretch into the realms of ethics and politics, both in antiquity and in the Renaissance. For example, the ethical, political, and stylistic opposition between Machiavelli and Castiglione, between Harvey and Nashe, are at bottom, and on the surface, owing to a reconstitution of ancient rivalries between dialectics and rhetoric. While Harvey and Nashe are scarcely commensurate with the others, their relevance to this study is such as to make it important to bring them into the focus of discussion at this stage.

The essential opposition between the arts of the trivium being such, then, as frequently to pit the one against the other, with results of the

greatest importance, it is useful to recognize that the present exposition of the history of the trivium is being made from a grammatical point of view. Exposition and interpretation of stated doctrines are grammatical problems; and derivative philosophy and almost all histories of philosophy are the products of grammarians. A history of dialectics by a dialectician does not exist, apart from the brief remarks of Aristotle. The matter is further complicated in the present section in so far as dialectics is being described in grammatical terms from a rhetorical point of view; for that is what a presentation of dialectics as employed by the Sophists amounts to.

M. Robin's is the voice of the grammarian when he asks:

> What, exactly, were the spirit and method of their teaching? Since their object was to prepare the pupil for every conflict in thought or action to which social life might give rise, their method was essentially "antilogy" or controversy, and the opposition of the theses possible with regard to certain themes, or "hypotheses", suitably defined and classified. The pupil had to learn how to criticize and to argue, to organize a "joust" of reasons against reasons. The Sophist may not have been an "arguer", but he taught his pupil to become one. It does not matter whether the opposition was between two long speeches or between the questions and answers of a conversation. This method is the practical application of the Heracleitean conception of a dynamic contrast between successive judgments, and also of the process of argument by which Zenon brought out the static opposition of simultaneous judgments about the fundamental notions of experience. Now, it was Heracleiteanism which gave Protagoras his theoretical basis, and Eleaticism which provided that of Gorgias. The fact that the works of Protagoras included Controversies and an Art of Argument shows that he was the originator of this method of forming the intellect.[10]

10. Robin, *op. cit.*, page 140.

Thus, before Socrates, the Sophists taught their pupils to debate the themes of

> good and evil; the beautiful and the ugly; the just and the unjust; the true and the false; folly and wisdom, ignorance and knowledge; whether knowledge and virtue can be taught; whether magistracies should go by lot or by capacity; that the man who can best make and apply laws is the dialectician, for he knows all oppositions; that the mnemonic system is the best of all inventions.[11]

And yet this art of inventing or discovering all the arguments for or against any position was subordinate not to the discovery of Truth but to rhetorical persuasion; "So, whether he called himself one or not, the Sophist was always a professor of the art of speaking or writing, a master of rhetoric."[12] As we shall see, most notably of all in Cicero's *De Oratore*, not knowledge but political power is the aim of the rhetor: "Their object was to enable their pupil to assume an air of technical mastery in any subject, in order to contest or defend that of others and to talk to craftsmen like a connoisseur. This, according to Plato (*Sophist*, 232d–233a) seems to have been the object of Protagoras' treatise *On the Palaestra*."[13] The encyclopædic ideal of the Middle Ages, while immediately indebted to Cicero, undoubtedly has its roots in this Sophistic ideal. Dialectics is used in this tradition not to discover truth but to arrange and order what is already known. This is equally true for a Ciceronian rhetorician such as John of Salisbury or for a grammarian such as St. Bonaventure. Yet the dialecticians were equally rigorous in subordinating grammar and rhetoric to their art.

It is unfair to suppose that because the rhetoricians subordinated dialectics to their art, making it a handmaid to *inventio* and *dispositio*, the first two departments of rhetoric, that they were therefore cynical about the ends for which they exercised rhetoric. They claimed in all seriousness to teach the means to wisdom. Wisdom, as well as eloquence, was somehow thought to be a by-product of erudition. It was this claim which most

11. Robin, *op. cit.*, page 140. Cicero in the *Orator* (xxvii, 95–96) designates the Sophists as the philosophic rather than forensic school of oratory.
12. Robin, *op. cit.*, page 141.
13. Robin, *op. cit.*, page 143.

annoyed Plato and against which he directs his dialectical refutations in the *Gorgias* and in other dialogues.

The technique of the antilogy proved to be universally applicable in the construction not only of arguments but of whole discourses. Once mastered, it permitted amplification as well as abbreviation of themes, and enabled the speaker to discourse on unfamiliar subjects.

> This decisive test of their art Gorgias and Hippias sought to obtain from the public. The mechanism which they set working appears clearly in the *Funeral Oration* spoken by Gorgias in honour of those killed in the war, or in Agathon's speech in Plato's *Symposium*. "What was absent in these men which should not be absent in men? And what was present which should not have been present?" And so on. This balancing of antithetical words and sentences is the process by which the speaker breaks up his thought and develops it, in the air, as it were, on a purely formal plane.[14]

With Socrates the methods of the Sophists are not changed. "The antilogy of the Sophists and the Socratic examination are varieties of the method of refutation, by which the opponent was involved in contradictions and so made to abandon his original thesis for the antithesis, then led, by further contradictions, to admit that the antithesis was likewise untenable, and finally left quite helpless."[15] Socrates, however, is not pursuing the ends of the Sophists towards which dialectics was a mere means. He is a dialectician, not a rhetorician, and rejects the Sophistic erudition. Dialectics is for him a way of testing evidence rather than of organizing facts. Socrates does not envisage the sage or wise man as an "old man eloquent." He does not conceive of wisdom as a copiously speaking eloquence in the manner of the Sophists, and later of Isocrates and Cicero; but he conceives of it as the possession of an intellectual virtue acquired by the constant exercise of critical examination of the status and nature of things.

Professor Robinson has recently published a study of *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*[16] which contributes nothing to the history of its origins but which

14. Robin, *op. cit.*, pages 141–142. This dialectical basis of early rhetoric thus explains one of the most curious features of it, its verbal patterns. "Gorgianic" has long been an adjective for a highly patterned form of prose which one finds in antiquity, in St. Augustine, in medieval sermons and in *Euphues*. [W. Rhys Roberts has a related suggestion in *Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism*, page 39; New York, 1928.] It can be shown that in all these instances the figures are predominantly figures of thought rather than of language; and as such they were designated in the rhetorical manuals. Figures or schemes of words do occur, but less commonly than is supposed. R. C. Jebb in *The Attic Orators*, II, 284ff. illustrates the distinctions between figures of thought and language.
15. Robin, *op. cit.*, page 158.
16. New York, 1941.

is a useful guide to the changing scope which Plato allowed to the art in the course of the dialogues.

> In his middle period Plato held emphatically that dialectic was not merely the noblest but also the most useful method. He does not, however, define clearly the realms to which its usefulness extends. Some passages seem to imply that it is useful in all study, art, and practice, of whatever sort. Thus, he says that "everything that was ever discovered concerning science became plain through this" method (*Philebus* 16c). At any rate, Plato in his middle period evidently thought of dialectic as useful in linguistics (*Cratylus* 390), mathematics (*Republic* 510–511), rhetoric and psychology (*Phaedrus* 269–273), and all ethical and political knowledge and conduct. Towards the end of his life he modified this to some extent. The *Laws* does not emphasize the importance of dialectic in the good city; and the *Philebus* seems to abandon the view that it is the most useful method, while reiterating that it is the surest and truest (58c).[17]

In general, Plato, while quite accustomed to using the art as it had been practiced before him, extends the term till it is almost identical with philosophy and especially with metaphysics. Later, Aristotle was to clarify the situation by showing how logic and dialectics are concerned with the truth of enunciations, and not, as metaphysics, with the essence or nature of things.

> The fact is that the word "dialectic" had a strong tendency in Plato to mean "the ideal method, *whatever that may be.*" Insofar as it was thus merely an honorific title, Plato applied it at every stage of his life to whatever seemed to him at the moment the most hopeful procedure. In the same way, he applied the abusive terms "eristic" and "Sophistry" on every occasion to whatever seemed to him at that time the danger most to be avoided.[18]

17. Robinson, *op. cit.*, page 73.
18. Robinson, *op. cit.*, page 74.

It is interesting to note the near relation between the cultivation of dialectics and concurrent literary expression. Thus the stages of the development of the method of antilogy with two and then three interlocutors may well have provided an impetus to the Greek drama.[19] Certainly the form of the Platonic dialogue is a function of the art of dialectics rather than a rhetorical device to gain attention.

> Furthermore, the dialectician's words are always arranged in the discontinuous form of conversation... The *Protagoras* strongly deprecates long speeches; *Letter VII* and the *Phaedrus* strongly deprecate writing philosophy down. Plato was so absolutely certain, throughout his life, that the supreme method has its being only in conversation, that he could name it from this fact; "dialectical" method means conversational method, and he represents an opponent of philosophy as calling it "whispering with three or four boys in a corner" (*Gorgias* 485 D).[20]

Professor Robinson certainly does less than justice to Aristotle when he writes: "In the *Topics* dialectic became a technique that could be learnt by itself apart from the study of any reality, and was thereafter equally applicable to all studies or none. By thus isolating it from the source of its inspiration, Aristotle changed dialectic from the highest intellectual activity to a dubious game of debate."[21]

It is a little strange to complain first that Plato never succeeded in separating dialectics from his immediate subject (Robinson, page 73 *supra*) and then to accuse Aristotle of having done it very efficiently. In a familiar passage of the *Gorgias* (465 A), Socrates says that rhetoric like cookery is no art but only a knack based on particular experience "because it is unable to explain or to give a reason of the nature of its own applications." Aristotle, rather than Plato, raised dialectics to the status of an art in this sense. Since Aristotle it is easy to see that logic and dialectics are distinct in that the former is demonstrative and the latter probable in the mode of proof; and that this is owing to the matters with which they are concerned.

19. R.C. Jebb in *The Attic Orators*, page xcviii (London, 1893) says that with Euripedes "Rhetorical Dialectic has broken into Tragedy, and the religious basis, the doctrine of Nemesis, has been abandoned in favour of such other interests as the poet can devise. Euripedes was brilliantly fertile in plots. This is what Aristotle means by *tragikotatos*, alluding especially to sudden and pathetic reversals of situation."
20. Robinson, *op. cit.*, page 81. The celebrated *Sic et Non* of Abelard is a further formalization of the dialectical method of the dialogue and had the greatest consequences not only in literature but in music and other arts. Just how pervasive an influence was dialectics in the Elizabethan drama has never been considered, although Professor Craig has written a tentative paper showing how habitual the formal methods of dialectics are in Shakespeare's comic effects. ["Shakespeare and Formal Logic" [see bibliography]] More serious use of the methods of formal disputation occur in such familiar speeches as *Hamlet*, III,I,56–90; and *Troilus and Cressida*, V,ii,136–159.
21. Robinson, *op. cit.*, page 76.

> Therefore a syllogistic premise without qualification will be an affirmation or denial of something concerning something else in the way we have described; it will be demonstrative, if it is true and obtained through the first principles of its science; while a dialectical premise is the giving of a choice between two contradictories when a man is proceeding by question, but when he is syllogizing it is the assertion of that which is apparent and generally admitted, as has been said in the *Topics*.[22]

In the second chapter of the *Topics* Aristotle defines the scope and usefulness of dialectics as consisting in three things: "intellectual training, casual encounters, and the philosophical sciences.... For purposes of casual encounters, it is useful because when we have counted up the opinions held by most people, we shall meet them on the ground not of other people's convictions but of their own, while we shift the ground of any argument that they appear to us to state unsoundly. For the study of the philosophical sciences it is useful, because the ability to raise searching difficulties on both sides of a subject will make us detect more easily the truth and error about the several points that arise." (101 a) So far, Aristotle's claims for this art are not unlike those of the Sophists; but then immediately follows a statement which clarifies many of the obscure issues in which Plato had involved the subject:

> It has a further use in relation to the ultimate bases of the principles used in the several sciences. For it is impossible to discuss them at all from the principles proper to the particular science in hand, seeing that the principles are *prius* of everything else: it is through the opinions generally held on the particular points that these have to be discussed, and this task belongs properly, or most appropriately, to dialectic: for dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries. (101a–b)

Dialectics in this latter sense is not to be encountered, after Aristotle, until the twelfth century, for the Stoics limited it to the first two senses. However, when one encounters a dialectician claiming precedence for his

22. *Prior Analytics* (24 a–b), translated by A. J. Jenkinson. Aristotle is referring to the opening of the Topics (100 a) where he says "Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from opinions that are generally accepted about every problem propounded to us...." (translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge) When the essence of a thing has been established by its particular science then the syllogism gives demonstrative knowledge; otherwise, probable knowledge.

art over grammar and rhetoric, it is important to know to which of these uses of the art he is referring. It is clear that in the sense of "casual encounters" as described by Aristotle the art has considerable reference to rhetorical argumentation. At least, the distinction is sufficiently vague to account for the centuries of controversy concerning the proper place for a boundary line. The modern misconception and distrust of the art of rhetoric dates from the sixteenth century success of Ramus in handing over to dialectics the first two branches of rhetoric (discovery and arrangement), leaving to rhetoric only embellishment (elocution), memory, and pronunciation or delivery.[23]

Aristotle says at the outset of his treatise that "Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic. Both alike are concerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science. Accordingly, all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others."[24] Moreover, the dialectician, he says, will make the better rhetorician for having studied all kinds of proofs (1355a). "It thus appears that rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic and also of ethical studies." (1355b) In view of the hybrid complexity of dialectics and rhetoric, it is scarcely astonishing that so much should have been claimed for them in the past. But, as Aristotle warned, they are not the less useful or important because erroneous claims may be made for them: "the more we try to make either dialectic or rhetoric not, what they really are, practical faculties, but sciences, the more we shall inadvertently be destroying their true nature; for we shall be refashioning them and shall be passing into the region of sciences dealing with definite subjects rather than simply with words and forms of reasoning." (1359b).

Needless to say, Aristotle did not share the analogist's view of words and phenomena as interrelated by proportions and etymologies. Yet, dialectics and rhetoric in the hands of the analogists were certainly refashioned until they became not merely sciences but the queens of the sciences. This is true not merely of Ciceronian rhetoric and scholastic dialectics, but of the "system" of Francis Bacon as well.[25] It is for this, among other reasons, that a

23. Peter Ramus, *In Ciceronis Oratorem Lib. I.*, col. 241; Basle, 1569.
24. *Rhetoric* (1354a) trans. W. Rhys Roberts. In his useful discussion of this matter in *Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism* (New York, 1928) Roberts points out that while representing rhetoric as a mere knack like cookery, in the *Gorgias*, Plato showed in the *Phaedrus* "that it might be reconstructed on the basis of reasoning" or dialectics. (page 32) He shows (pages 20ff.) how Aristotle expands these points systematically, not without reproving Plato for his stand on the subject of rhetoric. It is curious and significant to hear Cicero quote (*Orator*, xxxii, 114) Aristotle's remark that rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic and immediately to distort Aristotle by adding that the difference is obviously that rhetoric is broader and logic narrower: "ut hoc videlicet different inter se quod haec ratio dicendi latior sit, illa loquendi contractior."
25. *The Advancement of Learning*, Everyman, page 66.

history of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectics is an indispensable background even for the student of the sixteenth century.

After Aristotle the most significant contributions to dialectics were made by the Sceptics, the Stoics, and the Epicureans.

> Scepticism is the earliest in date of the great post-Aristotelian philosophies. Pyrrhon, whom the Sceptics unanimously regarded as their founder, was about forty years old at Aristotle's death. He was a contemporary of Theophrastos and Xenocrates. At Elis, where he was born, he may have known the last philosophers of the school of Phaedon, and it is certain that he was initiated by the teaching of Bryson, the pupil of a pupil of Eucleides, into Megaric dialectic, the most illustrious professors of which belonged to his time.[26]

A theory of knowledge based on the antilogies of dialectics provided an impressive basis for this scepticism. The same methods were held to contribute to the development of moral wisdom; "but gradually its dialectic assumed a significance which was mainly methodological."[27] Scientific dogmatism was impossible in this school; and that which had begun as a moral discipline ended as "a strict and untiringly exhaustive analysis of every aspect of a problem, unequalled dialectical skill, uncompromising honesty of a mind which refuses to dupe itself, determined hostility to theory and foregone conclusions, whatever they may be, respect for the pure fact, with anxiety to observe its relations scrupulously and to make use of it for practice."[28]

For the Epicureans, Robin points out (page 326), philosophy and logic are mere means to morality and happiness. With regard to language and grammar they are in substantial agreement with the Stoics: "By the study of language we come to know the natural notions. For words, far from being the product of a convention, or, as the pure Nominalists say, class names empty of all real content, condense and translate the most ancient effect of things upon us and the 'primitive notions' in relation to our natural means

26. Robin, *op. cit.*, page 315.
27. Robin, *op. cit.*, page 321.
28. Robin, *op. cit.*, page 322.

of expression and differently according to regions and races."[29] Just as language offers an extensive and complex apprehension of the structure of beings, so that faculty which produced this state of language is perpetually operative—an intuitive perception of essentials. There is no room for error in our intuitive grasp of nature, but in our methods of inference leading to the forming of opinions there is much likelihood of error. Thus, as we can see in the extant treatises of Philodemus *On Methods of Inference*[30] the Epicureans, perpetually under the concentrated critical attack of Stoic dialectics, had themselves to resort to a critique of dialectics by way of defense. This explains the seeming paradox of a highly sophisticated school of Epicurean dialecticians in the first century B.C. The Epicureans were uncompromising critics of the claims of the rhetoricians, as of dialecticians, to wisdom. Poetry, music, and grammar were the only exact, because empirical, sciences.[31] In these latter sciences nothing beyond the absolute veracity of intuitive perception is involved. A study of the wide artistic and educational influence of these views in antiquity would seem as obviously desirable as it is lacking. The Stoic doctrine of the Logos disposed them to trust ratiocination and inference quite as much as the Epicureans relied on immediate perception. "In the Stoic metaphysical scheme, reason rules the world conceived of as a completely deterministic system. All things are connected rationally in a necessary causal chain.... The contingency of matters of fact is only apparent, in that the finite mind has only a partial view of the interrelatedness of things."[32] Thus, Stoic dialectics like Stoic grammar is cosmological rather than terminological and propositional in reference; and the universal Logos guarantees their inferences. Similarly, physics or cosmology being prior to intellection, dialectics "can only be properly understood if we know the general principles of physics, in relation to the world and in relation to man."[33] In practice, Stoic physics and the art of grammar were so closely associated that we should expect, as we find, that grammar and dialectics are scarcely separable studies for them. "Words in combination form statements, questions, wishes, syllogisms, and so forth; there is therefore no clear line drawn between what we call syntax and logic respectively."[34]

29. Robin, *op. cit.*, page 327.
30. Edited with a translation and commentary by P. H. DeLacy and E. A. DeLacy, Philadelphia, 1941.
31. DeLacy, *op. cit.*, page 136. *Cf.* also pages 139, 157.
32. DeLacy, *op. cit.*, page 158.
33. Robin, *op. cit.*, page 345.
34. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, page 146.

Elsewhere Arnold says (page 37) the Roman translation of Logos as *ratio atque oratio* is a further indication of this relationship. Moreover, "In physics and logic alike Posidonius upholds the doctrine of the Logos, and it appears that it passed directly from him to Philo of Alexandria, and so into Judæo-Christian speculation." (page 105). As with grammar, so with dialectics, as regards the line of tradition in which Christian culture continued and adapted the thought and methods of antiquity.

Robin describes the Stoic dialectics in slightly different terms (page 351):

> The part of the physical theory which concerns human knowledge is an immediate condition of logic... What logic claims to be is a translation of the real into words. If, then, we pass over rhetoric, which is the art of "discoursing well", logic consists essentially in a dialectic, or science of correct discourse by questions and answers, capable of discriminating true and false in relation to *truth*, that is, the real, which is distinguished from the *true* as the corporeal from the incorporeal. The founder of Stoic dialectic was Chrysippos, who seems to have wanted to follow all the demands of his realistic conception to the end, without allowing himself to be deterred by the excesses of the most subtle formalism.

> It was inevitable that, holding the analogist view of language, the Stoics should have regarded dialectics not, with Aristotle, as a means or instrument, but as part of philosophy itself.

> One most important consequence for rhetoric and literature follows from the Stoic position. Just as the function of dialectic is "to discover the articulations of that creation and to enunciate them faithfully," so with morals. The object of morals is "to find the natural reason in ourselves and to express it in acts. Now, what has made us lose our clear vision of it is our *passions*.... 'All the passions,' then, 'are equally wrong'; they allow of degree only in their accompaniments or physical consequences."[35] The consequences for literary style of this doctrine are described by Arnold (pages 148–150). The Stoics allowed a distinction between dialectic as the

35. Robin, *op. cit.*, page 353. Robin proceeds to mention (page 354) that beneath the basic passions—pleasure and pain, desire and fear—"the Stoics who loved subdividing things minutely, recognized no less that seventy secondary passions." Arnold cites (page 172) the philosophic status of the passions in the Stoic view. Quoting Diogenes Laertius: "Zeno" (we are told) "laid down that there are two principles in the universe, the active and the passive. The passive is matter, or essence without quality; the active is the Logos or deity within it." Passion in man is thus reversion from the reason which is his being back into the non-being of matter.

briefest form of utterance and rhetoric as an expanded form. Zeno's celebrated comparison of one to the closed fist and the other to the open palm is, of course, relevant. (*Orator* xxxii, 113) On the view that words should "precisely and exclusively correspond to the objects described," the Stoics introduced many strange terms, as Cicero tells us (*De Finibus*, iv, 3, 7). Since thought, thing and language are aspects of one reality

> the Stoic will say what he has to say with "brevity"...; the graces of style will be represented by "becomingness" (*prepon*, decorum) and "neatness" (*kataskeue*), the latter including euphony. These virtues of speech are sufficient for speaking well which is neither more nor less than speaking truthfully; for the Stoic needs only to instruct his hearer, and will not lower himself either to amuse him or to excite his emotions.[36]

There can be no doubt about the influence of the Stoics in forming the "Attic" style, and, as we shall see, the Stoic criticism of Cicero and the Ciceronians raised issues which were in doubt in the sixteenth century.[37] Even as late as the eighteenth century Swift in some measure[38] and Johnson in large measure provided serious opposition to the "Attic" or expository prose which increasingly prevailed. The Stoics, then, divided antiquity on the subject of rhetoric.

> The "Stoic style" was a severe intellectual and moral discipline. The speaker was called upon under all circumstances to speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. He could hold back nothing from his audience, even though his words might be offensive to their religious opinions, their patriotic feelings, or their sense of decency; he could add no word which would touch their sympathies or kindle their indignation in the direction he himself might wish. He had always before his eyes the example of Socrates' defence before the Athenian jury and its result. The Stoic appeared before his audience as a brave, sane, and rather rugged

36. Arnold, *op. cit.*, page 149.
37. Cicero has many discussions of the influence of Stoic dialectics on style; e.g., *Brutus* xxxi, 118–120; xli, 152–153; lxxxii, 283–286; *Orator* xxxii, 113–115; *De Oratore* I, liii–lv.
38. See his *Letter to a Young Clergyman*.

> speaker, painfully ill-equipped in all those arts which the circumstances demanded. (Cicero, *de Oratore*, iii, 18)[39]

Nothing more need be said about the practical effects on rhetoric of Stoic dialectics for the purposes of this study.

Less vigorous and less dogmatic, the dialecticians of the Academy rallied to attack the nascent dogmatism of Stoic dialectics. This tradition continued the freely speculative Socratic cross-examination and antilogy, finally producing in the distinguished Carneades of Cyrene (214–129 B.C.) a man who not only forced the Stoics to abandon some of their most important positions (Arnold, page 63), but through his successor, Pænetius of Rhodes (c. 189–109 B.C.), had a profound influence on Cicero (*Cf.* Arnold, page 101). The same Pænetius, Cicero tells us (*de Finibus* iv, 28, 79), was also a student of the Peripatetics. For, as Arnold points out (pages 63–64), the Romans found little difference between the teaching of the Peripatetics and that of the earlier Academy. The purpose of the present account is, therefore, sufficiently served in this very compressed statement of the influence of the followers of Plato and Aristotle; since the Romans found no important differences between these schools, the differences which undoubtedly did exist can yet be said not to have made a difference in the development of dialectics in Roman times.

"During the Hellenistic age," says Gwynn,[40] "Greek philosophy began to decline. Stoic teaching, with its pantheistic cosmopolitanism and its interest in scientific research was best suited to the spirit of the age;... In the growing indifference to metaphysical inquiry, all four schools began to conciliate public opinion by a more popular programme of studies; and, by a strange irony of fate, Plato's school, with its memories of the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*, was the first to capitulate." Gwynn goes on to describe the popularity of the Academician Archesilaus (*Cf.* Cicero, *de Finibus* ii, 2; *de Oratore* iii, 80) and later of Carneades, whose highly rhetorical methods of presenting philosophy and dialectics caused students to flock "to hear his lectures and to study his oratorical technique" (Gwynn, page 73).

39. One rhetorical device the Stoics did permit themselves; namely, the paradox. It proved effective as a means of attracting an audience to announce such subjects as that all foolish men are mad, and that virtue is sufficient for happiness. Obviously the paradox, although it became the basis for a prolific literary genre which had a great vogue in the Renaissance, is no mere figure of rhetoric. It is a rhetorical figure of thought which is based on the antilogy whose discovery was the beginning of dialectics. [*Cf.* Arnold, pages 150–151] Another rhetorical figure freely employed by the Stoics was the exemplum or panegyric in teaching virtue. The exemplum is the main mode of ethical teaching and flourished most of all in the medieval sermon. The exemplum is in rhetoric what induction is in logic. [*Cf.* p. 231]
40. Gwynn, *Roman Education*, page 72.

After Greek dialectics, therefore, such a treatise as Cicero's *Topica* seems very meagre and barren of interest. It is frankly and wholly given to topics of disputation useful to a pleader in the courts. In so far, however, as it evoked a commentary from Boethius and had considerable influence on Gratian and the canon lawyers of the eleventh and twelfth centuries,[41] it cannot be pushed aside without admitting its probable effect on the revival of dialectics. A more satisfactory discussion of dialectics is offered by Cicero in the *De Inventione* and the second book of the *De Oratore* (chapters xxiv–xl). Characteristically, after praising the masters of dialectics, Cicero dismisses them as finicky and impractical:

> But, to recall Oratory to the point at which this digression started, ... it was Diogenes who claimed to be teaching an art of speaking well, and of distinguishing truth from error, which art he called by the Greek name of dialectic. This art, if indeed it be an art, contains no directions for discovering truth, but only for testing it. [Cicero implies the conventional Stoic view that grammar provides the inductive method of discovery.] In this connexion then that eminent Stoic is of no help to us, since he does not teach me how to discover what to say; and he actually hinders me, by finding many difficulties which he pronounces quite insoluble, and by introducing a kind of diction which is not lucid, copious and flowing, but meagre, spiritless, cramped and paltry; and, if any man commends this style, it will only be with the qualification that it is unsuitable to an orator. For this oratory of ours must be adapted to the ears of the multitude...[42]

Cicero scoffs at the Stoic claim that a man could not be an orator before he had mastered philosophy (*De Oratore* I, xviii), pointing to the dry, barren style of such men. The themes which concern the orator are those which concern the lives of all men: "... in such way does he range over men's souls, and explore their feelings and thoughts, that he needs no philosophers' definitions ... We require a man of sharpness, ingenious by nature and experience alike, who with keen scent will track down the thoughts, feelings,

41. Henry Osborn Taylor, *The Mediaeval Mind*, II, page 300, London, 1930. Gwynn (pages 100*ff.*) has a good account of Cicero's dialectics. *The Academic Questions* is concerned with dialectics in some degree. In the second book (chapters xxviii–xxx) Cicero gives an account of his own teachers in this subject.
42. *De Oratore*. Loeb, II, xxxiii. Both in preceding and succeeding centuries controversy was maintained as to whether the first two parts of rhetoric, invention, and disposition were or were not independent of dialectics. The precedence of the arts was at stake. Aristotle put rhetoric under dialectics (*Rhetorica* Book I), whereas Cicero and Quintilian put it under politics and law. "... for the effort of rhetoricians from Quintilian throughout the early Middle Ages was to claim consideration of general or indefinite questions or theses and to resist efforts to restrict rhetoric to determinate questions or hypotheses lest rhetoric yield its place and importance as a science to philosophy ..." (McKeon, "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages", *op. cit.*, page 29) On the same theme, Gwynn says that "Quintilian's attitude towards the study of philosophy is plain enough.... Quintilian would never have advised his young men to become pupils in the school of a philosopher." (*op. cit.*, page 238). Since Quintilian has nothing new to add to Cicero on the relation between dialectics and rhetoric, I shall merely refer the reader to the important discussion in Book XII, 2, 6–30; and also I, 12, 15; X, 1, 81.

In the sixteenth century the wide success of Rudolf Agricola, Talæus, and especially Peter Ramus in reducing invention and disposition to dialectics had even greater literary consequences than those R. Tuve recently pointed out. ("Imagery and Logic: Ramus and the Metaphysical Poetics" [see bibliography]) Our whole notion of the conflict between the "metaphysicals" and their contemporaries will be changed by an understanding of the current disputes between dialectics and rhetoric. An even more striking manifestation, the "baroque" school, will be found to be owing to the conscious adaptation of the methods of patristic scriptural exegesis to profane themes, resulting in the multivalent imagery.

beliefs and hopes of his fellow citizens and of any men whom on any issue he would fain win over by his word." (I, li.) It is not surprising, therefore, that Cicero should hold that philosophy is something that anybody can easily learn, since, like the Stoics, he held that the principles of philosophy of wisdom are innate in the hearts of all men (III, xxiii), and that unless a man can learn a thing quickly he can never learn it at all. It is on the basis of this Stoic principle of innate reason and virtue and wisdom that Cicero is able to identify eloquence and wisdom.[43]

Dialectics is thus ancillary to rhetoric, since its function is always to organize empirical knowledge, whether grammatical or medical or legal, into some form of art. (*De Oratore* I, 41.186)[44] There are many arts, says Cicero, but the great ones are politics, war, and eloquence. The mediocre arts consist of philosophy and its many branches, mathematics, physics, ethics, logic, grammar, etc. (*De Oratore*, I, 13–20; 28–34; *De Inventione*, I, 25; *De Officiis*, I, 42). All these are branches of knowledge requisite to a man of good breeding and to the orator. (*De Oratore*, I, 24) *Eloquentia* is supreme among all these

Further important discussion of the subordination of dialectics to rhetoric will be found in Cicero's *Brutus* xli–ii; and in the *Orator* iii–v; xiii–xv; xxxii–vi. Also *De Oratore* I, l–lii, beginning with the explicit suggestion "omnes artes oratori subiungere."

43. *De Oratore*, III, xv. In chapters xv–xxiii Cicero offers a history of philosophy from the beginning until his own time in which he attempts to explain how it came about that for some men, notably professional philosophers, there is a breach between eloquence and wisdom, between practical knowledge and a knowledge which these men pursue for its own sake. Whereas before Socrates, he says, learning seems to have been the preceptress of living rightly and speaking well, with Socrates there appeared others of great learning who were averse to politics and who derided eloquence. "Quorum princeps Socrates fuit, is qui omnium eruditorum testimonio totiusque iudicio Graeciae cum prudentia et acumine et venustate et subtilitate, tum vero eloquentia, varietate, copia quam se cumque in partem dedisset omnium fuit facile princeps; ..." (III, xvi) That Socrates of all men should have separated the ability of thinking wisely and speaking gracefully, functions naturally united, this strikes Cicero as inexplicable. Hence, he goes on to say, arose that divorce of the tongue from the heart, a division as absurd as it is reprehensible. From this point things went from bad to worse, in Cicero's opinion, though the Stoics, despite a refusal to cultivate eloquence, have alone of all the philosophers declared eloquence to be virtue and wisdom. (III, xviii) For truly, he continues, nothing is alien to eloquence since it embraces the origin, the influence, the changes of all things in the world, all virtues, duties, and all nature, so far as it affects the manners, minds, and lives of mankind. (III, xx) Of course, the ideal orator will also be the ideal dialectician, since the virtue of eloquence confers and controls all others. Such an orator will be able like Aristotle to deliver an opinion on both sides of a question on all subjects. (III, xxi) Thus Cicero explicitly claims to be emulating Plato in the *Republic* in seeking an ideal type. (I, xxvi; III, xxii. Also *Orator*, xxix, 101) Eloquence, he thinks of as a comprehensive virtue in the same sense as Plato conceived of Justice. Nor should this claim be forgotten in estimating the great prestige and continuous force of this doctrine in the work of St. Augustine and all that followed St. Augustine.

Bacon's account of the history of philosophy in the *Novum Organum* (I, lxiii–lxxxviii) is almost identical with Cicero's. This is not strange, since both hold the view that the arts are entirely to be judged on the basis of their usefulness to man. Like Cicero, Bacon regards Plato and Aristotle as mere froth and verbiage (I, lxxvii), for "when the rational and dogmatical sciences began the discovery of useful works came to an end." Of course, in the *Novum Organum*, Bacon is deploring the developments of philosophy from the point of view of a grammarian and dialectician, whereas Cicero is viewing the same as a rhetorician. Bacon never for a moment ceases to view the business of the arts as being the relief of man's fallen moral state. (See *Advancement of Learning*, Everyman, pages 37, 138; and *Novum Organum*, I, lxviii; xciii; II, lii.) In this matter he is in perfect accord with St. Bonaventure and Roger Bacon and a long tradition in which man's task was defined "as the organization of our earthly exile into a sort of suburb of the heavenly kingdom ..." (Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, page 479) Bacon's protestations of originality are seldom to be regarded seriously. Interesting to the historian of culture is Bacon's contempt for the learning of the barbarous middle ages because, when the more solid human learning of men like Cicero "had suffered shipwreck, then the systems of Aristotle and Plato, like planks of lighter and less solid material, floated on the waves of time and were preserved ..." (I, lxxvii) Bacon despised the Middle Ages for the very ardour with which they cultivated a knowledge which subsequent historians have denied they ever possessed. We have taken over the attitudes of Renaissance controversialists without knowing what the controversies were originally about.

arts, since it is the art in virtue of which (and Cicero thinks of art as a virtue or power which enables us to act) the orator is able to direct all the other arts for the advantage of human life.[45]

The justification for dwelling on Cicero here even though he contributed nothing original or even distinguished to the subject of dialectics is strikingly indicated by Professor McKeon, who enjoys what is, perhaps, a unique distinction in being a professional scholar both in the classical and in the medieval periods. He is referring to the late classical and early medieval

> tradition of logic which passed as "Aristotelian" yet which followed Aristotle only in the treatment of terms and propositions, and Cicero in the treatment of definitions and principles. Whatever the estimate critics and historians are disposed to make of Cicero's achievement, originality, and consistency, his choices and emphases fixed the influence and oriented the interpretation of ancient thought, Greek, as well as Latin, at the beginning of the Middle Ages and again in the Renaissance, and we today are far

44. As a matter of fact, it will be seen that Abelard, working with the vast body of empirical knowledge of texts provided by centuries of grammatical theologians and by Gratian and the codifiers of canon law, proceeded by dialectical method in this sense. The "Renaissance of the twelfth century" will be seen as the triumph of dialectical over grammatical method. See R. P. McKeon, "Renaissance and Method" in *Studies in the History of Ideas*; New York, 1935.

45. Finding his place in a long line of Ciceronians, Bacon has the same conception of the function of the arts. Grammar is the art of gathering and interpreting congruous instances, whether phenomenal or textual. It ought to be said in this connection that Mr. Willey is mistaken in supposing [*The Seventeenth Century Background*; London, 1934; page 35] that the idea of the "two scriptures" is new with Bacon, since it has an unbroken literary history from the *Cratylus* to the *Wisdom of the Ancients*. [See *The Advancement of Learning*, Everyman, page 138] Although grammar, or induction, is prior, dialectics and rhetoric govern everything: "...scholars in universities come too soon and too unripe to logic and rhetoric" which are "arts fitter for graduates than children and novices: for these two, rightly taken, are the gravest of sciences, being the arts of arts;..." [*op. cit.*, page 66] Bacon envisaged two modes of delivering scientific knowledge, both functions of rhetoric: one is esoteric; the other, exoteric: "But as young men, when they knit and shape perfectly, do seldom grow to a further stature; so knowledge, while it is in aphorisms and observations it is in growth: but when it once is comprehended in exact methods, it may perchance be further polished and illustrate [*sic: in the edition of 1605*] and accommodated for use and practice; but it increaseth no more in bulk and substance." [*op. cit.*, page 32] The ensuing discussion makes perfectly clear that Bacon considered his own aphoristic style in the *Essays* as part of a scientific technique of keeping knowledge in a state of emergent evolution. It is an immediate rhetorical development of the *antitheta* [which have clear affinity with the dialectical antilogies of the Sophists] that he added to the "De Augmentis", as anyone can see who compares the *antitheta* on Revenge, Friendship, etc. with the corresponding essays on those subjects. The progressive amplification of the Essays, between 1597 and 1625, is a mere rhetorical development, quite devoid of mystery or inconsistence [*sic*] on Bacon's part. The second function of rhetoric is argumentative and persuasive, as seen in the style of *The Advancement of Learning*, itself. A striking illustration of this fact is to be had in the comparison between the essay *Of Studies* with the same theme treated exoterically in *The Advancement of Learning* [pages 34–35]. A further glance at pages 37 and 138 will indicate the entirely conventional patristic models on which Bacon's conception of the aims and arts of learning rest. In the *Novum Organum* he quotes Daniel to prove that the seventeenth century will be an age of advancement in learning because such an advance was prophesied for the last days of the world. [*Works*, Vol. IV, page. 92; ed. Spedding, Ellis, Heath; London, 1858. See also pages 247–248.] The reason why the *De Tradendis Disciplinis* of Vives in 1531 reads, in large part, like *The Advancement of Learning* and the *Novum Organum* is simply that Vives [the disciple of Erasmus], like Bacon, relies implicitly on the great medieval tradition of grammar, or induction, in science. That tradition, almost eclipsed by the triumph of dialectics over grammar and rhetoric between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, rallied powerfully as scholasticism declined. The schoolmen are not abused by Vives and Bacon as violently as by most of their fellow grammarians, because both held dialectics in high esteem. [*The Advancement of Learning*, Everyman, pages 26–27]

from having freed ourselves from the consequences of that long tradition in scholarship, criticism, or taste.[46]

Between the second century B.C. and Plotinus in the third century A.D. one meets in dialectics, as in philosophy, with erudition and eclecticism, but not originality. "Certainly there were still remarkable personalities, but they were remarkable chiefly for the intensity of their moral sentiment. Greek thought as such had exhausted its powers of invention."[47] Plotinus "was like another Pythagoras or Empedocles" in so far as he mediated between cult and philosophy, "but one whose thought was stocked with five centuries of dialectical elaboration of philosophic concepts."[48] Later, Damascius, who wrote *On The Principles of Nature*, applies dialectical exegesis to an elaboration of the old mythologies of Greece and the Orient to show that they contain a secret foundation which is identical with "the eternal truth of which Neo-Platonism is the interpreter."[49] It is easy to see that this was the main route by which dialectics entered Christian thought, and was, from the time of St. Augustine, at least, available as a technique of speculation both on perceived and revealed truth.[50]

It is no longer possible to skip from antiquity to the Renaissance in discussing the origins of the modern world. "Modern philosophic thought can be fully understood only in the light of Mediaeval thought. Now, Mediaeval thought, through Cicero and other Latin writers, through the Fathers, and through the continuations of Neo-Platonism, took on the heritage of Greek thought. For Greek thought had its own middle age, which prepared and determined our own Middle Ages, and an old age which, nevertheless, bore within it the presage of a revival of speculation."[51]

1B

46. R.P. McKeon, *Speculum* 17 (1942), page 4.
47. Robin, *op. cit.*, page 361.
48. Robin, page 368.
49. Robin, page 377.
50. Robin, page 378: "The Latin translation of Marius Victorinus, a Christian philosopher, introduced Plotinus and Porphyry to St. Augustine.... it was from the Neo-Platonic tradition that the Middle Ages received their education in logic ... through Martianus Capella ... and through Boethius ..."
51. Robin, *op. cit.*, page 379.

CHAPTER ONE

C. RHETORIC

THE TRIVIUM UNTIL ST. AUGUSTINE

McLuhan deals extensively with the doctrine of the Logos in this chapter, emphasizing that it is both a spiritual and material phenomenon, noting that adherence to the doctrine entails the ideal of universal erudition, commenting on the translation of Greek logos *into Latin* ratio atque oratio. *He continues to teach the distinctions and complementarities that hold among the departments of the trivium: "Just as for the adherent of the doctrine of the Logos, grammar is a science, and dialectics a part of philosophy, itself, rather than a mere technique of testing evidence, so rhetoric is a virtue, and one which is almost synonymous with wisdom." Nashe's writings are cited for the first time, and he is given his due as providing an eloquent account of the Ciceronian ideal of encyclopedic wisdom and oratory.*

—(Editor)

The important thing to consider in the history of rhetoric before Cicero is the question as to how the Greek tradition contributed to the ideals and practice of the *De Oratore*. Considered in its own right, Greek oratory has the numerous virtues and claims to superiority which R.C. Jebb has so finely discussed in *The Attic Orators*. The achievement of Cicero seems to be second-rate beside the best of the Greeks; but the influence of Cicero on medieval and Renaissance culture is out of all relation to his intrinsic worth.[1] It is, moreover, indispensable to have the central tradition of culture in mind if one is to steer through the numerous schools of rhetoric between the time of Corax and Quintilian. Whereas, in the case of grammar and dialectics there is a poverty of scholarly studies, quite the reverse is true of ancient rhetoric.[2] The field has been adequately explored but there has been no effort to perceive the central facts of the tradition as they were transmitted to the Middle Ages, and as they were handed on to the men of the Renaissance. This is partly owing to the lack of study of medieval rhetoric, but even more the result of failing to see that the matter becomes intelligible mainly in terms of the strife between grammarians and rhetoricians, dialecticians and grammarians, and rhetoricians and dialecticians.[3]

Professor McKeon points to a basic fact in the misunderstanding of the interrelation of these arts when he says that

> Valla, Vives, Ramus, and other Renaissance historians who treat the history of rhetoric pass over the intermediate period to criticize, refute, and occasionally approve of the doctrines of Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and Boethius. In early works of erudition and philology the scope of the history of rhetoric is no broader than the scope of controversy.[4]

He then passes in review the principal European historians of rhetoric, from [Daniel Georg] Morhof[']s *Polyhistor Literarius*] to our own time, to show that they have all adopted the Renaissance habit of skipping over the medieval period. But, whereas Valla, Vives, and Ramus and the rest did this deliberately and belligerently, not because they regarded the preceding ages as

1. Speaking of the extraordinary homogeneity and stability of Roman culture, Marrou says [*Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique*, page 6], "La grande figure de Cicéron prend ici une valeur symbolique. J'aurai bien souvent à rappeler après tant d'autres, tout ce qu'Augustin doit à l'auteur des Tusculanes, quel rôle de premier plan Cicéron a joué dans sa formation. Ce n'est pas là un hasard: dans une certaine mesure Cicéron a dominé toute la culture latine; tous les lettrés de l'antiquité latine ont été ses disciples, ont plus ou moins voulu être ses imitateurs."
2. Cicero's own generous accounts of the history of oratory ought to be read not only because they are the basis of most modern work but because of the great influence they had in the Middle Ages and in the Renaissance: *Brutus*, vii–xl; *Orator*, xii–xiii, lii; *De Oratore*, II, vi–xxiv.
3. See, for example, the *De Oratore* [I, xvi], in which Cicero says that the poet is the rival and almost is the equal of the orator. That poetry [*grammatica*] is the handmaid of rhetoric, is a commonplace in Quintilian, St. Augustine, and throughout the medieval and Renaissance periods. C.S. Baldwin [*Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic*, New York, 1928] and D.L. Clark [*Rhetoric and Poetry in the Renaissance*, New York, 1922] find this position unaccountable and annoying. In a much misquoted phrase of Milton's *On Education [To Master Samuel Hartlib]* Milton takes this traditional Ciceronian view. After grammar, he says, just so much logic should be studied as is useful to "a graceful and ornate rhetoric." To these "poetry would be made subsequent, or, indeed, rather precedent, as being less subtile and fine, but more simple, sensuous, and passionate." [Richard Garnett, ed., *Prose of Milton*, page 56.] "Passionate" is used in its traditional sense as the opposite of *ethos*, the latter being more appropriate to the orator. Thus the moral character of epic poetry, as opposed to tragic poetry put it in the province of *ethos*. Milton and Spenser, in common with the epic practitioners and theorists of the Renaissance, conceived of an epic poem as involving many provinces of rhetoric. They use for the epic poet the language which Cicero and Quintilian apply to the ideal orator.
4. McKeon, « Rhetoric in the Middle Ages », page 2.

insignificant, but because they were rhetoricians engaged in a very real war with the dialecticians of Paris, subsequent historians have innocently assumed that there was simply nothing to be investigated. We shall find Petrarch and Erasmus, involved in the grammatical phase of the war with the dialecticians, talking about St. Jerome and St. Augustine as though a great patristic tradition, of which they were products, had never flourished from the time of the Fathers until their own day. There was for them little point in urging what was obvious to everybody. These things were already becoming blurred to men of the seventeenth century. Victories had been won, and the victors had settled down to enjoy the fruits. In the early eighteenth century, confused reverberations of these distant battles were to be heard in the quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns. Then there is silence, though not the end of the tradition. The official views of the controversies are defined, though not written up until the time of Michelet, Burckhardt, and Symonds. However, the points at issue in these prolonged quarrels are ineradicable. The controversies stirred up in America by [University of Chicago] President [Robert Maynard] Hutchins and Professor [Mortimer] Adler, and the educational theories which have been put into practice at St. John's, Annapolis, have given us a contemporary taste of these ancient disputes.

Instead, therefore, of giving an account of the rise of the various schools of ancient rhetoric, which can be found in such works as that of E. Norden,[5] the immediate problem is to discover how the dominant art of rhetoric, as practised by a man like Isocrates, could have forced both Plato and Aristotle to take steps to counteract it,[6] and could, in Cicero, have confirmed the principal modes of culture for many ensuing centuries. When the problem is solved, it will be possible to explain how Erasmus, when "fifty years old and the recognized intellectual leader of Europe,"[7] could address himself to the same business which occupied Cicero in composing the *De Oratore*.[8]

The central clue to the whole matter is once more provided by the doctrine of the Logos. Arnold, reporting the ancient interpretation of the Logos as expounded by Heraclitus, says, "All things both in the material and in the spiritual world happen through the 'Logos'; it is a cosmic

5. *Die Antike Kunstprosa vom VI Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance*. Leipzig, 1923. Norden's interest is principally stylistic.
6. W. Rhys Roberts, *Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism*, page 46. See especially *De Oratore* III, xxxv.
7. L. K. Born, *The Education of a Christian Prince*, page 42; New York, 1936.
8. Born provides a valuable survey (*op. cit.*, pages 44–125) of the treatises which treat of the education of the ideal statesman or prince, beginning with Isocrates (436–338 B.C.). He fails, however, to disentangle the issues, not noting, for example, the conflicts between the ideals of the ascetic sage and the public orator, and not perceiving the extraordinary way in which Cicero's ideal orator is the prototype of the treatises on princely education from St. Augustine to Castiglione.

principle, 'common' or 'universal'; and in the third place, it is the duty of man to obey this 'Logos', and so to place himself in harmony with the rest of nature."[9] It was thus that Heraclitus was able to harmonize "by bold generalizations such diverse provinces as those of physics, religion, and ethics. It is to the Stoics almost alone that we owe it that teaching so suggestive and so practical was converted into a powerful social and intellectual force."[10] Having already discussed the implications for grammar and science which were deduced from these postulates, it is here relevant to note two further positions which were adopted in the light of this great doctrine. First, that "the bond of the state is the Logos (*ratio atque oratio*)."[11] Society, ideally the cosmopolis or perfect world state, thus claimed the devotion of every virtuous man. And just as Zeno considered wisdom or prudence "not only as the first of the virtues, but as the foundation of all," so political prudence is the noblest sphere in which to exercise this virtue.[12] Professor Jaeger, discussing the Sophists, who were popularizers of the speculation of their time, comes to the same conclusion, though from a very different point of view.[13]

The second position of importance which was established for ensuing centuries from the doctrine of the Logos is that concerning the importance of speech. This has been indicated in the section on grammar. When the Romans translated Logos as *ratio atque oratio*, they were describing the intimate relation which the Greeks had held to exist between these two. Man is a rational animal, but he is also a speaking animal. In fact, it is speech that distinguishes him from the brutes, and he becomes less brutish as he becomes more eloquent.[14] This notion, perhaps, grew very gradually in antiquity; but it is established before Isocrates; and it is precisely against the Sophist claim to teach wisdom and eloquence, virtue and practical political power as inseparable and simultaneous achievements of verbal virtuosity that Plato argues so persistently. For the Sophist, however, as for the Stoic, there was no conflict between wisdom, eloquence, and political success. It was not until the time of Seneca that the Stoics turned their backs to the world and abandoned the burdens of political office.[15] For "the Stoics generally held that all wisdom must justify itself by practical results."[16] Just as

9. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, page 37.
10. *ibid.*
11. Arnold, *op. cit.*, page 275.
12. Arnold, *op. cit.*, page 306. See Wilkins' introduction to the *De Oratore*, page 41 (Oxford, 1892). Cicero's celebrated dictum "Neque deesse neque superesse rei publicae volo" [cf. (Pollio) *Fam.*, x, 33,5.] is the perfect expression of this position. Until Cicero's time political virtue and individual virtue were one. (Professor Jaeger, page 90, suggests another approach to the same conclusion.) With Seneca comes the shift from public to private virtue (Arnold, page 116), which is reflected in the altered ideal of the Orator, which will be noted in Quintilian. The extraordinary conflict, which divided the educated world for centuries as to whether true wisdom consisted in the glory of the active life or the asceticism of seclusion, centred around the secondary conflict about the function of rhetoric in education and society. Not the least remarkable of the prolific literary expressions of this conflict is found in the fourth book of *Paradise Regained* (ll. 220–365). Milton is able to deal the Ciceronians a heavy blow (he, himself, a Ciceronian for most of his life) by putting an eloquent statement of that position into the mouth of Satan. Christ retorts with a modified statement of the "Attic" or Senecan position. Milton's complete consciousness of the background of these speeches is evident, if only in his borrowing images from Montaigne (Senecan) on the same subject (*Essais*. Book I, Chapters xxiv and xxxix). (Another typical attack on the Ciceronian position from a central figure in the dispute is given by Cornelius Agrippa—*Of Occult Philosophy* I, LX, 53; translation 1631). Petrarch's *Secretum* (*Cf.* trans. By William H. Draper, London, 1911) is, perhaps, the most celebrated work in which the Ciceronian and Senecan positions are discussed.
13. Pointing to the wide conception of culture held by Protagoras, he says "his education was frankly aimed at *humanism*. He implies that by subordinating what we now call civilization—namely, technical

for the adherent of the doctrine of the Logos, grammar is the basis of science, and dialectics a part of philosophy, itself, rather than a mere technique of testing evidence, so rhetoric is a virtue, and one which is almost synonymous with wisdom. Arnold does not fail to point out that "in this sense we may speak of logic and physics as virtues, that is, as subdivisions of the virtue of wisdom." (page 306) And in no other way is it possible to account, not only for the assurance with which Cicero presents the view that eloquence and wisdom are one, but the virtual unanimity with which the doctrine was received until the end of the Renaissance.[17]

Before dealing with Cicero's ideal of oratory, it would be well to focus the matter of encyclopædic learning, the circle of the arts, as it relates to the ideal of the orator. Robin has sufficiently described the universal erudition and connoisseurship which the Sophists displayed,[18] although he has, perhaps, neglected to demonstrate how inevitably the ideal of universal erudition follows from the concept of the Logos. The fact that neither Plato nor Aristotle accepted either the doctrine or its implications[19] has much to do with their independence of many of the characteristic features of Greek and Roman culture. When Plato and Aristotle attack the Sophists for claiming to teach wisdom by words, the modern reader approves; but if he were confronted by the concept of verbal wisdom as persuasively expounded in the humanism of Isocrates and Cicero, rather than by the unfriendly dialectic of Plato and Aristotle, he might be in serious doubts. The vast majority of educated men in antiquity, however, felt no doubts in pursuing the urbane and scholarly ideal of the Sophists and the rhetoricians of Greece and Rome; and the precise, scientific implications of the thought of Plato and Aristotle have been of importance only to a handful of people.[20]

If there is one word which is oftener used by Cicero, or which better describes his position than another, it is *humanitas*.[21] Our own understanding of the concept today is not unlike that of Cicero's and Scipio's. "Scipio himself did not perhaps formally become a Stoic, but he introduced into Roman society the atmosphere of Stoicism, known to the Romans as *humanitas*: this included an aversion to war and civil strife, an eagerness to appreciate the

efficiency—to culture ... the only true 'universal' culture in Protagoras' eyes is *political* culture." And he adds, "This conception of the nature of 'universal' culture summarizes the whole history of Greek education: ethics and politics taken together are one of the essential qualities of true paideia." (Jaeger, *Paideia*, page 279) See also, pages 318 and 323 for further ways in which the Sophists transformed the idea of the state. Professor Jaeger's failure to relate the Sophists to the antecedent speculation makes his discussion less valuable than that of Robin.

14. Cicero develops the idea. (*De Oratore*, I, viii) When the history of the Ciceronian tradition in the sixteenth century is written, it will be easy to understand how important a part these doctrines played in the literature of that period alone. For example, Prospero says to Caliban that he "each hour

> Took pains to make thee speak, taught thee
> One thing or other: when thou didst not, savage
> Know thine own meaning, but wouldst gabble like
> A thing most brutish, I endow'd thy purposes
> With words that made them known." (I, ii, 354–358)

See, also, ll.363–364; 478–480. Prospero, like Cicero's orator, says that the liberal arts have been all his study (I, ii, 73–74). Thus, he was fitted for the exercise of political prudence.

15. Arnold, *op. cit.*, page 116. The Senecan withdrawal had very important literary and ethical consequences even before the Renaissance.
16. Arnold, *op. cit.*, page 306.
17. The praise which Boccaccio accords Petrarch is that which any poet or humanist of the Renaissance coveted: "I envy Argua the happiness of holding deposited in her soil him whose heart was the abode of the muses, and the sanctuary of philosophy and eloquence." (T. Campbell, *The Life and Times*

art and literature of Greece, and an admiration for the ideals depicted by Xenophon, of the ruler in Cyrus, and of the citizen in Socrates."[22] Thus, the more one explores the doctrines of the Sophists and the Stoics the more Ciceronian the Hellenic tradition seems to become. It is easy to make too much of a contrast between the free speculative character of Greek thought and the ethical and practical character of the Romans. Outside of Plato, and, more especially, Aristotle, two men whose esoteric, scientific discoveries had little effect on the main currents of Greek and Roman life, the great crowd of philosophic sects, as well as the Sophists, are strongly, tirelessly moral and political in doctrine and emphasis. If ethics and politics are seen as the basic orientation of Greek, as well as Roman, education and culture, the extraordinary prestige of Cicero, even for men like Quintilian, who are very much interested in Greek culture, becomes intelligible. Again, there is nothing strange in the fact that Cicero's pre-eminence is not seriously affected by the renaissance of Greek studies in the sixteenth century.[23]

Some effort having been made to indicate the traditions which converge in Cicero, it is necessary to outline his concept of the orator in order that its later influence and the controversies which it engendered may be understood. The Ciceronian ideal itself, apart from the modifications it underwent, is stated in a striking way at several places in the *De Oratore*. Cicero's insistence on the union of eloquence and wisdom is readily seen in Book III, chapter 35:

> "... Aristotle said *it was disgraceful for him to be silent while he allowed Isocrates to speak.* He therefore adorned and illustrated all philosophical learning, and associated the knowledge of things with practice in speaking. Nor did this escape the knowledge of that very sagacious monarch Philip, who sent for him as tutor for his son Alexander, that he might acquire from the same teacher instructions at once in conduct and in language. Now, if anyone desires to call that philosopher, who instructs us fully in things and words, an *orator*, he may do so without opposition from me; or if he prefer to call that orator, of whom I speak as having wisdom united with eloquence, a *philosopher*,

of Petrarch, II, page 315.) As poetry or grammar, and erudition, so moral philosophy and eloquence were one.

18. Robin, *Greek Thought and the Origins of the Scientific Spirit*, pages 139ff.
19. Arnold stresses the fact that Socrates and his followers alike "held aloof from the physical speculations" (page 47) which had been so prominent in the thought of his predecessors, and in that of the subsequent Stoics. Arnold cites Seneca to the effect that Socrates "recalled the whole of philosophy to moral questions" (page 43). This is a highly significant shift of emphasis and one ardently approved by Cicero (*De Oratore*, I, li). It had the effect of opposing Socrates and Plato to the Sophists and their pantheistic doctrines of the universal analogies which exist between all things and the mind of man. In this latter view erudition was an end in itself, because it bound us to creation and explained ourselves to ourselves. Thus, whereas Socrates said "virtue is knowledge," the Stoic was to say that we must study "physics that we may rightly understand the universe and its providential government, upon which the conception of duty depends." (Arnold, page 306)
20. W. Rhys Roberts, *op. cit.*, pages 44–46, has some good comments on the rivalry felt by Plato and Aristotle towards Isocrates, as, for example, that Plato's "pre-eminence, and that of Aristotle, in the unfettered search for truth made it inevitable that, from their time onwards, a clear line should be drawn between philosophers and rhetoricians, and that Socrates should find his fitting place among the latter." (page 45) However clearly this line may have been drawn by St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, and by mathematical physicists since Descartes, it is not so drawn between the time of Cicero and John of Salisbury. For Cicero on the rivalry of Aristotle and Isocrates, see *Orator*, li, 172.
21. *De Oratore*, II, xxxvii. See also Jaeger, *op. cit.*, page xxiii.
22. Arnold, *op. cit.*, page 381. Cyrus and Socrates are great figures for the Middle Ages as well as the

> I shall make no objection, provided it be allowed that neither *his* inability to speak, who understands his subject but can not set it forth in words, nor *his* ignorance, to whom matter is wanting though words abound, can merit commendation; and if I had to choose one of the two, I should prefer uneloquent good sense to loquacious folly. But if it be inquired which is the more eminent excellence, the palm is to be given to the learned orator; and if they allow the same person to be a philosopher, there is an end of controversy; but if they distinguish them, they will acknowledge their inferiority in this respect, that all their knowledge is inherent in the *complete orator*; but in the knowledge of the *philosophers* eloquence is not necessarily inherent; which, though it may be undervalued by them, must of necessity be thought to give a finishing grace to their sciences." When Crassus had spoken thus, he made a pause for a while, and the rest kept silence.[24]

Thus *doctus orator* is the perfect Ciceronian formula. This taken in conjunction with the notion of man as a talking animal (I, viii) and, therefore, as one who by cultivating his human nature, leads to what Cicero calls *politior humanitas*: "For to you, Catullus, I will speak as one having less learning than experience, which is the bigger thing. To discourse on any other topic, take my word for it, is but pastime to a man who is no dullard and has had some training, and is not unacquainted with general literature and a tolerably polite education."[25] *Politior humanitas* which Cicero assumes as a prior acquisition of the prospective orator is, of course, that grounding in linguistic disciplines together with the introduction to the encyclopedia of the arts which was provided by any competent *grammaticus*.[26] When, finally, there was added to this the political training provided by practice in the law-courts, the training of the orator was complete: "But the battles of the law-courts involve really great difficulty and, I rather think, by far the most arduous of human enterprises ..."[27]

It is to be shown that the Middle Ages never lost sight of the Ciceronian connection between oratory and letters, on one hand, or between law and oratory, on the other. But when great dialecticians and metaphysicians arose

Renaissance. In *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy* M. Gilson devotes a whole chapter to "Self-knowledge and Christian Socratism," tracing the medieval influence in Montaigne and Pascal (pages 209–228). Speaking of the medieval attitude toward pre-Christian pagans, he shows that whereas St. Paul "invoked against the pagans a natural revelation which condemns them, St. Justin gives them the benefit of a natural revelation which saves them. Socrates became so faithful a Christian that it is not surprising that the devil made him a martyr for the truth; and Justin, in fact, is not far from exclaiming like Erasmus: St. Socrates, pray for us!" (page 27)

23. In what is almost the only account of the anti-Ciceronian movement of the sixteenth century, M. W. Croll says that even the boldest anti-Ciceronian critics always keep an Augustinian and Ciceronian orthodoxy in reserve. Even Montaigne admits that mere literary excellence abstracted from moral value is best found in St. Augustine. ("Attic Prose: Lipsius, Montaigne, Bacon," page 142) The identity between St. Augustine and Cicero goes back beyond Petrarch.

    Nashe gives an eloquent account of the Ciceronian ideal of encyclopedic wisdom and oratory (McKerrow, 1.34,32–37,4) which he concludes with an attack on the Attic stylists and anti-Ciceronian politicians of the School of Night. The missing clues to the School of Night mystery will be found in the much larger Ciceronian dispute of which it is a minor reflection.

24. Trans., J. S. Watson, New York, 1860. (The Loeb edition of Book III is not at hand.) [Loeb Classical Library, Book III Trans., H. Rackham, pages 111–113.]

25. [Cicero, *De Oratore*, Books I–II, trans., E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library, page 251], II, xvii.

26. In the Augustan age, says Gwynn (page 158), "The *grammatici* were far less popular than the contemporary teachers of rhetoric, and their class-rooms far less fashionable. Those who know the Augustan age only from the works of Virgil, Horace, Ovid, and Livy can form no true judgment of the literary

once more, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, they could scarcely be expected to submit their science to those of the grammarian and rhetorician. A great strife arose, having the widest consequences for the development of human knowledge. The triumph of grammar and rhetoric in the sixteenth century provided all the methods and tools for the literary achievements of that age. They provided the ideal of Castiglione embodied in Shakespeare's *Henry V*:

> Hear him but reason in divinity,
> And all-admiring with an inward wish
> You would desire the King were made a prelate:
> Hear him debate of commonwealth affairs,
> You would say it hath been all in all his study:
> List his discourse of war, and you shall hear
> A fearful battle render'd you in music:
> Turn him to any cause of policy,
> The Gordian knot of it he will unloose,
> Familiar as his garter: that, when he speaks,
> The air, a charter'd libertine, is still,
> And the mute wonder lurketh in men's ears,
> To steal his sweet and honey'd sentences;
> So that the art and practic part of life
> Must be the mistress to this theoric:
>
> (*Henry V*, 1, i, 38–52)

Significantly, the opening lines of this speech show the modification which St. Jerome and St. Augustine and their successors, including Erasmus, made in the Ciceronian ideal. Apart, however, from the precedence given to grammatical theology, the rest of the speech could have come straight out of the *De Oratore*. It is an amplification of the position that "whatever the theme, from whatever art or whatever branch of knowledge it be taken, the orator, just as if he had got up the case for a client, will state it better and more

society in which these stately 'Augustans' moved. Fortunately Seneca's father, who was a student of rhetoric all his life and lived to the age of seventy, wrote down his personal reminiscences of the rhetores and their art for the benefit of his sons."

27. II, xvii. (Loeb, page 251)

gracefully that the actual discoverer and the specialist."[28] The Renaissance, as illustrated in this character of Henry V, is no leap back over the centuries to Cicero, but the outcome of a continuous tradition. For we shall find these ideals to be important ingredients of medieval culture itself.

However, the anti-Ciceronians of the sixteenth century, Lipsius, Montaigne and Muretus, challenged these ideals; and Descartes and Pascal tried to deracinate them. The quarrel between the ancients and the moderns is a revival, or continuation, of the quarrel which Cicero waged with the philosophers, and which the medieval dialecticians waged against the grammarians. So deeply ingrained is the Ciceronian ideal in the pattern of our culture that even Wordsworth can be seen in relation to it. His antipathy to the Ciceronian, Dr. Johnson, and his emphasis upon the feelings, rather than the words, of poetry led him to range himself on the side of the moderns and scientists. A consideration of the Ciceronian ideal and tradition, therefore, has claims to being one of basic importance in the history of Western culture, and its comparative neglect must be ascribed to impercipience of the ubiquitous, rather than to mere indifference, on the part of scholars.

One fact which has unnecessarily hindered historians in this matter has been to suppose that a history of oratory can be written in terms of the rhetorical textbooks which are available. Cicero can put us right on that matter, since he frankly designates his adversaries to be the professors of rhetoric. (*De Oratore* I, xxiii–xxxvi) Their boast that they could make any normally gifted man into an orator by schooling him in a set of rules was precisely an instance of what Cicero regarded as the fatal segregation and specialization of the arts. In fact, one reason for writing the *De Oratore*, he tells us, was to correct the popular opinions which were current, partly as a result of his own juvenile *De Inventione*:

> For it is your wish, as you often have told me, that—since the unfinished and crude essays, which slipped out of the notebooks of my boyhood, or rather of my youth, are hardly worthy of my present time of life and of my

28. *De Oratore*, I, xii. Quintilian (II, xxi) gives a lengthy development and illustration of this position.

experience gained from the numerous and grave causes in which I have been engaged—I should publish something more polished and complete on these same topics; and generally you disagree with me, in our occasional discussions of this subject, because I hold that eloquence is dependent upon the trained skill of highly educated men, while you consider that it must be separated from the refinements of learning and made to depend on a sort of natural talent and of practice.[29]

The *De Inventione* which was to remain a standard textbook from Cicero's day until the time, at least, of Ben Jonson, was, as Cicero says, based on the notes he had gathered while studying with Greek masters.[30] In the *Orator*, written after the *De Oratore*, Cicero significantly rounds out his technical treatment of the parts of rhetoric which are not treated in the *De Inventione*. The *Orator* is mainly concerned, not with invention and arrangement, but with style (*elocutio*) and delivery. In connection with these matters, Cicero gives a masterly presentation of the doctrine of decorum (traditional even in his day) which had the greatest influence on European literature.[31] The point of all this is that Cicero never wished to neglect the technical features of linguistic art, but insofar as oratory shared all these rules with poetry, there is in these texts no basis for defining the nature of oratory.[32] Cicero, therefore, repeats with emphasis that rhetoric is but one element in oratory. (*De Oratore*, I, xxiii; xxx–xxxi; xxxvi; II, iii; xvii–xix; III, xx; xxxvii) Since the precepts of the rhetoricians are the artistic formulation of the experience of men speaking in the Greek agora and in the Roman forum, this kind of textbook art of rhetoric is a mere by-product of true eloquence: "And, indeed, in my opinion, no man can be an orator complete in all points of merit, who has not attained a knowledge of all important subjects and arts. For it is from knowledge that oratory must derive its beauty and fullness ..." (*De Oratore*, I, vi)

A knowledge of what was called the liberal arts is plainly indicated (I, xvi). To these must be added the study of law, the only art to be studied in its entirety by the orator, and a long practice in the handling of the problems

29. *De Oratore*, I, ii.
30. Gwynn, *Roman Education*, pages 96ff. has a valuable discussion of the influence of the Greek treatises, in especial, those of Hermagoras, on the *De Inventione* and the *Ad Herennium*, showing that Stoic dialectics applied to rhetoric had already created the sort of barren handbook which was to recur in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, bringing down the wrath of the humanists. It is, once more, the effort of dialecticians to reduce all knowledge to a dialectical mode.
31. See *Orator*, v–vii, xxi–xxii, xxix, for his discussion and illustration of the three levels of style and the decorum which determines their application. See xvi; xxxix–lxxxi for *elocutio*. For delivery see xvii–xix. Memory, the fifth part of oratory, receives ample treatment in the *De Oratore*, itself: II, lxxiv; lxxxvi–lxxxix. Although the subject of decorum has been increasingly slighted since the seventeenth century, the results have been unfortunate. A study of the opposition to the grand style is needed. It would have to begin with the Greek "Atticists." In the time of Hobbes the arguments are refurbished in the interests of mathematical physics with its distrust of imagination and language. The best discussions of the matter I have found are by G. L. Hendrickson, J. F. D'Alton, Inez Scott, and Maurice Evans. [see bibliography for titles and complete publication information—ed.]
32. "The truth is that the poet is a very near kinsman of the orator, rather more heavily fettered as regards rhythm, but with ampler freedom in the choice of words, while in the use of many sorts of ornament he is his ally and almost his counterpart, ..." (*De Oratore*, I, xvi) This was a commonplace before Aristotle and remained one throughout medieval and Renaissance times until the age of Johnson. C. S. Baldwin (*Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic*) and D. L. Clark (*Rhetoric and Poetry in the Renaissance*) deplore the lack of distinction between rhetoric and poetic in medieval and Renaissance times. Since, however, their surveys are based on the handbooks whose authors considered many features of rhetorical and poetical language to be common to both arts, they naturally failed to find the distinctions they sought.

of private and public life (1, liv–lxii). For the whole orientation of the ideal orator is with regard to the exercise of political prudence. So completely interdependent for Cicero were eloquence and the right to political power that he can say of the grand style: "The orator of the third style is magnificent, opulent, stately and ornate; he undoubtedly has the greatest power. This is the man whose brilliancy and fluency have caused admiring nations to let eloquence attain to the highest power in the state;..." (*Orator*, xxvii) It is thus quite understandable that in medieval times eloquence was less a branch of homiletics than of law.[33] With full secular expression of the Ciceronian ideal in fifteenth-century Italy and in sixteenth-century Europe, what was more natural than to hear once more of the Ciceronian glorification of the state and of those who governed it? We shall see that those who wrote on the subject of politics and the education of princes and counsellors were consciously echoing Cicero.

In passing on to Quintilian we meet, not an orator, but a schoolmaster—a schoolmaster who idolized Cicero and had much to do with the consolidation and uninterrupted transmission of his doctrines through the following centuries. However, as Gwynn points out, "his *Institutio Oratoria* makes rhetoric the centre of education to a degree which Cicero would never have tolerated."[34] And Cicero's *doctus orator* tends in Quintilian to be a *scholasticus*. One further difference of emphasis in Quintilian as regards the perfect orator is that

> the first essential for such a one is that he should be a good man, and consequently we demand of him not merely the possession of exceptional gifts of speech but of all the excellences of character, as well. For I will not admit that the principles of upright and honourable living should, as some have held, be regarded as the peculiar concern of philosophy. The man who can really play his part as a citizen and is capable of meeting the demands both of public and private business, the man who can guide a state by his counsels, give it a firm basis by his legislation and purge its vices by his decisions as a judge, is assuredly no other than the orator of our quest[35]

70

These distinctions were made by medieval philosophers not in terms of linguistic technique but of function or end. See St. Thomas Aquinas In I *Anal. Post.*, lect. 1 for an explanation of Aristotle's traditional explanation of the provinces of logic, rhetoric, and poetic. Because the dialectician must use probable proof, and the rhetorician need only use presumptive proof, and the poet need only feign proof since actually he *makes* his connections, it does not follow that the poet may not use the modes of argumentation which lie outside his immediate province. The discussion of the modes of the occurrence of the syllogism in these arts, including sophistry, is such as to make modern efforts to distinguish between prose and poetry, or to isolate the logical content of poetry, seem utterly naïve. For a presentation and brief consideration of these texts, see W. J. Ong's "The Province of Rhetoric and Poetic" in *The Modern Schoolman* 19 (1942), pages 24–27.

33. L. J. Paetow, *The Battle of the Seven Arts*; Berkeley, 1914; pages 22–23. C. H. Haskins (*The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century*, Cambridge, Mass., 1927; chapter viii) is good on law, but does not see its connections with rhetoric and dialectics in the Middle Ages.
34. Gwynn, *Roman Education*, page 247.
35. *The* Institutio Oratoria *of Quintilian with an English Translation by H. E. Butler, M. A.*, 4 Vols. Loeb, 1920, Rpt., 1963, I. *Proemium* 9–10, pages 9–11.

The shift here from merely *doctus orator* to *vir bonus dicendi peritus* is surely in accordance with Cicero's desire to subordinate philosophy to rhetoric and to identify eloquence and wisdom. However, the tendency of Roman Stoics to dissociate public and private virtue at this time may have been influential.[36] It is striking to note how Milton adapts the language of Quintilian to his own description of the true poet.[37]

It is fairly obvious that Quintilian's substitution of *vir bonus dicendi peritus* for Cicero's *doctus orator* could not have but endeared the ideal of eloquence to Christian ages. If eloquence required encyclopedic learning, well and good: so did grammatical theology. But if eloquence, also, required perfection in moral virtue, the eloquence is even more desirable. Thus it will seem to St. Augustine; and there is nothing surprising in the early Christian concept of *Christus Rhetor* and the sculptured representations of Christ as the perfect orator.[38]

Quintilian offers the same program of studies as Cicero, and gives a much more detailed treatment of these, and all the matters of style and decorum, than does Cicero. Thus Quintilian was of much greater utility to the schoolmasters who followed him. Moreover, living as he did in a world in which there was no longer the same public scope for eloquence as in Cicero's day, he provided an adaptation of the ideals of Ciceronian eloquence which was workable for the immediately succeeding centuries. The strong emphasis on moral excellence in place of public success and power and magnificence was bound to appeal to Christian readers.

It is a commonplace that all the Latin Fathers of the Church underwent the kind of education outlined by Cicero and Quintilian. Grammar and rhetoric was the basis of their education.[39] The very understandable conflict between Christianity and pagan literature is met in many pages of the Fathers; but it seldom amounts to a prohibition for the very good reason that the choice was between a pagan education and no education. The persistent warning against the dangers of the classics is followed by the recognition that they must be read in order to provide the disciplines and knowledge necessary for theology.[40] A glance at de Labriolle will show

36. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, pages 113 and 394.
37. There is an apparent anomaly in the fact that so staunch a Ciceronian as Quintilian should in the sixteenth century have been a favourite with the anti-Ciceronians or Atticists. The fact, however, that he had in his youth been an enthusiastic Senecan (Gwynn, *op. cit.*, page 236), and that he shows an appreciation of the power of that style (X, I) and found it necessary to make a lengthy defence of Cicero's style against the Senecans (XII, x) may account for this in part. There is the further fact of his devotion to Stoic authors and to Plato. Gwynn states that "The tone of the *Institutio Oratoria* suggests that Quintilian owed more to these essays [of Seneca] than to Cicero's philosophical dialogues" (page 237). It is precisely in stylistic matters of this kind that the men of the Renaissance had a much more accurate scent than [do] modern classical scholars. At least Lorenzo Valla (1407–1457) knew Quintilian almost by heart, says F. H. Colson (*op. cit.*, page lx) and wrote a comparison between Cicero and Quintilian which offended Ciceronian orthodoxy. (See Izora Scott, *Controversies over the Imitation of Cicero*, New York, 1910; pages 10–14) Rudolph Agricola (1444–1485), the influential German humanist who had such a great effect in undermining the Ciceronians (his *Dialectica* inspired Ramus in breaking off the first two parts of rhetoric, leaving rhetoric only the art of ornamentation) was devoted to Quintilian. (Colson, *op. cit.*, lxix. Colson notes various instances of Quintilian's influences and reputation but seems to have given no consideration to the violent controversies which involved his name.) Erasmus' attack on the slavish imitators of Cicero in *Ciceronianus*, amplifies Quintilian's view in Book X, ii. And the *De Tradendis Disciplinis* (1531) of Vives, the greatest educational work of the sixteenth century, says Colson (page lxxii), while surpassing Quintilian's, yet rests solidly on him. Muretus, the great Attic rebel against Cicero and the inspirer of Montaigne, reports that in his boyhood nobody who did not give first place to Quintilian was held a good teacher. (Colson, *op. cit.*, page xxiv) Colson is puzzled that Quintilian seems to have had no interest for Rabelais, or Castiglione, or Montaigne.

that the great Fathers were, as Tertullian put it, *fiunt non nascantur christiani* (*Apologeticum*, 18, 4). And even Jerome, though reared a Christian, was a pupil of the celebrated Donatus. St. Augustine's account in his *Confessions* of his years as a famous professor of rhetoric, and of the fascination which the eloquence of Ambrose had for him, is too familiar to need amplification.

Such standard works as those of Norden, Manitius, and Raby have all shown that patristic literature is in its stylistic modes an expression of the very conditions of Latin literature prevalent at the time they were composed.[41] The further fact that the style and forms of medieval literature are a continuation of those of late Latin literature is just beginning to be appreciated. Again, the controversial emphasis on Cicero and Augustan literature in the sixteenth century, establishing, as it did, the general emphasis of classical studies until our own time, has obscured the origins and development of medieval literature. The fact that late Latin eloquence had lost its original objective—the formation of eloquent statesmen—rendered much of its program futile. The encyclopedia of the arts was redirected toward the writing of history and poetry. Into this situation entered the Fathers of the Church.

The remarkable sentence of St. Augustine cited by Marrou (page 2) gives us the new bearings of the entire Ciceronian program with regard to ensuing Christian culture: *O utinam doctissimum aliquem, neque id tantum, sed etiam eloquentissimum, et omnino sapientissimum, perfectumque hominem ... de hoc ambo interrogare possemus!*[42] As a writer this is exactly what St. Augustine has been. In the *Retractationes*[43] St. Augustine tells us that he had written a work *De Grammatica* (lost). We still have his six books *De Musica*. He adds that he had begun to write the following treatises, which he never completed: *De Dialectica, De Rhetorica, De Geometrica, De Arithmetica, De Philosophia*. That was the completed course of studies as St. Augustine thought it should be followed, and as Isidore of Seville was later to formulate it. The resemblance to Quintilian is obvious.[44]

So much for the *puerilis institutio*. What about the *politior humanitas*? St. Augustine became acquainted with the beauty of philosophy by reading the

Rabelais is an out-and-out grammarian and theologian, rather than a rhetorician. Castiglione is firmly Ciceronian, while Montaigne is so anti-Ciceronian that he has to discard Quintilian, as well.

38. Christopher Dawson, *The Making of Europe*; New York, 1938; page 64. See, also, Louis Bréhier's *L'Art Chrétien* (page 53) where he says that the figure of Christ, once it began to be freely represented, is based on the conventional figure of the ideal orator-philosopher. Further on (page 55) he says that early Christian art is really "the final flowering of Hellenistic art, but in adopting the style of a decadent culture it gave it a new charm and freshness, and, finally, breaking free from its earlier trammels and receiving the sanction and encouragement of the Church, became the Catholic art of the Middle Ages. Similarly, from the dying literary culture of the ancient world proceeded the vigorous shoot of Christian literature, which was to issue in the Latin of the Vulgate, and, at a later date, in the poetry of the *Stabat Mater* and the *Dies Irae*." (F. J. E. Raby, *A History of Christian-Latin Poetry*; Oxford, 1927; I, page 8)
39. de Labriolle, *History and Literature of Christianity*, page 6 *et passim*.
40. M. Roger, *L'enseignement des lettres classiques d'Ausone à Alcuin*, Paris, 1905; pages 131–143.
41. Marrou, *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique*, pages 4, 15, 89, *et passim*. Marrou's entire volume is devoted to an analysis of the implications of this situation for St. Augustine, and for the great influence of St. Augustine on the Middle Ages.
42. *De Quantitate animae* 33 (70), *P. L.*, 32, 1073. The references henceforth designated *P. L.* followed by the number of volume and column are to Migne's *Patrologia Latina*.
43. *P. L.* 32, 591.
44. de Labriolle (page 345) shows how Origen, in the third century, familiar with all Greek systems, had conceived the idea of an encyclopedic synthesis, the *Peri Archon*.

Hortensius, the lost treatise of Cicero. Like Cicero, he then became a member of the New Academy, but later embraced the doctrine of Plotinus. There was no eloquence without philosophy in St. Augustine; of his eloquence, it can be said, as of Cicero's that it was a copiously talking wisdom. Like Cicero, St. Augustine has written philosophical dialogues and delivered many orations and discourses. What had become a dead eloquence, a written eloquence, was again becoming public speech, the eloquence of a man addressing a crowd. Cicero wanted to become an historian but never realized his wish. St. Augustine did become one in the best Latin and Roman tradition in his *De Civitate Dei.*

As already seen, St. Augustine is the learned grammarian in his theological works, Quintilian's *poetarum enarratio* becoming with him a *psalmorum enarratio.* The *De Doctrina Christiana* is in the history of Christian culture the exact counterpart of the *De Oratore* of Cicero. It is the charter of Christian education. And grammar, as we have seen, plays a predominant role in this scheme because of its prime importance for the theologian.[45] Yet the fourth book is given over to rhetoric, to the modes of making known the meaning which grammar and the other arts have ascertained (IV, 1; 5). The doctrines of Cicero are repeatedly invoked as authoritative (IV, 3; 6; 7; 10; 12; 18) for the Christian orator is constantly dealing with great matters (IV, 18). Yet the Christian orator will naturally consider his audience and the occasion and the theme, saying little things in a subdued style in order to give instruction, moderate things in a temperate style, in order to give pleasure, and great things in a majestic style, in order to sway the mind (IV, 17). He quotes (IV, 12) Cicero's celebrated formula that an eloquent man must teach, delight, and persuade (*Orator*, XXI) and illustrates the various styles from the Scriptures (IV, 20) and from St. Ambrose and St. Cyprian (IV, 21).

One can see here a typical instance of the problems which unavoidably arise when a Christian thinks that the disciplines which he has learned are fundamentally sound, but have to be transformed by grace. Thus St. Augustine felt that all of Cicero's doctrines had to be overhauled. He was in a position to do the job; for with the great Christian orators of the four

45. Of its four books three are given over to the linguistic and liberal arts necessary to the interpreter of scripture. Just as Bacon was later to claim in attacking the dialecticians, St. Augustine says arts and knowledge are for use, for the relief of man's estate; and, as Bacon freely admits, the greatest art is theology, since it is for the relief of man's spiritual estate. Insofar as some arts are not merely for use but enjoyment, says St. Augustine (I,3), we must be chary of resting in them too long. We shall see that before Bacon, the grammarians attacked the schoolmen on these grounds, just as some highly cultivated men like Peter [Damiani] resolutely attacked all profane knowledge for the same reasons. St. Augustine devotes much space to the matter of interpreting figures of speech (II, xvi and most of Book III) and to the four levels of interpretation. He shows how Pliny's natural science is an exegetical aid (II, 16; 29) and how number symbolism with its relation to motion and sounds is necessary (II, 16; 38) since the science of numbers was not created but discovered by man. History is helpful (II, 28) and Dialectics is of great use in searching into all sorts of questions in scripture (II, 31). The fourth book was written thirty years after the first three.

centuries before him, Roman eloquence was coming back to life in the purity of the Ciceronian ideal; not merely the written eloquence of Quintilian. The difference was that instead of addressing men to guide them toward the common good of the city, as Brutus, Crassus, Cicero, and others had done, St. Augustine and the Christian orators resorted to eloquence to guide Christians to God and the common good of the City of God.[46]

46. E.K. Rand, in *Founders of the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass., 1928; pages 49–64), gives a useful resume of the Ciceronian Lactantius's *Divine Institutes*, which was the first book to be printed in Italy, and one of the most read books of the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Rand sums up: "For from first to last the principle is written clear that, while Christian faith finds much in Pagan belief and Pagan morals to avoid, it may, or rather *must*, draw freely for its sustenance on the thought, the poetry, and the inspiration of the past." (Page 63) See also Rand's chapter on "St. Jerome the Humanist" (pages 102–134).

CHAPTER TWO

THE TRIVIUM FROM ST. AUGUSTINE TO ABELARD

CHAPTER TWO

A. GRAMMAR

THE TRIVIUM FROM ST. AUGUSTINE TO ABELARD

In the opening pages of this chapter, McLuhan is in historical mode, spanning centuries, and providing the documentation for the correctives his thesis delivers. If we keep in mind the introductory chapter, the account of the origins of the dissertation, and the flaw that McLuhan detected in Chambers's On the Continuity of English Prose, *the unifying thread of his work is clear as a subtext throughout; here we are explicitly reminded of it at the end of his second paragraph: "to render the continuity of the trivium evident." This objective achieves its own intensified unity in passages succinctly drawing together all three domains of the trivium: "[Fourteenth-century Italy's] schools show an uninterrupted tradition of grammar and rhetoric, untouched by the great dialectical developments of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries."*

Footnote 5 has been retained exactly as originally written, between June 1940 and the submission of the dissertation, some two and a half years later. With no news of Etienne Gilson, then in occupied France, McLuhan's acknowledgement of Gilson's influence reads like an elegy, but none would prove to be necessary (see page xv). Footnote 23, perhaps to be construed as equal parts appeal and promise to readers impatient for the appearance of Nashe, also reemphasizes the unity of McLuhan's subject: "Education continued to be based on the cycle of the liberal arts until the days of Thomas Nashe. Our problem is at once to show this and to explain some of its more important literary consequences." Footnote 24 quotes E. C. Thomas (see bibliography) describing antiquity's division between the arts (the trivium) and the sciences (the quadrivium of arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy).

—(Editor)

"The influence of the schools of grammar and rhetoric is apparent in every page of Tertullian; of Jerome, and Augustine," says Raby,[1] "and until we arrive at the sixth and seventh centuries, we shall hardly find a Christian poet who does not owe his training entirely to the grammarians and rhetoricians." Raby is unable to show or even to guess at any other source of indebtedness for poets in these or any of the subsequent centuries which occupy his study. That there was no other conceivable education is evident in the lament of Gregory of Tours in 580 that the cities of Gaul allow the cultivation of literature to perish. Not one man can be found who had grammar, is versed in dialectics, who is able to depict the events of the times either in prose or in verse.[2]

Roman culture flourished in Gaul in the fourth and fifth centuries more than in Italy. Norden says[3] that Gaul was destined to be in a higher measure than the actual mother-country, Italy, the support of the ancient culture during the time of the Roman Empire and throughout the Middle Ages. Flooded with barbarians, sown with cloisters, he continues, she held aloft the banner of traditional education to the glory of herself and the service of mankind. This, however, as Haarhoff shows in his useful study,[4] was truer of the fourth and fifth centuries than of the sixth, seventh, or eighth centuries, when England kept alive the intellectual traditions which were restored to the continent when Charlemagne invited Alcuin to undertake the work of re-establishing an educational program in his empire. Some account of the events in England which led to the Carolingian renaissance is necessary to render the continuity of the trivium evident.[5]

The story of the growth of English culture has often been told. Before the Anglo-Saxon invasions Rome had already sent missionaries to Britain and built up a more or less flourishing Christianity. However, there was so much ill-feeling between the pagan invaders and the Christian Britons, including the clergy, that the conversion of the Anglo-Saxons by the Britons was impossible. In the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicles*[6] for the year 596 we read: "This year Pope Gregory sent Augustine to Britain with many monks to preach the word of God to the people."

1. Raby, *A History of Christian-Latin Poetry*, I, page 7.
2. *History of the Franks*, X, 31. There is a translation of a large portion of the work by Ernest Brehaut, New York, 1916.
3. E. Norden, *Antike Kunstprosa*, II, page 631.
4. T[heodore]. Haarhoff, *Schools of Gaul*, Oxford, 1920; page 39. See, also, A. F. Ozanam, *History of Civilization in the Fifth Century*, London, 1868.
5. Some years after having begun a systematic study of the origins and development of the trivium, I had the good fortune to see a report of some lectures of Professor Gilson. While I was at work on these matters in Cambridge (1939–1940) he gave several lectures (at the Institute of Medieval Studies in Toronto, where he is director of studies) on the continuity of classical studies in the Middle Ages. Professor Gilson returned to France some months before its fall, and nothing has been heard from him since. These lectures, among the last he gave in this country, are of the greatest interest. Although they are not primarily concerned with the trivium, they are full of the most stimulating and helpful insights into the tangled subjects of grammar and dialectics, and have helped to clarify several points by which I had long been puzzled. Had these lectures been published before now, I should have been able to reduce the extent of this and the next section on grammar, and have had more space to devote to the sixteenth century itself. Moreover, the authority of Professor Gilson's great scholarship would have been available to support many of my own interpretations. If, therefore, this and the next section on grammar have some merit undetectable in the rest of this study, I wish that all credit for it should go to Professor Gilson.
6. Everyman, page 281.

Our problem now is the history of early Anglo-Saxon literature, considered as a by-product of the missionary work of Augustine of Canterbury. When Augustine and his monks went to England, they naturally carried with them the necessary religious books without which Christian liturgy, etc., would have been impossible. Five years later, in the year 601, at the time when Augustine was consecrated first archbishop of Canterbury, the Pope sent a number of sacred vessels, ornaments, and, also, many books to the archbishop.[7] Bede does not say what sort of books these were; nor do we know from any other source. Against any assumption that these were merely religious books it is well to insist that the Roman missionaries had to learn Anglo-Saxon for themselves and also to teach Latin to those who were to become priests. As early as 644 a Kentish man was consecrated Bishop of Rochester. Around 647 another Anglo-Saxon succeeded him. In 655 a western Saxon who had received the name Deusdedit became the sixth successor of Augustine, himself. It is, therefore, at least possible that among the books brought in 601 some grammatical and literary texts had been included.

By the time Deusdedit was consecrated, Rome considered it advisable to send to England no longer simple missionaries, but highly learned men. In 664, after the death of Deusdedit, the Pope nominated as his successor a Greek monk, Theodore, whom [*sic*] Bede says was a man well learned in both profane and divine literature, in both Greek and Latin (Book IV, Chapter 1). Theodore was accompanied by the abbot Hadrian, an African, well versed in Scripture, experienced in discipline and skillful in the Greek and Latin tongues. He was put in charge of the monastery of St. Peter in Canterbury. Both Theodore and Hadrian "being well versed, gathered a company of students unto them and daily imparted wholesome knowledge." From that time there was a regular school of teaching; and, along with the volumes of sacred writings, they instructed in metrics, astronomy and arithmetic, "the proof whereof," continues Bede, "is that even to this day [after 700] some of their scholars yet living have as good knowledge of Latin and Greek as of their own tongue."[8]

7. See Bede's *Ecclesiastical History*, Loeb, Book I, Chapter 29.
8. Book IV, Chapter 2. Taylor (*op. cit.*, II, Chapters 28 and 29) discusses and illustrates the patristic heritage of scriptural exegesis as transmitted through Isidore, Bede, and Rhabanus Maurus. He is sketchy, and unaware of the grammatical basis, with its preliminary discipline in the reading of the classics. Marrou's work had to be done before a satisfactory account of these things was possible. However, the material which Taylor adduces is useful and makes illustration of these things unnecessary here. Taylor is quite mistaken in supposing that medieval cosmology and physics was a by-product of exegesis. The ancient union of grammar and physics has already been shown.

What was the content of the Anglo-Latin-English culture? We may well resort to the testimony of one of the most brilliant representatives of that culture—Aldhelm of Malmesbury. Although he was not from Kent, he both acquired and perfected his knowledge in Kent.[9] Born about 639, Aldhelm had already completed his studies in the monastery at Malmesbury, under the Irish monks there, when he came to Canterbury. Yet he was attracted by the reputation of Canterbury. When he went there, "All the previous labor spent on learning, whose sacred chamber I thought I knew already, seemed nothing. And I who thought myself before a past-master, began again to be a pupil."[10] In a letter to Eleutherius, Aldhelm described the course of studies in Caterbury, mentioning first that he had to study Roman law, just as though he were to become a *doctus orator*.[11] Then came metrics and prosody. He calls rhetoric the "most intricate business." Worst of all was mathematics and astronomy. Thus his education at Canterbury was predominantly that necessary to the learned grammatical exegetist of scripture.

Aldhelm died as bishop of Sherborne in 709. His writings include letters, rhythmic poems, a treatise *De Laudibus Virginitatis* in mixed prose and verse (his most important work), and Latin riddles (a form of light popular poetry later imitated by Cynewulf). He abounds in quotations from Virgil, Terence, Horace, Juvenal, etc. His prose is unmistakably rhetorical, full of the alliteration and devices which gradually found their way into the vernacular. Sandys sums up by quoting Stubbs that "he was the first Englishman who cultivated classical learning with any success, and the first of whom any literary remains are preserved."[12]

Aldhelm's literary work, therefore, justifies the statement that the Canterbury school was but a continuation of the *puerilis institutio* of the late Roman Empire. At the same time it was a continuation of the Augustinian ideal, a *doctrina christiana* (whether advertently [*sic*] or not). On a letter to Aethelwald, Aldhelm specifies that profane literature should be used to obtain a better understanding of Holy Scripture and likewise of philosophy:

9. See M. Manitius, *Geschichte der Lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters*, two volumes, Munich, 1911–1931; I, pages 134–141. Manitius is fundamental for the whole period on which we are entering.
10. *De Gestis Regum Anglorum*, Rolls Series, I, page 30.
11. *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, vol. xv, page 476. [Henceforth *MGH*]
12. Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship*, I, page 451. Sandys is a useful reference throughout the ensuing periods, but makes no effort to offer anything more than a handbook or catalogue. Raby, *op. cit.*, attempts much more but is mainly interested in noting metrical forms and the subject-matter of poems. A. F. Leach (*The Schools of Medieval England*, second edition, London, 1916) is a basic writer for our purposes.

> Above all, apply yourself incessantly to divine readings and to sacred prayers. If, beyond this, you wish to become acquainted with some part of secular letters, do it only in following this end: since the whole, or almost the whole, of chaining words together reposes on grammar, you will understand the more easily, in reading, the profound and most sacred senses of that same divine language, in order that you will have a better grasp on the rules the most different from the art which forms its woof.[13]

The type of culture imported from Canterbury to Malmesbury by Aldhelm was but a local adaptation of the classical culture of the Fathers of the Church.

In 635 Wessex received a Roman mission, which seems to have been different from that of Augustine of Canterbury. The history of the Wessex school is obscure.[14] About the year 685 a boy by the name of Winfred was sent to this school by his father. Later he went to the abbey of Nursling, between Winchester and Southampton, where he completed his studies. He did so well that he was finally appointed to the care of that school; but his vocation was not to be that of a professor. He wanted to do missionary work, to carry to German soil the new faith that he had learned in Britain. In 716 Winfred left Nursling and went to Frisland. He came back in 718. Then he went to Rome for pontifical approval, and, as soon as Gregory the Great approved his work, he went to Germany to preach in Saxony. He was summoned back to Rome in 722 and there was consecrated Boniface, Bishop of the German nation. He became later the first Archbishop of Germany (732), held the see of Mainz (745–754), and died a martyr in 758.

The writings of St. Boniface bear directly on our problem. Manitius has studied his works carefully (Vol. 1, pages 140–152). The importance of St. Boniface is difficult to exaggerate since he was not only a civilizer of the Germans but he consecrated Pepin as King of the Franks and thus began the Carolingian dynasty.

His writings consist of a grammar, a *De Metris*, poetic riddles, and many carefully-written letters. He seems to have known Virgil by heart.[15]

13. Roger, *L'enseignement des lettres classiques*, page 100. How perfectly continuous with the ancient analogist approach to etymology and physics, to grammar and the encyclopedia of the arts, is the early medieval development can be seen in the title, scope, and general character of the *Etymologiae* of Isidore of Seville (d. 636). "Throughout the *Etymologies* there is a leading principle which guides Isidore in his handling of the different subjects, namely, his attitude toward words. His idea was that the road to knowledge was by way of words, and further, that they were to be elucidated by reference to their origin rather than to the things they stood for." (E. Brehaut, *An Encyclopedist of the Dark Ages*, New York 1912, p.33) Brehaut misstates Isidore's conception and has, seemingly, no notion of its antiquity. St. Isidore's was a standard work for centuries.
14. See Bede, *Opera Historica*, III, Chapter 7.
15. See *MGH*, I, pages 5, 6, 9.

When St. Boniface felt the need of advice he turned either to Rome or to England and particularly to the Bishop of Winchester.[16] In short, he was a typical representative of Anglo-Latin-Christian culture, a highly learned monk among German and Slavic barbarians, of whom he wonderingly said: "ob quod semper amavit me Germanica tellus, Rustica gens hominum Sclaforum et Scythia dura ..."

The type of culture established on German and Frankish soil by Boniface was what survived of the *puerilis institutio* of the Roman schools. Moreover, this culture, after the fifth-century collapse, did not, in the main, come from Italy but indirectly through Canterbury, Exeter and Nursling; and without the civilizing influence of Boniface, future European culture would not have taken the course which history reveals.[17] This fact, perfectly familiar to all historians, seems to be less generally recognized among those who discuss the history of letters and culture.[18]

Bede tells us of the great and successful efforts of Benedict Biscop and Ceolfrid founding the great abbey school of St. Paul's at Jarrow (Book 1, Chapter 29). A large library was collected and strict rules to maintain its integrity enforced. Abbot Benedict, and afterwards Ceolfrid, educated Bede himself, as he tells us at the end of his history. Of the numerous works of Bede which he lists in this last chapter, he, himself, selects as most important his commentaries on Holy Scripture. There are thirty-five, all told, on Old and New Testaments. His ideal of learning was the same as that of St. Augustine.[19]

On the other side we must place the works which he considered as belonging to that intellectual culture which he received from Benedict and Ceolfrid. The *Ecclesiastical History* is a history in the best tradition of Latin classical culture. In praise of Bede, [Montague Rhodes] James writes that "from the literary point of view the book is admirable. There is no affectation of learning, no eccentricity of vocabulary. It seems to be one of the great services which Bede rendered to English writers that he gave currency to direct and simple style."[20] In addition, Bede wrote a good deal of Latin poetry, a book of hymns, epigrams, three pedagogical treatises, a book of

16. See *MGH*, I, pages 271–273.
17. See Roger, *op. cit.*, pages 428–432. Also [Francois Pierre Guillaume] Guizot, *Histoire de la civilisation en France depuis la chute de l'empire romain*, vol. II, page 92.
18. E.g., Taylor, *op. cit.*, page 249.
19. "This island, at this present, with five sundry languages equal to the number of the books in which the Divine Law hath been written, doth study and set forth one and the same knowledge of the highest truth and majesty, that is, with the language of the English, the Britons, the Scots, the Redshanks, and the Latin, which last by study of the Scriptures is made common to all the rest." (Bede, I, Chapter 1.) Bede's word is not "Latinus" but "Latinorum," indicating a group of people speaking Latin. The Loeb translator, somewhat unwarrantedly, refuses Bede's statement.
20. "Latin Writings in England to the Time of Alfred" in A. W. Ward and A. R. Waller, eds., *The Cambridge History of English Literature*, New York: Macmillan, 1933, vol. I, 72–96, 91. It would be misleading to suggest as do James, W. P. Ker, and R. W. Chambers, that simplicity and directness of style was the *outcome* of a long tradition. We shall have sufficient occasions to note that the direct style was designated for specific functions, mainly of a devotional character. But other styles were simultaneously admitted and cultivated by one and the same writer. The doctrine of decorum, noted in Cicero, and accepted by St. Augustine for Christian preaching, determined on what occasions the various styles were appropriate. This doctrine is never challenged by anybody between St. Augustine and Pascal.

orthography, an art of metric, and one of tropes and schemes, in which the figures are illustrated from Scripture in the manner resumed by several sixteenth-century rhetoricians.[21] The literary productions of Bede are in fact but another proof of the perpetuity of Roman classical culture: grammar, rhetoric, history, and astronomy. The *De Natura Rerum* of Bede bears this out, for it is encyclopedic; it tries to fulfill the plan of the *De Doctrina Christiana*: a summary of all that is necessary to know in order to understand the Bible and explain it to others. The works of Bede became the textbooks of the great school at York to which students came from Germany and France. The same books went with Alcuin to the schools of Charlemagne.[22]

In relating the activity which resulted in centers of learning at Canterbury, Winchester, Nursling, Jarrow, Weirmouth, and York, to the vernacular developments in our literature the historian can gratefully turn to the work of W. P. Ker and R. W. Chambers. For us here, the general conclusion is that the Carolingian renaissance was preceded by the flowering of Anglo-Saxon civilization, in which it had its origins.

Sandys, noting the list of books which Alcuin gives as being in the library of York, says: "...in the last quarter of the eighth century, the library at York far surpassed nay, even in the twelfth century, in England or France, whether at Christ Church, Canterbury, or at St. Victor's in Paris, or at Bec in Normandy." (1, page 456) In his poem containing the list of books, Alcuin says that learning had come from Greece to Rome and thence had been transferred to York. Some of the books named were those of Jerome, Ambrose, Hilary, Augustine, Orosius, Basil, Cassiodorus, John Chrysostom, Bede, Aldhelm, Pliny, Aristotle, Boethius, Cicero, Sedullius, Juvenal, Lactantius, Virgil, Donatus and Priscian. Obviously, the school at York was equipped to carry on the grammatical exegesis of Scripture and to form learned Christians for this purpose.[23]

Alcuin tells us that his teacher often taught him how the arts had been discovered, not created, by the wisest men, who had made out the laws inscribed by God in nature, itself, on the day of creation. It would be a deep and lasting shame, he goes on, if we allowed these discoveries to perish or

21. *Opera Omnia ... P. L.*, Vols. 90–95.
22. See Abelson, *The Seven Liberal Arts*, page 23, where with the astonishment of a classical scholar for the first time examining the evidence he says: "The classic Latin authors were studied to an extent surpassing even the expectations of the most sympathetic student of medieval culture."
23. See Leach, *The Schools of Medieval England*, page 59 and pages 59–63 for his account of the library at York. The education so conceived was encyclopedic in Alcuin's time, as it had been and for the same reasons, in the time of Philo, Origen, Jerome, and Augustine. Education continued to be based on the cycle of the liberal arts until the days of Thomas Nashe. Our problem is at once to show this and to explain some of its more important literary consequences.

even languish for lack of zeal. Such was the spirit in which classical tradition was transmitted by monks like Bede and Alcuin.[24]

In view of the gratuitous doubts which have been cast on the subject of whether or not the classics were appreciated in the dark ages, it may be well to mention an anecdote from the anonymous *Alcuini Vita*.[25] So devoted was young Alcuin to Virgil, says his biographer ("Virgilii magis quam psalmorum amator"), that he would not leave his cell to go to night office. He preferred to read Virgil. On a certain night, Alcuin, then a boy at the school of York, was asleep in his cell with a young peasant lad, a sound sleeper and a snorer. Suddenly the place was invaded by a troop of evil spirits. They looked at the boys and began by tackling the young peasant, flogging him severely. Alcuin then made a vow that if he escaped the cruel hands of the fiends he would never again prefer Virgil to the reading of the Psalms.[26] For a while the historians repeated the views of fifteenth and sixteenth century humanists that during the Middle Ages nobody read the classics.[27] When it became obvious that, on the contrary, the classics had been widely read in the Middle Ages, then historians said that they were read but not loved or understood. "Let us grant, therefore," said Gilson in his lectures,

> that most medieval professors of grammar would order their students to read the *Aeneid* and yet forbid them to love it. Of course, the question rises, did the professor himself, who forbade his pupils to love the *Aeneid*, himself love it? And, can anyone read the *Aeneid* and not love it, much less a student who has been forbidden to love it? From the fact that students in the Middle Ages were forbidden to love Virgil, a well established fact, we cannot draw the inference that they did not love it.[28]

When Alcuin later forbade the reading of Virgil in his own school, he had to overcome the resistance of men who loved Virgil as much as he, himself, did when a boy.[29] We should not confuse, therefore, the official attitude of the masters toward the classics with the personal reaction of the pupils by whom the classics were read.[30]

24. E. C. Thomas, *History of the Schoolmen*, London, 1941; pages 112–113: "It was at this school of the Palace that Alcuin taught the Three Arts: the trivium, grammar, rhetoric and dialectic or logic; also the four sciences: the quadrivium, arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy. This method of distribution of the arts and sciences was undoubtedly invented by Alcuin and for centuries remained the recognized plan of instruction." It is distressing to encounter this sort of thing in a work which professes to be a specialist's guide. The rest of the work is of a piece with this statement.
25. *P. L.*, 100, 91–92.
26. The more familiar story of Jerome is to the same effect. He was on his way to Bethlehem, carrying with great inconvenience his beloved authors: "Miserable man that I am! I was fasting and then I began to read Cicero; after many nights spent in watching, after many tears, which the remembrance of my faults of not so long ago drew forth from the depth of my heart, I took Plautus in my hands. If by chance, on recollecting myself, I started reading the Prophets, their unadorned style awoke in me feelings of repulsion." He imagines himself before the seat of judgment: "On being asked my profession, I replied, 'I am a Christian.' Whereupon, he who presided said, 'Thou dost lie; thou art a Ciceronian and no Christian; where thy treasure is there thy heart is also.'" [de Labriolle, *History and Literature of Christianity*, pages 11–12.]
27. In his *Filium Labyrinthi*, Francis Bacon shows himself an exception to the Renaissance habit of ignoring the predecessors of the hated Schoolmen. After conventionally attacking the contentious dialectical learning which the Schoolmen had derived from the great scorner of antiquity, Aristotle, he says, the true and precious heritage of antiquity, both natural and revealed knowledge, has been preserved by the Church: "in the bosom and lap thereof, in the greatest injuries of times, ever preserved [as holy relics] the books of philosophy and all heathen learning; and that when Gregory, the bishop of Rome became adverse and unjust to the memory of heathen antiquity, it was censured for pusillanimity

Alcuin has left distinguished treatises on each branch of the trivium. Of the rhetorical and dialectical treatises we shall speak later; but the *Grammatica*[31] begins by inviting the student to the love of true wisdom, provided they learn it only for the sake of God. Wisdom, he says, has built her house on seven pillars, the seven liberal arts, the necessary disciplines whereby philosophers, statesmen, and kings of old have achieved their ends, and doctors of the church have defeated their enemies (854 A.)[32] Add that Alcuin shows full awareness of Priscian and that his teaching, as can be seen from his letters, included large sections of the quadrivium, and the picture is complete.

Such was the general culture of the man whom Charlemagne invited in 781 to settle in France to organize courses of higher studies. His influence was very great. He seems also to have been behind the school reform outlined in Charlemagne's famous letter to the Bishop of Fulda in 789.[33] The letter seems most likely to be the work of Alcuin, himself. Then Alcuin gave a great impetus to the teaching of the liberal arts in the Palatine school.[34] Both Charlemagne and Alcuin were convinced that the ideal of Christian culture was the patristic one, that of grammar employing the encyclopedia of the arts.[35] Charlemagne's famous remark, "Oh, that I had twelve scholars like Jerome and Augustine!" elicited from Alcuin the reply, "God had only two and you want twelve!" The ambition of the king and his headmaster was to pave the way for the future rise of such men as Anselm, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas; but they could scarcely have dreamed of the rise of men who were to be greater that Cicero, Jerome, and Augustine. Perhaps they might have been appalled by the prospect of the great dialecticians who were to transcend their ideal of eloquence.[36]

Soon after these events had occurred at the court of Charlemagne, they came to be regarded as marking the opening of a new historical era. Several medieval historians have summed them up in terse formulae which nowhere appear in histories of medieval philosophy or literature. Nevertheless, literature called the *de translatione studii* represents the only authentic medieval formulation of these facts. When the men of the ninth century looked at

in him and the honour thereof soon after restored, and his own memory almost persecuted by his successor Sabinian; ..." (*Works*, *op. cit.*, III, page 501) The words which immediately follow these are equally relevant to the present study since they show Bacon an enthusiastic exponent of the revived grammatical theology and encyclopedia of the arts, which had been neglected by the dialectical Schoolmen: "and lastly in our times and the ages of our fathers, when Luther and the divines of the Protestant Church on the one side, and the Jesuits on the other, have enterprised to reform, the one the doctrine, the other the discipline and manners of the Church of Rome, he [Bacon] saw well how both of them have awakened to their great honour and succour all human learning." Bacon refers with enthusiasm to the Jesuits and their revival of grammatical exegesis and Ciceronian eloquence in *The Advancement* (*Works*, *op. cit.*, III, page 277). The *Ratio Studiorum* of the Jesuits won Bacon's hearty approval because it assigned the same emphasis and order to grammar, dialectics, and rhetoric, as he himself did. The fact is that Vives, the disciple of Erasmus, was the common mentor of St. Ignatius and Francis Bacon. (See the discussion of these matters by Foster Watson, *Vives: On Education*, Cambridge, 1913; pages lxxxiv–lxxxv; ciii–cxix.) Nothing is more damaging to Bacon's profession of novelty than a study of [Vives's] *De Tradendis Disciplinis* (1531). The Jesuits shared with Vives and Bacon the Ciceronian doctrine of the primacy of eloquence and political or civil prudence among the arts and sciences. Without these, knowledge could never, they said, be applied to the relief of man's fallen state. Just as Bacon and Vives are encyclopedists in the ancient tradition, so the French encyclopedists of the eighteenth century are products of the Jesuit training and tradition. Comte and Spencer represent the decline of the same tradition.

28. [See footnote 5 for reference to Gilson text quoted here.—ed.] Taylor, *op. cit.*, II, Chapter 31, has further discussion of this question.
29. *Alcuini Vita*, Chapter 10, *P. L.*, 100; 101.

the state of education before Charlemagne, they found only ignorance. Then came Alcuin from England, and there is the sudden blossoming of literary culture in France. Alcuin said that he was erecting upon French soil a new Athens more beautiful than the old one had been. Seeing the results of Alcuin's labors, the medieval scholars concluded that he had done it. Probably the oldest of these historians who expressed that conviction is Notker Balbulus, author of the famous *Chronicle of St. Gall*. In chapter one, *De Gestis Caroli Magni* (*P. L.*, 98, 1371–1373), we find the following:

> At that time when Charles began to reign along the Western part of the world, the study of letters had almost everywhere fallen into oblivion. Then it happened that two Scots came from Ireland[37] with British traders and landed on the French coast. These men of incomparable learning, both in profane and in Sacred literature, as the people crowded around them to buy their goods, proclaimed that if anyone was desirous of wisdom, let them come to them. They said they had wisdom for sale... They kept on repeating the same thing before those men who were amazed or persuaded that they heard lunatics. Finally their words were reported to Charles, always a lover of wisdom, and he had them come to his court. He asked them if it were true what was reported of them, namely that they were in possession of wisdom? They answered, we not only possess it but we are willing to give it in God's name to all who seriously want it. Charles asked what they wanted in return for their wisdom. They answered: a convenient place, intelligent pupils, and something to live on. At these words Charles was filled with great joy, and he kept them with him for a little while, but later on was compelled to go to war and prescribed that Clement stay in France, where he entrusted him with the teaching of boys of the middle and lower classes; the other one, whose name was Albinus, he directed to Italy and put in charge of the monastery of St. Augustine near Pavia, so that all who wished to learn could gather there around him.[38]

30. This is the view of Paul Abelson in his standard work, *The Seven Liberal Arts*, New York, 1906, page 25.
31. *P. L.*, 101, pages 849–902.
32. The "seven liberal arts" represents a number arrived at, not by Cicero, Varro, Vitruvius, Pliny, or Quintilian. It was the result of the work of Martianus Capella before 330 A.D. (see Abelson, *op. cit.*, page 6) and (Capella's) *De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii* omits architecture and medicine from Varro's nine arts "only in order to keep within the mythological setting of his allegorical framework." (Abelson, *op. cit.*, page 7) Abelson, however, is quite mistaken in supposing that the Middle Ages was uniformly interested in the trivium and quadrivium. The extraordinary variety of emphasis at medieval universities is only now getting general recognition, thanks in part to the researches of L. J. Paetow. (See his introduction to *The Battle of the Seven Arts* of Henri D'Andeli, Berkeley, 1914; and his *Arts Course at Medieval Universities*, 1910.)

    The "seven liberal arts" is a phrase vaguely descriptive of that "round" of secular studies which were preparatory to the higher disciplines of philosophy and theology. (Abelson, *op. cit.*, page 9) Isidore of Seville, writing in the sixth century, needs even less introduction than Capella, for there is the useful study of E. Brehaut (*An Encyclopedist of the Dark Ages*, New York, 1912). Their great influence I take as generally known and understood; but Isidore will appear later in the sections on dialectic and rhetoric.

    A significant fact concerning Capella's *Marriage of Philology and Mercury* was first suggested to me by Francis Bacon's remark in the *De Augmentis* (Book II, Chapter 13) where he asserts the superiority of allegorical or parabolical poesy above all others "especially as religion itself commonly uses its aid as a means of communication between divinity and humanity." Further on he seeks to prove this by a grammatical, or philological, exegesis of the myth of Pan: "Concerning his [Pan's] origin there are only two opinions, nor can there indeed be more. For he either sprang from Mercury, that is, the Word of God (which the Holy Scripture places beyond question, and which was perceived also of the

At least, from the time of Notker's chronicle (about 884), it became acknowledged fact that classical learning which of old had been in the possession of the Greeks, then of the Romans, had been entrusted to the French by an Anglo-Saxon. Such is essentially the historical theme which will become tradition in the Middle Ages until it finds its perfect formulation in the words *de translatione studii*, the tradition of letters. Naturally, the French writers will be inclined to forget Alcuin[39] and the part the English played; but they will not forget that they have become heirs to Greek and Roman culture. The main point is that the modern historians of the Renaissance are wont to describe it as a rediscovery of antiquity either forgotten or despised by the men of the Middle Ages; whilst the men of the Middle Ages seem always to have considered that they were modern men, living in a modern age and entrusted by God with the mission both of preserving the classical culture of Greece and Rome, and of enlarging it and bringing it to perfection through the teaching of Christ. In Vincent of Beauvais[40] we read that Alcuin, a man famous for his knowledge, transferred from Rome to Paris the study of wisdom, which in former times had been transferred from Greece by the Romans. In the *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* [See Denifle and E. Chatelain, eds.] there is a document dated Paris, March 28, 1384, containing a record of a controversy between the faculty of law and the chapter of the cathedral, in which these claims for the *de translatione studii* are fully set forth.

There is a luminous page of his study of *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*[41] in which Professor Gilson points to the self-confidence of the Middle Ages that they could improve on the Ancients:

> The medievals felt it incumbent upon them to gather up the spoils of this always incomplete success and push on the advance. They saw themselves providentially placed at the crucial point where the whole heritage of ancient thought, absorbed by Christian revelation, was now to multiply a hundredfold. The age of Charlemagne struck men's minds as the coming of an era of enlightenment: *hoc tempore fuit claritas doctrinae*, wrote St. Bonaventure

philosophers themselves who have been accounted most divine) ..." Capella intends even in his title to represent the union of pagan arts with Christian theology. Mercury also signifies eloquence.

33. *P. L.*, 97, 176–177.
34. Roger (*L'enseignement des lettres classiques*, pages 408–409) suggests that the monastic reforms of Columban hardly affected the restoration of ancient culture in Gaul.
35. Alcuin is thought at least to have had a hand in the *De Litteris Colendis* (787) sent by Charlemagne to all the cathedrals, churches, and monasteries of his empire. Referring to the undistinguished style of the official letters received at the palace from ecclesiastics: "On reading these letters and considering their lack of skill we began to be afraid lest the writers' knowledge and understanding of the Holy Scripture might also prove to be much less than it ought to be. Wherefore, we now exhort you, do not neglect the study of literature ..." (quoted by E. C. Thomas, *op. cit.*, page 113). From Philo and St. Augustine to Erasmus and More, this remains the invariable attitude toward the necessity of studying letters as the preliminary and indispensable discipline for exegesis. Excellence of literary style is the hallmark of theological competence in the tradition of grammatical exegesis. The neglect of literary grace by the Schoolmen will be the sure proof, for men like Petrarch and Erasmus, of a decline of spirituality, a relapse into barbarism. St. Jerome, a great scholar, and also a master of every style of eloquence, even by modern standards, was a favourite of Alcuin's, as of Erasmus. Jerome's letter to Paulinus on the study of the Bible was prefixed to every copy of Alcuin's version of the text. There were many copies.
36. The name of Charlemagne lives in history inseparable from the names of a host of scholars. Among these, none is so important as Alcuin, yet their very number is important in itself. For example, Paulus Diaconus (725–797), a Lombard, taught Greek at the court of Charlemagne from 782–786. He retired to Monte Cassino where he wrote his most famous work, the *Historia Langobardorum*. Peter of Pisa

in the full thirteenth century. Then was effected that *translatio studii* which, handing on to France the learning of Rome and Athens, entrusted to Reims and Chartres and Paris the task of adapting this heritage to, and integrating it with, Christian Wisdom. None better than the poet Chrétien de Troyes has uttered the pride felt by the men of the Middle Ages in being the guardians and transmitters of the civilization of the Ancients (*Cliges*, tr. L. J. Gardiner, London, 1912, 27–39). The glory of his native land, which a French poet of the thirteenth century thus delighted to express, was none of his own imagining.... When an Englishman, John of Salisbury, saw Paris in 1164, that is to say, before the extraordinary doctrinal flowering-season of the future University, he had no hesitation about the providential character of the work that there went forward: *vere Dominus est in loco isto, et ego nesciebam*; the Lord is surely in this place and I knew it not.

As Professor Gilson put it in his lectures, historians will say that the question still remains: did the men of the Middle Ages actually do what they said they were doing? Did they actually understand ancient culture? Should we not say that the true meaning of the culture was first discovered in the late fifteenth century? There is no need to answer such questions before they are raised. But even so, such a contention would be difficult to prove concerning Aristotle; because everybody was complaining that for three centuries nobody else was talked about.

With regard to grammar, it is clear that one main line of defense that the Middle Ages understood antiquity would be the evidence adduced in the first section on grammar, where it was shown that the allegorical modes of interpretation and symbolization which we associate mainly with medieval literature were continuously, and intensely, though not exclusively, cultivated from early Greek times. The exclusive devotion to these modes in the Middle Ages is clearly the result of focussing the art of grammar on Scripture. But the fact remains that Chrysippus or Varro or Pliny or Donatus would have found nothing in the literary modes of the Middle Ages with which they were not familiar. The doctrinal bias of Dante would

(see Manitius I, pages 452–456) preceded Alcuin at the court of Charlemagne. Paulinus Aquileinsis (see Manitius I, pages 368–370), born before 750, became a professor of grammar at the Palatine school as early as 777. Clement Scotus (see Manitius I, pages 456–458), an Irishman, the author of a grammar and a very successful Latin teacher in the Palatine school. Theodulf of Orleans, a Spaniard (see Manitius I, pages 536–543), became archbishop of Orleans, a wit and a man of remarkable artistic taste, defended the moral interpretation of classical authors in his *De libris quos legere solebam*, quoting many of them freely (*P. L.*, 105; pages 331–332). According to Sandys (I, page 462), Theodulph supplies us with the earliest poetic description of the seven liberal arts. The fact should be noted that there is not a single German or Frenchman in this group. The only source of classical learning, as seen in the names of these scholars, was Italy and Spain. Clement was the extreme vanguard of the Irish scholars who were to come to France in later years, among whom was to be John Scotus Erigena. In the immediately subsequent history of classical learning, however, we encounter pupils of Alcuin everywhere, but no pupils of Peter or Paulinus or Theodulph.

37. The chronicle was written in a monastery founded by St. Gallus, one of the descendants of St. Columban, hence the patriotic claim of priority.
38. [Quotation translated from the Latin text cited—ed.] Clement was certainly older than Alcuin and was still teaching twenty or more years after Alcuin's death. Albinus may have been a mistake for Alcuinus. At least, nothing is known of him. In chapter two of the *Chronicle* we are told of Albinus [Alcuin?] the Englishman who was perfectly instructed in the whole field of letters, better than any other man of modern times—*modernorum temporum*—because he had been a pupil of the learned Bede.
39. A proof that they had not forgotten this in the fourteenth century occurs in a letter from Paris by the youthful Petrarch: "...its population contains the most learned of men and it is like a great basket in which are collected the rarest fruits of every country. From the time that its university was founded,

have been a difficulty for them, but not the modes of statement. The reasons given for abandoning these modes of writing after the sixteenth century will be indicated later on. The Protestant controversialists gave one set of reasons, the humanist rhetoricians another; and the Cartesians were the most decisive of all.

In his study of *Dante le théologien* (Paris, 1936), Mandonnet provides extensive evidence from our period to show that theology from the Fathers to the end of the twelfth century was symbolical and grammatical (page 168). Earlier he says that, faced with the inherent difficulty in understanding and interpreting the *Commedia*, the simplest and most efficacious procedure is to follow the method current in the time of Dante, both for writing and expounding learned texts. The professors, when concerned with a book of the Bible or a profane author, approached it by the four causes (page 17). Since these general conclusions are not affected, it is unnecessary to go into the basic reinterpretation of the facts which Gilson makes in his very important study of *Dante et la philosophie* (Paris, 1939). This work, itself, offers an extensive treatment of some of the problems of the classical heritage of the Middle Ages.

However, at this point in the present study, the problem is not to exhibit the continuity of scriptural exegesis, a well attested fact, but rather to show how exegesis involved the continuity of the classics. A testimony from a very different angle is provided by Gilson in *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*. Discussing the acceptance of the autonomous natural order in St. Thomas, he says:

> To define virtue and vice in this way, by their accord or disaccord with nature, is not merely to rest in the opinion of Aristotle, but to accept what St. Augustine himself had expressly wished to retain from Greek naturalism: *omne vitium eo in ipso quod vitium est, contra naturam est*. Here, then, is no question of a tardy invasion of Christian theology by Hellenism, but a position common to the Patristic era and the Middle Ages, and thus essential to Christian thought itself. Nothing could be more purely classical; and yet, in

as they say, by Alcuin, the teacher of Charlemagne, there has not been, to my knowledge, a single Parisian of any fame. The great luminaries of the university were all strangers; ..." (T. Campbell, *Life and Times of Petrarch*, 2 vols., second edition, London, 1843; I, pages 91–92)

40. *Speculum Historiale*, Book 22, Chapter 173; Venice, 1494; fol. 308v B.
41. Trans. A. H. C. Downes, New York, 1936, pages 396–397.

bringing in his technical elucidations borrowed from the Aristotelian ethic. St. Thomas was preparing to pass beyond the master who inspired him.[42]

As early as the ninth century, medieval culture began to show a conflict. Arts were studied as a preparation for Holy Scripture; but very few students proceeded to theology. Most of the clergy engaged in education specialized in one or another of the arts.[43] Naturally there arose numerous disputes. A man teaching scripture would favor a strict subordination of the arts; but his colleagues teaching the arts would claim for them the right to a certain autonomy. As a teacher of grammar, Alcuin prescribed Virgil. Later, as headmaster of Tours he proscribed Virgil.

Rhabanus Maurus (784–856), the pupil of Alcuin, was a perfect representative of the Biblical ideal of learning.[44] He is an encyclopedist and a scriptural exegetist. His most important work is the *De Clericorum Institutione* (*P. L.*, 107; 293–420). It is owing to this treatise that he has been given the title *Praeceptor Germaniae*. However, Rhabanus was a pupil of the older Alcuin, who had proscribed Virgil. His point of departure is Alcuin's point of arrival, the straight program of Augustine's *De Doctrina Christiana*. The poetry and literature of the pagans can be read because of the beauty of their eloquence, but pagan eloquence should be dealt with as, in Deuteronomy (21:13), the Jews were ordered to treat the pagan captives they wanted to marry. In the *De Clericorum Institutione* (*P. L.* 107; 395) Rhabanus says that this is what Lactantius, Hilary, Augustine, and all the great Christian doctors of the Church did; and he wishes to follow their example.

Rhabanus' *De Rerum Naturis et Verbis Propriis et de Mystica Rerum Significatione* is by far the nearest approach to the perfect Church encyclopedia such as Augustine said he hoped some Christian would write.

There is no space in which to designate the numerous ninth century humanists, since the problem of indicating mere continuity is one which requires a good many words. But the *Vita Caroli* of Einhard has long been recognized as a worthy imitation of Suetonius' *Vita Augusti*. Servatus Lupus of Ferrières, born at the beginning of the ninth century, left a remarkable

42. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pages 326–327. See, also, Taylor, *op. cit.*, II, pages 297–298; 309, on this same point. The implications of this fact for the understanding of the techniques of characterization both in Pagan and Christian literature have not begun to be recognized, let alone studied. Rhetoric and ethics are inseparable, alike for Aristotle, Virgil, Chaucer, Shakespeare, and Pope.
43. L. J. Paetow pointed out long ago that "there is abroad a generally erroneous notion about religious instruction in the Middle Ages. Any close inspection of the work of medieval schools reveals the rather startling fact that they offered extremely little religious instruction. It is equally surprising to find that theology was taught in comparatively few universities of the Middle Ages, whereas a faculty of law was lacking in not a single one of them ... It is a grave mistake to identify practically all advanced medieval learning with theology. All learning generally was a mere figure of speech when so few students pursued the long and arduous path which led to the degree of doctor of theology. Henri D'Andeli presents a very significant personification of Theology, who withdraws from the army of Logic to the wine-cellars of Paris, because she takes so little interest in the contest between the secular books." *The Battle of the Seven Arts*, pages 19–20.
44. H. O. Taylor, *op. cit.*, pages 221–224.

collection of letters which show a great love for the classics. We still have the manuscript of the *De Oratore* copied for Servatus with the critical corrections of the text which he supplied. In one letter he writes of an Irishman, Probus, priest of Mainz, who is now walking through the woods wondering whether Cicero and Virgil and many other good men of ancient times could not have been admitted to heaven owing to the sacrifice of Jesus Christ.

If one were asked for a fact, said Gilson in his lectures, which taken by itself would be considered sufficient to prove the existence and vitality of Roman classical culture in the ninth century, the best answer would be: open at random any critical edition of classical Latin writers and look for the date of the earliest manuscripts of the text. Virgil is only a partial exception. In short, the discovery of classical Latin antiquity by the later humanists was simply the rediscovery of what the ninth century had known of antiquity.

Even in the worst period of the Scandinavian invasions in the tenth and early eleventh centuries, the monastic seats of learning seem to have maintained themselves in existence with at least a minimum of activity. We have many manuscripts of the eleventh century and particularly a series of manuscripts of Terence, Cicero, and Virgil, which were made in Fleury-sur-Loire. The Cluniac reform carried out by the second abbot, Odo, gave a strong impulse to the study of the liberal arts, not only in Cluny, but also in the schools connected with the Cluniac order, such as Metz, Rheims, Liège and Paris.[45] Odo had had his education at Tours, in the school made illustrious by Alcuin. He tells us (*P. L.* 133. 49A) that while at Tours he delighted in the study of Virgil; but he was warned in a dream to abandon that perilous occupation.[46]

The German nun Hroswitha[47] is of great interest to the historian of classical culture. She is the author of a number of long Latin poems, a history of the Blessed Virgin, a history of the Ascension, sufferings of several martyrs, a poem on the origins of the monastery of Gandersheim, and another on the life of the Emperor Otto I.

2A

45. See Sandys, I, pages 498ff.
46. The number of anti-Virgilian dreams is impressive as evidence of the charm he exercised. See L. Friedländer "Das Nachleben der Antike in Mittelalter," in *Errinerungen, Reden und Studien*, Strasbourg, 1905, pp. 272–391. List of dreams pp. 293–295.
47. See Manitius I pp. 619–632.

We know a good deal about her from the prefaces to her works. For example, in her epistle to her patrons at the beginning of her book of six Terentian comedies, she tells of "the sweat and fatigue which my labours have cost me."[48]

From many of her statements, not to mention her works, one can readily gather that there was a high level of general culture at Gandersheim, a fact which helps us to understand the later case of Héloise. Learned women ceased to be exceptional cases as soon as women's monasteries became centers of education. The lack of evidence is misleading, since, no matter how excellent the school, if it did not produce a writer who has survived we know nothing about the school. As an instance, we know nothing about the school of Saint Vorles except that St. Bernard was educated there. The impressive standards of instruction at the school for girls at Argenteuil (twelfth century) are known to us because Héloise was educated there.

Plautus and Terence were medieval as well as Renaissance grammar-school favorites for more than one reason. An understanding of the scope and aims of ancient and medieval grammar, however, makes it clear why this should have been so. The first poems studied in grammar schools were bucolics, because they were written in the low style and thus were easiest to construe. Next came the writers of comedy who naturally used the middle or colloquial style. Epic was studied last.[49] This order was not only the natural order for introducing students to the reading and composition of poetry, but was the order in which Virgil, and later Spenser and others, composed their works.[50] Bucolics were usually the vehicle for political and ecclesiastical satire, and moral instruction, as, for example, the seventh eclogue of Petrarch. This was so with Virgil, and it became the impulse behind a prolific medieval genre to which notable contributions were made as late as Mantuanus.

Spenser's eclogues and Milton's *Lycidas* are largely conventional in this respect. The basic Scriptural figures of sheep and pastor lent new significance and intensity to the classical form.[51]

The middle style, comprising such variety as the Georgics, Terence and

48. *The Plays of Roswitha*, trans. Christopher St. John. London, 1923, page xxx. In another preface she speaks of how "in my first works I made many mistakes not only in prosody but in literary composition," and says that "unknown to all round me I have toiled in secret, often destroying what seemed to me ill-written, and rewriting it" (pages xxxi–xxxii).
49. Scripture was recognized as being mainly in the low style, because of its function to teach. But many were to follow the example of Juvencus (about 330 A.D.) in turning the gospels, or themes from them, into heroic verse, or the grand style. The *Evangeliorum Libri IV* became a favorite medieval schoolbook. Abraham Cowley's *Davideis* is in this tradition, as well as Du Bartas. It would be a mistake to suppose that the Fathers thought that all Scripture was in one style. Donne is rehearsing Patristic commonplaces when he says: "[T]he Holy Ghost in penning the Scriptures delights himself not only with a propriety, but with a delicacy, and harmony, and melody of language; with height of Metaphors, and other figures, which may work great impressions on the Readers, and not with barbarous or triviall, or market or homely language ..." (See W. F. Mitchell, *English Pulpit Oratory*, London, 1932; page 189.)
50. For an account of this procedure as it was somewhat narrowly codified in a period of ascendant dialectics, see E. Faral, *Les arts poétiques du XIIe et du XIIIe siècle*, Paris, 1924; pages 86–89. Faral and others seem to be quite unaware that the twelfth and thirteenth century treatises on poetry, based on the traditional grammar and rhetoric instruction, were compendious formulations of a set of classical doctrines which had been given much fuller scope in the earlier education of the Middle Ages. It was precisely because the dialecticians were robbing the grammarians of both pupils and time that these brief treatises came into demand. "Grammar and Rhetoric in ten easy lessons" was the sort of attraction they held for men who were eager to get on to the study of dialectics. The evidence for this will be adduced later on; but one has only to think of the anathemas directed by fifteenth and sixteenth century humanists at the very treatises Faral has published, to recognize that they were lumped together

Horace, was the level for direct moral instruction related to foolish and vicious types of everyday life. Thus, Hroswitha, the founder, as it were, of Christian drama, not only has the utmost respect for Terence as artist and moralist, but could not conceive of comedy without the representation of vice. She apologizes "that I have been compelled through the nature of this work to apply my mind and my pen to depicting the dreadful frenzy of those possessed by unlawful love..."[52] The doctrines of decorum which guided the entire practise of antiquity and the Middle Ages, were rigorous only because they were related to a complete and harmonious system of ethics, politics, and rhetoric. When the continuity of this system of rational ethics is considered, the continuity of the peripheral doctrines in literature is less astonishing. The length of life enjoyed by these doctrines is commensurate with the extension of the study of patristic theology in Europe. As long as patristic theology propped up by the classics was the main concern of the leaders of the educated world, that is until after the time of Donne and Bossuet, the entire body of associated grammar, poetic, rhetoric, and politics remained intact. At least the so-called Neo-classicism of the seventeenth century has no intelligible explanation apart from this fact; and Neo-classicism does not survive patristic theology.[53]

The preface which Hroswitha wrote to her plays offers further interesting light on the attitudes towards the classics in the Middle Ages:

> There are many Catholics, and we cannot entirely acquit ourselves of the charge, who, attracted by the polished elegance of the style of pagan writers, prefer their works to the holy scriptures. There are others who, although they are deeply attached to the sacred writings and have no liking for most pagan productions, make an exception in favour of the works of Terence, and, fascinated by the charm of the manner, risk being corrupted by the wickedness of the matter.[54]

That is surely explicit enough, and sufficiently casual to be a testimony to a vital tenth-century humanism. Hroswitha has excellent literary tact. She

with other works of the schoolmen. However, Erasmus, Reuchlin, and Bacon were no more hostile to this compendious method of dealing with grammar than Salutati. Hroswitha was certainly not brought up on such meagre fare.

51. For the ways in which the traditional Greek allegorical modes were continued in Christian Latin poetry see E. K. Rand, *Founders of the Middle Ages*, Cambridge, Mass., 1928; pages 195ff. Pointing to some of the most characteristic features of *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained*, he says: "If we look for the ultimate origin of the hybrid art, we must go back, as for most things, to Greece, in particular to the Hellenistic Age and the Jewish dispersion in Alexandria" (page 186). This tradition, he shows, "flourished in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance" (page 195). He nowhere, however, shows that he perceives the basis of the whole matter in the methods and need [*sic*] of Scriptural exegesis. Saintsbury (*History of Criticism*, I, pages 392; 394; 409) has some remarks on medieval eclogues. C. S. Baldwin, *Literary Theory and Practice in the Renaissance* (New York, 1939; pages 80ff.), is more helpful.
52. St. John, ed., *op. cit.*, page xxvii.
53. As an instance, what might seem to be so insignificant a circumstance as the admiration of Ben Jonson, Swift, and Doctor Johnson for the wit, eloquence, and virtue of Sir Thomas More is, perhaps, best explained by the fact of More's identity with the theological, and, therefore, grammatical, program of Colet and Erasmus; but this fact in turn illuminates their own conceptions of their own positions in relation to the learning and interests of their age. They are still at war with the schoolmen, the dialecticians, and the pedants; only the new scholasticism for Swift is represented by Descartes, Newton and experimental science. They are withdrawing the attention of men from the basic human problems, the study of man, himself. At the end of chapter seven of Book Three of *Gulliver* there is a sentence which defines Swift's position as identical with that of More, Erasmus, John of Salisbury, Cicero, and Socrates: "I had the honour to have much conversation with Brutus, and was told, that

has no illusion about her limitations: "None can justly accuse me of wishing to place myself on a level with those who by the sublimity of their genius have so far outstripped me. No, I am not so arrogant as to compare myself even with the least among the scholars of the ancient world" (*ibid.*). But her confidence is unshaken because if her "work is on a much humbler scale" yet it is "altogether different" (*ibid.*). A clear-headed perception of artistic inferiority was yet inseparable from a conviction of having something new to say, something of much greater significance than any pagan was ever granted to perceive or to utter: "For the more seductive the blandishments of lovers the more wonderful the divine succour and the greater merit of those who resist ..." (*ibid.*) In a word, the founder of Christian drama posed the dramatic conflict simultaneously on a social and spiritual plane. A new dimension has been added to literary material, and the confidence born of having perceived its implications produces its full effect in the *Divine Comedy* and in *Macbeth* and *Athalie*, not to mention the plastic arts which were to express an intensity of dramatic organization far beyond the scope of antiquity. Even in Hroswitha one can note that the effort to preserve classical antiquity is seconded by the effort to enlarge it. The effort to enlarge strengthens steadily in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, especially among the dialecticians.[55]

Having come so far in describing the continuity of classical culture, one has definitely the sense of being over the hump. There is no dearth of writers from now till Abelard to attest to the vitality of the tradition. The twelfth and thirteenth chapters of Taylor's *The Mediaeval Mind* (pages 282–330) provide sufficient evidence in themselves. Take Gerbert of Aurillac, who became Pope Sylvester II, as an example. As a boy he loved the classics, and to his life-long devotion to them, his letters are an eloquent witness. He invokes the punishment of hell on a man who has been slow to return his books. He is a perfect exponent of the Ciceronian ideal of eloquence as appears in his forty-fourth letter to an abbot at Tours:

his ancestors Junius, Socrates, Epaminondas, Cato the Younger, Sir Thomas More and himself, were perpetually together: a sextemvirate to which all the ages of the world cannot add a seventh." The omission of Cicero is partly political, partly because Swift had espoused a moderate Atticism in style. But Cicero's conception of Socrates', rather than Plato's, significance (*De Oratore* III, 16) is the one which associates More and Socrates in Swift's mind. Even so superficial a particular as the close resemblance of form and aim between *Gulliver* and More's *Utopia* and Erasmus' *Praise of Folly* would suggest the need of further study of this matter. Likewise, Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees* (Mandeville was a student at the same school as Erasmus) has obvious affinities with the paradox-loving Erasmus and More, the imitators of Lucian, and needs to be considered in its tradition.

A more obvious testimony to the Ciceronian and patristic tradition as seen in Swift, Johnson, and Gibbon is the whole matter of the "baroque." This needs a special study, but one which presupposes the present one. For example, E. I. Watkin, in his recent *Catholic Art and Culture* points to numerous "baroque" effects in the literature of the patristic period (*Cf.* pages 22; 24–28; 34; 93ff; 119; 139–143). If one examines the program proposed and executed even by such minor figures as Southwell and Crashaw, one will readily see that they quite deliberately set about applying the four levels of interpreting Scripture to the amatory themes and imagery of profane love poetry. The matter is, of course, complicated by the fact of the "Petrarchan" imagery having in its turn been borrowed to some extent from the language of Christian mysticism. The "baroque" in poetry and in the other arts is the patristic program, as revived by Petrarch, Salutati, Erasmus, and Reuchlin, in action.

54. St. John, ed., *op. cit.*, page xxvii.
55. "Thus by its own philosophy of history the Middle Ages was led to conceive itself placed at a decisive moment of the drama that opened with the creation of the world. It never imagined that learning had always been what it had become since Charlemagne, nor that further progress was impossible" (Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, page 397).

> But since I am not one who, with Paenetius, would sometimes separate the good from the useful, but rather with Tully would mingle it with everything useful, I wish these best and holiest friendships never to be void of reciprocal utility. And as morality and the art of speech are never to be separated from philosophy, I have always joined the study of speaking well with the study of living well. For although by itself living well may be nobler than speaking well, and may suffice without its fellow for one absolved from the direction of affairs; yet for us, busied with the state, both are needed. For it is of the greatest utility to speak appositely when persuading, and with mild discourse check the fury of angry men. In preparing for such business, I am eagerly collecting a library; and as formerly at Rome and elsewhere in Italy, so likewise in Germany and Belgium, I have obtained copyists with a mass of money, and the help of friends in those parts. Permit me likewise to beg of you also to promote this end. We will append at the end of this letter a list of those writers we wish copied. We have sent for your disposal parchment for the scribes and money to defray the cost, not unmindful of your goodness."[56]

Unfortunately, we don't have the list of writers promised for the end of the epistle, but there is more than enough in Gerbert's easy grasp of every phase of Cicero's ideal to render tediously irrelevant the frequent complaint that the Middle Ages had only the vaguest knowledge of Cicero: "For there is nothing more noble for us in human affairs than knowledge of the most distinguished men; and may it be displayed in volumes multiplied. Go on then, as you have begun, and bring the streams of Cicero to one who thirsts."[57] Taylor comments: "So Gerbert used the classic poets in teaching rhetoric, and doubtless the great prose writers too, with whom he was familiar. Following Cicero's precept that the orator should be a proficient reasoner, he prepared his young rhetoricians by a course in logic, and completed their discipline with exercises in disputation" (1, page 290).

When it is said that Gerbert was the teacher of Fulbert of Chartres, who gave the great cathedral school the impetus which made it the greatest

56. Taylor, *op. cit.*, I, page 287.
57. Taylor, *op. cit.*, I, page 289.

centre of classical culture in the Middle Ages, then the task of tracing the continuity of this grammatical and philological culture from St. Augustine to the twelfth century is complete. Taylor, facing this problem, says, "We start with Italy" (1, page 249). It is our privilege to correct him and say, "We end with Italy." Taylor does not envisage the problem of the *translatio studii* clearly; and he does not view it in the light in which it appeared to the men of the early Middle Ages at all. However, the fact that Italy did not contribute directly to the *translatio studii*, that the classical heritage of the West was not transmitted and vitalized in the early Middle Ages by her, need not blind us to the fact that there persisted uninterruptedly in Italy a meagre tradition of laic erudition. This fact has no great significance between the eighth and thirteenth centuries; but with the expansion of commerce and the rise of a leisured and cultivated laity in fourteenth-century Italy, the existence of this core of laic culture becomes a fact of decisive importance. Its schools show an uninterrupted tradition of grammar and rhetoric, untouched by the great dialectical developments of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. What was more natural than that Italy should provide the grammatical learning and ideals of secular eloquence in the period of declining dialectics? The elucidation of this matter and its significance for a fuller interpretation of the grand Renaissance will occupy some later pages.[58]

2A

58. Raoul Glaber in his *Historiae Libri Quinque* (*P. L.* 142, 609–699) is at great pains to abuse the Italians, and particularly the tenth-century Vilgardus, for their excessive attachment to grammar and the poets. (644a–b)

The fine portrait of Hildebert of Lavardin (b. 1055) given by Taylor (*op. cit.*, II, pages 164–175) should be read to round out the rather hasty sketch I have given. "Hildebert's writings evince that kind of classical scholarship which springs only from great study and great love" (page 173). Three centuries before Petrarch he becomes lyrical over the ruins of Rome. "The spell of the antique lay on Hildebert as on others of his time. 'The gods themselves marvel at their own images, and desire to equal their sculptured forms.... There is a look (*vultus*) about these deities, and they are worshipped for the skill of the sculptor rather than for their divinity'" (page 168). This helps to settle an important point in the history of culture. How could Petrarch and his contemporaries have been so completely mistaken about the antecedent centuries? Paetow provides the explanation:

> Now the lowest ebb in the study of ancient classical literature occurred in the century which preceded Petrarch. So low it was that he and his contemporaries believed that the dry and barren period upon which they had fallen must have extended back for centuries to the last days of classic Latin literature. They were badly mistaken. Only three generations had passed away since France had echoed, with a quarrel between the "ancients and the moderns" which, in importance and interest may well compare with the seventeenth century was which agitated the French Academy and the Royal Society. (*The Battle of the Seven Arts*, page 12.)

The barren period was not barren in dialectics as we shall see. Neither Paetow nor any other historian has seen the implications of these matters for the interpretation of the sixteenth century; and this is sufficient justification to rehearse the familiar in such a way that it may explain the obvious. Although he devoted much study to the matter, Paetow never succeeded in explaining to himself the connection which he was sure existed between the twelfth and seventeenth century battles of the books. If he did not succeed, at least he tried. Very few have seen the significance of the problem at all.

CHAPTER TWO

B. DIALECTICS

THE TRIVIUM FROM ST. AUGUSTINE TO ABELARD

This chapter and its counterparts for other periods may suggest that McLuhan overdisciplined himself in conciseness only when dealing with dialectics, but much of the subject is dealt with in chapters on grammar and rhetoric. The brevity of the presentation here should not obscure the emphasis it gives to a variety of important points.

McLuhan pronounces on a principle of historiography in the early pages: "For the historian of culture the matter of significance is not so much to determine the precise content of this teaching [of logic] as to note how it functioned in relation to the disciplines of grammar and rhetoric." The remark comes after a lengthy quotation from one of McLuhan's principal sources, McKeon's "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages" (see bibliography). McKeon studied under Gilson, making his scholarship congenial to McLuhan by its implicit support for his own call for a revisionist approach that unmasks "history as disguised philosophy" (see footnote 2).

A crucial paradigm shift in the teaching of logic, upsetting the traditional subordination of dialectics to rhetoric, is set out, with full documentation promised for the next chapter on rhetoric. Here, the lengthy footnote #4 provides details on the revival of Old Logic in opposition to New Logic, because "there are the greatest consequences at the literary level." There are consequences not only for the generations of writers following the upheavals in question but for the present generation of students unschooled in the evolving legacy of antiquity: "The basic difficulty in discussing such matters today is that we, inevitably, are attempting to deal with the complex and sophisticated intellectual disciplines provided by the trivium, in the terms of the naïve literary and linguistic culture of our own day."

—(Editor)

No more important evidence of the powerful influence of the tradition of grammar could be asked for than the fact that Abelard, the great enemy of grammar, and the initiator of the dialectical revolt, was yet, involuntarily, a grammarian in most of his work: "... in this concern to gather the significant texts of any controversy, discipline or science from philosophers, Scriptures, Fathers and decrees of councils, he worked as did most of the grammarians, theologians and canon lawyers of the century."[1] Further evidence of the vitality of grammar, in spite of dialectical supremacy, can be seen in the celebrated *Didascalion* of Hugh of St. Victor in the twelfth century. Grammar is the supreme method for him, as for his equally famous disciple the encyclopedist Vincent of Beauvais.[2]

Taylor suggests that the twelfth-century dialectical development was an inevitable development: "Thus in medieval education, and in the successive order of appropriating the patristic and the antique, logic stood on grammar's shoulders" (11, page 364). However, the Renaissance must then be regarded as retrograde, in that it rejected the logic and metaphysics of the schoolmen, and became grammatical once more. This is only to say that Taylor's main interpretations do not account for the facts in which he is interested.

Professor McKeon's recent article on "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," already cited, provides precisely the texts and perspective necessary to understand the problem of dialectics in this period. Its authority and accessibility permit a considerable abbreviation of this section of the study:

> The discussion of logic during the Middle Ages may be divided into four periods: during the first period the elements of logic were learned from simple treatises like the pseudo-Augustine's *Principia Dialecticae* and *Categoriae Decem* (which Alcuin recommended to Charlemagne as Augustine's translation of Aristotle's *Categories*) or the sections on dialectic in such handbooks as those of Martianus Capella, Cassiodorus, and Isidore of Seville; during the second period, after the curriculum instituted by Gerbert at the end of the tenth century, the basis of instruction in dialectic was broadened to

1. McKeon, "Renaissance and Method," page 69. "The twelfth century did a thorough piece of grammatical preparation for the dialectical developments of theology in the thirteenth century" (page 70). McKeon, a pupil of Gilson, is the only person besides Gilson who seems to be aware of the necessity of writing the history of medieval and Renaissance culture in terms of the rivalry among the trivial arts:

   > The difference between the method of Erasmus and that of Abelard may, therefore, be stated as that between a use of the three arts oriented to an understanding of a passage (that is, the three arts arranged in accordance with the needs of grammar), and the use of the three arts oriented to a comparative estimation of a variety of arguments (that is, the three arts arranged under the domination of dialectic)" (page 81).

   When the three arts are arranged according to the needs of rhetoric one has the Ciceronian ideal of the *doctus orator*, the man of political prudence, the wise counsellor of princes, the courtier ideal of the Renaissance, the ideal of the epic poet as eloquent moral guide and political philosopher, joining wisdom and delight as in the ideal of Spenser and Sidney.
2. Taylor, *op. cit.*, II, pages 345; 446–449. Taylor, unaware of the nature of grammatical method, confuses the sort of work done by these men, and by the even greater grammarian, St. Bonaventura, with dialectical scholasticism, simply because they were men of note in a period of ascendant dialectics. It is the failure to make basic distinctions of this kind which evokes McKeon's comment that accounts of the Renaissance since the sixteenth century "all betray history as disguised philosophy." He continues: "By most accounts it is easy to distinguish the characteristics of the Renaissance from those of the Middle Ages, but when those distinctions have been made, the Reformation tends to be assimilated to the Renaissance or to a reaction back to the Middle Ages; recently, however, the characteristics that

include the works and translations of Boethius, among them two of the six books of Aristotle's *Organon*, which together acquired the traditional name of the Old Logic; during the third period, the translation of the remaining four books in the twelfth century set up the New Logic, constituted of the *Introduction* of Porphyry, the *Organon* of Aristotle, and the *Six Principles* of Gilbert de la Porée, yet the authority of the Old Logic continued strong, for the contemporaries of John of Salisbury found the *Posterior Analytics*, which treats of the principles of scientific demonstration, difficult or even unintelligible, and, indeed, the first important commentary on that work was written in the thirteenth century by Robert Grosseteste...; and finally during the fourth period, the discussion of logic is determined less by Aristotle's *Organon* than by the *Summulae* written in the thirteenth century by Petrus Hispanus, Lambert of Auxerre, and William of Shyreswood. (Pages 7–8.)

For the historian of culture the matter of significance is not so much to determine the precise content of this teaching as to note how it functioned in relation to the disciplines of grammar and rhetoric. Thus, for the first two periods designated by McKeon both dialectics and rhetoric are subordinate to grammar and Scriptural exegesis. It is in this fashion that Alcuin's greatest pupil, Rhabanus Maurus, designates the province of dialectics in the *De Clericorum Institutione*:

> He defines it in words which we have met before as, "*disciplina rationalis quaerendi, diffiniendi et disserendi, etiam vera et a falsis discernerendi potens.*" His enthusiasm for that subject of the curriculum of the seven liberal arts was due to the fact that to his mind logic enabled one to penetrate with subtlety into the craftiness of the heretics and to confute their opinions by magical conclusions of syllogisms. By illustrating how a fallacious syllogism might, for instance, disprove the resurrection, he showed the necessity of studying the true modes of the syllogism in the school, which knowledge was "to be applied to find the truth in the scriptures."[3]

had been taken to be marks of the Renaissance have been found earlier and earlier in the Middle Ages so that the sharpness of the distinction has been breaking down..." ("Renaissance and Method," page 43).

3. Abelson, *The Seven Liberal Arts*, page 81.

This is only one instance of many which point, in the case of dialectics as of grammar, to the fact that the classical studies were eagerly cultivated in the interests of theology. In practise, of course, most of the teachers of these subjects were not theologians, and each claimed a large degree of autonomy for his specialty.

In the next section, on rhetoric, it will be necessary to show how rhetoric influenced dialectics, assimilating it to logic "on the authority of Cicero," as McKeon shows (page 9). Owing to the traditional subordination of dialectics to rhetoric by Cicero and Quintilian, logic consists for the early Middle Ages, not so much in the "treatment of the differences of demonstrative, dialectical, and sophistical principles and proofs" as in "the problem of discovering arguments or things" (McKeon, page 10). That is to say that dialectics becomes, primarily, in the Old Logic, assimilated to the first two branches of rhetoric, namely invention and disposition.[4]

In the Old Logic, then, of the early Middle Ages, one finds the ancient opposition of the topics of dialectics and the topics of rhetoric. Just as with Aristotle, those who took over rhetorical topics as a branch of dialectics made rhetoric subordinate to dialectics. This is the case with Boethius and Scotus Erigena. Cicero had made the genus of rhetoric to be politics, identifying rhetoric with wisdom, eloquence with philosophy. Aristotle, however, had made rhetoric something narrower by defining it as the art of persuasion in civil, judicial, and deliberative causes. "It is, as Isidore later observed, an elusive question, in which the genus of an art can be transmuted into its matter, but that strange difference is one of the slight remnants of the difference between Aristotle's conception of rhetoric and that of Cicero and the rhetoricians, and from that remnant in Boethius' questions, medieval commentators were to reconstrue, with slowly increasing erudition, the full specifications, of the old opposition."[5]

One has only to turn to Prantl or to Abelson and glance at the list of numerous commentaries turned out on the *Ten Categories*, a *Dialectica* attributed to St. Augustine from the sixth to the tenth centuries, to recognize the central place of dialectics in the education of this period. Great theological

4. When William of Ockham, Rudolph Agricola, and Ramus later revive the Old Logic in opposition to the New Logic or Aristotle and St. Thomas, there are the greatest consequences at the literary level. No less a question that whether rhetoric is to survive as anything more than the art of ornamenting a logically ordered discourse is at issue. Spenser, Sidney, Ben Jonson, Bacon, Herbert and Milton threw their weight into the Ramistic scales. The issue was further complicated by the strong theological currents flowing through Ockham and Ramus. Rosamund Tuve, unfortunately, has done nothing to clarify these confused perspectives in her recent study of Ramus and the Metaphysical Poets. Theories of poetic diction and doctrines of literary criticisms are often strikingly dependent on the position held by dialectics in the hierarchy of interests of a given writer. The opinions of Hobbes, Sprat, and Dryden, concerning the poets of the preceding age, are dialectically based. The very term "metaphysics," as applied to Donne by Dryden, implies a rejection of Donne's particular use of dialectics in poetry. Donne would have seemed almost a scholastic to Dryden. So the large body of present-day discussion of "metaphysical" poetry is wide of the mark simply for a lack of study of the aims which Donne set for himself in verse. The basic difficulty in discussing such matters today is that we, inevitably, are attempting to deal with the complex and sophisticated intellectual disciplines provided by the trivium, in the terms of the naïve literary and linguistic culture of our own day.

With Ramus, the method of dialectics is claimed not only as supreme for purposes of rhetorical invention but for scientific purposes, not only for arguments but for things. It is in this regard that Renaissance stylistic disputes are inseparable from scientific and philosophical questions. The influence of Ramus on [Thomas] Wilson, [Sir Philip] Sidney, [Abraham] Fraunce, and others is recognized. [See W. G. Crane, *Wit and Rhetoric in the Renaissance*, New York, 1937; pages 54–56, and Hardin Craig, *The Enchanted Glass*, New York, 1936; page 149.] The fact that Cambridge was a Ramistic centre in the days of Gabriel Harvey, Francis Bacon, and John Milton, had great effects on English letters. The

controversies, such as those on the Eucharist and on predestination, forced the disputants to ransack the fathers, to arrange a concordance of their discordant canons, and to attempt a dialectical or probable resolution of their opinions. This work brought dialectics into constant use.[6] Late in the tenth century dialectics flourished even more vigorously, owing to the efforts of Gerbert of Aurillac, later Pope Sylvester II. In his teaching at Paris, he used all the works and Aristotelian translations of Boethius on dialectics, the *Isagoge* of Porphyry and the *Topics* of Cicero.[7]

However, Fulbert of Chartres, the pupil of Gerbert, significantly subordinated logic to rhetoric in his teaching at Rheims. A student of his, Richer, who wrote his life, says:

> When he wished to lead them on from such studies to rhetoric, he put in practice his opinion that one cannot attain the art of oratory without a previous knowledge of the modes of diction which are to be learned from the poets. So he brought forth those with whom he thought his pupils should be conversant. He read and explained the poets Virgil, Statius, and Terence, the satirists Juvenal and Persius and Horace, also Lucan the historiographer. Familiarized with these, and practised in their locutions, he taught his pupils rhetoric. After they were instructed in this art, he brought up a sophist, to practise them in disputation, so that practised in this art as well, they might seem to argue artlessly, which he deemed the height of oratory.[8]

In this Ciceronian tradition, dialectics was never permitted to assume a function superior to rhetoric even among its ablest practitioners.[9]

One interesting consequence of the full restoration of the works of Boethius in Gerbert's time was a shift of the terms and problems of dialectics, with the result that the dialectics of the preceding age was quickly forgotten. We have only to think of the rapidity with which in the twentieth century many of the basic interests of the nineteenth century have been forgotten, to have an analogy. Within the lifetime of Abelard in the twelfth century an equally abrupt progress in dialectics occurred:

106

further fact that St. John's College was an Aristotelian stronghold, contemptuous of what Hooker designated as "the poverty of that other devised new aid" (referring to Ramist dialectics, *Eccles. Polity*, I, v, 4) has very immediate bearings on the Harvey-Nashe quarrel.

In the *De Augmentis*, discussing the relation of dialectics and scientific method, Bacon makes quite explicit that he approves the Old Logic: "And herein Ramus merited better in reviving those excellent rules of propositions (that they should be true, universally, primarily, and essentially)..." (*Works, op. cit.*, IV, page 453). Bacon's impatience with the "vermiculate questions" of the schoolmen is owing to his conviction that his tradition of logic with its rhetorical topics dealt with arguments and things, while that of the Aristotelians dealt with words only. A very great deal of specialized work remains to be done in the history of the decadent scholasticism of Ockham and his followers before the historian of culture will be able to write a satisfactory account of many phases of the sixteenth century.

5. McKeon, "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," page 11. "These were not technical questions which were discussed by a few learned men, but distinctions which entered into all parts of mediaeval culture and life. Christianity had grown up in the environment of a culture which was predominantly rhetorical..." (*ibid.*)
6. See Taylor, *op. cit.*, I, pages 220–234, for a discussion of the parts played by Alcuin, Rhabanus, Scotus Erigena, and Agobard in these matters.
7. See McKeon, "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," page 16; "Renaissance and Method," pages 50–51; and Taylor, *op. cit.*, I, pages 280; 290–294.
8. Taylor, *op. cit.*, I, pages 289–290.
9. However, Berengar of Tours (*ob.* 1088) was a pupil of Fulbert, who became an out-and-out dialectician. See Prantl (*op. cit.*, II, page 73) for a contemporary letter written by a fellow student of Berengar in which he is described as one who is bent upon novelties, one who despises Priscian, Donatus, and

When Abailard wrote during the first half of the twelfth century he enumerated as the sources of his logical ideas precisely the works that had formed the basis of Gerbert's new course. But even Abelard's contemporary and pupil, John of Salisbury, possessed the "new logic," that is, the translation of the whole of Aristotle's *Organon*, and in his time the philosophic renaissance which culminated in the thirteenth century was already underway.[10]

Boethius. In his *De Sacra Coena* (Berlin, 1834, page 100), Berengar states that it is the mark of the noblest minds everywhere to resort to dialectics. Dialectics is the art of reason, and reason is the mark of man. He cites St. Augustine on dialectics as the art of arts. An eleventh-century contemporary of Berengar was the dialectician and theologian, Lanfranc of Bec. He engaged in controversy with Berengar. (See Manitius, *Geschichte der Lateinischen Litteratur*, III, page 81.) With St. Anselm of Canterbury (*ob.* 1109), the pupil of Lanfranc, we are almost in the full tide of dialectics. The adversary of Anselm, Roscellinus, was the teacher of Abelard.

10. McKeon, "Renaissance and Method," page 51. Frankly confronting the problem of how many can still retain today the sixteenth-century notion of the Middle Ages, McKeon points out that up until as late as the fourteenth century each intellectual revolution was heralded as a return to some more ancient doctrine that had been known to the preceding generation. However, the followers of Ockham and the Averroists in the fourteenth century prepared for the fifteenth and sixteenth century revolt against the whole traditions of philosophy. "It does have the peculiarity that, whereas in preceding renaissances philosophers forgot their newer formulation of philosophic problems, the philosophers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries expended a great deal of their energy in calumniating their predecessors" (page 53). In the next section on grammar, some reasons will be offered in explanation of this anomaly.

CHAPTER TWO

C. RHETORIC

THE TRIVIUM FROM ST. AUGUSTINE TO ABELARD

Important new dimensions of rhetoric are presented, adding to the vast tableau of the trivium that will emerge in all its fulness before it is applied to the work of Thomas Nashe. McLuhan opens his discussion by explaining the notion of colors of good and evil *and how it is relates to figures of thought, mentioned first in the discussion of dialectics in the period from antiquity to Saint Augustine. The latter topic now receives fuller treatment.*

McLuhan offers convenient working definitions of various terms in the rhetorician's intimidating array of intellectual tools: effictio *(physical traits),* notatio *(psychological traits)—used in the ancient practice of portraiture—*pathos *(representation of human suffering),* ethos *(characterization),* ethopoiea *(the imitation of other persons' characteristics), etc. Two references to works on the* second sophistic *are given here. The topic assumes its full importance in the closing lines of the dissertation, where McLuhan will link the notion to the work of James Joyce.*

The key word continuity *is to be found in the opening line of this chapter and repeated thereafter in conjunction with a reminder of the author's purpose: "to indicate the continuity and wide influence of the rhetorical tradition in medieval and Renaissance times." In support of this objective, McLuhan quotes again from McKeon, on the subject of what McLuhan himself has elsewhere called "the interfusion of the trivium." The passage from McKeon is couched as a warning against formulating a definition of rhetoric that confines it to style, literature, or discourse, to their mutual exclusion, precisely because doing so obscures the history of the subject in the medieval period and contributes to the fragmentation of the trivium. The discussion here extends to legal rhetoric and judicial oratory. Just as an earlier chapter offers the prospect of making a test-case juxtaposition of dialectics and deconstruction, here is a starting point for juxtaposing rhetorical analysis in a long view of the trivium with rare contemporary treatments of legal language from the perspective of linguistics, such as Lawrence Solan's* The Language of Judges.

McLuhan refers in footnote 22 to a separate monograph he had undertaken on the subject of Francis Bacon's scientific program in relation to grammar, dialectics, and rhetoric, welcoming confirmation of the views he expressed there by way of McKeon's "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages." The holograph version of the monograph in question is an expansion and synthesis drawn from many sections of the present work. It was eventually submitted for publication to an editor who made suggestions for reducing the length of the submission from over forty to under twenty pages by omitting the condensed history of the trivium, the detailed comparison between Roger Bacon and St. Bonaventure, and all discussion of Francis Bacon in relation to rhetoric. McLuhan, of course, found these suggestions uncongenial, and the work was never published. As for his projected "sketch of early medieval sermon technique," mentioned in footnote 24, the compiled material was never brought to publication form.

The chapter draws to a close with a discussion of the paradox of grammar and rhetoric in the service of the codifiers of Canon Law producing a renaissance of dialectics in the twelfth century. McLuhan concludes: "This emphasizes once more the complex bonds which join together the rival sisters of the trivium." Given that the laws of media articulated by McLuhan at the end of his career apply to many dimensions of language, it is pertinent to ask if and how the present work suggests the possibility of articulating a tetrad of the trivium.

—(Editor)

One method of illustrating the continuity and wide influence of the classical rhetorical tradition in the Middle Ages would be to trace the effects of the doctrines of *laus et vituperatio*, of the topics of praise and blame or, as they were often referred to, the colors of good and evil. Praise and blame, whether of policies, actions, or persons, was the principal object of ancient rhetoric considered as the art of persuasion.[1] The great collection of sayings and doings made by Valerius Maximus is both in character and intention a simulacrum of the entire art. Ethics and eloquence were as inseparable in the nature of classical rhetoric as eloquence and learning were for Isocrates and Cicero. And it was the profoundly ethical character of eloquence which at first secured its adoption by the Fathers and later assured its cultivation by the medieval Church.[2]

One of the most convenient ways of pointing out the effects of the colors of good and evil is in their relation to descriptions of characters and persons. The handbooks of rhetoric refer to this matter variously as *icon, ecphrasis, hypotyposis, ethopoeia, notatio, effictio, mores, descriptio, characterismus, ethologia*, and others, but all of which fall under *figures of thought* (Quintilian, IX, 3, 98–99). For present purposes it is unnecessary to begin with a treatise earlier than the *Ad Herennium* of about 80 B.C. This earliest of Latin rhetorical treatises is probably no more than a translation of a popular Greek manual. At any rate, it is modelled upon the Greek manuals just as one finds with the *De Inventione* of Cicero. Quite early in the Middle Ages the *Ad Herennium* was attributed to Cicero, and, with the *De Inventione*, became a standard reference work. The *Ad Herennium* codifies the ancient practice of portraiture under *effictio* and *notatio* (IV, 63). *Effictio* is concerned with physical, *notatio* with psychological traits; but the ancient arts of physiognomy and medicine rendered any basic distinction between physical and moral traits merely nugatory.[3]

When the texts on the subject in Cicero, Quintilian, Augustine, Priscian, Capella, Emporius, Cassiodorus, Isidore, and the rest down to the twelfth and thirteenth century *arts poétiques*, published by Faral, have been examined, the important job is to assess their influence on literary practice.[4] Since this

1. "Isocrates held that praise and blame find a place in every kind of oratory" (Quintilian, III, 4). Some would even make rhetoric a "department of morals" (II, 21, 3).
2. As Wust observes in "Crisis in the West", (page 105), "the ethical theory of the Middle Ages, which penetrates far more deeply than modern ethics into the personal foundations of man, is actually explained by this unquestioning preference for the practical life to all theory." The practical bias of medieval ethics is rooted in the practise and theory of classical law and oratory. This tradition is even more evident as a result of the increased Renaissance stress on Cicero and Quintilian. Men like Erasmus insist on character formation almost as the sole end of education, whether of young or old. See his *De Pueris Instituendis* (pages 183–184 *et passim* in *Desiderius Erasmus concerning the Aim and Method of Education*, trans. by W. H. Woodward, Cambridge, 1904). The moral and rhetorical functions of the *Adagia* of Erasmus are inseparable. The same fact can be illustrated from almost any Renaissance writer.
3. Recognizing this, Matthew of Vendome recommends the combining of *effictio* and *notatio*. (Faral, *Les arts poétiques*, pages 118–119; 134), and Guillaume de Machout, one of Chaucer's models, mingles physical and psychological description just as Chaucer does. W. C. Curry, in *Chaucer and the Medieval Sciences* (New York, 1926), gives a detailed analysis of the profound way in which the arts of medicine, and physiognomy, and astrology enter into Chaucer's choice of epithets in character description. He seems to have been unaware of the direct illumination which might have been brought to bear from the widely-established *arts poétiques* with which Chaucer, like any literate man of his day, was quite familiar. (See Faral, *op. cit.*, pages 80; 101.)
4. *Ad Herennium*, I, 2; 7; III, 6–8; IV, 49–50; 63. Cicero, *De Inventione*, I, 5; 24; II, 18–19; *De Oratore*, II, 22. Quintilian, II, 4; III, 4; 7; V, 11; VIII, 3; 64–73; XII, 2. Horace, *Ars Poetica*, II, 114–127; 158–178. Halm's *Rhetores Latini Minores* (Leipzig, 1863) contains the texts from Fortunatianus to Emporius. Their

is a largely unexplored field, only a few general facts can be presented here, no more than enough to indicate the continuity and wide influence of the rhetorical tradition in medieval and Renaissance times. While there is no branch of ancient prose and poetry which cannot serve to illustrate the recognized techniques of *effictio* and *notatio*, these devices of description flourished with especial exuberance in epideictic oratory. It was this oratory of display and virtuosity which eventually provided the fantastic themes and events of the Greek romances; and these in their turn had a great medieval and Renaissance vogue because of their wealth of rhetorical description.[5] It is scarcely surprising that Philostratus, born about 170 A.D., from whom we learn most of what we know of Greek epideictic oratory (Seneca the elder's *Controversiae* have preserved for us the knowledge of the same genre among the Romans), should also have been the author of *Eikones*—descriptions in prose of pictures he had seen. Perhaps these were very like the *Daphnis and Chloe* of Longus, which belongs to the same period.[6] It is with regard to the rhetorical traditions of personal description in ancient, medieval, and Renaissance romance that a basic distinction must be drawn, the distinction between *pathos* and *ethos*, in the methods of the description. Failure to note this distinction, so carefully observed by the rhetoricians themselves, has involved the historians of the subject in needless perplexities.[7] Aristotle takes the division for granted as one universally recognized in his day when he says in *Poetics* that it is possible to have a tragedy without characters. The point is that tragedy is a representation of human suffering or pathos, and that ethos or characterization, so indispensable to the motivation of comedy, need be present in tragedy only in that degree necessary to verisimilitude. Character in tragedy is contingent; in comedy, necessary. Whereas tragedy presents men as suffering, as subject to outward forces, comedy represents men as agents, active and morally purposive; for character is that which reveals moral purpose.[8] This classic distinction between passion and *ethos* or virtue was continuously and unquestioningly observed by grammarians, rhetoricians, and critics until the eighteenth century. Cicero observes the distinction, and its consequences for decorum, in his discussion of the use of

2C

112

treatment of praise and blame in the matter of *effictio* and *notatio* to be found in Halm is as follows: Fortunatianus: page 81. St. Augustine: page 139. Victorinus: pages 303–305. Julius Victor: page 436. Capella: pages 456–457. Cassiodorus: page 495. Isidore: pages 508, 521. Alcuin: page 526. Priscian: pages 555, 586–588. Emporius: page 570. The texts edited by Faral are rich in this regard. Matthew of Vendome: pages 118–119, 120, 132–136. Geoffrey of Vinsauf: pages 214, 271, 273, 310. Everard: page 348. Likewise John of Garland's *De Arte Prosayca, Metrica, et Rithmica* (ed. by G. Mari in *Romanische Forschungen* 13 (1902), pages 883–965, 888, 914, 919, 937, 939).

5. As Cinthio said, "The word *romance* has the same meaning with us as epic with the Romans." (Baldwin, *Renaissance Literary Theory and Practice*, page 159.)
6. Philostratus, like Lucian the favorite of More and Swift, was Attic in style and a favorite with Ben Jonson, whose "Drink to me only with thine eyes" has its source in Philostratus' *Erotic Epistles*.
7. Baldwin, *op. cit.*, page 123, says of the Renaissance in general that "Renaissance poets, for all the cult of classicism, often revived the ancient world in Alexandrian decadence, saw in Vergil only his high style, conceived poetic as rhetoric, and ran after the Greek romances. Ariosto was one of these Alexandrians." Failure to perceive that the romance writers were consciously cultivating *pathos* rather than *ethos* makes it impossible for Baldwin to see that, despite many superficial resemblances, the intention of Tasso and Spenser is ethical teaching, that of Boiardo, Ariosto, and Cervantes is *pathos*. Thus Ariosto can incorporate the medieval *compleint d'amour* and many other features of medieval romance without ceasing to be "classical," because medieval romance was firmly grounded in classical rhetorical theory and practice. "Nobody can be the historian of the Romance or the Elegy who has not followed up the clues of the rhetorical curriculum and the aesthetic theory of the Hellenistic world." (*English Literature and the Classics*, ed. G. S. Gordon, Oxford, 1912; page 90.) Quite consistently with his purpose and the rhetorical canons which he carefully observed throughout his

various styles (*Orator*, xxxvii–xxxviii, cxxviii, and *De Oratore*, II, 43–44). Both the representation and the incitation of the passions require, as do tragedy, epic, and romance, the grand style, whereas the style for ethical praise and blame is *come iucundum, ad benevolentiam conciliandam* (*Orator*, cxxviii).

Quintilian has, of course, a much fuller treatment of the subject:

> Emotions, however, as we learn from ancient authorities, fall into two classes; the one is called *pathos* by the Greeks and is rightly and correctly expressed in Latin by *adfectus* (emotion): the other is called *ethos* (morals) and consequently the branch of philosophy known as ethics is styled moral philosophy by us (VI, 2, 8).

This is the same distinction observed by Aristotle in dealing with the major passions in his *Rhetorica* and considering the other passions in the *Ethics* as aspects of the virtues, whether deficient or excessive. Throughout medieval and Renaissance times the passions were treated as a branch of rhetoric.

The *Characters* of Theophrastus were in the nature of school exercises illustrating not *pathos* but *ethos*. As Quintilian says, "There is also good reason for giving the name of *ethos* to those scholastic exercises in which we portray rustics, misers, cowards, and superstitious persons according as our theme may require. For if *ethos* denotes moral character, our speech must necessarily be based on *ethos* when it is engaged in portraying such a character" (VI, 2, 17). And later: "The imitation of other persons' characteristics, which is styled *ethopoeia* or, as some persons prefer, *mimesis*, may be counted among the devices which serve to excite the gentler emotions. For it consists mainly in banter, though it may be concerned either with words or deeds." (IX, 2, 58).[9]

A useful discussion of ancient literary practice of the character sketch is given by E. C. Evans in her "Roman descriptions of personal appearance."[10] She is primarily concerned with the way in which the ancient doctrines of physiognomy were employed by the rhetoricians, and, along with everybody else, overlooks the decisive distinctions between *ethos* and *pathos* in

works, Spenser "avoids the great knights, the great scenes and motifs of Arthurian romance according to Chrétien and Malory." [Edwin Greenlaw, *Studies in Spenser's Historical Allegory*, page 51.] Spenser simply avoids *pathos*.

8. Quintilian says: "The *pathos* of the Greeks, which we correctly translate by *emotion*, is of a different character, and I cannot better indicate the nature of the difference than by saying that *ethos* rather resembles comedy and *pathos* tragedy." [VI, 2, 20.] After treating *pathos*, Quintilian turns to the subject of jests, a department of *ethos* [VI, 3, 1ff.] and points to the fact that jests which are adapted to character are called *ethical* by the Greeks [VI, 3, 93–94]. John of Garland in the thirteenth century offers a fuller discussion of the principles and decorum of comedy and tragedy as related to *ethos* and *pathos*. [*op. cit.*, page 919.]
9. For the relation of these doctrines to that scheme of education of youth in morals and eloquence which held uninterrupted until the sudden rise of dialectics in the twelfth century, see Quintilian I, 8 and 9. The fifteenth and sixteenth century revival of the same education needs no comment; but the implications for medieval and Renaissance literary modes need much study. W. G. Crane [*Wit and Rhetoric in the Renaissance*] is aware of the close Renaissance connection between the moral discourse, essay, sermon, comedy, and character [chapter 10] but does not seem to be aware of the tradition nor of the philosophical basis of the tradition. Thus *Euphues* is a moral discourse written in the middle style, as Lyly explained. It is the sermon style of St. Hilary, St. Augustine, and of many a medieval preacher, dominated by figures of thought, and sparing in the figures of emotion or *pathos* which prevail in the high-styled [Sidney's] *Arcadia*.

   As Sidney himself states in *An Apology for Poetry*, "... the greatest part of Poets have apparelled their poeticall inventions in that numbrous kinde of writing which is called verse: indeed but apparelled, verse being but an ornament and no cause to Poetry, sith there have beene many most excellent

description. Both kinds, however, are either of praise or blame:

> An analysis of the material collected revealed three principal methods of description used over and over again. First, there is the method where the body is described in general terms in such expressions as *forma eximia, corpus ingens*, a type which is commonplace in literature and in general consists of descriptions, laudatory or otherwise, of the permanent appearance of a man. Secondly, there is the type where the emotion of the individual registered on the body or countenance is indicated by such phrases as *laeto voltu, truci voltu*. The second type is to be found especially (1) in panegyrics in which the dignity of the appearance, the tranquillity of the countenance, and the nobility of the eyes are lauded, or in vituperative attacks on enemies and (2) in expressions in which the momentary appearance of a man is depicted, that is to say, in phrases which suggest the reaction of a person to some event or speech as it is reflected for a brief space upon the countenance. This device of characterization reaches its highest development in Tacitus. Thirdly, there is the type where the whole body is photographically described, as in the *Lives* of Suetonius.[11]

Miss Evans proceeds to illustrate these types of characterization from Livy, Tacitus, and Suetonius.[12] They could just as easily be illustrated from any other genre of classical description, and from the Fathers.

Since W. C. Curry's *Chaucer and the Medieval Sciences* has shown in detail the organic relations between physiognomy and medicine in the Middle Ages, the further fact of their close connection with rhetoric in the Middle Ages can be indicated by showing precisely the same relations in antiquity. Galen tells us that Hippocrates really established physiognomy as a science (Evans, page 47). Thus the immediate connection of medicine with rhetoric is found in the matter of rhetorical delivery and the art of gesture and expression. However, even a superficial study of the *Corpus Hippocraticum* shows the importance of rhetoric in the methods of delivering medical knowledge. "Writing in aphorisms" was part of the Stoic technique of

Poets that never versified ... For *Xenophon*, who did imitate so excellently as to give vs *effigiem iusti imperii*, the portraiture of a iust Empire vnder the name of *Cyrus* (as *Cicero* sayth of him), made therein an absolute heroicall Poem; so did *Heliodorus* in his sugred inuention of that picture of loue in *Theagines* and *Cariclea*; ... But it is that fayning notable images of vertues, vices, or what els, with that delightfull teaching, which must be the right describing note to know a poet by: ..." (*Elizabethan Critical Essays*, edited by G. Smith, I, pages 159–160). Ethical portraiture in the mode of *laus et vituperatio* is for the Renaissance almost the whole of poetry, as it is of rhetoric.

The designation of the *Arcadia* as an epic poem by Sidney's contemporaries is quite natural and justifiable on traditional grounds. Crane's treatment of "The Sentimental Novel and the Romance" (*op. cit.*, chapter 11) is, unfortunately, quite confusing for lack of these basic distinctions, made by the writers themselves, between *ethos* and *pathos*. The same is true of S. L. Wolff's *The Greek Romances in Elizabethan Prose Fiction* (New York, 1912).

10. *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 46 (1935), pages 43–84.
11. Evans, *op. cit.*, pages 44–45. All these methods of description belong to *effictio* rather than *notatio*, since the latter is description by mental qualities. *Effictio* is naturally of prime importance in romance, epic, and tragedy for achieving *pathos*; but owing to the doctrines of physiognomy, *effictio* was also of psychological significance. Evans shows how *pronuntiatio* or *actio*, the fifth division of rhetoric, was based on a highly sophisticated art of gesture, which itself was but a part of physiognomy. (See *Ad Herennium*, III, 19; 26–27; *De Oratore* III, 216; 221ff.; *Orator* 55; 59; 60; *Brutus*, 110; Quintilian, XI, 3, 65ff.)
12. E. K. Rand's essay on "Suetonius in the Early Middle Ages" (*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 37 (1926), pages 1–48) establishes the continuity of the classical modes of characterization in historical writing in the only period in which it has been doubted.

dialectics and rhetoric which deeply interested the Hippocratics from a scientific point of view.[13] Thus McKeon is not at the root of the matter when he says that "Plato's and Aristotle's comparison of rhetoric and medicine has been made into a scientific method which rhetoric shared with medicine."[14] Greek medical "writing in aphorisms" has the same stylistic and scientific bearings in antiquity as it has for the "Attic" writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; and the Stoic ideal of the scientific sage described in the treatise *Decorum* might easily serve as a description of the "anti-Ciceronian" type of both ages.

> No studied preparation, and no over-elaboration. Dress decorous and simple ... aiming rather at good repute, and adapted for contemplation, introspection and walking. The several characteristics are to be serious, artless, sharp in encounters, ready to reply, stubborn in opposition, with those who are of like mind, quick-witted and affable, good-tempered towards all, silent in face of disturbances, in the face of silences ready to reason and endure, prepared for an opportunity and quick to take it, knowing how to use food and temperate, patient in waiting for an opportunity, setting out in effectual language everything that has been shown forth, graceful in speech, gracious in disposition, strong in the reputation that these qualities bring , turning to the truth when a thing has been shown to be true.[15]

The rhetorical doctrines associated with the far-reaching divisions of *ethos* and *pathos* in antiquity, in the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance have an interesting bearing on the genre of Romance writing as practiced in all three periods. Furnished with the basic concepts of the rhetoricians, it is possible to survey the evidence gathered by such writers as Wolff and Crane and to see the whole complex and confusing picture which they present assume distinct and intelligible outlines. For example, the fact that all romances are concerned with love and adventure and that the heroes and heroines are shoved about by fortune rather than creative of their own fates.[16] That they utter long plaints expressive of their feelings in the face

13. Hippocrates, Loeb II; pages xxv–xxviii.
14. McKeon, "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," page 11.
15. Hippocrates II, pages 381–382. The Hippocratic "revival" of the sixteenth century is well known, though its direct influence on rhetorical style has not been studied, nor its medieval antecedents recognized. Perhaps one reason why the essays of Morris W. Croll have failed to bring about the redirection of scholarly effort in the study of the Renaissance which they ought to have done is that they do not show the continuous relations between medicine and rhetoric in the Middle Ages, and they thus contribute to the illusion that the Renaissance "revival" in this as in other matters is a mere recovery of antiquity rather than a complex feud between traditions which had been continuously active throughout the Middle Ages. At any rate, Croll saw deeper than anybody else and his essays need to be gathered into a book [...] [See four entries for Croll in bibliography—ed.]

    The concept of the Stoic sage affected profoundly patristic speculation on monastic ideals. It is thus through a main artery of Christian tradition that many of the most important ethical and literary doctrines of the ancient world entered the life-stream of the early medieval world. [See Gilson's *Héloise et Abélard*, pages 174–180.] This subject, so vital even to the understanding of prominent features of medieval and Renaissance literary style awaits an historian. For example, Chrysostom, the eloquent pupil of the celebrated Libanius, "composed his three books against the opponents of monasticism, and wrote the interesting little treatise in which he institutes a comparison between the monarch and the monk. In this we may detect traces of his scholastic training, and his study of Stoicism. He endows the monk with something of the qualities of the Stoic sage." [J. F. D'Alton, *Selections from St. John Chrysostom*, London, 1940; page 4.] Most medieval treatises for princes are in the Ciceronian tradition; but the Attic Chrysostom is here clearly seen to be a fountainhead for the anti-tradition. The

of fortune is of the essence of that *pathos* characteristic of the grand style. Schoolboys were brought up, not only to write ethical sketches of historical and fictitious persons, but to make and utter decorous speeches appropriate to Niobe or Hecuba torn by grief. Wolff notes (page 137) the absence of *character* as an active force but sees no further.

Statius, says Wolff (page 132), has the first chivalrous character, but he fails to see that the cult of the heroic, in style as well as suffering, gives rise to the whole of medieval chivalric romance. Statius and Lucan were not medieval favorites for nothing. And, as E. K. Rand has shown in *The Founders of the Middle Ages*, "Jerome's works have a close connection with the poetical legends current at the time, developed, as we shall see, by Pope Damascus, and likewise with the Greek Romances, most of which were written by Pagan authors" (page 121). The fact that most patristic literature is frankly an adaptation of the styles popular in the Silver Age helps to account for the early and late medieval popularity of the Greek Romances and their numerous subsidiary genres. The neglect of Silver Age literature subsequent to the seventeenth century likewise accounts for much of our failure to see the vital continuity of classical literature in numerous medieval literary forms, as for example "a splendid line of tradition," in saints' lives, "that runs down the Middle Ages and culminates in Jacopo da Voragine with his Golden Legend."[17]

When it is recognized that ancient oratory was dominated by the ethical purposes of *laus* et *vituperatio* and that descriptions of things and persons have the widest ramifications in ancient medicine and psychology, then the evidence adduced by Faral assumes a character which he scarcely suspected. It is nothing less than a testimony to a profound continuity, in the bases as well as the superficies, between ancient and medieval culture. He says:

> Les arts poétiques du moyen âge font à ce genre de descriptions une place importante: c'est à elles qu'est consacré, en majeure partie, le traité de Matthieu de Vendôme. A l'ampleur de l'étude qu'il leur consacre, au soin qu'il met à en détailler les principes, au nombre et à l'étendue des exemples

conflicting concepts of the ruler as sage or *doctus orator* never cease to clash throughout the Middle Ages and, at the Renaissance, achieve an intense animosity for each other.

16. Wolff, *op. cit.*, pages 127, 137.
17. Rand, *op. cit.*, page 121. The endless descriptions of nature and the "psychologizing of the passions" which have been complained of in the romances, and which find such a prominent place in Spenser and Sidney, deserve to be set in the perspective of a richly complex tradition of philosophy and science which we have lost. They are not the mere ebullience of epideictic rhetors. Faral (*op. cit.*, page 102) is speaking in too limited a context when he points out that the medieval mode of the portrait can be traced back to Sidonius Apollinaris. It is curious that Walter Whiter (*A Specimen of a Commentary on Shakespeare*, London, 1794) tries to show that Renaissance modes of character portrayal have their roots in the decorum of a medieval tradition. He cites the accurate descriptions by Bede of the ages, figures, beards, hair, etc. of wise men, and the carry-over from rhetorical to tapestry representation. As so often, Whiter is right but not sufficiently informative.

qu'il en propose, il est visible que Matthieu considère la description comme l'objet suprême de la poésie" (pages 75–76).

Since any ancient poet, grammarian, or rhetorician would have endorsed Matthew's doctrines as heartily as Spenser and Sidney did later, it is incomprehensible that Faral should add: "C'est chez lui que cette conception se trouve formulée pour la première fois, au moins à notre connaissance." One must suppose that Faral has made no study of classical modes of *ecphrasis*, *effictio*, *notatio*, etc., nor has he grasped the relations between these and ethical, medical, and psychological theory both in ancient and medieval times. It is rather owing to the increased importance of these sciences in medieval times that Matthew is disposed to give such emphasis of formulation to the classical doctrines of description. Certainly, if the rhetorical formulae of Matthew and his fellow rhetoricians and grammarians are divorced from the medieval sciences, they are unintelligibly superficial. But there is no evidence that they were so divorced, while there is a mass of evidence to the contrary.[18]

One interesting consequence of the doctrines of *ethos* and *pathos* and their related doctrines of praise and blame is the fact that descriptions of women ordinarily dominated romance, in the first place because women were held to be ideally creatures of *pathos* (that is, passive, rather than motivated by purposes or *ethos*), and in the second place because the actions of the male characters were motivated by the beauty (*pathos*) of women.[19] Matthew of Vendome puts the matter succinctly: "Sometimes the description of anyone is opportune and sometimes superfluous. By way of example, if there is a question of the manliness of a person, of inconstancy of mind, of concern for respectability, of aversion to servility, as in the case of Cato's sternness in Lucan (II, 381ff.), the manifold virtue of Cato is to be described so that, his refinement of manners and his manifold eminence in virtue having been presented, the hearer may be better able to appreciate whatever follows about the carelessness of Caesar and the respect for liberty." This much for *ethos*. "Furthermore, if there is a question of the

18. See W. C. Curry, *Chaucer and the Medieval Sciences*, *passim*. Nothing could be more indicative of the causes of Faral's misunderstanding than his complaint that "dans toute la littérature du moyen âge, la description ne vise que très rarement à peindre objectivement les personnes et les choses et qu'elle soit toujours dominée par une intention affective qui oscille entre la louange et la critique" (page 76). On these grounds one must dismiss the whole of European literature before the French Naturalists of the nineteenth century as mistaken in aim and method. But even in phrasing his objection Faral testifies to the unity of medieval and classical, as well as of Renaissance, literary doctrines.
19. That psychological insight into character was fostered, rather than hindered, by these doctrines was the opinion of Gaston Paris and W. P. Ker. See W. P. Ker's *Essays on Medieval Literature*, London, 1905; page 251.

    Raby, too (*A History of Christian-Latin Poetry*, page 45), shows how "Along side of the satirical epistle flourished the satirical description, an obvious subject for a school exercise ... Every schoolboy learned how to describe a woman's beauty, and how to write an 'invective' against women." That is to say that schoolboys from the time of Cicero until the time of Dr. Johnson were taught the ethical and psychological implications of *pathos* and *ethos* and their relation to *laus et vituperatio*.

affairs of love, for example, how Jupiter was consumed [illegible], a description of the maiden should be first set forth ... so that ... the reader may readily conjecture how Jove's mind was inflamed by such charms."[20] Thus the long descriptions of the romances were intended functionally and dramatically, and had no place in ethical writing such as history, biography, satire, sermons, etc.

It need scarcely be said that investigation of this complex subject has scarcely begun, but much study is needed if we are ever to appreciate the aims and methods of medieval and Renaissance writers. For example, the "character writers" of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are mere by-products of the rhetorical drama, the epic, and the romance of the same period; but both are the products of the education given in the trivium and get their "classical" character from this source. Characterization in all branches of European literature follows the ancient doctrines until the rise of sentimental ethics in the eighteenth century challenged the basis of the entire body of doctrines. Not until the rational nature of man is questioned, not until the basis of natural law is brought into doubt does there arise any doctrine or method of characterization to interrupt the influence of those continuously effective from the time of Aristotle to the time of Dr. Johnson. The methods of Crabbe and Jane Austen are, of course, the traditional ones, unaffected by the new psychology.[21]

The above described way of viewing the classical rhetorical heritage of the Middle Ages is one which is, perhaps, more embedded in the particular than the second which is to be described here. I mean the relation of rhetoric and law. But for both ways of viewing this complex subject the concluding statement of McKeon's "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages" is a timely warning: "Yet if rhetoric is defined in terms of a single subject matter—such as style, or literature, or discourse—it has no history during the Middle Ages; the many innovations which are recorded during that period in the arts with which it is related suggest that their histories might profitably be considered without unique attachment to the field in which their advances are

20. Faral, *op. cit.*, pages 118–119. My translation.
21. Pope's *Characters of Women* present an instance of traditional methods of invective, of praise and blame. His bad women have *ethos*; his good ones, *pathos*. Coleridge assumes the same grounds in discussing the women of Shakespeare in his "Notes on the Tempest" (*Essays and Lectures on Shakespeare*, Everyman, page 67–68) and he and Pope are in complete agreement despite his gibe at Pope. According to Coleridge, Shakespeare's women are all creatures of *Pathos*, in their "distinctive energies of faith, patience, constancy, fortitude,—shown in all of them as following the heart ..." Lady Macbeth has to unsex herself in order to achieve masculine *ethos*.

celebrated" (page 32). Just as the arts of grammar and dialectics had great roles, not only in the study and production of literature but of theology, so

> the art of rhetoric contributed during the period from the fourth to the fourteenth century not only to the methods of writing and speaking well, of composing letters and petitions, sermons and prayers, legal documents and briefs, poetry and prose, but to the canons of interpreting laws and scriptures, to the dialectical devices of discovery and proof, to the establishment of the scholastic method which was to come into universal use in philosophy and theology, and finally to the formulation of scientific inquiry which was to separate philosophy from theology.[22]

It has been seen in connection with Cicero how completely his ideal orator unites philosophy and eloquence in order to be a practical man. Rhetoric, placed under dialectics by Aristotle, remained ancillary to politics with Isocrates and also with Cicero and Quintilian. And so it remained during the early Middle Ages that the rhetoricians opposed any effort to particularize or narrow their art. Part of the debate in this matter was centered around the question of whether rhetoric should be restricted to determinate questions or whether it should be allowed to treat of theses and general matters. Even from an academic point of view these problems seemed significant since they were important in Cicero's *De Inventione*.[23] The full status of the Ciceronian doctrine concerning the orator does not seem to have been fulfilled until the thirteenth century and after, with which we shall not be concerned until the next section on rhetoric. In the early Middle Ages, the question of rhetoric did arise in a very practical way, however, in relation to exegesis, to dialectics, to preaching, and to law. Professor McKeon has dealt summarily with the first two in "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages." The third, that of preaching, awaits an historian. From the twelfth century onwards the subject has been sufficiently explored to make unmistakable the nature of rhetorical doctrine in the sermons of the time; but this also belongs to the next section on rhetoric.[24] Concerning the fourth,

22. Page 32. I have already suggested how completely Bacon's scientific program was tied up with grammar and dialectics and with rhetorical theory and practice, and had already undertaken a separate monograph on this subject before McKeon's paper appeared. His views are welcome confirmation, however, and not only for the work of Francis Bacon: "Since the problems of the sciences and the arts are closely related and are often stated in almost identical language, a slight shift of theory or terminology may at a point bring an unexpected richness from one art into the threadbare terminology of another. The three customary questions of rhetoric, *whether it is*, *what it is*, and *what sort*, merged readily with the questions of logic and influenced early modern attempts to formulate scientific method" (page 32). He gives examples, important for the understanding of Renaissance scientific method as well as for conceptions of poetry, from Zabarella (of the Aristotelian school of Padua), Campanella, Varchi, and Robartelli (page 30).
23. See *De Inventione*, i, 4, where the genus of rhetoric is *civilis scientia*. Cicero's history of the dispute is repeated by Isidore in the *Etymologiae*, ii, 2. A group of early commentators seem also to have been aware of Quintilian's very full discussion of the subject (iii, 5; 15; 21). For example, Fortunatianus, *Ars Rhetorica*, I, 1 (Karl Halm, *Rhetores Latini Minores*, Leipzig, 1863; page 81).
24. I have been collecting materials for a sketch of early medieval sermon technique but they are at present insufficient. The *Facta et Dicta Memorabilia* of Valerius Maximus (collected in the first century A. D.) would figure prominently in any such sketch. (See J. W. Duff, *A Literary History of Rome in the Silver Age*, London, 1927; pages 65–81, for the character and scope of the work.) This celebrated collection was typical of the aids which rhetoricians employed from Greek times. The sententious and highly figured style of the contents made adaptation for civil and epideictic themes unnecessary. The contents are digested in accordance with the vices and virtues precisely in the mode of the numerous medieval and Renaissance manuals for rhetors. One can see at a glance from these compilations the immediate

something should be said here, since it bears on the continuity of the classical tradition in a very interesting way.

It is generally agreed nowadays among medieval historians that, although there never was any breach in the continuity of lay culture in Italy even during the early Middle Ages, the *translatio studii* in the West was brought about mainly by English and French scholars. The lay culture of Italy, based on at least a minimal urban and commercial life, was, however, more concerned with law, rhetoric, and medicine than with grammar and exegesis of Scripture. The sharp difference between the medieval role of Italy and that of the West becomes evident just as soon as the grammatical-theological basis of Western culture is recognized. France and England were the centers of theological study in the early Middle Ages, so they were most interested in the discipline of classical grammar studies. But Italy was in a peculiar way the continuing home of a lay culture supported by a commercial life which fostered the study of law.[25] And the study of law and rhetoric were so closely associated that legal studies were usually subsumed under rhetorical studies. This was natural enough in view of the fact that the province of oratory was civil science. With the decline of the pleading of great causes in the Senate and Forum, legal rhetoric took a literary turn, just as deliberative and judicial oratory had taken an epideictic turn.[26] In this way it is possible to make sense of the seeming paradox that a great law school like Bologna was famous mainly for its *Ars Dictaminis* and later its *Ars Notaria*. [The former was to become] the legitimate successor of public oratory. "Hence in the very beginning of the Middle Ages, letter writing and the preparation of documents began to occupy the student of rhetoric in his course of the seven liberal arts."[27] Both secular princes and ecclesiastical chancellories had a persistent need for those versed in the *ars dictaminis* and for students of Roman law.

The amount of material which the teacher of the middle ages gathered for this form of instruction is vast, indeed. Incidentally, besides showing the manner and method of instruction, these collections give us a comprehensive

relation between moral discourses and the character sketch, between sermon, essay, romance, and novel. The medieval preacher and Montaigne and Bacon work in the same rhetorical tradition. Duff cites Niebuhr's statement that Valerius "was considered the most important book next to the Bible throughout the Middle Ages; it was the mirror of virtues and was translated into all the languages of Europe" (page 71).

25. After discussing the sixth century Theodosian Code and the Visigothic *Breviarium* of Alaric II and the Salic law, Taylor says, "The Roman law always existed in the Middle Ages" (*op. cit.*, II, page 277). The prevalence of its cultivation "hung upon larger conditions—whether society had reached that stage of civilized exigency demanding the application of an advanced commercial law ..." (*ibid.*) The same principle, of course, conditions the increasing prevalence of both law and rhetoric in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, lending much of its specific quality to the Renaissance. Tracing the continuity of legal studies from Cassiodorus, Taylor says: "At Pavia there was a school of law in the time of Rothari, the legislating Lombard king; this reached the zenith of its repute in the eleventh century. Legal studies also flourished at Ravenna, and succumbed before the rising tide of the Bologna school at the beginning of the twelfth century." (*op. cit.*, II, page 280). It must surely be owing to a failure to appreciate the nature and force of the Ciceronian ideal that has led all historians to neglect the study of the history of law for the continuity of that ideal in the early Middle Ages.
26. The full implications of this fact for the forms of medieval and Renaissance literature have not been recognized even by the specialists who have done useful spadework: E. Norden, *Die Antike Kunstprosa*, II, 529ff.; 550ff.; T.C. Burgess, "Epideictic Literature," *University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology* 3 (1902), pages 89–261. In view of the universal imitation of the Fathers in the sixteenth century, good studies of patristic style are immediately relevant to an understanding of Renaissance prose: T.E. Ameringer, *The Influence of the Second Sophistic on the Panegyrical Sermons of St. John*

view of mediaeval life and institutions which very few other sources afford. We find there glimpses of the growth of national law, the gradual introduction of the Roman law, the all-embracing relations in which the Church came in contact with the affairs of life.... The material in these so-called dictamen treatises has attracted the attention of students of the history of Roman law. Following Savigny, who traced the origin of the study of the Roman law in Western Europe to the study of the dictamen in Italy as a part of rhetoric, investigators of this subject have been carefully sifting these formularies.[28]

It is necessary to add that in the thirty-six years since Abelson wrote these words historians of rhetoric have done nothing to advance the understanding of the subject; and that facts which are commonplace to the historian of law are, with their rich implications for the historian of literature and culture, still unutilized.[29]

The instruction in rhetoric was not theoretical but of immediate practical utility, as the contents of the treatises show, and the various levels of style and the doctrines of decorum governing their use were taught. Since the high style for the interchanges of *haute politique* was of less general utility, the middle and low styles, necessary for commerce and ordinary Church business, are given most attention (Abelson, page 64). Most of the space of the treatises is given over to model documents and letters covering multiple exigencies. All the figures of thought and of pathos and of words are exhibited, and the divisions of the composition follow strictly those of the classical oration (Abelson, page 65). A fuller treatment of this matter must be reserved until the next section on rhetoric. Paetow, considering even the wide cultivation of *Ars dictaminis* in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries concludes, however, that "there can remain no doubt that the study of formal rhetoric did not flourish at the universities even as much as it had done in the best schools of the early Middle Ages."[30]

Taylor reinforces this approach to the close connection between early medieval rhetoric and law: "For the treatment of Roman law presents stages

Chrysostom, Washington, 1921; J. M. Campbell, *The Influence of the Second Sophistic on the Style of the Sermons of St. Basil the Great*, Washington, 1922.

27. Abelson, *The Seven Liberal Arts*, page 60. Abelson gives some useful facts and documents for the sixth and immediately following centuries (pages 61ff.) but offers no connected account.
28. Abelson, *op. cit.*, page 61.
29. The student of literary style in the sixteenth century cannot afford to sidestep this subject since at least one important controversy of the sixteenth century centered around the use of ancient legal terms as a means of achieving forceful Tacitean obscurity. See Croll's "Muret and the History of 'Attic' Prose," pages 259–260; 269–270; 283. The key to the Attic vs. Ciceronian controversy of which the ramifications embrace politics, ethics, and science, is found in the quarrel between the Barthollist or dialectical commentators of the civil law on the one hand, and the grammarians Bude, Cujas, Hotman with their followers, Montaigne, Muret, Lipsius, etc., on the other.
30. *Arts Course*, page 70. "The Universities" is, of course, a vague expression, since the University of Paris arose only when dialectics broke away from the trivium and set up house for itself. In a considerable degree, Paris, Oxford, Cambridge, and the German universities taught dialectics to the relative exclusion of everything else. Yet the Italian universities never taught dialectics at all; but there is a bewildering variety of subjects and emphasis at any one university during any one century. Rashdall's account, helpful in many ways, is of little use in this regard. [Likely a reference to Hastings Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1895)—ed.]

essentially analogous to those by which the Middle Ages reached their understanding and appropriation of other portions of their great inheritance from classical antiquity..." (11, page 287). This is especially true of rhetoric; but applied to grammar and the study of the poets, it is quite misleading. Theology, as we have seen, was inevitably the great support of the reading of literature. This need not lead to a denial of the incentive to grammatical study provided by Roman law, since the glossators of the Roman law had need of every scrap of linguistic knowledge they could command.[31] They made much of the *Etymologiae* of Isidore, just as Isidore depended heavily on Varro, and Priscian.[32] Rhetoric and the *ars dictaminis* were indispensable tools of the professional lawyer, but prior to these "grammar was needed for the interpretation of the *Pandects*; and, indeed, some of the glosses of Irnerius and other early glossators are grammatical rather than legal explanations of the text."[33] What this meant as an incentive to maintaining a vigorously historical and accurate latinity in the Middle Ages has never been assessed; but Taylor proceeds to reinforce the fact:

> We should bear in mind that this august body of jurisprudential law existed not in the inflated statutory Latin of Justinian's time, but in the sonorous and correct language of the earlier empire, when the great Jurists lived, as well as Quintilian. Accordingly a close study of the *Pandects* required, as well as yielded, a knowledge of classical Latinity. Thus law tended to foster, rather than repress, grammar and rhetoric...[34]

This raises a point closely associated with the problems to be faced in the next sections on grammar and dialectics. The flourishing of grammar and rhetoric in Italy throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when dialectics had driven the classics from Paris and Oxford, is owing to the deeply rooted legal tradition with its intense repugnance to formal definitions: *Omnis definitio in iure civili periculosa est*, is the keynote of Roman law. But without vigorous definition there could be no dialectics. Therefore, "the dialectalizing of grammar took place in the North, under influences radiating

31. See H. Kantorowicz, *Studies in the Glossators of the Roman Law*, Cambridge, 1938.
32. Taylor, *op. cit.*, II, page 279.
33. Taylor, *op. cit.*, II, page 148.
34. *ibid.*

from Paris. These did not deeply affect grammatical studies in Italy, or in the Midi of France, which in some respects exhibited like intellectual tendencies".[35] And yet, as we shall see in the next section on dialectics, the codifiers of Canon Law, working with the grammarian's techniques over their discordant texts, helped to bring about the great dialectical activity of the twelfth century. Thus, law, which shuns logic, but needs grammar and fosters rhetoric, paradoxically helped to produce the renaissance of dialectics. This emphasizes once more the complex bonds which join together the rival sisters of the trivium.[36]

35. Taylor, *op. cit.*, II, page 156. Taylor's testimony is the more valuable for the purpose of this study in that, knowing a great many facts about the Middle Ages, he was never able to piece them together. Evidence of this is to be found in his disappointing *Thought and Expression in the Sixteenth Century*. He felt quite certain that the sixteenth century was not a renaissance but a direct product of the earlier time. He had all the clues without recognizing them.
36. See Taylor's *The Mediaeval Mind*, II, pages 262–263; 298; 304–308 for the striking way in which the Church extended its hospitality to the *ius naturale* of Roman law. It is important for the student of medieval literature to recognize that both in theory and in practise the Middle Ages allowed great scope and autonomy to the natural order as it concerned human life.

    The reader of John of Salisbury's *Policraticus* will encounter on almost every page the appeal to the Stoic concept of *ius naturale*, and can see how this concept, formulated in the Justinian Code, is explicitly linked in John's mind with the ideal of the *doctus orator* of Cicero. (See John Dickinson's introduction to his translation of *The Statesman's Book of John of Salisbury*, New York, 1927; pages xxviii–xli. See also John, himself, page 109. On page xvii Dickinson points out the continuity of these matters in the patristic tradition.) This will not only assist the understanding of medieval literature itself, but will prevent the recurrence of such mentally crippling notions as the one that the Renaissance can be designated as a period of naturalism in which man discovers, or recovers, himself. Such works as Gilson's *Héloise et Abelard* (Paris, 1938) are important indications that the lesson of the facts requires some radical reformulation of concepts. See especially "Le Moyen Age et le Naturalisme Antique" (pages 183–224).

    Apropos of Petrarch, it will be seen that the continuity of Roman law in Italy had the unexpected result of confirming many besides Petrarch in the view that all save Italians were barbarians. When the hostility of the humanists to the Goths and Huns of learning (i.e., the doctors of Paris) is added to

2C

this age-old antipathy, some notion of the complexity of the status of that humanism can be seen. The triumph of grammatical and patristic humanism in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries served to confuse rather than to clarify the issues.

CHAPTER THREE

THE TRIVIUM FROM ABELARD TO ERASMUS

CHAPTER THREE

A. GRAMMAR

THE TRIVIUM FROM ABELARD TO ERASMUS

The opening of this chapter identifies a paradox of a different type from that discussed at the end of the preceding chapter. There the paradox is to be explained in part, at least, by the internal dynamics of the trivium; here it is essentially a matter of historical accident. McLuhan's opening comments on the rationale of choosing Abelard as a turning point in the history of the trivium show his skill in simultaneously illustrating grammatical and rhetorical modes operating in combination and using that combination to justify his argument. McLuhan draws on the case Gilson made for Abelard (whose name is most frequently associated with "the early triumphs of dialectics") as a humanist "in the full Renaissance sense of the term." Following developments from Abelard to Erasmus, therefore, allows McLuhan to reinforce his thesis that the trivium endured intact, even during those periods when obvious ascendancy of one component appeared to eclipse another. As for Erasmus, the grammarian, McLuhan rejects the notion that he viewed the Middle Ages "as given over to the barbarities of the schoolmen." Instead, McLuhan makes the case for both Abelard and Erasmus as committed to "the use of the three arts."

As a cultural historian McLuhan is impartial; as a grammatical historian he expresses his bias. He deems the application of dialectics to the resolution of apparent contradictions of authorities as inevitable, but continues: "It was not inevitable, nor was it fortunate for the history of thought and culture, that the dialecticians should have spurned the aids of grammatical method and that they should have insisted upon an exclusively dialectical method for the solution of every kind of problem, even those of metaphysics." But McLuhan is not impervious to flaws in the fabric of grammatical thought over the centuries: "We shall see that the basic error of the grammarians sponsoring the patristic tradition was to mistake scholasticism for a surrogate for, rather than a fulfillment of, the work of the Fathers." That fulfillment is explicitly summarized as "the complete patristic ideal in which all the liberal arts harmoniously collaborated with eloquence and theology."

It is at this point that McLuhan refers to the organization of his own work as a framework for studying Nashe and the necessity of beginning with an account of a "large party within the late medieval church" to whom the ideals of sixteenth century humanism can be traced, in order to explain what was self-evident to Nashe but invisible to commentators who have failed to understand him. "More specifically, the work of Nashe and his contemporaries is inexplicable except as a consistent development of the aims and interests of that party—a debt so pervasive that Nashe, Bacon, or Donne would have been puzzled by any demand for explanation."

Given the historical period under review, the interaction of grammar and dialectics is a substantial focus of this chapter: mnemonic grammars and the influence of dialectics in grammar becoming a speculative study; the role of theology in relation to the rise of dialectics and the decline of grammar, etc.

A remarkable passage in the middle of this long chapter relates an instance of theological doctrine being a catalyst for optical experiments. McLuhan uses this case to illustrate the place that analogy occupied simultaneously in scriptural exegesis and science. The quotations from St. Bonaventure around which the discussion develops deal with light in both the physical and spiritual sense and relate light to our five senses. As such, the entire passage relates to both the privileged position that the later McLuhan will accord to light as a medium and the relationship he will describe between media ecology and the human sensorium. The passage also anticipates the role that analogy will play in McLuhan's thought and writings throughout his career. A passage McLuhan chooses to quote from McKeon on the subject of Francis Bacon (footnote 35) also has anticipatory resonance: "The study of Bacon is chiefly the study of this theory of knowledge and of the details of reform to which knowledge of languages and of the various sciences is to be subjected." It requires only the expansion of languages to languages of the media *for the observation to characterize the media ecology studies of McLuhan twenty years on.*

As this rich chapter draws to a close, McLuhan draws attention to how basic facts in the history of culture can be skewed, linking the problem to the revisionist views he is advancing: "When Erasmus is seen to be of this ancient [patristic] party, then it is, for example, easy to see why Swift is not a 'modern,' and Descartes, the child of scholastic culture, is." McLuhan implicitly sets a challenge for any investigator wishing and willing to build on the groundwork offered here: "Just why the Renaissance gradually lost interest in the fourfold interpretation of myth and Scripture has never been explained."

As for Nashe, McLuhan simply identifies him here as an upholder of traditional patristic culture, alongside Thomas More, Francis Bacon, and Sir Thomas Browne. —(Editor)

The problem in this section is to reduce the amount of evidence without giving the conclusions the air of sheer assertion. A great many excellent monographs treating numerous phases of learning and culture have been recently made for the centuries subsequent to the eleventh. An instance is *La Renaissance du XIIe Siècle* by Paré, Brunet and Tremblay (Paris, 1933). This work offers much evidence of the kind relevant to this study and it is necessary merely to refer to the conclusions of such authors. It is not, therefore, only the historian of medieval philosophy who sighs with relief on reaching the twelfth century. The historian of culture has equal reason to be grateful as he enters on three centuries rich in philosophical speculation; for, if he is facing a period which it has been customary to regard as given over to the barbarian dialecticians, the materials which evince the continuous vitality of the classics are also abundant. These materials, recently subjected to intensive study, have led many scholars to concur in the views of E. K. Rand:

> First, then, I make bold to say that the current theory, if I have correctly stated it, is not wholly satisfactory. When we consider some of the great works of literature of the period or of that of the immediately succeeding, we ask ourselves whether the whole story has been told. When we read *The Romance of the Rose* or *The Divine Comedy*, to take but two examples, we are soon aware that beneath the first lies a profound acquaintance with Ovid, and beneath the second lies a profound acquaintance with Virgil.... Needless to say, Virgil and Ovid were not the only ancients with whom these poets were familiar, nor were they themselves the only masters of vernacular literature who had somehow been schooled in the same way. It is easy to call these greater lights exceptions, and to attribute their acquaintance with the Latin Classics to private reading. And yet this explanation is—to me—a bit disquieting. Once more, has the whole story been told?[1]

One is faced at the outset of the twelfth century with the paradox that, in the widely recognized teaching of Bernard of Chartres and in the manifest humanistic culture of John of Salisbury, grammar in its full classical

1. E. K. Rand, "The Classics in the Thirteenth Century," *Speculum* 4 (1929), pages 250–251. "The current theory" is not, of course, the popular notion of medieval sterility but the view of such scholars as C. H. Haskins and L. J. Paetow that a flourishing classical culture in the twelfth century was suddenly swept into discard by a brilliant efflorescence of dialectics.

sense reached an acme of successful cultivation at the moment when dialectics rose to challenge its very right to existence. This is a very different picture from that of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries when grammatical humanism triumphed over an internally weakened, confused, and corrupt scholasticism. The case of Abelard may serve to resolve the apparent difficulties of the historian.

Abelard is a name almost synonymous with the early triumphs of dialectics. How did he view the prevailing methods of grammatical exegesis of Scripture and their associated classical culture? He was in fact very friendly to the classics, and expert in the traditional modes of patristic exegesis. He was a humanist in the full Renaissance sense of the term as Gilson has established beyond question.[2]

His own approach to theology was by way of the huge digests of patristic, grammatical commentary on Scripture (*Summa Sententiarum*) and his own work, despite his genius for logic, remains more a monument to grammatical than to dialectical method, more in harmony with the spirit of St. Augustine than of St. Anselm.[3] In fact, it would have been a miracle had Abelard not been under the sway of grammatical method, since nothing else had been in vogue for many centuries. However, Abelard lived at a time when much progress had been made in organizing the huge corpus of patristic writing in accordance with the techniques perfected at the time by Irnerius in Roman law at Bologna.[4] And this development, "be it noted, took place but a little before the time of Gratian's achievement in the Canon law, itself contemporaneous with the appearance of Peter Lombard's novel *Book of Sentences*."[5] Thus, in the celebrated *Sic et Non* of Abelard, "in this concern to gather the significant texts of any controversy, discipline or science from philosophers, Scriptures, Fathers and decrees of councils, he worked as did most of the grammarians, theologians and canon lawyers of the century."[6] It was an inevitable step that dialectics should be brought to bear on the resolution of the seeming contradictions of accepted authorities, once the materials had been organized by the grammarians. It was not inevitable, nor was it fortunate for the history of thought and culture, that the dialecticians

2. See his *Héloise et Abelard*, Paris, 1938, *passim*. Gilson raises questions of the widest significance: "Avant de trouver une formule pour définir le moyen âge, il faudrait en trouver une pour définir Héloïse. Je conseillerais ensuite d'en chercher une pour définir Pétrarque. Ceci fait, que l'on en cherche une troisième pour définir Erasme. Ces trois problèmes une fois résolus, on pourra procéder en toute sûreté à définir le Moyen Âge et la Renaissance" (page 180).
3. Paré, Brunet, Tremblay, *La Renaissance du XIIe siècle*, pages 213ff. In these pages the authors give a useful survey of the grammatical art of Scriptural exegesis as practised from St. Augustine to Abelard. The art is the one described in the first section of this study. "De Saint Augustin à Hugues de Saint-Victor, la doctrine se précise, mais sans changer d'inspiration" (page 217). The connections between exegesis and natural science are explicit in Hugh of Saint-Victor (pages 218–220). The whole range of the arts and sciences is indispensable to the perfection of theological technique (pages 233–237). They offer the best available history of the developments which led to the clash between grammatical and dialectical exegesis.
4. Taylor, *op. cit.*, page 284. "The knowledge and understanding of the Roman law in the mediaeval centuries should be viewed in conjunction with the general progress of intellectual aptitude during the same periods. The growth of legal knowledge will then show itself as a part of mediaeval development, as one phase of the flowering of the mediaeval intellect. For the treatment of Roman law presents stages analogous to those by which the Middle Ages reached their understanding and appropriation of other portions of their great inheritance from classical antiquity and the Christianity of the Fathers (page 287).
5. Taylor, *op. cit.*, page 289. Gratian's Concordance of Discordant Canons represents the same application of grammatical erudition to the Fathers which Irnerius had brought to bear on Roman law.

should have spurned the aids of grammatical method and that they should have insisted upon an exclusively dialectical method for the solution of every kind of problem, even those of metaphysics.

Abelard, the greatest dialectician of his time, does not use either the marginal gloss of Strabo or the interlinear gloss of Anselm, the two dialectical modes of commentary in his Scriptural commentaries. Instead, he proceeds by means of patristic *enarratio*, allowing full scope to all the liberal arts, interpreting by etymology and freely appealing to the four levels of signification.[7] In short, Abelard seems to have been perfectly aware that the free word-by-word line-by-line exegesis of text was unexcelled as a pedagogical method for imparting doctrine, just as he was aware that such an exegesis could not possibly satisfy the requirements of systematic doctrine. He was able to work happily and without confusion by both methods. When, however, after three centuries of doctrinal organization and disputation, the dialecticians had shown themselves unable to advance piety or to instruct the faithful, the grammarians, who had not ceased to provide a hostile opposition, rapidly regained the interest and attention of the learned world. That, we shall see, is the significance of Erasmus.

In view of the fierce disputes which developed in Abelard's lifetime between the grammarians and dialecticians, causing Abelard to cry out, "Sister Heloise, dialectics has made me hateful to the whole world," it is absurd for us to adopt the particularist and controversial standpoint of men like Petrarch and Erasmus in viewing the Middle Ages as given over to the barbarities of the schoolmen. Abelard and Erasmus are equally and exclusively theologians (McKeon, page 72). But as a grammarian, Erasmus was primarily concerned with the question of "What was said?"

> That Plato or Pythagoras or even Moses, may have said something similar is irrelevant to the problem; all the devices of the arts are exploited to determine the authenticity of the document, the accuracy of the text, the precision and sufficiency of the interpretation. Abailard, on the other hand set as his task to discover truth by examining the various statements

6. McKeon, "Renaissance and Method," page 69. "The twelfth century did a thorough piece of grammatical preparation for the dialectical developments of theology in the thirteenth century. One of the *Books of Sentences* prepared during this century by Peter Lombard (who died in 1164) was to become the basis of theological education: like the *Sic et Non*, by which apparently Lombard was influenced, it is fundamentally a collection of quotations for the most part from the Church Fathers on important questions ranging from the nature of God through the work of creation, the redemption, the sacraments, the last judgment, back to heaven. By the thirteenth century the basic course in the Faculty of Theology of the new universities was the explications on the *Book of Sentences*: from these courses resulted hundreds of commentaries on the *Sentences* of Lombard, and most of the great philosophers, Bonaventura, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, William of Ockham among them, were authors of such commentaries and frequently gave in them the most complete statement of their philosophic views" (page 70).
7. Paré, Brunet, Tremblay, (*op. cit.*, pages 231–239; 290–291) give examples and details which show the full force of the patristic-classical ideals at work in Abelard.

> that had been made on a given problem. ...to seek, behind the statements of many writers, the identical truth which they all faced, some stating it more adequately than others, some misstating it.[8]

Since most of the quarreling from the twelfth until the seventeenth centuries is between the exponents of these distinct, yet quite reconcilable, methods it is most important to have them clearly focused. "The difference between the method of Erasmus and that of Abailard may therefore be stated as that between a use of the three arts oriented to an understanding of a passage (that is, the three arts arranged in accordance with the needs of grammar) and the use of the three arts oriented to a comparative estimation of a variety of arguments (that is, the three arts arranged under the dominance of dialectic)."[9]

There is an obvious antecedent probability that a dialectics called into existence by the eminently successful labors of numerous grammarians would scarcely encroach to the same degree as, later on in the sixteenth century, grammar would succeed in overwhelming a dialectics which was collapsing from within. In short, there quite probably was proportionately as much grammatical (humanistic) activity in the three centuries dominated by dialectics as there was dialectical (philosophical) activity in, say, the period from Ramus to Hegel, in which grammar was ascendant in Europe. To sketch briefly the status of the classics in a period of exorbitant dialectics is the business which remains in this section; for it will ultimately be found impossible to account for the character of sixteenth-century humanism unless it is perceived to have been sponsored by a large party within the late medieval Church itself. More specifically, the work of Nashe and his contemporaries is inexplicable except as a consistent development of the aims and interests of that party—a debt so pervasive that Nashe, Bacon, or Donne would have been puzzled by any demand for explanation.[10]

It is evident from the account given by John of Salisbury (in his *Metalogicus*) concerning the teaching of Bernard Of Chartres that the teaching of the classics reached its peak in the twelfth century. The technique

8. McKeon, *op. cit.*, page 80.
9. McKeon, *op, cit.*, page 81. That Abelard was splendidly equipped to have achieved a perfect harmony of grammatical humanism and dialectics is not the least distressing of the circumstances in the situation. He might have achieved the restoration of the complete patristic ideal in which all the liberal arts harmoniously collaborated with eloquence and theology. And it was certainly his opinion that "those who are more learned in the arts can succeed better in sacred erudition" (page 65). We shall see that the basic error of the grammarians sponsoring the patristic tradition was to mistake scholasticism for a surrogate for, rather than a fulfillment of, the work of the Fathers. This charge, so common in the sixteenth century, was raised in the twelfth century and never abandoned.
10. Donne, however, in defending his own rhetorical style, makes the conventional patristic appeal to the rhetoric of the Scriptures, as well as to the Fathers, themselves. He states that Catholic theologians had neglected the Fathers but that the Protestants had for the past three-score years studied them to great effect. Donne, of course, was too well informed not to be aware that the revival of the Fathers was brought about within the Roman Church in the fifteenth century; but he is correct in pointing to the great influence of the Fathers on the modes of English prose and poetry. [See L. P. Smith, *Selections from the Sermons of John Donne*, Oxford, 1925; pages 26–28. [This reference cannot be traced. Logan Pearsall Smith is the editor of *Donne's Sermons; selected passages*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1919—ed.]]

of Bernard, described in detail by John, is precisely that of Donatus and the ancients, just as it is also identical with the methods of the sixteenth-century humanists. Defending classical humanism, and the Ciceronian ideal of the *doctus orator* against the utilitarians of his day, John says,

> There were other devotees of letters who were one in their opposition to this error. I speak of Master Thierry, a most earnest scholar of the arts; of William of Conches, the most resourceful grammarian after Bernard of Chartres; and the peripatetic of the Palace [Abelard], who bore away the palm of logic from all his contemporaries to such an extent that he alone was believed to be favored with communication with Aristotle.[11]

Toward the end of the first book (1, 24) comes the celebrated account of Bernard's teaching:

> This method was followed by Bernard of Chartres, the most abounding spring of letters in Gaul in modern times. In the reading of authors he showed what was simple and regular; brought out clearly the rhetorical figures and adornments, the emptiness of sophistries; and he pointed out where the subject of the day's lesson bore upon other studies. Not that he tried to teach everything in a single lesson;... Moreover since the brilliancy of discourse depends either on propriety—the proper joining of an adjective or verb with the noun—or metathesis—the transfer of an expression, for good reason, to another signification—these were the things he took every opportunity to inculcate in the minds of his hearers.... Before those who were to perform the preliminary exercises of imitating prose and poetry he held up as models the orators and poets and bade his pupils follow in their footsteps, pointing out their arrangement of words and the elegant terminations of their phrasing. But if anyone had sewed another's cloth to his own garment, he detected and dealt with the theft;... he taught ... the value of economy, the advantages of embellishment, where there should be tenuity and, as it were, economy of expression in the choice of words, where

11. *Metalogicus*, I, 5. The *Metalogicus* is in Migne, *P. L.*, page 199. John gives an account of his training in logic in Book II, chapter 10. This section is translated by R. L. Poole in his *Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning*, London, 1920; pages 177–186.

> copiousness is permissible and where it is excessive—in short he taught them the appropriate limit in all things.... In this wise did my teachers in grammar ... instruct their pupils awhile. But after-wards, when opinion did prejudice to truth, and men chose to seem, rather than to be, philosophers, and some professors of arts undertook to give their pupils the whole course of philosophy in a shorter time than three, or even two, years, they were overcome by this onset of the ignorant mob, and retired. Indeed, since that time less time and care have been devoted to grammar, and persons who profess all the arts, liberal and mechanical, are ignorant of the primary art without which a man advances in vain to the rest.... Since, indeed,... Varro uses it to mean instruction in reading and writing, the one who professes a knowledge of it or advocates its study, is said to be lettered.

John expounds all the traditional grammatical doctrines: man is distinguished from the brutes by speech (1, 1, 7); the secrets of nature need to be approached *via* language (1, 4) and vice-versa (1, 6); Nature is the font of all arts (1, 11) and the encyclopedic or liberal arts serve for the exegesis of Nature (1, 12). And John is very conscious that he shares these positions with the ancients.[12]

The general position of grammar in this period has been better investigated by L. J. Paetow than anybody else.[13] In the first place, Paetow confirms the fact that dialectics never got a foothold in Italy.[14] Moreover, grammar and rhetoric were strongly entrenched in the great schools of Chartres, Orléans, Toulouse, and Perpignan even after the rise of the schools of dialectics at Paris. From the beginning, the medieval universities neglected grammar and the classics, and of the latter "not one of them is prescribed in the statutes of the various universities of Europe of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries."[15]

Paetow lists several reasons for the decline of *grammatica*, though they are not of equal importance. First he notes clerical feeling against profane literature.[16] This, however, is no different in kind or degree from the feeling expressed by the most learned of the Fathers. More interesting is the

12. It is worth noting that Thierry of Chartres (Bernard's brother), a chancellor from 1141–1150, was celebrated for his *Heptateuchon*, an encyclopedia of the seven liberal arts. Similar in scope is the work of William of Conches (d. 1154) mentioned as "*grammaticus post Bernardum opulentissimus*" by John. As shown in the first section of this study, the analogical concept of grammar imposed also the encyclopedic program. The medieval encyclopedists are in this *Speculum mundi* tradition rooted in antiquity.
13. *The Arts Course at Medieval Universities*. Not knowing, however, the specific theological and cosmological functions of medieval grammar puts Paetow at the disadvantage of investigating the history of a subject of whose complete nature he is unaware.
14. D'Andeli, *The Battle of the Seven Arts*, page 51, note.
15. *Arts Course*, page 11. The usual conclusion "that nothing better could have been expected from the work at the universities" is an error. "To-day no competent scholar would pronounce such a verdict." (*ibid.*)
16. *Arts Course*, pages 20–23.

second reason: the popularity of good medieval Latin literature. "Especially in the twelfth century a good deal of excellent Latin literature was written which deservedly became popular. Just as the pagan poets were often crowded out of the schools by the early Christian poets such as Prudentius and Sedulius..." (page 23). He notes in particular the *Alexandreis* of Gautier de Lille, written between 1176–1179, an epic on Alexander the Great. The *Tobias* of Matthew of Vendome was another popular school poem, relating the history of the two biblical Tobits (page 24).

A third reason for the decline of ancient *grammatica* was the renewed interest in science, brought about by contact with the east during the Crusades. With extension of the subjects of interest the time available for the teaching of the big subject of the classics was steadily diminished. As in our own day, the substitution of handbooks for the classical texts was an inevitable resource. There thus arose a series of versified "new grammars" which supplanted Priscian and Donatus. Mnemonics became an important branch of learning in an age which produced rhymed charters, chronicles, sermons, and even Bibles (page 34). "The following gloss, found in one of the new grammars, clearly states the demands of those times: 'The metrical form which this author follows is better than prose which Priscian uses, and for these reasons: the metrical form can be more easily comprehended, it is more elegant, it is briefer, and can be remembered more easily'" (page 35). Associated with these streamlined mnemonic grammars was the influence of dialectics in transforming grammar into a speculative study; but this is discussed further on.

In the fourth place, Paetow notes the"[r]ise of the lucrative studies of medicine and law" (page 26). "Indeed, civil or canon law, or both were taught at all medieval universities whereas not even one-half of them had a faculty of theology" (page 27). Closely related to law was the *Ars Dictaminis* or *Ars Notaria*, the foe of grammar and even of the older rhetoric. "This too was a lucrative study since it prepared its votaries for positions in the chanceries of church and state. At Bologna it gradually usurped almost the whole field of the arts" (page 28).

Most important of all was the "increasing popularity of logic which led to scholastic philosophy and theology" (page 29). The rise of Aristotle and dialectics to supremacy among the arts was especially disastrous to grammar and the classics because logic "became most absolute in northern France where the humanistic tendencies had been strongest" (page 29). Grammar and classical culture had been preserved by the Church after the fall of the Empire because grammar was then the indispensable mode of theology. The advent of dialectics was, therefore, sheer gain for theology but almost a total overthrow for grammar.

That this is history according to the evidence is vividly confirmed by the contemporary poem of Henri D'Andeli. His *La Bataille des VII Ars* was written in the second quarter of the thirteenth century, and its allegorical form, later adopted by Swift, may be a parody of the *Psychomachia* of Prudentius.[17] The poem begins:

> Paris and Orleans are at odds.
> It is a great loss and a great sorrow
> That the two do not agree.
> Do you know the reason for the discord?
> It is because they differ about learning:
> For Logic, who is always wrangling,
> Calls the authors authorlings
> And the students of Orleans mere grammar-boys.

The grammarians retort:

> They call Dialectic
> In evil spite, a cock-a-doodle-doo.
> However, logic has the students
> Whereas Grammar is reduced in numbers.
> Grammar is much wrought up;
> And has raised her banner

17. *The Battle of the Seven Arts*, page 34. There is no evidence I know of to suggest that Swift was directly acquainted with D'Andeli's work. This genre of writing was cultivated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as instanced in the *Technogamia* of Barten Holyday, played at Oxford in 1617. This play is very interesting to the historian of the trivium. There is a critical edition by Sister M. Jean Carmel Cavanaugh, Washington, 1942.

> Outside of Orleans, in the midst of the grainfields;
> There she assembled her army.
> Homer and old Claudian,
> Donatus, Persius, Priscian.

Logic assembles her army, and we find on her side not only Plato and Aristotle but Civil Law and Canon Law who "rode haughtily ahead of all the other arts" (page 43). Theology stands aloof from the quarrel. Grammar is defeated and D'Andeli prophesies that:

> For thirty years this will continue,
> Until a new generation shall arise,
> Who will go back to Grammar
> Just as it was the fashion
> When Henri D'Andeli was born (page 60)

St. Bernard of Clairvaux is an example of a great twelfth-century theologian in the patristic tradition who represents the theological outlook of those whose education, like that of Jerome and Augustine, was classical and humanistic. Another such man is Rupert of Deutz (d. 1130), a theologian and a poet, whose conception of theology is Erasmian four centuries before Erasmus. He divides philosophy into two sections. It is either inane, that is, *non secundum Deum*, or sane, that is, *secundum Deum*. His view is that the *philosophia secundum Christum* is to be found only in the Gospel and the prophets which contain all that is to be found in the liberal arts. Philosophy in this sense is literally the gift of science or knowledge, a gift of the Holy Ghost, while the liberal arts were like little girls until Revelation gave them something to think about and some useful work to do. Then, like many before him, he illustrates how all the arts are in Scripture: figures of rhetoric, syllogisms, etc.[18] And this *Philosophia Secundum Deum* always contained in Scripture is what Erasmus calls *Philosophia Christi*. This is the true patristic tradition, though many of its representatives preferred to stress the fact that the arts

18. *P. L.*, 167, 1764; 1768.

contained in Scripture could best be understood by a preliminary cultivation of the profane arts. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the tradition represented by Rupert of Deutz gains a notable expression in the *devotio simplex*, which sides with the humanists against the dialecticians. It is in this tradition that Gerrit Groot arises with his *devotio moderna*. Groot was the champion of the *antiqui* (grammarians) against the *moderni* (dialecticians) and established at Deventer the famous school for the study of Scripture, the Fathers, and ancient poets from which came Thomas à Kempis and Erasmus.[19]

For the sake of making Erasmus and sixteenth-century humanism an intelligible development from vital medieval traditions, let us glance at some of the great representatives of culture in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Much confusion has arisen from not seeing that some of the most famous of them are radically opposed to scholasticism. Hugh of St. Victor is a good one to begin with since Taylor (11, page 87) illustrates "the symbolic universe" from his work. Hugh, like Plato, the Stoics, the ancient grammarians, and the Fathers, conceived of the universe as an organism. It was not so conceived by the Aristotelian dialecticians; and Taylor comes tantalizingly near to the truth when he suggests (11, page 144) that the old poetical physics was a potent factor in keeping alive the study of the classics. It is the fact that ancient grammar and physics were almost one that led Francis Bacon to applaud the Jesuit education of his day; for the Jesuits had put the reading of the ancient authors in the foreground of their *ratio studiorum*.[20] For Hugh, St. Bernard, and St. Bonaventura, the forms of the world "and its visible sublimities drew his mind aloft to the contemplation of God:... the work of foundation, whereby God created the physical world for the support and edification of its crowning creature, man; and the work of restoration, to wit, the incarnation of the Word, and all its sacraments."[21]

In his *Eruditio Didascalica*[22] he shows, like the Fathers before him and like Francis Bacon after him,[23] that the arts are for the relief of man's fallen state. Grammar is the most basic art of all. Man cannot look with understanding on the book of nature until he has been perfected in the art of grammar.

19. Albert Hyma's *The Christian Renaissance* (New York, 1925) describes the rise of the school. Hyma seems to be unaware of the uninterrupted patristic tradition represented by Groot and Erasmus. He thus unwittingly presents the conventional and controversially-colored picture of events which the sixteenth-century protagonists themselves maintained.
20. *Works, op. cit.*, III, pages 277, 501.
21. Taylor, *op. cit.*, II, page 386.
22. In Migne, *P. L.*, 176, 740–838.
23. *Works, op. cit.*, III, pages 217; 245; 296; 500; IV, 263; 316; 320.

"There are two things by which we gain knowledge, to wit, reading and meditation; reading comes first."[24] Naturally, the classics have an important place in this scheme of the *Philosophia Christi*: "There are two kinds of writings, first those which are termed the *artes* proper ... *Artes* comprise the works grouped under (*supponuntur*) philosophy ... as grammar, dialectic and the like." The *appendentia artium* are the classics: "tragedies, comedies, satires, heroics, and lyrics too, and iambics, besides certain didactic works (*didascalica*) tales likewise, and histories; ..."[25] Again:

> It follows that all the natural arts serve Divine Science and the lower knowledge rightly ordered leads to the higher. History, *i.e.*, the historical meaning, is that in which words signify things, and its servants, as already said, are the three sciences, grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric. When, however, things signify facts mystically, we have allegory; and when things mystically signify what ought to be done, we have tropology. These two are served by arithmetic, music, geometry, astronomy, and physics. Above and beyond all this is that divine something to which divine Scripture leads, either in allegory or tropology. Of this the one part (which is in allegory) is right faith, and the other (which is in tropology) is good conduct; in these consist knowledge of truth and love of virtue, and this is the true restoration of man.[26]

Another great encyclopedist in the patristic tradition is Vincent of Beauvais. His predecessors were such men as Cassiodorus, Isidore, Rhabanus Maurus, Hugh of St. Victor, Bartolomaeus (author of the *De Proprietatibus Rerum*) and Audomarensis. It is hard to see how Taylor can confuse this grammatical tradition with scholasticism.[27] Nothing could be more explicitly patristic and grammatical than the general prologue to Vincent's *Speculum Naturale*. His work is, he says, a collection of

> certain flowers according to my modicum of faculty gathered from every one I have been able to read, whether of our Catholic Doctors or the

24. Quoted by Taylor, *op. cit.*, page 387. In pointing out that grammar is to guide the student in both secular and divine writings, Taylor says: "I think of no previous work so closely resembling the *Erud. didasc.* as the *Institutiones divinarum et saecularum lectionum* of Cassiodorus." This is to stress its patristic character.
25. Quoted by Taylor, *op. cit.*, II, page 137.
26. Quoted by Taylor, *op. cit.*, II, page 93. Hugh's treatise opens with an exposition of the Six Day's Works. Bacon explicitly claims adherence to the patristic tradition in calling Salomon's house in the *New Atlantis* the College of the Six Days' Works (*Works, op. cit.*, III, pages 145–146). Its relation to the Hebrew king who had recovered the natural wisdom lost by Adam is also made explicit by Bacon (III, pages 298–299). His entire program for the advancement of learning is patristic: "So much concerning the several classes of idols, and their equipage: all of which must be renounced and put away with a fixed and solemn determination, and the understanding thoroughly freed and cleansed; the entrance into the kingdom of man, founded on the sciences, being not much other than the entrance into the kingdom of heaven, whereinto none may enter except as a little child." (IV, page 69. See also III, pages 217; 245; 296; 500.) Bacon is assured that progress in knowledge is at hand because the prophecy of Daniel "touching the last ages of the world ... and the advancement of the sciences, are destined by fate, that is, by Divine Providence, to meet in the same age." (IV, page 92. See also III, page 221.) Bacon's entire concept of science is the recovery of the natural wisdom lost by Adam (III, pages 220; 401; 448; IV, page 296.) Like the Fathers, like Hugh of St. Victor, Roger Bacon, St. Bonaventura, and the rest, Bacon conceives of the book of nature as scripture, as a natural revelation of God, to be expounded in the same manner as Holy Writ (III, pages 217ff.; IV, pages 165–166). Like St. Bonaventura, Roger Bacon and Vives, Francis resembles them in defining man's task as "the organization of our earthly exile into a sort of suburb of the heavenly kingdom" (Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, page 479). It

> Gentile philosophers and poets. Especially have I drawn from them what seemed to pertain either to the building up of our dogma, or to moral instruction, or to the incitement of charity's devotion, or to the mystic interpretation of divine Scripture, or to the manifest or symbolical explanation of its truth. Thus by one grand *opus* I would appease my studiousness, and perchance, by my labours, profit those who, like me, try to read as many books as possible, and cull their flowers.[28]

The entire scheme of his work depends on the concept of the two scriptures: "Moreover I have diligently described the nature of things, which I think, no one will deem useless, who, in the light of grace, has read of the power, wisdom and goodness of God, creator, ruler and preserver, in that same book of the Creation appointed for us to read."[29] Taylor gives the plan of his work (II, page 348) in which Vincent expressly refers to the example of Isidore's *Etymologiae*, beginning with the Creation, the fall, the restoration by the Incarnation and the arts. Since his work in its encyclopedic character is primarily intended as prolegomena to theology (II, page 352):

> For the end and aim of all human actions and studies, which reason regulates, ought to look either to the reparation of the integrity of our nature or to alleviating the needs to which life is subjected. The integrity of our nature is repaired by Wisdom, to which *Theorica* relates, and by Virtue, which *Practica* cultivates. Need is alleviated by the administration of temporalities, to which *Mechanica* attends. Last of all is Logic, source of eloquence, through which the wise who understand the aforesaid principal sciences and disciplines, may discourse upon them more correctly, truly and elegantly; more correctly, through Grammar; more truly through Dialectic; more eloquently, through Rhetoric.[30]

Vincent's concept of dialectics as subordinate to eloquence is quite alien to the view of the schoolmen of his day. There is much more reason for confusing St. Bonaventura with the dialecticians, since he was a master of

is, perhaps, unnecessary to underline any further the complete harmony between the broad outlines of sixteenth-century humanism and the medieval patristic writers from whom it derives. What some have today tended to regard as a medieval survival in the Renaissance was in reality that very body of writings and concepts which the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century humanists successfully substituted for the much more modern developments of scholasticism (the schoolmen were always called the *moderni*). This sounds paradoxical to us but not to Bacon, who wrote in the *Filum Labyrinthi* of the natural science or wisdom of Solomon "whereby he wrote a natural history of all verdor, from the cedar to the moss, and of all that breatheth; ..." This was the conventional view of the humanists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Church Fathers were the men of the hour. The mistake of subsequent secularist historians of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has been to pretend, contrary to all evidence, that the sixteenth-century humanists working within a traditional theological concept of the origins and destiny of mankind, were really working not to restore patristic culture against the Schoolmen, but for a variety of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century objectives of which they had never heard. When these claims are made also for Wycliffe or Petrarch, the one a Simon-pure Schoolman, the other an ardent Augustinian who detested Schoolmen, the confusion sinks discussion beneath the level of an undergraduate debating society.

27. He calls both Hugh and Vincent scholastics (II, page 346) and despite a vast reading has overlooked the patristic sources of Vincent's doctrine that the arts are for the relief of man's fallen state (II, pages 103; 351). Contemporary encyclopedists of Vincent were Roger Bacon, John Peckham, and John of Wales, all Oxford men and Franciscans. There is nothing adventitious in Peckham's affirming the radical opposition of the Franciscan and Dominican theologies, the one patristic, the other dialectical. The "new theology" which he denounced was none other than that of St. Thomas Aquinas. There is, likewise, nothing accidental in his being the author of a celebrated treatise, *Perspectiva Communii*,

logical technique. However, he finds his true place in the tradition of grammatical exegesis along with Hugh of St. Victor and Vincent of Beauvais.

> At first sight the logic of St. Bonaventura does not differ from that of Aristotle. The syllogism in his eyes is the instrument par excellence of scientific demonstration, the means by which probable knowledge is elaborated in the sphere in which absolute knowledge fails, the instrument which allows reason to enrich its knowledge by deducing from first principles the consequences that they contain. Yet it is impossible to read the works of this philosopher for long without perceiving that Aristotelian logic is for him rather a process of exposition than a method of discovery.[31]

In short, for all his resemblance to the schoolmen, the work of St. Bonaventura is animated by the analogical grammatical exegesis which we have seen in Philo and St. Augustine:

> In a universe with the metaphysical substructure which we have disclosed the only suitable process of explanation must consist in discerning, beneath the apparent disorder and diversity of things, the tenuous strands of analogy which connect them with one another and reunite them all to God. Hence this prodigious quantity of resemblances, correspondences, proportions and conformities in which some have tried to-day to see only a mental gymnastic, a delight of the imagination or, at best, an inebriation of the soul which tries to forget its human condition, but in which in fact we must see first and foremost the only means of exploration and interpretation exactly adapted to St. Bonaventure's universe.[32]

In his *De Reductione Artium ad Theologium* Bonaventure gives classic statement to the basic patristic concepts concerning the order of the sciences in subordination to theology.

as will be shown apropos of St. Bonaventura's doctrine of light. John of Wales is in the straight patristic tradition as the mere titles of his works show: *Breviloquium de virtutibus antiquorum principium*; *Compendium de vitis illustrium philosophorum et de dictis moralibus eorundem*; *Breviloquium de sapientia sive philosophia sanctorum*. Robert Kilwardby, author of a well-known commentary of Priscian, was a Dominican Oxonian in the same tradition. A glance at the scholastic encyclopedia of the Dominican Albertus Magnus will show its total difference in aim and method from the tradition of Varro and St. Augustine. But, as Kilwardby attests, there remained a patristic core of opposition to the new theology even within the Dominican order.

28. Quoted by Taylor, *op. cit.*, II, page 346.
29. Quoted by Taylor, *op. cit.*, II, page 347.
30. From cap. 9 of liber i. of the *Speculum doctrinale* quoted by Taylor, *op. cit.*, II, page 351.
31. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, pages 228–229.
32. Gilson, *op. cit.*, page 229. Lest it should be imagined that modern science has no respect for the techniques and the insights of St. Bonaventure, one might instance the doctrines of A. N. Whitehead. Like Bergson, in full revolt against the long monopoly of Cartesian and Newtonian mathematical physics in the interpretation of the universe, Whitehead says that on the materialistic theory "there can merely be change, purposeless and unprogressive. But the whole point of the modern doctrine is the evolution of the complex organisms from antecedent states of less complex organisms. The doctrine thus cried aloud for a conception of organism as fundamental for nature.... The organism is a unit of emergent value, a real fusion of the characters of eternal objects, emerging for its own sake." (*Science and the Modern World*, Pelican Books, London, 1938; page 130.) For the "forms" of Bonaventure, Whitehead substitutes "events." "Events" are patterns of universal being. Mental cognition, he says, "knows the world as a system of mutual relevance, and thus sees itself as mirrored in other things" (page 174).

> And so it is clear how the "manifold wisdom of God", which is lucidly revealed in Holy Writ, lies hidden in all knowledge and in every nature. Moreover, it is clear how every knowledge serves theology. And accordingly, it borrows examples and employs terms belonging to every genus of knowledge. Moreover, it is clear how wide the road of illumination is, and how in each thing, which is sensed or known, God himself lies hidden therein. And this is the fruit of all the sciences, that in all things faith may be built up, 'God may be glorified,' actions may be set in order, and consolation drawn.[33]

The concept of light dominates the thought of St. Bonaventure and offers a curious example of how a theological doctrine advanced the optical experiments of Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon. St. Bonaventure begins his little treatise on theology and the arts in this way:

> "Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the father of lights," James i., 17. In these words the source of every illumination is touched upon ... Now though every illumination of knowledge occurs inwardly, we can however make a logical distinction, so to speak, between that which is the outward light, namely, the light of mechanical art; the lower light, namely, the light of sensitive knowledge; and the higher light, namely, the light of grace and Holy Writ. (Page 3)

The second kind of light concerns optics:

> And it is divided according to the five senses. Augustine shows their sufficiency according to the nature of the light of the elements in this way: because the light or brightness which enables us to distinguish corporeal things exists either in the eminence of its own propriety, and in a certain purity, and then it is the sense of light; or it is mixed together with air, and then it is hearing; or with vapor, and then it is smelt; or with moisture, and

The metaphor of the mirror comes as naturally to Whitehead as to Bonaventure, of whom Whitehead knows nothing. All specialism in knowledge disappears for Whitehead as for Philo or Hugh of St. Victor: "We can now see the relation of psychology to physiology and to physics. The private psychological field is merely the event considered from its own standpoint." (page 175) The difference between Whitehead and Bonaventure is that between a man taking his first uncertain steps into a new world of inexhaustible significance, and a man born into that world. The concepts in terms of which Whitehead falteringly apprehends his brave non-Newtonian world are crudely makeshift and tentative. Bonaventure's are delicately and complexly poised, deftly touching his world at innumerable points.

33. Trans. by C. G. Wallis, Annapolis, 1938, page 11.

> then it is taste; or with the grossness of earth, and then it is touch. For the sensible spirit has the nature of light... (page 4)

It is within this system of analogy, rooted in the ancient notions of the Logos and grammar, and seeking the light of revelation, that Bonaventure's fellow Franciscans Grosseteste and Bacon envisaged the importance of their physical experiments. There is thus no inconsistency but propriety in the fact that Roger Bacon, like Erasmus and Francis Bacon, asserted the primacy of the art of grammar in approaching both Scripture and the book of nature.[34] Every attack which Bacon made on the theologians of his day is immediately intelligible when his relation to the patristic tradition is perceived: "For they are ignorant of Greek and Hebrew and Arabic ... They study and lecture on the *Sentences* of the Lombard instead of the text of Scripture" (Taylor, II, page 526). Again: "Seven are the vices of the chief study which is theology; the first is that philosophy in practice dominates theology.... The second vice is that the best sciences, which are those most clearly pertinent to theology, are not used by theologians. I refer to the grammar of the foreign tongues from which all theology comes" (II, pages 525–526).

Roger Bacon's quarrel with the Schoolmen is precisely the same as that of his remote kinsman Francis Bacon; nor is there any time from Augustine to Descartes when this grammatical tradition is not very much alive.[35] What might seem to be startling anticipations of Renaissance notions turn out to be continuous traditions given the appearance of novelty or revival by the circumstance of the sudden triumph of the grammarians over scholasticism. For example, Bacon's four idols, which confuse and bewitch human reason, appear in Roger Bacon. The eloquence of the two men is identical:

> There are four principal stumbling blocks (*offendicula*) to comprehending truth.... From these deadly pests come all the evils of the human race; for the noblest and most useful documents of wisdom are ignored, and the secrets of the arts and sciences. Worse than this, men blinded by the darkness

34. Gilson, in *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, paraphrases Bonaventure in a passage relevant to Francis Bacon and the Renaissance: "To one who once penetrates to its constitutive and really primary principles, creation seems to be nothing but a sort of representation of the divine wisdom, as might be a picture or a statue ... It is also a book in which is inscribed in brilliant characters the creative Trinity;... As an unlettered layman carries a book without concerning himself about its contents, so are we before this universe, the language of which has become for us like Greek or Hebrew, or like a barbarous language the very origin of which is utterly unknown to us" (page 214).[1965: 194]
35. Bacon (ca. 1210–1292), educated at Oxford, spent most of his life at Paris. His *Opus Majus* is St. Augustine's *De Doctrina Christiana* put into the new formulae of the thirteenth century. His revival of mathematics and the quadrivium was a deliberate program conceived to circumvent the dialectical masters of Paris. He is no more a scholastic than Vincent of Beauvais, but an Augustinian champion of the *doctrina christiana*. Thus he puts ethics above all branches of philosophy, saying that it presupposes metaphysics (*Opus Majus*, Book VII). It is scarcely surprising that the seventh book of the *Opus Majus* is almost a compilation from Seneca. Bacon was the first to collect Seneca's philosophical treatises; but in his love for Seneca he is at one with the Fathers, with Alcuin, Petrarch, Erasmus, Montaigne, Bacon, and Browne. The study of the influence of Seneca in the Renaissance cannot be said to have begun, since we haven't heeded the basic attitudes towards Seneca which gave him his great medieval vogue; but wherever Seneca is loved there also will the Fathers be venerated. McKeon's statement about Roger holds for Francis and the whole grammatical tradition: "... God revealed all philosophy to man in the beginning, and the history of thought since has been the cyclical rediscovery, after periods of sin, of a wisdom the patriarchs received. Of course, the primitive revelation had to be filled by the details of science (that was why the patriarchs lived three hundred years), and Bacon therefore strikes the double posture of the prophet who heralds the return to the ancient truths and of the scientist

> of these four do not see their ignorance but take every care to palliate that for which they do not find the remedy;... when they are in the densest shades of error, they deem themselves in the full light of truth.[36]

Since the tradition of Descartes, Hobbes, and Newton is that not of the Fathers but of the schoolmen or *Moderni*, it is small wonder that some writers have been puzzled how to reconcile Erasmus and Bacon with the "moderns." Humanists such as Erasmus, Vives, Reuchlin, Agrippa, Mirandola, and Bacon took great pains to advertise themselves as "ancients."

Roger's experimental method of interpreting nature is, like that of Francis, grammatical in character: "... the holy patriarchs and prophets, who first gave the sciences to the world, received inner illuminations and did not stand on sense alone."[37] Taylor is again looking at the full truth without apprehending it when he says, "Manifestly with Roger Bacon the *scientia experimentalis* held the place which logic held with Albert, or queenly dialectic with Abaelard." Like Francis Bacon "He repeats continually in stating its properties and prerogatives, yet without advancing to greater clearness of conception" (II, page 536). The baseless and misconceived complaint of Taylor is heard again in the disappointment of Spedding with his hero:

> In our eyes the interest which attaches to his labours is of a different kind. We no longer look for the discovery of any great treasure by following in that direction. His peculiar system of philosophy, that is to say, the peculiar method of investigation, the "organum", the "formula", the "clavis", the "ars ipsa interpretandi naturam", the "filum Labyrinthi", or by whichever of its many names we choose to call that artificial process by which alone he believed that man could attain a knowledge of the laws and a command over the powers of nature,—of this philosophy we can make nothing."[38]

Viewed in the perspectives of this study, however, it is possible to make complete sense of Francis Bacon and his fellow humanists and alchemists. More than that, it is possible to claim a genuine validity for the *filum labyrinthi*,

who possesses new and strange truths with which to revivify the ancient doctrine. Wisdom is one, but items of information may be added to build it out and substantiate it without altering its outlines. Experimental knowledge is to accomplish this, and its procedure will be to work either with the things without the mind or the things within; God is the active intellect. The study of Bacon is chiefly the study of this theory of knowledge and of the details of reform to which knowledge of languages and of the various sciences is to be subjected." *Selections from Medieval Philosophers*, edited and translated, with introductory notes and glossary by R. P. McKeon, New York, 1930; II, pages 5–6.

36. Taylor, *op. cit.*, II, page 524. The entire section is given by McKeon in his *Selections*, II, pages 8ff.
37. Taylor, *op. cit.*, II, pages 536–537. "Again, all the saints and all the ancient wise men in their expositions take a literal sense from the nature of things and from their properties, that they may bring forth spiritual senses by appropriate adaptations and likenesses.... for, as God made creatures and Scripture, so he wished to place in the Scripture the things which he had made for the understanding of its literal as well as its spiritual sense. But the whole intention of philosophy is only to work out the natures and properties of things. Wherefore the power of all philosophy is contained in the sacred writings;..." He takes the rainbow as a proof of this. McKeon's *Selections*, II, pages 36–37.
38. Bacon, *Works*, III, page 171.

which baffled Spedding and the nineteenth century. Yet there is something rather amusing in the resonant praises which Macaulay bestows on the work of the follower of Philo, St. Augustine, and St. Bonaventure. It is, of course, the utilitarianism of Bacon which charms Macaulay, and the utilitarianism of the fathers, from which Bacon's derives, is, it is true, intense. Nothing was more utilitarian than the salvation they preached. Naturally, the arts and sciences which assisted in this grand utilitarian scheme were also of great practical concern. The Middle Ages were completely utilitarian. Even the classics were of utility; and St. Bonaventure the theologian put up a much better case for the study of the classics than Macaulay the civil servant. In so far as Macaulay retains a grasp of the Ciceronian view of the great practical utility of eloquence as a political wisdom, he can thank Bacon and the Fathers.[39]

Having seen that grammatical exegesis and the concomitant encyclopedic activity were vigorously pursued, outside of Italy, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and having seen the general disposition of the schools of grammar in the same period, it is time to consider briefly the cultivation of the classics themselves. For the purpose of convenience and compression, it will be best to confine attention to two men who by any account would be accredited with being representative of their centuries: John of Salisbury and Francis Petrarch. If it can be shown that the work and significance of these eminent humanists, equally with Erasmus, are to be seen in the light of the patristic grammatical tradition, then it will readily be allowed that the character of the Renaissance is strikingly in need of revaluation.

John of Salisbury (1110–1180), after spending the years 1136–1148 studying in Paris, returned to England to become the secretary of Theobald and, later, Thomas of Canterbury, becoming Bishop of Chartres in 1176. His famous *Policraticus* is the record of a lifetime of observation of the world of men and events which he was so well equipped to understand. For the *Policraticus* is a statesman's manual in the great tradition of the *De Oratore*. Eloquence is crowned as political wisdom. This aspect of John will be discussed in the section on rhetoric. Since, however, John was fully versed in

39. The liberal arts as conceived by antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance, were never thought of as lacking in utility. They were liberal as opposed to the mechanical arts, not liberal in the sense of being ends in themselves. The Renaissance arguments for poetry, for example, are mainly based on its utility, whether to make men witty or eloquent or wise. These Renaissance arguments are all found in and frequently derive from Boccaccio's *Genealogia Deorum Gentilium* (the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century books of which have been translated and edited by C. G. Osgood, *Boccaccio on Poetry*, Princeton, 1930) which never adduces an argument from antiquity which has not been approved by the Fathers. This defence of poetry against ignorance, Philistines, and Puritans, is along the traditional lines of allegorical exegesis, as in Sidney and Jonson. The Renaissance humanists were not always so frank as Boccaccio in giving credit to the Fathers for their own views.

See Roger Bacon's demonstration (McKeon's *Selections*, II, pages 81–110) that practical science is moral and civil science, and is the end of all parts of philosophy, mechanical, experimental, and speculative. This Stoic position, the basis of Cicero's concept of eloquence, is also central to patristic thought and to the Renaissance.

the entire *Organon* as well as the *Ethics* and *Politics* of Aristotle, Dickinson's judgment loses half its proper force:

> It is the only important political treatise written before Western thought had once more become familiar with the politics of Aristotle. It thus represents the purely medieval tradition unaffected by ideas newly borrowed from classical antiquity. It is the culmination in their naturest form of a body of doctrines which had evolved in unbroken sequence from patristic literature in contact with the institutions of the earlier middle ages.[40]

Seemingly unaware of the Ciceronian tradition of eloquent wisdom as the princely ideal, and its profound effect on the Fathers, Dickinson and other political scientists have been at a loss to place John. But his relation to the Stoic-Ciceronian scheme once seen (and he never tires of proclaiming his debt to Cicero and the Stoics) then the *Policraticus*, far from being a culmination, is merely an important landmark in a tradition which produces Erasmus' *Education of a Christian Prince*, Castiglione's *Courtier*, More's *Utopia*, Rabelais' *Gargantua*, Bacon's *Essays*, and even Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees*.[41]

John of Salisbury is, perhaps, unique among humanists, if not in his knowledge of logic and dialectics, at least in his high regard for the subject. (Erasmus had a sound training in logic at Paris but never liked it.) When John arrived in Paris in 1136, he was struck by the evidence of extraordinary intellectual activity. His remark in a letter to Becket has become classic: "*digitus Dei est in loco isto et hoc nesciebam.*"[42] John first studied logic under Abelard himself, later under Alberic of Rheims and Robert of Melun. After two years in logic, he proceeded to study grammar a second time at Chartres, and then rhetoric under the celebrated Peter Elias. This was followed by a review of all his studies under Richard l'Evoque, a man, says John, of immense erudition.

After three years of teaching, John returned to his studies and proceeded to theology under Robertus Pullus. Then, prompted by the desire to renew his old acquaintances, he went to Paris again. In the *Metalogicus* he

3A

40. John Dickinson, *The Statesman's Book of John of Salisbury*, trans. with introd., New York, 1927; page xvii.
41. Mandeville's relation to Erasmus has already been suggested. John of Salisbury (Book VI, ch. 21) writes "that the Commonwealth should be ordered to the pattern of Nature and that its ordering should be borrowed from the bees." He cites Plato, Cicero, Plutarch, and Virgil on nature's design for men in society; "Run through all the authors who have written on the commonwealth, turn over all the histories of commonwealths, and you will find no truer or more appropriate description of life in civil society [than that afforded by the bees]." (Dickinson, page 245.)
42. Almost contemporary (ca. 1250) is the account of Bartolomaeus Anglicus: "Even as Athens shone of old as the mother of liberal arts and the nurse of philosophers, so, in our day Paris has raised the standard of learning and civilization, not only in France but all the rest of Europe; and, as the matter of wisdom, she welcomes guests from all parts of the world, supplies all their wants and submits them all to her peaceful rule." Ward and Waller (*C. H. E. L.*, Vol. I, page 204). Just as Alcuin thought of England as Athens in the Anglo-Saxon age, so now we enter the age of French supremacy in the twelfth century.

describes what had been going on there while he had been perfecting his grammar and theology away from Paris:

> I found them as before and where they were before. They did not appear to have advanced an inch in settling the whole question of old; nor had they added a single proposition ... They had progressed in one point only: they had unlearned moderation. They knew not modesty and to such an extent that one might despair of their recovery. So experience taught me a manifest conclusion, that while logic founds other studies it is by itself lifeless and barren, nor can it cause the soul to yield the fruit of philosophy except the same conceive from some other source.[43]

This testimony of a man skilled in logic and who also believed that "logic runs through all the other disciplines as blood runs through the whole body of man," is of especial significance. John saw clearly that the mistake of the dialecticians was to separate their discipline from the trivium of which it is an indispensable part, and to make it do service for all. John was quite right. The only question which logic can solve by itself is a question in logic: "*propositas de se expedit quascumque sed ad alia non consurgit*" (*Metalogicus*, II, 11). Separating itself from the main body of classical culture, setting itself up as an end was to involve Western thought in confusions from which it has not yet recovered. Thus the first voice raised against the dialecticians on behalf of classical culture was clearer and more sweetly reasonable than any which was heard in the long and bitter controversy which followed. Erasmus is harshly unreasonable beside John. John's plan to circumvent the logicians was the patristic one: to bring the seven liberal arts to the service of Christian truth, grammar at the base, and logic subservient to eloquence as in Cicero. The *Metalogicus* is thus the principal defence of the Ciceronian ideal before the time of Petrarch.

Let us not forget that Cicero came to the men of the Middle Ages as the orator whose *Hortensius* had brought about the conversion of St. Augustine. Moreover, his speculative modesty and profoundly practical and ethical

43. Book II, ch. 10, *P. L.*, 199, 869. See Baldwin's convenient digest in *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic*, pages 164–167.

bent appealed to them. His Stoic view of philosophy, not as a knowledge but as a virtue which led to happiness, induced many Christians before and after Petrarch to assert him above Aristotle.

As F. H. Colson has shown in his introduction to Quintilian, no medieval writer makes such extensive use of Quintilian as John of Salisbury. And C. S. Baldwin gives a list of lengthy passages which John has incorporated from the *Institutes*.[44] The Ciceronian tradition as expressed by John must, however, be reserved until the final section on rhetoric. It is sufficient to say here that in his insistence on the marriage of Mercury (eloquence) and Philology (wisdom) John develops the concept of the Christian orator more clearly than anyone before him.

In his Toronto lectures in 1939, Professor Gilson devoted considerable time to dispelling some basic illusions concerning Petrarch. For example, in a justly celebrated sentence of his *Res Memorandae* Petrarch spoke of himself as "placed on the border line of two peoples, and simultaneously looking both behind him and in front of him": *ego velut in confinio duorum populorum constitutus ac simul ante retroque prospiciens*."[45] To these two peoples Petrarch has given no names, but our modern historians, Gilson pointed out, do not hesitate to call the one the people of the Middle Ages and the other the people of the Renaissance. Gilson then demonstrated how sixteenth-century humanist opinion of Petrarch, born in violent controversy, produced the modern illusion. But how disingenuous modern historians can be when led by the same spirit of controversy is illustrated in their excluding of this sentence of Petrarch's from its context. Petrarch, as a good grammarian, has been praising Pliny for the same reasons that St. Augustine or Erasmus or Francis Bacon praised him: because Pliny is a great grammarian and a great scientist. He proceeds: "But as many illustrious authors of antiquity I am praising, as many shameful crimes of their posterity I have to denounce." This posterity of theirs has allowed to perish the *codices* so carefully written by their great predecessors. In its sterility it has not even been able to preserve that heritage in order to transmit it to its own posterity. Pliny's Roman history has been lost. Petrarch continues:

44. *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic*, pages 169–170. Baldwin is needlessly puzzled by what he supposes to be John's "slighting of rhetoric." "He begins with a *logica* embracing all studies of words [obviously related to Logos]; he devotes a whole book to grammatica; in his last pages he is speaking of an *organon* that shall be a minister to *eloquentia*. Yet *rhetorica* he merely mentions when he must" [page 169]. The explanation is very simple. Like Quintilian, John treats grammar and rhetoric as inseparable.
45. Book I, ch. 2, in *Francisci Petrarchae Opera Omnia*, Basileae, 1581, page 398. See also Gilson's *Les idées et les lettres*, pages 193–194.

> I am not mentioning this fact, nor all the others which my sentence has deplored, in order to lessen the courage of the people which is to be born after us; I am simply pouring forth my sorrow, and blaming the sleepiness and laziness of an age most curious of what it should not be curious [i.e., dialectics], but wholly uncurious of such noble things. I find no such complaint among our predecessors, nothing concerning such a disaster which, should things go as I think they will, our grandchildren shall have perhaps neither known nor felt. The ones would have thus possessed it all, a thing to be lamented by those who will come after us. As to myself, since I can neither deplore this wholesale ignorance nor enjoy its consolation, I am, so to speak, established on the border line between two people, and looking at the same time backward and forward, I have desired to transmit to our descendants this complaint which I have not received from our ancestors.[46]

It becomes quite clear that the two peoples are on the one hand the golden age of antiquity, who knew everything, and on the other the people of the future, who, if things go as Petrarch was sure they would go (*si ut auguror, res eunt*), shall know nothing at all. Petrarch says he cannot know what the past knew, but he is keenly aware of what the future will be ignorant. The Dark Ages lie ahead of him. He is in a twilight betwixt and between light and darkness. He saw himself not as the first man of a new age, but as the last representative of antiquity struggling against the barbarian hordes of the Schoolmen. It is thus easy to see how humanist grammarians two centuries later, still engaged in the same struggle with the same Schoolmen, called in Petrarch as a powerful auxiliary in their quarrel. Petrarch certainly did not foresee the victory of his cause, but his fellow grammarians quite naturally began to look back on him as having helped to stem the tide of the dialecticians, and even as the turning point in the struggle. But the irony of their praise is that Petrarch, in his intense nationalistic pride, would have spurned as a raucous, barbarian cacophony the praises of the Dutch Erasmus, the Spanish Vives, the German Reuchlin, and the French Budé. For Petrarch stubbornly admitted a *translatio studii* from Greece to Rome, but

46. *ibid.*

nothing further.[47] There never was and never would be any culture outside of Italy. His wrath towards barbarian France was owing to her having permitted the classics to perish during that period when she was the nurse of arts, and especially because, by a conspiracy of consent in the learned world, she was usurping that headship in culture which belonged to Italy. It is in this context that Petrarch's life-long effort to convince the Popes to return from Avignon becomes intelligible. Because the role of Italy throughout the Middle Ages had been a secondary one, Petrarch denigrated the Middle Ages as totally barbaric, a dark night of the Goths and Huns of learning.[48] That a Dutch barbarian such as Erasmus or a professor in Omaha should one day designate the Middle Ages as barbaric because a fanatically jealous Italian nationalist did so in the fourteenth century, is typical of the judgment of history on the historians.

Although the case of Petrarch is complicated by his factitious opposition of Italian and non-Italian culture (a fact which may very well be owing to his indoctrination in Roman law at Bologna), the basic fact about him was summarized in his lectures by Gilson in this way:

> Petrarch never saw himself otherwise than as the natural heir to the tradition of Italian culture, which is singly and indivisibly both classical and patristic: the culture of Virgil and of Cicero, completed by the culture of Ambrose and Augustine. By his family, by his education, Petrarch has completely escaped the influence of thirteenth-century scholasticism. His first opposition to it therefore is that of a classicist to the destruction of the liberal arts by the dialecticians.[49]

While there is no work which sets Petrarch in any intelligible relation to the main currents of thought of his time, or of the succeeding time, there is no lack of biographical material.

Petrarch's father was an Italian notary, a great lover of Cicero, who sent his sons to the best schools of the day. First, Petrarch learnt "Grammar, Dialectic and Rhetoric suited to my age—as much, in fact as is generally

47. See Gilson's *Les idées et les lettres*, pages 176–188.
48. George Gordon (*Medium Aevum and the Middle Age*, Oxford, 1925) says that Petrarch's view of himself as a man in a middle age is the only one he has found in the Middle Ages (page 7). But on his own evidence (pages 10ff.) Petrarch could not possibly have thought of himself as medieval since the dimmest adumbration of the concept of a "middle age" does not occur for a century after his death.
49. Pierre de Nolhac, in *Pétrarque et l'humanisme* (Paris, 1907), illustrates and discusses Petrarch's wide reading in the classics from the point of view of his libraries, collected at various times during his nomadic life. The Fathers and the classics are almost evenly divided in his last collection, while law and scholastic philosophy are not represented at all (Vol. I, pages 112–116). Amusingly, de Nolhac is embarrassed by the presence of the Fathers, and perfunctorily dismisses them as an irrelevant blemish in the intellectual life of one whom Rénan happily designated, as de Nolhac feels assured, "le premier homme moderne" (I, page 2).

learnt in schools..."[50] His schooling, though in Provence, was under an Italian, Convenevole, a schoolmaster of the traditional Italian type. "Our poet says, in the last year of his life, that he had never known Convenevole's equal as a teacher, though he lacked the power of putting his great knowledge to practical use" (Tatham, 1, page 90). The first to recognize Petrarch's promise, Convenevole in later years was asked by Cardinal Colonna, "'Have you any place in your heart for our Francesco?' Silent at first, the old man turned away, choked with sobs, and swore by all that is holy that he never loved any of the whole number so well" (Tatham, 1, page 91). While still a child, Petrarch was induced by his father to read Cicero aloud to him. Writing in old age, Petrarch said that his father "might easily have risen to a great height of scholarship, had not his family business with his exile and the weight of domestic burdens drawn his fine talents aside... At that age then, when all older boys are yawning over Prosper and Æsop, I applied myself to the books of Cicero. I could understand nothing; simply the sweetness and harmony of the language enchained me..." (Tatham, 1, pages 95–96). It may, therefore, be said that instead of having been led by the ruins of Rome to study the classics, Petrarch was led by love of the classics to admire the remnants of Roman grandeur; for he never saw Rome until 1336, in his thirty-second year.[51]

From 1316–1320 Petrarch attended the great civil law school of Montpellier, and from 1320–1326 he was studying rhetoric and civil law at Bologna. The secularist spirit of these great civilian schools was sharply at variance with that in the schools of canon law, and had been so throughout the Middle Ages, a fact of the greatest importance in both estimating and interpreting the much-stressed secular and pagan character of the Renaissance.[52] In view of the close connection between law and grammatical exegesis, on one hand, and law and the theses or commonplaces of rhetoric, on the other, it is not hard to see how naturally Petrarch's legal studies assisted in his development as a humanist. At least it is certain that he carried on his studies of the classics, especially Virgil and Cicero, during this period; and the law nourished his patriotic impulses, since, as he said, "it is

50. *Francesco Petrarca, The First Modern Man of Letters, his Life and Correspondence; a Study of the Early 14th Century (1304–1347)*, E. H. R. Tatham, London, 1925; Vol. I, page 87.
51. The famous poem by the French Hildebert, in the twelfth century, on the ruins of Rome must be regarded in the same way. [Text in Norden, *Die Antike Kunstprosa*, II, page 723.]
52. See Tatham, *op. cit.*, I, pages 103–117.

doubtless great and full of that Roman antiquity in which I delight."[53]

The great turning point in Petrarch's life came in 1333 at the age of twenty-nine, when he was stunned by his first contact with the *Confessions* of St. Augustine. He wrote to his Confessor how he had set out to climb a mountain with his brother:

> [W]hile I marvelled at these things in turn, now recognizing some earthly object, now lifting my soul upwards as my body had been I thought of looking at the book of Augustine's *Confessions*, the gift of your love... I opened the little volume, of handy size but of infinite charm, in order to read whatever met my eye, for nothing could meet it but what was pious and devout. I opened it by chance at the tenth book, while my brother stood intent to hear Augustine speak by my mouth. I call God to witness, and my listener too, that these were the words on which my eyes fell: "Men go abroad to admire the heights of mountains ... and themselves they neglect." I confess I was amazed; and begging my brother, who was eager to hear more, not to trouble me, I closed the book, indignant with myself that at that very moment I was admiring earthly things...[54]

Not the least shock which Petrarch received from St. Augustine was the knowledge that Augustine wrote better Latin than he did. St. Augustine remained his friend till death; and it is obvious why Petrarch regarded him as a providentially-appointed director; for Augustine had lived the same sensual life in pursuit of the same glory by means of the same eloquence as Petrarch himself. It is in light of these facts that Petrarch's *Secretum*, a dialogue between himself and St. Augustine, is to be read. The saint is throughout the voice of Petrarch's own conscience. It is false, therefore, to pretend that until twenty-nine Petrarch was a genuinely modern man but later reverted to a conventional medieval piety. When teased by his friends for retaining his love for the classics in later life, he cited St. Augustine as one who stayed with them after his conversion. Instead of having to make a choice between his early humanism and his later devotion to religion, he

53. Tatham, *op. cit.*, I, page 136. A book of great value for the understanding of the widespread insistence on the prior claims of Italian classicism early in the Middle Ages and afterwards is P. F. Schramm's *Kaiser, Rom und Renovatio*, Leipzig, 1929. Petrarch was fond of citing the first sentence of the preface written by Justinian to his code. "The supreme protection of the commonwealth which springs from the two-fold root of Army and Law and derives from them its force, has had for its effect in the past to place the Romans at the head of all Nations, and, with the help of God, it will eternally keep them there in the future." This defines Petrarch's basic conceptions. Just as Rome was first of all nations, so Christian Rome has retained all the political and cultural prerogatives of ancient Rome. However, Alcuin, John of Salisbury, and Dante alike regarded classical culture as universally valid.

54. Tatham, *op. cit.*, I, page 323. Discussing this "second Petrarch," the one neglected by, or unintelligible to, humanist historians, Tatham writes: "We have positive proof that from the year 1347 he endeavoured to order his life on strictly religious rules.... In a very interesting letter of two or three years later he tells his correspondent that he is devoting a large part of his time to sacred literature, which he used to despise, and that his favourite book of poetry is now the Psalms of David, which he keeps under his pillow at night and would wish to have beside him at his death" (II, page 280). Chapman was later to paraphrase Petrarch's paraphrases of the Penitential Psalms.

ardently appealed to the fact that without Cicero there would have been no St. Augustine. In the *Secretum*, St. Augustine constantly quotes Virgil, Ovid, Seneca, and Cicero. These are only a few of the many facts which point to the conclusion that Petrarch and the origins of Italian humanism are inseparable from the classical, patristic culture whose uninterrupted course will bring us finally to Erasmus.[55]

If we turn briefly to Boccaccio, the younger contemporary and disciple of Petrarch, we meet one who had "the passionate hope to survive as the scholar-humanist" rather than as a teller of tales or a poet in the vulgar tongue.[56] As the very title of his principal work, *Genealogia Deorum Gentilium*, tells us, he is in the patristic tradition. "The Genealogy is a huge encyclopaedic repository of classical mythology in fifteen books. Both in form and plan it is a book of its times. It embodies the Aristotelian-Catholic idea of the cycle of learning, with pagan precedents such as the work of Pliny and Varro."[57] The erudition which Boccaccio, like every humanist, strove to display is to be understood in the light of the classical ideal of *doctus orator* in which eloquence and learning were inseparable. The rest of Boccaccio's works are intelligible only in this grammatico-rhetorical tradition: *De Claribus Mulieribus*, *De Casibus Virorum Illustrium*, *De Montibus*. The encyclopedic aim of this work was to make available matter for invention and elocution. In short, the Renaissance idea of the poet as *vir bonus dicendi peritus* is thoroughly patristic, and was continuously envisaged and cultivated from the time of Ambrose and Augustine.[58]

Against the enemies of poetry, the lawyers, the doctors, the dialecticians, Boccaccio asserts the ideal of *doctus orator*: "Some men have thought that the learned poet merely invents shallow tales, and is therefore not only useless but a positive harm.... Now this work of mine removes the veil from these inventions, shows that poets were really men of wisdom, and renders their compositions full of profit and pleasure to the reader."[59] How was this to be done? By the method of grammatical exegesis, the method employed in a similar cause by Francis Bacon in his work *The Wisdom of the Ancients*.[60] "To Boccaccio every myth is alive, quick to stir anew a poetic imagination

55. Matters such as Petrarch's "Subjectivity" have naturally no place in a study such as this. But his subjectivity is nothing compared with that of St. Bernard of Clairvaux in the twelfth century. For his "naturalism" as a modern trait the *Héloise et Abelard* of Gilson constitutes a decisive *peripeteia*. As for the mode even of Petrarch's early approach to the classics, there is not the least question of its "medieval" character. For example, Tatham complains: "Petrarch has taken the eclogue, not fresh from the hands of his model Virgil, but rather at the developed stage which it had reached after centuries of Christian adaptation" (II, page 391). (See *supra*, page 95.) So did Spenser and Milton. De Nolhac gives an example of Petrarch's allegorical interpretation of the first eclogue of Virgil, following the suggestions of Donatus. He adds wryly: "On est tenté de sourire en voyant Pétrarque occupé à une besogne aussi puérile et en assistant à cette transformation singulière du texte du Virgile ..." (I, page 147). The irresistible conclusion is that Petrarch cannot be the first modern man of letters, since he was typically employed in doing exactly what had been done during all the centuries from Donatus to John of Salisbury. If to gloss and allegorize the classics is to fail to appreciate them, then not only medieval monks, but Boccaccio and Milton failed to appreciate them.
56. C. G. Osgood, *op. cit.*, page xi.
57. Osgood, *op. cit.*, page xi. Osgood's testimony is the more valuable as it comes from a man who knows nothing about the classical patristic tradition. His mention of the "Aristotelian-Catholic idea" shows his vague awareness of scholastic philosophy; but he confuses the scholastic dialectical tradition with the classical encyclopedic tradition, lumping together "the stupendous achievements of Albertus, Aquinas, and the four vast *Specula* of Vincent of Beauvais and his imitator" (page xii).
58. Osgood says: "The considerations of his defence of poetry are such as had been accessible and current during all or part of the millennium before him. Petrarch, Isidore—and through him, Suetonius and

as it had often done before. "One must bear in mind," he says, "that these myths contain more than one single meaning. They may indeed be called 'polyseme', that is, of multifold sense."[61]

Osgood is correct when he insists that Boccaccio's theories of exegesis are an "integral part of his conception of literature and poetry"; for him "to explore and defend antiquity or mythology is to explore and defend the art of poetry" (page xxix). In defending poetry he has, incidentally, to defend the seven liberal arts.

It is worth pausing to inquire who were the enemies of poetry and learning in the fourteenth century, if only because there are the same enemies bringing the same charges in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[62] "First there are the ignorant "so garrulous and detestably arrogant that they presume to shout abroad their condemnation of everything that even the best men can do" (page 18). The second group consists of "those who, without learning or taste, pretend to both" (page 19). "They call the Muses fools and babblers, while Helicon, the Castalian spring, the grove of Phoebus and the like are the raving of lunatics, or mere elementary exercises in grammar" (page 21). Third comes a powerful and important class known to the Italian humanists alone: the civil lawyers. "Clients swarm at their heels, and they are conspicuous and influential men.... by their help innocence is exalted, each man gets just rights, and the State is not only maintained in its natural strength, but, through an increasing tradition of justice, grows stronger and better. These men therefore deserve special reverence and honor" (pages 21-22). However, these men despise the muses because "poetry does not get wealth, thus hoping, as one may easily see, to separate it from all things worthy of imitation" (page 23). Medical men in Italy likewise despised grammarians and poets for their poverty, but Boccaccio passes them over. The fourth and very formidable class consists of the philosophers, the dialecticians, who scoff at the frivolity and mendacity of poets: "These enemies of poetry further utter the taunt that poets are liars" (page 62). This class of men, the Schoolmen, so powerful at Paris, was but little known in Italy, for Italy had never cultivated dialectics during the Middle Ages.[63]

Varro,—Gregory, Macrobius, Lactantius, Augustine, Jerome and Horace were Boccaccio's chief instructors" (page xl). The *Genealogy* "assembles and makes articulate ... the critical ideas that had prevailed for a thousand years and more.... these ideas awaited but the recovery of Aristotle's *Poetics* in the fifteenth century, to unite with it and form the substance of literary theory for the renaissance" (page xxx). To suppose, however, that Aristotle's *Poetics* exercised any fraction of the influence of the patristic rhetorical tradition would constitute a total distortion. The stock medieval ideas about poetry which Boccaccio gathered together were quite as popular in the sixteenth as in the fourteenth century: "The large number of manuscripts and editions, especially in the sixteenth century, is only one sign of its popularity.... These ideas ... are current and recurrent in the flood of critical essays that abound for two hundred and fifty years" (pages xliv-xlv).

59. Osgood, *op. cit.*, page xv.
60. "There are certain pietists who, in reading my words, will be moved by holy zeal to charge me with injury to the most sacrosanct Christian religion; for I allege that the pagan poets are theologians.... these critics.... If they had read widely, they could not have overlooked that very well-known work on the *City of God*; they might have seen how, in the Sixth Book Augustine cites the opinion of the learned Varro, who held that theology is threefold in its divisions—mythical, physical, and civil" (Osgood, *op. cit.*, page 121).
61. Osgood, *op. cit.*, page xvii. On pages xviiiff. Boccaccio's use of the four levels of exegesis is described and illustrated. "But it is not my intention to unfold all these meanings for each myth when I find one quite enough" (page xviii). He follows St. Augustine's method in *The City of God* in discussing the gods of the gentiles. St. Augustine was by no means oblivious of the moral value of ancient myth. It was, as E. K. Rand has shown (*Ovid and His Influence*, Boston, 1925), by this means that Ovid came to dominate the medieval imagination. Ovid's vogue during the sixteenth century is the same in kind, if

Finally, and to an Italian lover of poetry, the most dreadful foe is the puritanical theologian. For Italy, and not France or England, produced Peter Damiani, Jacopone da Todi, and Savonarola. They were the more effective scourges because they, and many like them, were men of high cultivation in the arts. There are many learned and noble theologians, says Boccaccio:

> But others there are who grow so elated with what is virtually elementary knowledge, that they fall upon their great mistress' robes as it were with their talons, and in violent haste tear away a few shreds as samples; then don various titles which they often pick up for a price; and, as puffed up as if they knew the whole subject of divinity, they rush forth from the sacred house, setting such mischief afoot among ignorant people as only the wise can calculate. Yet these rascals are sworn conspirators against all high arts (pages 33–34).

But Boccaccio, like Petrarch and Coluccio Salutati, coveted poetry for the sake of religion; and he happily unleashes the arguments of the Fathers against these men. This, however, did not prevent Petrarch, Boccaccio, and Erasmus from being on the side of the *simplices et ydiotae* when it came to defending the patristic *philosophia Christi* against the sophisticated *moderni*, the dialectical Schoolmen.[64]

The recognized head of the classical party in Italy after the death of Petrarch was Coluccio Salutati (1330–1406), the Latin chancellor of Florence. His numerous letters constitute a complete view of Italian humanism in his lifetime.[65] The disputes in which he was engaged cover precisely the same ground, and are conducted along the same lines as in Petrarch and Boccaccio. His friend, the Schoolman Zonarini, tells him Virgil is a pagan and a liar and that his conscience cannot permit him to read Virgil (*Epistolario*, 1, page 301). In replying, it is clear that for Salutati it is either grammar or dialectics. No compromise is possible. Where, he asks, would Augustine have been without Cicero? Did not Virgil prophesy the Incarnation? It also becomes clear that Italy was much divided on the

not in degree, as in the twelfth. Just as Wereker in his *Speculum Stultorum* could use Ovid against the dialecticians by telling the story of the ass who lost his tail and in compensation attempted theology at Paris (Rand, page 122), so Guido Morillonius wrote in 1516: "When, not many days ago, I would refresh my mind after the meanderings of the dialecticians and seek the holy dwellings of the Muse, by chance I laid hand on the *Heroides* of Ovid. Ye Gods, what manifold learning do they display, and how they twinkle with sprightly wit" (*ibid.*, pages 155–156). It is no accident that Wereker in the twelfth should use the same satirical techniques as Erasmus against the same object, scholastic theology. Rand notices the strong Ovidian flavor of *The Praise of Folly* (page 159). To the modern mind, schooled in Jung and Freud, ancient myth is once more alive and lancing, and able to stir the poetic imagination radically and polysemously. Just why the Renaissance gradually lost interest in the fourfold interpretations of myth and Scripture has never been explained. One important cause, as we shall see, was the increasing prominence of the exegetical school of Antioch over that of Alexandria—that is, of Chrysostom and Jerome over Origen and Augustine. In its emphasis on the historical and literal meaning of Scripture rather than the allegorical and mystic senses, the school of Antioch was relatively "modern." As a result of Erasmus' favoring of this school, the Council of Trent was influenced in setting its seal of approval on it. Today Catholic exegetists follow Jerome rather than Augustine, Erasmus rather than Reuchlin, Mirandola, and Agrippa.

62. John of Salisbury's *Metalogicus* in the twelfth century is directed against the *Cornificiani*, the "moderns" and the enemies of poetry and eloquence—the ignorant, the pseudo-learned, the utilitarian physicians and lawyers, and the dialecticians. The same trio of professions is excoriated by Erasmus in *The Praise of Folly*. (Kennet's translation, London, 1937; pages 66ff.)
63. Petrarch speaks of the dialecticians as something new and exotic: "I knew," he wrote, "that there was an army of Dialecticians in Great Britain, but you tell me that notwithstanding Scylla and Charybdis,

subject of the classics. Giovanni da Samminiato, a young humanist, asked why we should read the fables of the poets when we have the sound moral doctrines of Seneca and Aristotle. Beyond that, the basic principles of things can best be found in Holy Scripture. Salutati answered him at some length.[66] All his arguments are in Boccaccio, as well. We must study poetry because Scripture employs the modes of poetry. Since we can have no concept of God, we can have no words in which to speak to him or of him. We must, therefore, fashion a language based on his works. Only the most excellent mode will do, and this is poetry. Thus poetry may be outwardly false but essentially true. Holy Writ is of this kind. The origins of poetry are in the foundations of the world. Admittedly, however, the reading of pagan writers cannot be an end in itself, as the Fathers saw very clearly.

Salutati makes the extreme Renaissance claim for poetry as the queen of the arts, but his entire argument is patristically based. He does not hesitate to incorporate all the arguments which Cicero alleged for eloquence in the *De Oratore*; and in this he anticipates the position of Milton.[67] Since any Christian surpasses any pagan in wisdom, it, therefore, follows for Salutati (convinced by the Ciceronian identity of wisdom and eloquence) that any Christian orator is more eloquent than any pagan orator (*Epist.* IV, pages 131–135). It was thus that Salutati retorted to his dear friend Poggio, regretting the latter's skepticism and deploring that divorce between eloquence and Christian faith which he saw in preparation.[68] How impressive and spontaneous the union of pagan tradition and Christian faith could be is found less in the literature than in the plastic arts of Italy. Here there was no question of a barren imitation of ancient art, and the resulting achievement far surpassed anything ever done in ancient Rome. This is a question which deserves to be considered in estimating the claims of humanists of the Valla stamp.[69]

Once the two main parties in the Church have been identified, it is relatively easy to point out the others. For example, Gilson pointed to three: Averroists or the philosophically-minded pagans whose only master was Aristotle; the classically-minded pagans who aimed at pagan naturalism

3A

158

they have now swum across to Sicily.... I knew there had first been Cyclops in Sicily, then tyrants, but I did not know that a third sort of monsters,... had arrived there, this army of Dialecticians." [*Rer. Fam.* Book I, letter 7; ed. Rossi I, page 36.] Petrarch's first complaint against the dialecticians was that they were barbarian invaders; his second, that they were parasitic and non-productive ravagers of sound learning. He hated them, first as an Italian patriot, second as a grammarian. Like everybody else, he regarded the development of Scholasticism as a substitute for, rather than a healthy and natural fulfillment of, patristic theology. His third reason for hating and fearing them was of later but deep growth: his dread of that Averroism, rooted in the Arabic Aristotle, which drew so many into atheism during and after the thirteenth century.

64. The cornerstone of Petrarch's notion of theology is found in *The City of God* (VIII, 8). See *Rer. Fam.* VI, 2; ed. Rossi II, page 55. For the extraordinary career of Jacopone da Todi, author of the *Stabat Mater*, see *The Franciscan Poets* of Frederic Ozanan (Eng. Trans. London, 1914, chapters four and five). After studying dialectics in order to become a theologian, he renounced all learning as a deceit: "I reject the wonderful art whose secret Aristotle revealed, and the platonic doctrines which more often than not are heresies. A pure and simple understanding stands aloof, and rests on its own merit, to ascend to the presence of God without the help of their philosophy" [*op. cit.*, pages 199–200]. The ideal of simple piety exercised an increasing attraction as the complexities of scholasticism multiplied, and naturally led to the question, "Why not go back to the Fathers?"

In Italy, where dialectics came late, and where there had never been any ousting of the classics, such as had occurred at Paris in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the classical program of the encyclopedic arts was more successfully, because more exclusively, cultivated. The reason why Petrarch was led to suppose that there had been very little interest in the classics, say in the twelfth century, is easily assigned. In his day the monasteries were denuded of monks, for the monks had

minus pagan religion; and the rigorist or know-nothing party for whom Scripture was all.

An example from the early fifteenth century of this last party is the Florentine Dominican Giovanni Dominici, whose *Lucula Noctis* was the answer of his party to Salutati's defense of Christian classical learning.[70] The argument is that a Christian must apply himself only to things which lead to beatitude. But the pagan authors and the disputations of the philosophers certainly do not do this (page 126). Gilson said in his lectures that what we find in the argument of this Dominican (of the same house from which Savonarola came) is the Franciscan ideal minus the holiness and charity of St. Francis. Dominici concludes that even though the whole world were perfectly converted, all philosophy, with the exception of some part of the liberal arts, would be destroyed (page 435).

It is in connection with this party of rigorists and *ydiotae* that the career of Gerrit Groot (1340–1384) should be considered. For without any of the fanatical rigor of Jacopone da Todi or Dominici, his ideal of Christian learning was: first Scripture, then the Fathers. Living during the heyday of Scholasticism, the founder of the *Devotio Moderna* was all his life a follower of the *antiqui* against the *novi et moderni doctores* or the Schoolmen. He warned his friends against studying theology at the University of Paris. Since Paris excluded grammar, the Fathers and the classics, then these great aids to piety had to be studied outside the new universities. Thomas à Kempis in his life of Groot relates these things along with how there came to be formed the Brethren of the Common Life and the famous patristic school at Deventer.[71] It was in this school that Erasmus later received his early education, and which gave rise to the so-called *Devotio Moderna*.[72] Gilson points out that it pretended to be anything except the old devotion of Richard and Hugh of St. Victor, of Bernard of Clairvaux, of the lives of the Fathers, of Cassian, of Gregory the Great, of St. Benedict, and of St. Augustine. It was the direct continuation in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries of the ideal of following Christ that had been both taught and enacted in the thirteenth century by the *Christi perfectus imitator*, St. Francis of Assisi.[73]

mostly gone to Paris to study and teach dialectical theology. It was easy to suppose in his day that what had prevailed for two centuries had always prevailed. As for the humanists discovering the manuscripts of the classics, this meant that they discovered mainly eleventh- and twelfth-century manuscripts which had been much in demand until the rise of dialectics. Since the monks had become preoccupied with philosophy, it fell in some measure to laymen to "discover" the antiquity that the monks recently came to neglect.

65. *Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati*, ed. Francesco Novati, 5 Vols., Rome, 1891–1911.
66. *Epistolario* IV, pages 170–240.
67. Better informed and less nationalistic than Petrarch, Salutati knew that classical erudition had flourished until the time of Bernard of Clairvaux and Abelard, not only for men but for women (*Epistolario* I, page 43). In a remarkable passage of the *Ciceronianus* Erasmus shows, although incidentally, a perfect awareness of the *translatio studii* and of the continuous vogue of Ciceronian eloquence from Lactantius through all the Fathers, through Bede, Isidore, St. Bernard, St. Bonaventure to Petrarch. St. Ambrose is a bit sluggish, being too much under the influence of Isocrates; St. Bernard's marvelous eloquence is yet that of a man who seems not to have known Cicero. (Luther's praise is significant as placing Luther in the currents of learning of his time: "Bernard surpasses all the other Doctors of the Church." (*St. Bernard's Sermons on the Canticle of Canticles*, Dublin, 1920; I, page xiv.) For Bernard's mode is persistently ultra-Augustinian and allegorical.) The claims to eloquence of Anselm, Alexander of Hales, and St. Thomas Aquinas are canvassed. Then, Erasmus' spokesman says: "For several generations Eloquence seems to have died out entirely, but not so long ago it began to come to life among the Italians, then later among our own people." Yet Petrarch, the leader of this revival "smacks of the rudeness of the preceding age." (Izora Scott's translation in *Controversies over the Imitation of Cicero*, New York, 1910; pages 93–94.) The very important fact to note is that Erasmus is

Groot's ideal, carried out in the school at Deventer makes grammar, not dialectics, the handmaid to theology. And the stimulus to Dutch and German humanism extended far beyond the school both before and after Erasmus.

Before proceeding to Erasmus and the conclusion of this section, brief attention must be given to the French humanists who managed to survive the dialectical deluge. In this matter A. Coville is of prime assistance.[74] Nicolas de Clamanges (ca. 1360–1400), teacher of rhetoric at Paris and later a papal secretary in Rome, was a Christian humanist primarily interested, like Erasmus and More, in ecclesiastical reform, especially the reform of theology and preaching by means of *grammatica*. The preparation of a theologian in addition to *grammatica* consists in the constant reading of Scripture by the assistance of its author, the Holy Ghost.

Guillaume Fichet (b. 1433) learnt his love of Petrarch and the classics at Avignon and took his doctorate in theology at Paris in 1468. For many years he taught the liberal arts in the morning and gave special lectures in eloquence in the evening. He edited the *De Officiis* of Cicero at the first Parisian press, which he had established in 1470. In his preface to his text on Rhetoric (1471–1472) he makes a statement which can only make sense in light of the long struggle between grammar and dialectics:

> Our contemporaries excel in dialectics and in philosophy, but they despise orators. Hence this result, that although Paris has become a place in no way less glorious than defunct Athens, there has never arisen in Paris, up to our own days, a man able to combine and to teach rhetoric together with the whole body of philosophy, as was once done by Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, Theophrastus and other Athenians. Our men, on the contrary, content themselves with the naked knowledge of things; some of them entangled in business, public or private, some others less embarrassed; in other cases because, if not the number of authors and the size of their works, at least their own poverty-stricken minds frighten them so that they fail to study eloquence at all.[75]

perfectly aware of the continuity of the full classical and patristic tradition at least up until the end of the twelfth century. Dialectics then intervened "for several generations."

68. *Epistolario* IV, page 167. Laurentius Valla (1407–1457) is an example of how that divorce was to occur, leading to that sterile humanism of slavish imitation of the classics which is nowhere found in the work of John of Salisbury, Petrarch, or Erasmus. From his time onwards the humanism of imitation grows side by side with the traditional patristic culture which, to mention only English names, flourishes in More, Nashe, Donne, Bacon, Browne, and Taylor.
69. To those who urge that in the fifteenth century occurred a revival of Greek letters unknown to the Middle Ages and that there was, therefore, a wholly new element in Renaissance classical culture, it need only be pointed out that St. Jerome was the hero of Erasmus and the Hellenists. The late Renaissance thus represents, especially on its Hellenistic side, the recovery of a part of that patristic heritage which had long been in abeyance. Insofar as the recovery of the total patristic-classical heritage in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was accomplished against opposition, that opposition was provided within the Church by the dialectical theologians. Insofar as the grammarians within the Church, in triumphing over another Church party, assisted the relatively small numbers of pagan humanists in their efforts, it was unwitting. But the abundant and overwhelming mass of historical fact stands apparent to the investigator to prove that it is impossible to make sense of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries by writing about them from the point of view of the secularism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Yet that is precisely what is done by those who suppose that Petrarch and Erasmus were, according to their lights, really trying to establish something they could not possibly have foreseen. The best energies of Petrarch and Erasmus were spent in trying to recapture the complete patristic culture of Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine. Not only does their work stand to prove it, but unless their work is seen in this long tradition, its outlines remain obscure and

He forecasts, however, that just as the arts, severed from eloquence, have languished, so they will presently revive, since eloquence is beginning to flourish once more. The French humanists did not want the destruction of dialectics and philosophy, but rather the restoration of rhetoric to its place in the *egkuklios paideia*.

While Abelard might have brought about a reconciliation among the arts, these men actually desired that it should be accomplished. Jean Gerson, chancellor of the University of Paris, had attempted it by means of his writings in the early fourteenth century; what was needed, however, was not a book but reform of the whole curriculum of studies. Thus the faculty of arts might have become the means of organizing and disseminating the entire body of humanistic learning. This could, perhaps, have been done at Oxford, Cambridge, or Heidelberg; but, as Gilson stated in his lectures, Budé's creation of the Collège de France in 1530 can be considered as the public notification to the learned world of the sad fact that the University of Paris had to be considered as incorrigible. The consequence of this failure was that the revival of Christian classical culture had to take place in helter-skelter style. The grammarians had no access to any university in Europe; and so the conflict between the representatives of university studies and those outside the universities took on a religious character. This was the situation to which Erasmus of Rotterdam was to bring his eloquent leadership and his patristic and classical erudition.

It is instructive to note what a total lack of consistency the biographers of Erasmus have found in him. But not one of his biographers has been aware that Erasmus' whole life and work must be seen as the struggle for a theological and monastic reform, as a struggle on behalf of what he repeatedly praised as "the old theology" of the Fathers as opposed to the "modern theology" of the barbarian scholastics.[76] As soon as Erasmus' classical studies are seen in the patristic perspective which he tirelessly claimed for them, his entire work assumes the integrity which it had in the eyes of St. Thomas More.[77]

Even after Luther's excommunication, Erasmus did not hesitate to

its import unintelligible. The facts fall into natural perspective only by reversing Norden's judgment, which is the conventional one. He designates as the moderns, not the young party of the scholastics, but the grammarians who sought to awaken the classical authors from their slumber (*op. cit.*, II, pages 743–744). When Erasmus is seen to be of this ancient party, then it is, for example, easy to see why Swift is not a "modern," and Descartes, the child of scholastic culture, is.

70. Ed. with Introd. by R. Coulon; Paris, 1908.
71. *Opera Omnia*, Cologne, 1759; Vol. III.
72. See A. Hyma's *The Christian Renaissance*, New York, 1925.
73. The temptation to call "modern" a form of Christian spirituality that called itself "ancient" is felt by many historians who wish to suggest that true Christian piety, having been exterminated by the Schoolmen, was restored in the fifteenth century by the forerunners of Martin Luther. Luther represents for such historians a kind of *terminus a quo*. This question is raised only in order to show how the basic facts in the history of culture can be controversially shuffled.
74. *Gontier et Pierre Col et l'humanisme en France au temps de Charles VI*; Paris, 1934; and *Recherches sur quelques écrivains du XIVe et du XVe siècle*; Paris, 1935.
75. A. Rénaudet, *Préréforme et humanisme à Paris pendant les premières guerres d'Italie. (1494–1517)*, Paris, 1916; page 84.
76. J. J. Mangan, *Life, Character and Influence of Desiderius Erasmus*; New York, 1927; two vols. Erasmus refers to his inspirer, Colet, as "the vindicator and assertor of the old theology" (I, page 109). In a letter to Erasmus he designates the scholastics as "this modern school of theologians who spend all their lives in mere quibbling and fallacious cavilling"; and goes on to praise Colet, who, "took upon yourself to wage war to the utmost of your powers against this stubborn race of people, so that you might restore to its former splendor and dignity our ancient and true theology..." (I, pages 114–115). In 1527

affirm that Luther was partly right in opposing the dialectical studies of the monks of his day: "It has distressed pious minds to hear in the universities scarcely a single discourse about the doctrine of the Gospel, to see those sacred authors so long approved by the Church [the Fathers] now considered antiquated..."[78] He soon came to regard Luther as a tragic case: "This tragedy first arose from hatred to good literature, and from the stupidity of the monks."[79] That is how the Reformation appeared to a protagonist, a monk of the same order as Luther. The universities, built on the basis of dialectics in the twelfth century, refused to admit grammar, that is, the Fathers and the classics. Thus they excluded what, in the eyes of Erasmus, as in the eyes of Petrarch and St. Bernard and St. Gregory and St. Augustine, was the *philosophia Christi*. The panegyric of Erasmus on Colet, shortly after Colet's death, is to the same effect: "Oh true theologian! Oh wonderful preacher of evangelical doctrine! With what earnest zeal did he bring in the philosophy of Christ!"[80] Erasmus soon became alarmed at what he calls "the tragedy of Luther," not because the monastic orders, and consequently the universities, were endangered, but because the cause of patristic learning, of the classics and the age-old *philosophia Christi* was equally jeopardized. For throughout his life Erasmus was an extreme Tory theologian, full of the irreverent high-spirits and revolutionary wrath observable in some Tories of every century.

Those who suppose the Renaissance to have been merely the restoration of classical *grammatica* or philology have certainly no right to claim Erasmus as a man of the Renaissance. For Erasmus, as for Jerome, the classics are an incidental means which the young student will cultivate "*cautim ac moderate*" in order to form his style. The real end of these studies is the understanding of Scripture, and the student must beware of contamination by pagan manners: "Verum, nolito te cum Gentilium letteris, gentilium et mores haurire." Antiquity must be approached with the utmost caution. In short, Erasmus concludes:

> ...it will prove useful to have gone over the whole of pagan literature, provided it be done at the appropriate time of life, with moderation, with

the Faculty of Theology at the Sorbonne condemned the theology of Erasmus as that of a grammarian. Mangan, whose work is mainly useful for its copious excerpts from the works of Erasmus, is quite mystified (II, page 265).

77. This is equally true of Rabelais, of whom Saintsbury wrote in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article that he had no plan or scope that is discernible to any reader. Rabelais' *Life of Gargantua*, for example, is quite clear and consistent when one follows his intentions in striking a blow on behalf of grammar and eloquence against the dialecticians. Grammatical allegory he openly proclaims as the mode of his work. He introduces *bona fide* classical and Ciceronian eloquence to contrast with parodies of the barbarian sophistication of the Schoolmen; and he upholds the ideal orator as the type of the perfect prince. He introduces a mock dialectical exegesis in contrast with true grammatical exegesis. As for the satirical form, without insisting on his relation to Lucian (model for *The Praise of Folly* and the *Utopia*), it is easy to see him in the long tradition of Franciscan satirical writing. (See Gilson, *Les idées et les lettres*, "Rabelais Franciscain," pages 197–241.)

    Discussing Jerome and the classics, Christopher Dawson points out that: "Even the intolerance and pugnacity which have scandalised so many modern critics do not spring from the fanaticism of a bigot, but from the irascibility of a scholar, and his literary vendettas are often curiously similar to those of the humanists of the Renaissance, who were themselves among his warmest admirers" (*The Making of Europe*, page 57).
78. Mangan II, page 153.
79. Mangan II, page 57.
80. Mangan II, page 135.

> prudence, and with a discerning mind; moreover, young men should go through it as pilgrims and not stay there as inhabitants; last, and not the least, while doing so they should refer everything to Christ.[81]

The future theologian, said Erasmus, will read the pagan poets just as he will later read Scripture, allegorically. After all, Homer and Virgil themselves intended their poems allegorically. In fact, when we find a classical text contradicting the Gospel we are either to treat it figuratively or to regard it as corrupt.[82]

The old Franciscan theme never ceases to resound in the pages of Erasmus: *Unus Christus Magister*. This accounts for his rage towards the monks who were expounding Plato, Pythagoras, Stoics, Cyrenaics, Aristotle, Cynics and Epicureans. Where does Christ or his apostles speak of Aristotle? A follower of Aristotle would blush to be ignorant of such questions as that concerning prime matter; but what have these to do with salvation?[83] Should anyone urge that this is to reduce philosophy and learning almost to nothing, we have, says Erasmus, the witness of the Apostles and martyrs to confirm the rectitude of this course.

When Luther stirred up a storm the same dialecticians naturally attempted to confuse the issues in order to recover the ground they had lost to Erasmus the philologist: "But this is a scheme of certain monks who love me no more than they love good literature, in order to involve me willy-nilly with Luther.... But by none of their schemes can I be moved from my mental resolve. I acknowledge the Roman Church, which I hold not to differ from the Catholic Church."[84]

But that Luther's initial attitude toward the Fathers and his aversion to the scholastics was sound in the opinion of Erasmus, he also acknowledges: "I have always desired that ... he [Luther] might simply expound the philosophy of the Gospel, from which the character of this generation has too widely departed." (*ibid.*) Erasmus is not hedging. He is being perfectly candid and consistent. It remains to show, very briefly, that he is truly one of the *antiqui theologi*, and that the widespread enthusiasm in the sixteenth

81. Gilson gives these and other related texts from Erasmus in his *Héloise et Abélard*, pages 187–188. He offers further instructive contrasts between the typical Renaissance views of Erasmus and the conventional historicisms of J. H. Randall's *The Making of the Modern Mind*. Those who suggest that the enthusiasm of Erasmus for the simple, unpagan character of the Gospels is insincere would be discouraged if they ever took the trouble to consult the evidence. For example, writing to an Italian professor of Greek, who like all the Italians had been nettled by the *Ciceronianus* (1528), Erasmus says: "There is also that species of enemies who have lately begun to spring out of ambush. They feel put out that good literature should treat of Christ, as if nothing could be elegant but what is pagan.... They extol with praise Pontanus to the skies, while they turn up their noses at Augustine and Jerome.... Among these people it is almost more disgraceful not to be a Ciceronian than not to be a Christian, just as if, were Cicero now alive, he would not speak differently about Christian matters than he did in his own day, when it was the main part of eloquence to speak to the point at issue.... It will not much grieve me to be blotted from the list of *Ciceronians*, provided I shall be inscribed in the ranks of Christians" (Mangan II, pages 294–295). It is important to note that Erasmus turns the Ciceronian argument from *decorum* in style against the Ciceronians. Like John of Salisbury and Petrarch, he was too much a classicist to ape the classics. In precisely the same spirit Erasmus contemned the current sentimentality over the ruins of Rome: "Rome? There is no Rome, except her ruins and rubbish, the scars and vestiges of her former disasters. Take away the Pope and the Cardinals, what then would be Rome?" (Mangan I, page 269). See also Izora Scott, *op. cit.*, page 115.
82. Gilson, *Héloise et Abélard*, pages 187–188.
83. See Gilson, *op. cit.*, page 189ff. In his *Letter to a Young Clergyman* (Sheridan's edition, London, 1808; VI, pages 283–312), Swift defends the pagan moralists: "... even that divine precept of loving our enemies, is at large insisted on by Plato ..." (page 300). And in the true grammarian vein of the *philosophia*

century for the theological program, which, like Petrarch, he attempted to reinstate, cannot be dissociated from the character of the Renaissance.[85]

Deventer was a decisive factor in moulding Erasmus, as his contemporary biographer, Rhenanus, tells us:

> At Deventer he made his first entrance into learning by imbibing the rudiments of both languages under Alexander Hegius of Westphalia, who had contracted a friendship with Rudolph Agricola, recently returned from Italy, by whom he was being instructed in Greek ... As a boy he had the comedies of Terence at his fingers' ends, for he had a most tenacious memory and a penetrating mind.[86]

In view of Erasmus' own expressed contempt for the learning at Deventer it is worth considering that his motives were mixed and his censure relative to his own later achieved standards. However, Mangan says:

> We are forced to quote Erasmus against himself on this point. He says that he was under the care of these Brothers for about six and a half years, during which period he went through the whole course of logic, physics, metaphysics and morals, besides being so well versed in Terence and Horace that he could recite them by heart. He had also made a beginning in Greek, which in those days was an almost unknown study.[87]

Since, however, the Brothers had begun their revival of *grammatica* in the thirteenth century when the methods and texts, as Paetow has shown, were the worst in the entire Middle Ages, Erasmus may have had some reason to complain.[88]

After entering the Augustinian monastery at Steyn, famous for its classical and patristic library, Erasmus read St. Jerome and at once became lyrical. However, there was nothing adventitious in this. He had learnt to love the Fathers at Deventer; and when his funds proved insufficient to support him at a university, he did not hesitate to become a monk in order that he might

Christi he argues against scholastic theology that "neither did our Saviour think it necessary to explain to us the nature of God ..." (page 301). Swift is relevant since even the allegorical mode of his satires shows him to be in an uninterrupted tradition.

84. Mangan, *op. cit.*, II, page 165. The problem here is not to discuss Luther and Erasmus but merely to use the statements which the controversy elicited from Erasmus to show that he was consciously and consistently an exponent of the complete patristic-classical program: "Here again I call on my fair-minded critic, and ask him why I should be brought to book as the author of this opinion [free will], when ... all the theologians, both ancient and modern, Origen, Jerome, Chrysostom, Hilary, Arnobius, Scotus, and Thomas, being in agreement with me on the point ..." (II, page 214).
85. Luther's own estimate of Erasmus is not inapposite. In a letter to a friend whose competence as a grammatical theologian Erasmus had called in question, Luther denies to Erasmus any proficiency as a commentator on Scripture, merely allowing that: "He had performed the task to which he was called: he has reinstated the ancient languages, and recalled them from pagan studies" (Mangan II, page 244). The point is that Luther denies Erasmus the title which Erasmus had given Colet and which he certainly wished for himself: "the vindicator of the old theology." In this context the famous passage in Bacon's *Advancement of Learning* makes complete sense, and proves that we have been following, not making, history in this study. Bacon thus explains what we have since called the Renaissance: "Martin Luther, conducted, no doubt, by a higher providence, but in discourse of reason finding what a province he had undertaken against the Bishop of Rome ... was forced to awaken all antiquity, and call former times to his succours to make a party against the present time. So that the ancient authors both in divinity and humanity, which had long time slept in libraries, began generally to be read and revolved.... And thereof grew again a delight in their manner of style and phrase ... much furthered and precipitated by the enmity and opposition that the propounders of those primitive but

have leisure to pursue learning. It was at Steyn that he wrote *De Contemptu Mundi* and the *Antibarbari*. The first part of the latter, he wrote to a friend, is "occupied mostly in refuting the silly reasonings of the barbarians, and in the second part I will make you and other learned men of your kind speak in the praise of literature."[89] The barbarians are, of course, the scholastic theologians, so that the term "barbarian" means something rather different from what it had signified to the patriotic Petrarch. Erasmus did study theology at Paris, and to good effect, as his ably-written treatise on Free-will against Luther was later to show.[90] When, therefore, Erasmus listened to Colet for some months (in 1499) on the epistles of St. Paul, he was already a widely grounded patrist, thoroughly able to appreciate the reform that Colet was attempting extra-curricularly at Oxford. It is mainly owing to his enthusiasm for the patristic humanism of Colet, Grocyn, Linacre, Warham, More, Fisher, and Lee that we know as much as we do of these men.

Erasmus had affected incompetence when Colet first urged him to become a vindicator of the old theology[91]; but in 1504 Erasmus had been overjoyed at getting a manuscript copy of Valla's *Annotations on the New Testament* "which he had lighted upon in the Library of the Abbey of Parc"[92]; and he soon wrote Colet: "I cannot well express to you, dearest Colet, with what energy I am giving myself to theology, how everything which calls me away, or even hinders me from it is disgusting to me.... I have read a good share of Origen's works;... because he opens up the very sources of theological science, and indicates the methods to be pursued."[93] Nothing could be more explicit than this. Erasmus, like St. Jerome, held that philological work on the text of Scripture is the prime task of the theologian. When in 1516 he finally published with introduction and annotations a new translation of the Greek testament into Latin, he supposed, along with the humanists, that he had made a major contribution to theology. For theology, he conceived, was the explaining of the teaching of Christ as revealed in Scripture. Erasmus never ceased to hold that the differences of the Schoolmen were the same dissensions to which the Fathers had pointed as existing among the pagan philosophers; and it had been an evil day for the Church when

seeming new opinions had against the Schoolmen;... whose writings were altogether in a different style and form;..." (Everyman, page 23). Bacon introduced this explanation to protest against the monopoly of copious patristic-Ciceronian eloquence in his day. He held a brief for the aphoristic style of writing as a scientific technique. It is apropos of the same subject, the triumph in his day of grammatical over dialectical divinity, that he raises once more the problem of style in the *De Augmentis* (1622). His qualified preference for patristic divinity is elaborately expressed *in figura* (*Works*, *op. cit.*, V, page 118). His position is that of Hobbes, whose lengthily expressed preference for the patristic method is hard to reconcile with Mr. Willey's view that he is one "to whom a 'naturalistic' type of explanation seems completely satisfying" (*The Seventeenth Century Background*, page 97).

86. Mangan II, page 379.
87. Mangan I, page 9.
88. P. S. Allen in *The Age of Erasmus* tells us that John of Garland, Eberhard of Bethune, and, finally, Alexander of Villedieu were the texts used (pages 36ff.).
89. Mangan I, page 51.
90. Mangan notes that it is a purely scholastic treatise (II, page 247). In this respect it is alone among Erasmus' works.
91. Mangan I, page 114.
92. Mangan I, page 196.
93. Mangan I, page 199.

she had opened her gates to the dialecticians.[94] Once they were in, Erasmus could think of no better way of routing them than by rebuilding the edifice of *grammatica* which they had razed. One need only glance at the numerous works which he wrote for grammar school use, and the vast number of editions which they went through, to see how much he deserves the title of the Schoolmaster of Europe.[95]

In his preface to the New Testament, called *Novum Instrumentum*, or method of study, Erasmus lays down the old encyclopedia of the arts with grammar at the base:

> A fair knowledge of the three languages, Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, of course are the first things.... It would be well too were the student tolerably versed in other branches of learning—dialectics, rhetoric, arithmetic, music, astrology, and especially in knowledge of the natural objects—animals, trees, precious stones—of the countries mentioned in the Scriptures; for if we are familiar with the country, we can in thought follow the history.... Other branches of learning may all be turned to account.[96]

We thus owe the natural history lore of *Euphues* and much of the poetic imagery of Renaissance literature to a theological reform which aimed at a reinauguration of the encyclopedic-grammatical program of the Church Fathers. Without, then, describing the vast work of editing Origen, Jerome, Chyrsostom, and others, which occupied the long life of Erasmus, let him conclude this section with a statement of his central position around which he rallied the whole learning of Europe: "As to the Schoolmen, I had rather be a pious divine with Jerome than invincible with Scotus. Was ever heretic converted by their subtleties?... That doctor is abundantly 'great' who purely preaches Christ."[97]

94. Mangan I, page 299.
95. Mangan gives these data (II, pages 400ff.). It is, perhaps, unnecessary to point out that the inspiration of Colet's famous grammar school was entirely owing to his eagerness to effect a theological reform by means of a restoration of *grammatica* as understood by Donatus, the teacher of St. Jerome.
96. Given by Seebohm in *The Oxford Reformers*, London, 1896; page 329. Seebohm points out that these instructions for reading Scripture were much extended in the second edition and later were separately printed as the *Ratio Verae Theologiae*.
97. Seebohm, *op. cit.*, page 330. See also Izora Scott's translation of a long letter of Erasmus on Christian wisdom as a source of true eloquence (*op. cit.*, pages 25–27).

CHAPTER THREE

B. DIALECTICS

THE TRIVIUM FROM ABELARD TO ERASMUS

In commenting on the interaction of the departments of the trivium here, McLuhan focuses on the virtual inseparability of grammar and dialectics for Abelard. This leads to an important discussion of dialectics as "the province of concepts and authority, but not of equal authorities." Aristotle, for example, would be a dialectician's authority for postulating probable conclusions for an argument, but citing him would be a different matter from citing a text of Scripture, the authority of which was absolute. The latter was, therefore, "the object of dialectical investigation rather than dialectical proof." The whole concept of authority, McLuhan stresses, is radically different for dialectics and for philology. If grammar and dialectics were both put into service by Abelard, it remained for Saint Thomas to reconcile them, as McLuhan points out, drawing heavily on Gilson.

McLuhan provides much useful orientation for the reader by way of concise overviews:

- THE GRAMMARIAN IS CONCERNED WITH CONNECTIONS; THE DIALECTICIAN WITH DIVISIONS;
- THE FOUR DIALECTICAL FUNCTIONS ARE HERMENEUTIC, APOLOGETIC, POLEMIC, AND THEOLOGICAL;
- GRAMMARIANS DISTRUSTED ABSTRACTION; DIALECTICIANS DISTRUSTED CONCRETE MODES OF LANGUAGE.

McLuhan continues to advance his revisionist perspective here: "[T]he modern view that allegory is a product of medieval Scholasticism is the precise contrary of the facts." And he continues issuing challenges: "[T]he history of Renaissance education ... is still badly needed."

The closing pages seem to promise the reader that awaiting the completion of the panopticon McLuhan is erecting will be worth the advantage of seeing Nashe fully illuminated: "The celebrated satire of Agrippa on human learning, from which Nashe drew so frequently, is pointless except it be seen against the background of a decadent scholasticism under attack by patristic theologians."

—(Editor)

After quoting a celebrated text from Stow to illustrate the deep hold of dialectical disputation in the schools and universities of the early seventeenth century, Foster Watson comments on the thousand-year vogue of Donatus as follows:

> The movement known as the Renascence may be briefly described as the attempt to return to a study of grammar (including in this term literary appreciation of authors) and rhetoric (which served as a systematic analytical study of good Latin style). These subjects afforded a refuge from the medieval disputational scholasticism, which had rendered all studies an arid waste, only to be freshened in the long course of the Medieval Ages by the introduction of Arab learning and thought which from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries brought the only 'liberalizing' studies.[1]

Here Watson combines a fresh perception of the Renaissance, based on first-hand study of their school texts and educational manifestoes, with a stale controversial view based on hearsay and conjecture about the twelfth and fourteenth centuries. Had Watson known about these centuries a fraction of what he knew about the sixteenth century, he could undoubtedly have written the history of Renaissance education which is still badly needed. The facts he knew compelled him to see the Renaissance as the triumph of the old grammar. Why was he not impelled to inquire whether the old grammar had not been crushed by the medieval universities, by the very arrival of the Arabian Aristotle which he vaguely supposes must have been friendly to grammar?[2] Failing to see that the age-old tussle between grammar and dialectics was primarily to decide whose was to be the privilege of serving as exclusive the handmaid of theology, Foster misses the main point about his own period. He narrows the subject of grammar almost to its nineteenth-century nonentity. Thus restricted, it certainly will not function as the key to the door to the literary modes of its great period of success and cultivation.[3]

This section, devoted to a brief inquiry into the history of dialectics

1. F. Watson, *The English Grammar Schools to 1660*, page 8.
2. Francis Bacon could have helped him to clarity on this point in the *De Augmentis*, for example, where he accuses the universities of having been founded on a dialectical basis rather than a classical-grammatical one (*Works, op. cit.*, IV, page 288); and accuses Aristotle as a modern who waged "war on all antiquity" (*ibid.*, page 344).
3. See, for example, Bacon's statements about philosophical or metaphysical grammar as opposed to mere literary grammar: *The Advancement of Learning* (Everyman, pages 37, 138), also *Novum Organum* (*Works, op. cit.*, IV, pages 441-442).

from Abelard to Erasmus, has, therefore, its proper term in the elucidation of the literature of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Success should enable us, for example, to see exactly why Sir Hudibras the Calvinist, and a palpable Schoolman, should be a figure of ridicule to one of the patristic party like Samuel Butler, as, indeed, he would have been to Erasmus, to Reuchlin, or to Rabelais:

> In *School-Divinity* as able
> As he that hight *Irrefragable*;
> A second *Thomas*, or, at once,
> To name them all, another Dunce.[4]

Butler proceeds to diagnose the ills of theology, as well as of human society, as proceeding from the disputatious habits of these Scholastics. That is, the Puritans are represented as anti-humanistic because they are followers of the scholastic tradition, whereas Lutherans and Anglicans are permitted the nourishing fare of the Fathers and the classics.[5]

It becomes possible to discuss with precision and profit such things as "the Renaissance and the Reformation" in terms of grammar and dialectics; but the attempt to distinguish them in terms of "the humanistic spirit" and "the religious spirit" has produced whole libraries of chaotic writings. Thus Luther had "the religious spirit" yet he hated the scholastic theology of Wycliffe and Calvin. Ramus had "the religious spirit," as evinced by his Protestantism; and he had "the humanistic spirit," as evinced by his enmity toward Aristotle, and his devotion to eloquence, yet he was primarily interested in the writings of antiquity as supplying examples of dialectical method.[6] Ramus was a thorough-going scholastic and yet he was the hero of Puritan-humanists like Wilson and Sidney. Clearly, such notions as "the spirit" of humanism or paganism or subjectivism or otherworldliness are totally useless in discussing the sixteenth century.

Before proceeding to a closer glimpse of medieval dialectics, one more example of the importance of approaching the literature of the Renaissance

4. Butler, *Hudibras*, Part I (1663), Canto 1.
5. That Calvin was an out-and-out Schoolman needs little urging. See H. O. Taylor's *Thought and Expression in the Sixteenth Century*, I, pages 389–417. But the extraordinary consequences, even at the level of formal literary expression, have only begun to be recognized. The fact that Scotland and New England alike were committed to an intensive program of scholastic method in divinity, at the very moment when the Church of England elected to adhere to the patristic program, has issued in widely differing objects and products in education. The relative ease with which the Scot or the New Englander enters the milieu of French culture is owing to all three having in common the scholastic tradition; for Descartes was nothing if not the heir of the Schoolmen. Professor Gilson's *Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien*, Paris, 1930, has completely reconstituted the basis of Cartesian study.

   Gilson is concerned to show the Augustinian roots of Cartesian philosophy. On the mechanical-mathematical side Pierre Duhem has demonstrated the influence of the great Schoolman William of Ockham on Descartes. The Parisian Ockhamist Franciscans of the fourteenth century, very much more than the Oxford Franciscans (Bacon and Grosseteste), can be considered as the precursors of Cartesian mathematical-physics. The break with Aristotelian dynamics came not with Copernicus and Galileo, but with the doctrines of space, time, and locomotion of Ockham and his disciples, John Buridan (d. 1358), Albert of Saxony (d. 1390), and Marsilius of Inghen (d. 1396). (See Duhem, *Etudes sur Leonardo da Vinci*, Paris, II, pages 86; 193.)

   R. F. Jones points out that the Puritans were sympathetic towards Cartesians, and suggests that this was because they had a common enemy in Aristotle who had corrupted both nature and divinity. (*Ancients and Moderns*, page 77. See also W. F. Mitchell, *English Pulpit Oratory*, page 102.) However, the case is involved in numerous contradictions for Professor Jones because he is not aware that

by this route may not be amiss. The first words which Faustus speaks in Marlowe's play are to tell the audience that he is a hateful Schoolman who has confounded the *philosophia Christi* with Aristotle:

> Having commenc'd, be a divine in show,
> Yet level at the end of every art,
> And live and die in Aristotle's works.
> Sweet Analytics!, 'tis thou hast ravish'd me!
> *Bene disserere est finis logices.*
> Is to dispute well logic's chiefest end?[7]

Obviously, Faustus is damnable for his method in theology even before he becomes a necromancer. Having rejected the lucrative professions of law and medicine, he decides that:

> When all is done, divinity is best:
> Jerome's Bible, Faustus; view it well.
> *Stipendium peccati mors est.* Ha!
> The reward of sin is death: that's hard.
> *Si peccasse negamus, fallimur, et nulla est in nobis veritas:* If we say that we have no sin we deceive ourselves, and there's no truth in us. Why, then, belike we must sin, and so consequently die:
> Ay, we must die an everlasting death.

Nothing could have been plainer to a sixteenth-century audience. Faustus takes Jerome's Bible, the text of the great grammarian-hero and model of Erasmus. He then proceeds very blatantly to apply the dialectical method to the text, instead of the grammatical method of exegesis; and he ends in Calvinistic despair. Regardless of Marlowe's personal opinions, it is only necessary to note that the main issues in the great war between grammar and dialectics were so broadly drawn that they could become the basis of a popular play.[8] In the second place, the issues are not "humanistic," except

Aristotle was a "modern" for Erasmus and Bacon. Bruno, left-wing scholastic in the nominalist Ockham tradition, attacks both Aristotle and the "ancients." The Puritans are "moderns" or Schoolmen of the left, attacking Schoolmen of the center. Had Mr. Willey [*The Seventeenth Century Background*] seen that Bacon and Browne and the Cambridge Platonists were not moderns but ancients, defenders of the ancient *grammatica* and sympathetic to the Stoic tradition of the *Logos*, many of the perspectives of the seventeenth century would have easily clarified themselves. For example, Milton's position as an "ancient" only becomes intelligible in the light of the entire Ciceronian-Augustinian tradition. Mr. Willey almost says this [page 239] but does not follow it up. Milton didn't call his work on scriptural exegesis *De Doctrina Christiana* for nothing.

6. Ramus, in the tradition of Ockham, espouses *logica utens*, or grammaticized logic, and discards *logica docens*. [See *P. Rami Scholae in Liberales Artes*, Basilaea, 1569, a2; l3- 5.] St. Thomas held both [See *In Met.* IV, lec. 4.] and defined *logica utens* as the science of probable conclusions. During the last three centuries, formal logic has been typically dominated by the Ockhamist-Ramist tradition. One of John Milton's last works was a compendious adaptation of the logic of Peter Ramus. Wilson, Fraunce, and Sidney were much influenced by Ramus, whose scholastic alignments were congenial to their Calvinistic mode in theology. Vives was, as it were, a late convert to grammar, having been trained, as More wrote to Erasmus, "in the highest branches of knowledge." That is, in metaphysics and theology. And Erasmus wrote back to More: "I rejoice that my estimate of him agrees with yours.... No other man is more fitted to utterly overwhelm the battalions of the dialecticians in whose camps he served for a long time." [See Watson, *Vives: On Education*, page xxiii.] It is interesting to note that Vives endorses *logica utens* before Ramus, and specifically refers us to Rudolf Agricola and the *Topica* of Aristotle: "...not so much with a view to refining and adapting this instrument for judging what is credible [*logica docens*], but much rather so as to observe the maxims and the precepts upon all matters which are

incidentally; and in this respect the relative importance of theology and letters remains in the late sixteenth century exactly what it was for John of Salisbury in the twelfth and Petrarch in the fourteenth.[9]

The general preparation of the ground which was to produce the great harvest of dialectical theology in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries has already been indicated in earlier sections of this study. Just as the need for reading the *divina pagina* had from the time of the Fathers kept alive the pagan classics and *trivial* disciplines, so

> ce fut au XIIe siècle la théologie qui garantit à la dialectique le réalisme sans lequel elle ne serait que jeu insipide; car, dans le domaine de la philosophie, tant que la physique d'Aristote et la science des Arabes ne seront pas parvenues aux esprits occidentaux, la logique fonctionnera à vide, comme une machine tournant sur elle-même, comme une méthode à raisonner sans matière de raisonnement, comme un instrument de science sans objet de science.[10]

Before the application of dialectics to the Scripture, theology as a science not only did not exist but the word was not in use. Isidore employed *theologi* to designate pagan writers who treated of the gods (*Etymol.* Lib. VIII c. 6–7). Thus, long after

> [l]a formulation des recueils sententiaires et la naissance de "questions" modifient, au cours du XIe siècle, la physionomie de la *lectio* scriptuaire ... la dénomination demeure, car les mots ne ratifient qu'après coup l'évolution des institutions et le progrès des disciplines. A la fin du XIe siècle, saint Anselme ... ignore le mot *theologia*.... En plein XIIIe siècle, alors que le livre des Sentences du Lombard sera décidément installé comme texte de cours, alors que le maître tiendra, hors sa leçon scriptuaire, des "disputes," on dira encore parfois *magister in sacra pagina*. Le formulaire juridique, le plus immuable de tous, conservera l'appellation: "Universis doctoribus *sacrae*

38

172

gathered together in that work, and to have them at hand when the subject under consideration requires it" (*ibid.*, pages 178–179). Having come to the conclusion that dialectics had destroyed the rest of the arts, Vives wishes to bring it once more into subordination to rhetoric. The texts in Watson are of the utmost value for an understanding of this business which Watson failed to understand.

7. The matter is slightly complicated here, since the Latin is the first sentence of the *Dialecticae* of Peter Ramus. In the *Massacre at Paris*, Ramus is introduced in a way which exhibits Marlowe's familiarity with his doctrines and his differences with the Aristotelians. Thus, Faustus' allegiance to Aristotle and his seeming scorn for the method of Ramus can mean that Marlowe is sympathetic toward the dialectical theology of Ramus, who was the Puritan model. However, Cambridge rather than Oxford was Ramistic at this time, and Hooker's scorn for Ramus is well known. Marlowe may wish to brush aside both Aristotle and Ramus in order to exalt St. Jerome. More probably, he is setting the matter in a light pleasing to the majority of his audience. This leaves the question very much in the air, pending a much wider study.
8. When the fallen angels in *Paradise Lost* discuss theology "And found no end, in wandering mazes lost," it is, of course, dialectical theology which is in question (Book II, ll. 557–569). By Milton's time the grammarian's position was better established, and he is casual about the question.
9. The reader of Selden's *Table Talk* will recall how frequently he discusses the claims of patristic and scholastic divinity; and Bishop Sprat's *History of the Royal Society* cannot be understood in any other context. Sprat's diagnosis of the ills of his age is the conventional one of the grammatical theologians: the Church called in the aid of Aristotle to overthrow the pagan dialecticians and was in turn undone by its pagan auxiliary. [See *Oxford Book of English Prose*, 1925; no. 204.] It is, at first, rather bewildering to discover that the typical Protestant charges against the Roman Church in general are borrowed verbatim from Catholic patristic theologians at war with the dialecticians.

paginae," dira Innocent III en 1208; et la traditionaliste université d'Oxford parlera encore ainsi au XIVe siècle.[11]

In point of fact, it was Abelard, himself, who applied the term *theologia* in its modern sense to his method when he entitled his first important work *Theologia Christiana* and later wrote an *Introductio ad theologium* whose purpose was, he wrote in his preface, "ut multo facilius divinae paginae intelligentiam nostrum penetraret ingenium" (*ibid.*, page 308). Sufficient historical work has been done to see Abelard in his true perspective as one who brought the antecedent labors of centuries of grammatical exegesis to fruition. The Fathers had undertaken to effect an elaborate concordance between the Old and New Testaments, as well as of the Evangelists among themselves. The work of the twelfth- and thirteenth-century dialecticians was to carry this a step further and to effect a harmony of Christian doctrines.

That grammarians such as Erasmus saw fit to challenge scholastic divinity as an alien and pagan novelty, corrupting the deposit of Christian philosophy, is easier to understand in terms of the decadent scholasticism of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries than it is in the vitally creative atmosphere of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It is not a matter which need be discussed here, beyond its immediate relevance for an understanding of what the real issues were, and were to become. The problem scarcely arose for Abelard. Unlike Faustus in the play, he freely applied the grammatical method before proceeding to a dialectical resolution of problems: "...Abélard groupe une première série de réflexions sur la variabilité des significations: selon les besoins du langage, selon les habilités de l'écrivain, selon l'adaptation à l'auditoire, selon l'usage, prévalant sur la propriété des termes, selon l'inadéquation des mots par rapport au fond de notre pensée" (*ibid.*, page 291).

The dialectical method is scarcely separable in his technique from grammatical exegesis.[12] The strictly dialectical technique of exegesis is clearly seen, however, in demonstrating the identity of concepts in disparate texts,

In his very popular *Art of Prophecying* (1607) [McLuhan cites an edition of 1592—ed.] Perkins puts the rigorist case which we have encountered frequently in the Middle Ages. No human eloquence has any place in a sermon. Aware, however, that his exhortation to baldness of style may be mistaken for a defence of the Schoolmen, he adds: "If any man thinke that by this means barbarism should be brought into pulpits; hee must understand that the Minister may, yea and must privately use at his libertie the arts..." (quoted by W. F. Mitchell, *op. cit.*, page 100). "Barbarism" always refers to the Schoolmen in this period. Donne said: "They mistake it much that thinke, the Holy Ghost hath rather chosen a low, and barbarous, and homely style, then an eloquent and powerful manner of expressing himselfe" (*ibid.*, page 189). Such examples are too numerous to need multiplication here.

10. Paré, Brunet, Tremblay, *La Renaissance du XIIe siècle*, pages 306–307.
11. *ibid.*, pages 307–308. "*Theologia*, au sens aujourd'hui reçu, désignant une discipline distincte de l'exégèse scriptuaire, fait donc son apparition, dans la langue chrétienne des écoles médiévales, avec Abélard; et ce sens naît très précisément dans l'explication scientifique du donné révélé" (page 309).
12. Paré, Brunet, Tremblay show how the *questiones disputatae* were at first firmly united to the scriptural gloss (page 129). The famous *Sentences* of Peter Lombard "ne sont autre chose que les questions qu'il a soulevées ou disputées au cours de son enseignement de la Bible" (page 131). The excesses to which the dialecticians went were corrected by the greatest of all the Schoolmen, St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas. They effected a return to the ancient *expositio*, but an *expositio* which had been greatly improved in technique and efficiency (page 129).

"Without deserting his advocacy of the arts, therefore, Abailard can say with Gregory that he judges it extremely improper to restrict the words of the divine oracle under the rules of the grammarian Donatus" (McKeon, "Renaissance and Method," page 65).

as well as the diversity of concepts in apparently concordant texts. The establishing of the authority of a text in the total context of a writer's system of thought is beyond the province of the grammarian and philologist. Dialectics is thus the province of concepts and authority, but not of equal authorities; and when the dialecticians invoked the "authority" of Aristotle or Plato, or Augustine, or Avicenna, they were doing what a dialectician must do in order to establish probable conclusions. But citing Aristotle is a totally different thing from citing a text of Scripture, and different again from citing Cicero, Seneca, or Virgil. The "authority" of Aristotle was no greater for a medieval dialectician than the integrity of his principles and the comprehension of his conclusions. Aristotle could, therefore, be cited by various disputants on different sides of the same question. The "authority" of Cicero was dependent on his moral integrity and the prestige of his eloquence, and seldom carried any dialectical, but rather rhetorical, force. The "authority" of Scripture was absolute, but was for that very reason the object of dialectical investigation rather than dialectical proof.[13] However, the humanist outcry against the dialectical dotage of the thirteenth century and its "authority of Aristotle" is too badly founded to deserve discussion. This very outcry, moreover, becomes a source of enlightenment when one realizes that it is an occupational myopia of the philologist for whom "authority" has a totally different sense from that understood by the dialectician. Wherever contempt for the authority of Aristotle is uttered, there will be found the grammarian complaining also that the dialecticians have destroyed the old theology of the Fathers and corrupted the simple truths of the *philosophia Christi*.[14]

In the twelfth century, then, exegesis, the highest object of human effort in Western Europe, was subjected to the systematic techniques of Aristotle's fully-recovered *Organon*

> La *doctrina sacra* se développait dès lors en deux espèces différentes, non seulement comme genre littéraire, mais comme objet: la pure *expositio*, commentaire scripturaire ou patristique, attachée à son texte et serve de

13. This raises the point of Abelard's alleged rationalistic scepticism, which is, sufficiently discussed by Paré, Brunet, Tremblay on pages 290; 294; 296; 301–303; 305. They cite Gilson on Abelard's intention: "Ce n'est pas le sens de la révélation qu'il a la prétention de nous découvrir, mais un sens de la révélation, juste ce qu'il faut pour que la formule ne s'en réduise pas à des mots privés de sens lorsque nous la prononçons" (page 303).
14. Another important aspect of dialectical method is the precise definition of the extension and comprehension of terms—the fact which made dialectics non-functional in law-ridden Italy. Law is too much concerned with the particular and the individual to be accessible to the necessary modes of abstraction of dialectical argument. Grammar is, likewise, pragmatic and positivistic, a fact which made it the inevitable method of physics for Vives and Bacon, but not for the mathematicians. Discussing this crucial distinction is his *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, Gilson pointed out that when the sensible world as well as forms and souls are considered as allegories or analogies of the trinity (*Logos* for the ancient world) the syllogism of Aristotle is powerless. "Adapted as it is to a universe of natures which it is able to analyze, it leaves us without the means to explore the secrets of a symbolic world such as that of the Augustinian tradition..." (page 320). Thus the nature of analogy in St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas is totally distinct and "sometimes the identical formulae (in) which they employ the principal term has scarcely ever the same significance" (page 235). St. Thomas alone reconciled grammar and dialectics: "To satisfy the demands of exemplarism it shows the dependence and the kinship which unite particular things to their eternal models; but to satisfy the demands of Aristotelian logic it separates the analogous from the univocal by a line of demarcation which may not be crossed" (page 235). The grammarian is concerned with connections; the dialectician, with divisions. Naturally, Plato was regarded as a friend by the grammarians, because of his figurative modes of statement. For a good example of the dialectician at work on language, see Abelard on Porphyry in McKeon's

l'occasion que ce texte suscite, et d'autre part, la spéculation théologique, ordonnée de soi à une systématisation indépendante de toute attache textuelle, comme à une élaboration intrinsèque de chacun des éléments proposés. Ce souci rationnel, plus ou moins actif, plus ou moins conscient surtout, chez les maîtres de 1200 à 1240, est très nettement exprimé par saint Thomas dans le prologue de sa *Somme*: ..."[15]

It is, then, in the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas that the new method matures, reflects critically upon its own procedure, observes the bearings, the extent, the limitations of itself, makes itself accountable to the *sacra pagina*, and thus comprehends the intention of patristic theology as well. St. Thomas opens his discussion with the grand question: *Utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia*. There is, however, nobody before or after him for whom the same claims can be made.[16] Before him patristic exegesis had comprised interpretation, freely expressed opinions, as well as incipient techniques of systematization. With Anselm and Abelard had come the beginning of a consistent application of dialectics; but there was no distinction made between the various dialectical functions: the hermeneutic, the apologetic, the polemic, and the theological.[17] In St. Thomas all these distinctions are observed, and the subalternation of all the sciences clearly defined in order to clarify the position of theology.[18]

The enormous mass of writing and speculation on theological and philosophical matters which occurred between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries is what is referred to when the scholastic culture of the Middle Ages is referred to. However, enough evidence has already been adduced to show that "scholastic culture" is abstracted from the Middle Ages when we so speak. It was only one aspect of the culture of those centuries, and was heartily opposed by the more typical patristic-classical culture which had long been in vogue and which suffered only a temporary eclipse from the dialecticians. From the beginning, therefore, the dialecticians met their real opposition within the Church itself; for there was much which smacked of suspicious novelty and idle curiosity about the dialecticians. Setting aside

Selections from Medieval Philosophers, I, page 213.

A grammatical exegetist like Hugh of St. Victor, therefore, expounds words and terms by elaborate analogies and allegories; for parabolic interpretation is authentically pragmatic, and the modern view that allegory is a product of medieval Scholasticism is the precise contrary of the facts. The modern distrust of allegory and parable is demonstrably rooted in the prevalence of the mathematical modes of abstraction which become general in the seventeenth century but is no less typical of Abelard and the dialecticians. It is the Cartesians who distrust fancy with its metaphors, allegories, and similes. Just as the grammarians distrusted abstraction, so the dialecticians contemned the concrete modes of language.

15. M.-D. Chénu, "La Théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle," pages 32–33. In the passage from his prologue St. Thomas rejects the method of Peter Lombard and establishes theology as a science in the full Aristotelian sense, as defined in the *Posterior Analytics* (*ibid.*, pages 57–58). Chénu offers a succinct account of the antecedent effort: "Au départ, dans un labeur encore fruste malgré la lente perfection acquise depuis le XIe siècle, un simple recueil de sentences, de *flores*, désormais ordonné et systématique,... Puis ... l'oeuvre abélardienne, oeuvre déjà critique, où le souci d'harmonisation par recours à la dialéctique, introduit avec soi un effort rationnel de mise au point, de discussion, de précision conceptuelle ... Pierre Lombard, jusqu'en son allure traditionaliste est un premier fruit de cet effort; mais son précieux recueil reste encore bien sommaire en fait d'argumentation, et les *Hic solet quaeri* ... provoqués de-ci de-là par les textes patristiques sont loin d'introduire vraiment ce qu'on appellera bientôt les *quaestiones* avec leur appareil dialectique" (page 31). He proceeds to point out numerous important dialecticians of the early thirteenth century and concludes: "Les *Sommes* de Guillaume d'Auxerre, de Philippe le Chancelier, et, de suite après eux, la série des Sententiares, achèvent en tout cas, dans l'ensemble et dans le détail de leur travail, cette oeuvre d'introduction de

the grammatical opposition, there was the official hostility of the hierarchy, as well as the opposition of the new religious orders. In 1231 pope Gregory IX repeated his interdiction against the forbidden books of Aristotle, and urged the reading of Priscian on the masters and students of theology at Paris, for disputation is odiously unchristian. In 1277 the matter came to a head with the Averroistic crisis. Historians are still ignorant of the true nature of this complex episode, but anti-Aristotelian sentiment was strong. St. Thomas himself was condemned.[19]

Within the Dominican order there were many devoted to the old theology, as Mandonnet has shown.[20] But the Franciscans were a much more formidable opposition. The group called the Spirituals within that order wished to adhere to the letter of St. Francis' rule. To them scholastic studies appeared to be diabolical frivolities.

After the Averroistic crisis of the later thirteenth century there arose at Paris the notorious conflicts among the Schoolmen which finally brought dialectics into universal disrepute. Just as soon as the scientific methods of the Schoolmen had brought order and precision into their subjects, it became obvious that there were three or four opposed and unreconcilable systems. As Gilson pointed out in his lectures, this explosive situation was worsened when the religious orders, in order to safeguard their unity, singled out an official theologian for each order. St. Thomas was given this title by the Dominicans in 1278–1279. Giles of Rome became the official theologian of the Augustinians in 1287. Duns Scotus almost immediately assumed the same position among the Franciscans. These alignments were much disrupted by William of Ockham, a Franciscan whose position was summarily described by Gilson as theological fideism linked to a metaphysical probabilism, itself based on an epistemological nominalism. The influence of this man, whose work is scarcely known even to experts today, was enormous. A group of his propositions was condemned by the University of Paris in 1339 and 1340, but without affecting the spread of Ockhamism.[21] In the matter of opposing Ockham the Thomists and Scotists were united; and there began that resounding warfare which reverberates throughout

la *ratio* et de son mécanisme dans l'explication et l'élaboration du révélé et des données patristiques. Et si Bacon se plaint, en 1267, que le goût des *quaestiones* ait fait abandonner depuis trente ans le *textus sacer*... c'est que son esprit obstinément retardataire n'avait pas compris la nécessité—et la légitimité—d'une évolution qui établissait efficacement, au coeur même de la *doctrina sacra*, ce facteur de progrès théologique, de 'science' théologique: la raison" (page 32).

16. It is an extraordinary fact that Erasmus at all times excludes St. Thomas from his general censure of dialecticians, even in *The Praise of Folly*.
17. Paré, Brunet, Tremblay, *op. cit.*, page 303. "The writers of the eleventh and twelfth centuries are divided between those who saw in reason and dialectic the source of all error and heresy, and those who saw in them the source of understanding and the one means of defense against error and heresy. The lines of the opposition may seem less sharp since even those who used dialectic and were suspected of excess in its use could be suspicious of its use by others: Lanfranc could be accused of an excess of dialectic in his commentaries on Paul, and could caution Anselm against dialectic; ..." [McKeon, "Renaissance and Method," page 59].
18. Chénu, *op. cit.*, page 62. In our own day, a notable effort to designate the subalternation of the sciences has been made by J. Maritain in *Les degrés du savoir*, Paris, 1935. A section of the *Summa Theologica* especially relevant to this study is article 10 of Part I: "Utrum Sacra Scriptura sub una littera habeat plures sensus." The order is first the statements of various important authorities on the point. Then the *conclusio* or position to be defended by disputation: "*Cum Sacrae Scripturae auctor Deus sit, qui omnia simul suo intellectu comprehendit, ea ipsa doctrina sub una littera plures sensus habet; litteralem multiplicem, spiritualem triplicem; videlicet allegoricum, moralem et anagogicum.*" [This is the form in which the passage is quoted in both the holograph and typescript versions of McLuhan's text. As such, its source cannot be identified. The passage of the *Summa Theologica* which

literature until the eighteenth century. The conventional view of the grammarians is expressed by Pope:

> Let subtle Schoolmen teach these friends to fight,
> More studious to divide than to unite.[22]

And here arose further uses of the terms "ancient" and "modern" which have confounded the unwary. To teach philosophy and theology after the manner of Thomas or Scotus was to follow the *Via Antiqua*; after the manner of Ockham, the Via Moderni. This distinction was made on the basis of the doctrine of the universals, since the realist position was thought of as traditional, whereas the nominalist or terminalist position was held to be novel. A further anomaly: the logic of Ockham was called the Old Logic because it dispensed with the recently recovered portions of Aristotle's *Organon*. The New Logic was taught by those of the *Via Antiqua*. When discussing the grammarians *vs.* the dialecticians, however, the entire group of Schoolmen are *moderni theologi*. The ancients are the patrists. This latter is the basic alignment for the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[23]

As though things weren't bad enough in 1473, Louis XI suddenly intervened decreeing that the doctrines of Aristotle and his commentator Averroes, of Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Alexander of Hales, Scotus, and other *Reales* should be taught in the Faculties of Arts and of Theology as being more profitable than that of the new doctors: Ockham, Gregory of Rimini, Buridan, Pierre d'Ailly, Marsile of Inghen, Adam Dorp, Albert of Saxony, and other *Nominales*.[24]

John Gerson, Chancellor of the University of Paris from 1395–1429, was typical of the state of mind induced by the confusion. After many attempts to bring order into the situation, he began to turn increasingly toward the practical problems of spirituality and of mystical life in the manner represented at the same time by Groot and many others. As Gilson summarized it in his lectures, the disease was a general confusion of the orders of knowledge, everybody using the mode of signification proper to

it purports to quote runs as follows: *Quia vero sensus litteralis est, quem auctor intendit, auctor autem sacrae Scripturae deus est, qui omnia simul suo intellectu comprehendit, non est inconveniens, ut dicit Augustinus XII confessionum, si etiam secundum sensum in una littera Scripturae plures sint sensus.*—ed.] There follows his dialectical proof of this position, after which the conflicting authorities are dealt with one by one.

19. In view of the endlessly repeated allegations of the humanists that the Aristotle of the Schoolmen was not the real Aristotle, it may be well to introduce expert contemporary opinion. The classical scholar, as such, is incompetent either to translate or to judge a translation of Aristotle, since it is not a question of translating words but of bringing to bear his total philosophy to the interpretation of a single term. Thus the word *imitation*, so crucial to an understanding of the *Poetics*, is meaningless outside the context of the *Metaphysics*, which treatise is presupposed in the reader of the *Poetics*. Thirteenth-century Latin was a better language for translating Aristotle than any we have today, because men had been philosophizing in Latin for many centuries. By the time of William of Moerbeke, contemporary of St. Thomas, the accretions and corruptions of the Arab text of Aristotle had been purged. Under the direct supervision of St. Thomas, William turned out a translation of the complete Aristotle which is today regarded as the best translation ever made. See J. Maritain, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, page 97. For Aristotle before the thirteenth century, see McKeon, "Renaissance and Method," pages 83ff. McKeon points out the reasons why "the philosophers of the thirteenth century had the information to discuss the philosophic positions of the Greeks, even that of Plato, at least as intelligently from a philosophical point of view as did their successors in the sixteenth century" (*ibid.*, page 45).
20. *Siger de Brabant*, Louvain, 1911, I, pages 33; 35–36.
21. Denifle and Chatelain, eds., *Chartularium*, II, pages 485; 505.
22. Pope, *Essay on Man*, II, ll. 81–82.

a certain order to signify what belongs in another order of reality. As epigraph to his *De Modis Significandi* (1426), Gerson put a text from St. Matthew: "Generatio mala et adultera signum quaerit: et signum non dabitur ei, nisi signum Jonae prophetae." The text was not only apt to his immediate subject but to the fatal conclusion of the disorders. To signify is to represent something by expressing it. When looking at his university, the Chancellor of Paris could see his masters of Grammar, whose proper order is that of congruity of speech, solving grammatical problems by means of Logic, whose proper order is that of truth or falsity in enunciation; but he could see also his masters of Logic, whose art is concerned with enunciation only, settling by the formal rules of logic the problems of Metaphysics, which does not deal with enunciations but with things; even worse, he could see all of them dealing with theological problems as though Scripture could be reduced to any single human mode of signification.[25]

There are too many men of unquestioned calibre, Petrus Tataretus and Johannes Major, in the later fifteenth century, to permit any blanket condemnation of even late Scholasticism. There were, moreover, many able thinkers whose extant writings no person of recent generations has ever examined. In fact, we know very much less about scholastic culture than the scholastics knew about classical culture; and historians of modern science have long been aware that complacency in this matter is fatal to an understanding of the developments of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century science. In general, however, it is true that the last of the Schoolmen were commenting too much and creating too little. They were writing philosophical treatises about philosophy instead of writing them about things.[26]

It is needless to cite texts to show how in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries men blamed the Schoolmen for having brought war and confusion into Europe by seeking victory rather than truth in their disputations.[27] But as an instance of how far one of these repentant Schoolmen was prepared to retract his position, Vives provides what was a moderate statement for his day in the *De Tradendis Disciplinis* (1532):

23. "The fourteenth century prepared in the writings of William of Ockham and of the Averroists for a transformation of philosophy which has been represented as a revolt against the whole tradition of philosophy of the Middle Ages.... Their revolt, they said, was against the doctrines of Aristotle; they returned to ancient sources, to Plato, to Augustine, Jerome, and the New Testament..." (McKeon, "Renaissance and Method," page 53).
24. Rénaudet, *Préréforme et humanisme*, page 92. Nominalism regained the ascendancy when in 1482 the king revoked his decree (page 3).
25. Vives, whose *De Causis Corruptarum Artium*, as well as his *De Tradendis Disciplinis*, represents serious efforts to bring order into the various knowledges, wrote: "The moderns confound the arts by reason of their resemblance, and of two that are very much opposed to each other make a single art. They call rhetoric grammar, and grammar rhetoric, because both treat of language." (quoted by J. E. Spingarn in his *History of Literary Criticism in the Renaissance*, page 313). The "moderns" are, of course, the dialecticians whose speculative grammars had brought about this confusion.
26. In his *Secretum* Petrarch set the style for much ensuing description: "This prattling of the Dialecticians will never come to an end; it throws up summaries and definitions like bubbles.... The best way of dealing with this brood, with their studied air of carelessness and empty curiosity, is to launch at their head some such invective as this, 'You wretched creatures, why this everlasting labour for nothing: this expense of wit on silly subtleties?... Heaven grant that your foolishness hurt no one but yourselves, and do as little harm as possible to the excellent minds and capacities of the young.'" Petrarch then has St. Augustine attack the dialecticians, somewhat incongruously; for St. Augustine was no foe of dialectics: "I agree that nothing half severe enough can be said of this monstrous perversion of learning" (*Secretum*, pages 29–30). Apropos of Milton's famous praise of Spenser as "a better teacher than Aquinas," Petrarch's discussion of practical vs. theoretical ethics is interesting

> Let me give warning, now, at the threshold, since human sinfulness has matured all over the world.... there is no need of greater sharpness of criticism, (but rather as it were of some blunting), not that men should become devoid of practical wisdom, but that they should develop more sincerity and simplicity, and for that very reason, become wiser, not more astute. Our life will become so much the more happy, the less it is strained by deceit and Sophism, the more like it becomes to the life of men of old, whose rectitude and simplicity of mind rendered them worthy of conversation with God.[28]

Vives is obviously yearning for the simplicity of the *philosophia Christi* as enjoyed by the Fathers. As a grammarian who saw the justification of study in the elucidation of scripture rather than human fame and power, he feared eloquence: "The heathen, in the last place, possesses every ornament, grace, elegance, and splendour of discourse.... For when men's care and thoughts are directed towards ambition or gain, only those things are pursued which bring money or glory" (pages 49–50). He then points to the Fathers "to show the impurity of the former and the excellence of ours, and by the comparison with darkness, make our light appear the brighter."[29]

One of the most notorious by-products of the war against the dialecticians, quite as famous as *The Praise of Folly* or *The Life of Gargantua*, was the *Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum*.[30] Since both the techniques of ridicule and the subject matter occur again in Nashe, it deserves to be mentioned here. The discussion of the subject by Mr. Stokes, useful in many ways, yet fails to show either the nature of the work or to account for its enormous success; since he is unaware of the postulates of those who conducted this attack on the Schoolmen of Cologne and Wittenberg. Herder seems to have understood the work better since he is quoted by Stokes as saying that it did more for Germany than *Hudibras* for England or *Gargantua* for France (p. lxviii). Pascal understood the work in its entirety, and used its technique of pseudo-revelation in the *Provincial Letters*. St. Thomas More, writing to Erasmus, greeted it with a cheer because he regarded it as a blow struck against

as showing that the position of a poet in the fourteenth century was identical with that of a poet in the seventeenth (*Secretum*, pages 99ff.). Aristotle and St. Thomas were, of course, taught in the English and European universities of the seventeenth century. In fact, all the major editions of the Schoolmen were turned out in the seventeenth century. See Gilson, *Les idées et les lettres*, pages 251–256. In Milton's *De Doctrina Christiana*, which Professor Kelley has shown to be a grammatical gloss or commentary on *Paradise Lost*, (*This Great Argument*, Princeton, 1941). Milton uses the phrase "scholastic barbarism" in the same sense as Petrarch. Defining and defending the grammatical method of interpreting Scripture, he says: "...What infatuation is it, that even Protestant divines persist in darkening the most momentous truths of religion by intricate metaphysical comments ... stringing together all the useless technicalities and distinctions of scholastic barbarism ..." (Book I, Ch. xxx, "Of The Holy Scriptures."). Milton's "humanistic" position is entirely that of the Ciceronian-Augustinian tradition.

27. See R. F. Jones, *Ancients and Moderns*, pages 34ff.
28. Foster Watson, *Vives On Education*, page 47. Vives is obviously pleading for intellectual disarmament. He doesn't question the value of dialectics in itself, but he argues that the world is too wicked to know how to employ this powerful and explosive weapon. Thus with the confidence born of the achievement of St. Thomas he is able to boast: "I have also sought to free the sciences from impious doubts, and to bring them out from their heathen darkness into the light of our faith. I shall show that the old writers were mistaken, not through the limitations of the human intellect, as some have thought, but by their own fault. Therefore I have produced my reasons from Nature, not out of divine oracles, so that I should not leap across from philosophy to theology" (page 7). Perhaps a little less optimistic than Bacon, he is yet in full agreement that natural science should contribute to higher ends: "The observation of Nature is so immense, so unlimited, that if anyone steeps himself in it, he will not attain what he desires, and will lose the whole fruit of his life's labour, unless he applies the knowledge which he

scholastic theology by the defenders of the old theology, represented by Colet, Erasmus, and Reuchlin:

> It is worth a good deal to see how greatly the *Epistolae obscurorum virorum* pleases everybody, the learned taking it as a joke, and the unlearned accepting it in all seriousness, who, while we are laughing, deem it is only the style we are laughing at, and while they do not defend it in that respect, declare that this is made up for by the importance of the sentiments expressed therein, and that in this rusty scabbard there hides a most excellent sword. I would that they had given another name to the book; for, indeed, not in a hundred years would men dull by inclination perceive the nose of the work were it even longer than that of a rhinoceros.[31]

Viewed in the main perspectives of the quarrel between the old and new theologies, the facts concerning the controversy as it concerned Reuchlin become perfectly intelligible, and provide the indispensable background for Rabelais, who came on the scene rather late.[32] The alignment of Reuchlin, Mirandola, Erasmus, Rabelais, More, and Agrippa in this business provides a useful approach to many problems facing the student of Nashe. The celebrated satire of Agrippa on human learning, from which Nashe drew so frequently, is pointless except it be seen against the background of a decadent scholasticism under attack by patristic theologians. The *De Incertitudine et Vanitate Scientiarum et Artium* has a very simple and consistent aim, as Agrippa tells us: "Our scornful magistrates will demand of me a recantation, and I shall be proscribed under the great seals of the world-supporting men of the Sorbonne; but I write this because I see men puffed up with human knowledge contemning the study of the Scriptures, and giving more heed to the maxims of philosophers than to the laws of God."[33] The *philosophia Christi* makes all human learning vain, especially dialectical theology: "Moreover, we find that a most detestable custom has invaded all or most schools of learning, to swear their disciples never to contradict Aristotle, Boethius, Thomas Aquinas, or whoever else may be their scholastic god..."[34] Agrippa,

has acquired in his studies either to the uses of life, or to the admiration and worship of his Creator" (page 47).

29. *ibid.*, page 50. Vives also feared the poets but thought of them as a diseased limb to be cured rather than amputated (page 128). His pages are full of the typical patristic views of profane literature which were current in the sixteenth century. Apropos of the great controversy of the roles of art and nature in poetry in which Nashe participated and in which Shakespeare was inevitably relegated to the camp of the untutored: "Perhaps someone will wonder whence comes this great admiration for them [poets] not only among the common people but even in the schools of those who follow after wisdom?... There is no human mind however silly and far removed from human instruction which has not received from nature certain germs of all arts.... So we find with our own poets, who compose poetry in the vernacular languages, and who, although we know them to be unlearned men, yet they insert into their poems such things as we, who know them, marvel that they should be able to include; and they easily persuade the ignorant and unlearned that they have pursued every branch of knowledge with long and deep study" (pages 129–130). For heroic poetry Vives admits an important ethical function, such as was claimed for the epic by Spenser, Sidney, Davenant, Milton, and Dryden (page 126).
30. Edited, with an introduction and translation by F. G. Stokes, London, 1925.
31. Mangan, *Life, Character, and Influence of Desiderius Erasmus*, II, page 305. Erasmus wrote to Lipsius: "When first the *Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum* appeared, it was received with great applause by the Franciscan and Dominican monks in Great Britain, who persuaded themselves that it had been written in all seriousness to abuse Reuchlin and to favor the monks; ..." (page 304).
32. Perhaps one sample of the *E. O. V.* will do: "There is one here who lectures on Valerius Maximus, but he pleased me not half as well as you pleased me when you lectured on Valerius Maximus at Cologne, for he merely expounded the text—but when you treated of 'The Neglect of Religion' or 'Dreams,' or

made a doctor in divinity at twenty-three for his lectures on the grammatical theology of Reuchlin, remained a theologian all his life. His fame as an alchemist or magician was well-founded, since his system of occult philosophy is identical with that of Plato, Philo, Augustine, and Bonaventure. His occult philosophy begins with words, and proceeds by the methods of grammatical exegesis, giving the most complete sixteenth-century statement of the traditional views.[35] Thus Agrippa's magic is a by-product of his theological interests, and his treatise on the subject was directly inspired by Reuchlin's grammatical studies.[36]

When Agrippa went to London, he cultivated Colet and was his guest, like Erasmus, and worked hard at the Epistles of St. Paul.[37] Soon afterwards, he was lecturing at Pavia, friendly to grammatical theology, where he expounded "the ancient theology" and assaulted the vain syllogisms of the monks.[38] The pattern of his life is simply the opposition of a thoroughgoing grammarian to the pagan Aristotle and of the monkish Schoolmen. However, his friends and supporters were nearly all monks, too, as with Erasmus.[39] This fact, like most of the facts of Agrippa's life, involves Morley in the sort of historicisms which have concealed the character of these controversies.[40]

Two matters related to the direct influence of Scholasticism remain to be mentioned. The first is the effect of the speculative grammars on the history of what we today call philology; and the second is the problem of estimating the effect of Scholasticism on what we have long called the humanities. Concerning the first, Paetow's summary statement is useful:

> A much more important change was effected by the influence of scholasticism which gradually transformed grammar into a speculative study. Instead of referring to examples from the best Latin literature to explain a doubtful point, the grammarians now preferred to solve the matters by the rules of logic. Priscian could not satisfy these new requirements. The situation is thus summed up in a gloss to one of the new text-books: "Since Priscian did not teach grammar by every possible means, the value of his

'Auspices,' you quoted Holy Scripture, that is to say the *Catena Aurea* of St. Thomas which is called the *Continuum*, and *Durandus*, and other shining lights of theology, ..." (page 381). Compare this with the conflicting modes of exegesis of Gargantua and the monk as applied to the famous prophetic riddle. Gargantua the grammarian finds that it signifies the progress and carrying on of the divine truth, whereas the monk with his scholastic method can only see in it a description of a set at tennis. The point of this last figure is explained by a New Englander attacking the Scholasticism of Harvard in the seventeenth century. The Bible, said Webster, is the sport of the dialecticians, "a tennis ball to be tossed and reverberated by their petulant wits and perverse reasons" (Perry Miller, *The New England Mind*, New York, page 114).

33. *ibid.*
34. Given by Henry Morley in *The Life of Henry Cornelius Agrippa*, London, 1856; II, page 153.
35. It need hardly be said that alchemy has its basis in grammatical physics. Many respectable scientists of the seventeenth century were convinced alchemists, including Boyle and Newton. See L.T. More, "Boyle as Alchemist" in *Journal of the History of Ideas* 2 (1941), pages 61–76. Morley provides a splendid resume of Agrippa's science: I, pages 63–76; 115–203. See pages 159–160 for the full doctrine of speech as not formed by chance but from above.
36. *ibid.* I, page 63. Hardin Craig, in *The Enchanted Glass*, says that: "No aspect of [George] Chapman's philosophy is more significant than its doctrine of expressiveness. Indeed, it seems a clue to the Renaissance love for drama and all expressive arts. Poets and artists heard the voice of all the world speaking to them, saw a universe written full of messages, and gave to speech itself a special significance. These things Chapman exploits. He wished to find all the meaning to be had in a world which itself was a message from God. In *Ovid's Banquet of Sense* Chapman describes the power of the eye to inflame the heart.... By remembering that each natural agent works but to the end of making what

> books is greatly diminished. Thus he gives many constructions without assigning reasons for them, relying solely on the authority of the ancient grammarians. Therefore, he should not teach, because those only should teach who give the causes for what they say."[41]

One result of this attitude was the appearance of two of the most influential texts ever written: the *Doctrinale* of Alexander of Villedieu and the *Graecismus* of Eberhard of Bethune.[42] After these came the speculative grammars. Let it not be supposed that the dialecticians failed to recognize the *sui generis* character of languages; but they also insisted that all human languages performed one and the same function in expressing the rational intentions of the human mind. *Grammatica speculativa* aimed to consider these problems which again today are in the forefront of linguistic study.[43]

The second matter, the influence of scholastic philosophy on the humanities, has been discussed by Gilson in his essays, "Humanisme médiévale et Renaissance," and "La scholastique et l'esprit classique."[44] It is necessary only to point to the main conclusions. First, if, as is generally agreed, St. Thomas and others restored the complete Aristotle to Europe, are we to deny Aristotle to have been an integral part of Greek humanism? If this disciple of Plato was truly representative of Greek culture, then there is a fallacy in the position of those who reproach the Middle Ages with having been at once ignorant of antiquity and dotingly fond of Aristotle (page 190). Although Gilson does not say so, this difficulty can only be removed by an historical analysis of the origins of this fallacy. Of course, the grammarians are responsible for it.

The Middle Ages never lost sight of the *ius naturale*, but St. Thomas fully restored the *Ethics* and the *Politics* of Aristotle. Without these works the Renaissance would have been much different from what it was. "La théorie du Magnifique est antérieure à Laurent le Magnifique, et c'est dans la Somme théologique qu'on la trouve.... Car la magnificence est force; elle domine les vices opposés qui retiennent le souverain d'agir selon son essence" (page 191). The tragedy was that the Italians were to sever these great moral

it works on like itself, one comprehends Chapman's important doctrine of persuasion. Rhetoric does not work persuasion but is a means to make it work." (page 179) This is to say that Chapman was a grammarian of the school of Agrippa, Mirandola, Bonaventure, and Cratylus. In large measure this is true of all humanists of the sixteenth century.

37. *ibid.*, I, pages 230; 303–304.
38. *ibid.*, pages 285–286; 299–303.
39. *ibid.*, II, page 43.
40. As for the satirical aspect of the *De Incertitudine*, its deliberately paradoxical form puts it in the same class as *The Praise of Folly* and the *Utopia*. Agrippa's amusingly ingenious treatise on the supremacy of women exhibits the full panoply of sophistical rhetoric so much relished by humanists. An especially interesting instance of this genre is Bishop Jewel's *Oration against Rhetoric*, delivered in Corpus Christi while he was professor of rhetoric. The traditional arguments against rhetoric are rehearsed and capped with praise of Scotus, who thrived "when Cicero, neglected and scorned, lay in mould and darkness." (Trans., with Introd. by Hoyt Hudson in *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 14. (1928), pages 324–392.)
41. Paetow, *op. cit.*, page 35. [Paetow's quotation is taken from Wrobel, *Eberhardi Bethuniensis Graecismus*, Praefatio, ix. –ed.]
42. *ibid.*, page 38.
43. The Reader of Horne Tooke's *Diversions of Purley* (second ed., two vols., London, 1829) will recognize in him one of the true sons of Ockham and *Grammatica speculativa*. From his numerous footnotes one can almost construct a history of the subject from Thomas of Erfurt, whose *De Modis Significandi* was still ascribed in Tooke's day to Duns Scotus, down to Bacon, Urquhart, James Harris, and Condillac. It is not hard to continue the history through J. W. Donaldson (*The New Cratylus*, London, 1850) to

conceptions from their supernatural sanctions (page 192).

Then what of classicism as it came to be defined in France of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries? Classicism, said Taine, is *l'esprit abstrait*. It is the spirit of Scholasticism misapplied, says Gilson. Confronted with the rich diversity of French literature, it seeks a formula (page 248). To *l'esprit classique* it opposes *l'esprit gaulois* and leans back satisfied. Why do Taine and his fellow historians, gaily irresponsible in the presence of profound and concrete realities, never seek for the sources of this *esprit classique?* Because for them the classical spirit is the modern spirit: "C'est essentiellement une manifestation littéraire de l'esprit rationaliste et cartésien; c'est donc, en fin de compte, la négation de tout un passé, qui ne valait d'ailleurs pas mieux, mais qui, en étant l'antithèse, ne saurait aucunement servir à l'expliquer" (page 249).

Gilson proceeds to show that Descartes thought like his contemporaries because he received at college the same scholastic and Aristotelian education as they.[45] He shows how the problem of Aristotle's *Poetics* fits into this background. The imitation of nature in this milieu means to observe and record the internal principles of the operation of a being rather than its outward manifestations (page 259).

Thanks to this abstracting spirit of generations of historians of literature, not only of French but of Italian, Spanish, and English literature, and thanks to a blind trust in "the modern spirit" as a solvent for the problems of explaining the diversity of the literary past, the real questions remain untouched.[46]

Ogden and Richards. Donaldson, though shying away from the extreme nominalism of Hobbes and Tooke, hails Ockham as the father of modern philology "...he showed ... that words are the instruments of reasoning, not objects of science" (page 24), as they were for Plato in the *Cratylus* and for the ancient grammarians. Ockham's *Summa totius logicae*, says Donaldson, is "as sound a treatise on the philosophy of syntax as any which has come to our knowledge" (*ibid.*).

Donaldson is right about the great influence of Ockham, though he has the vaguest notions about how that influence came about. Prantl is clearer (*Geschicte der Logik*, Leipzig, 1867, vol. III). He shows (page 73) how the grammatized logic or logicized grammar which was developed by the dialecticians at the end of the thirteenth century dealt with the nexus between grammatical forms and thought forms. Most important as representing this new art was the influential *Summulae logicales* of Petrus Hispanus. Thus was prepared the ground for the nominalist or terminalist views of Ockham. See also Martin Grabman, *Die Entwicklung der Mittelalterlichen Sprachlogik*, Munich, 1936, page 117. The standard history of this subject is Charles Thurot's *Notices et extraits de divers manuscrits latins pour servir à l'histoire des doctrines grammaticales du moyen âge*, Paris, 1868. One obvious result of these developments was that grammar and rhetoric were assimilated as branches of dialectics. Logic included the entire trivium. These were bad days for the classical grammarians and they did not fail of their revenge.

44. *Les idées et les lettres*, pages 171–196; 243–261.
45. In 1664 Boileau designated the pedant as one who:

    Croit qu'un livre fait tout, et que, sans Aristote,
    La raison ne voit goutte, et le bon sens radote. (*Satire* IV, ll. 9–10)

    The pedant retains the lineaments of the medieval dialectician.

3B

184

46. The difficulties and confusions inevitable in any account of Renaissance controversies which does not go far behind the Renaissance are fully apparent in Perry Miller's fascinating book on *The New England Mind.* Miller is aware of two powerful influences on the New Englander of the seventeenth century: St. Augustine and Peter Ramus. Not perceiving these influences in their historical development, he is, nevertheless, able to exhibit their force by a mass of evidence. If the alleged "empirical spirit" of the English mind is not unrelated to Ockham, on the one hand, and patristic theology, on the other, pragmatism, both in theory and practice, is a direct product of the Ramistic divines of Harvard and Yale who boldly substituted "technologia" for metaphysics as early as the seventeenth century (Miller, page 175). William James and John Dewey are legitimate by-products of Puritan theology in quite as full a sense as are *The Scarlet Letter* and *The Turn of the Screw.*

Miller's account of the influence of Ramism is the best so far, and is sufficient to enable us to see how for Puritan divines every form of literary expression was subordinate to, and organized according to, the modes of dialectics, and not only in New England (pages 119; 132; 145; 205; 345).

CHAPTER THREE

C. RHETORIC

THE TRIVIUM FROM ABELARD TO ERASMUS



With McLuhan's history of the trivium drawing to a close, his ideal of working in the broadest possible perspective comes within reach. It informs his commentary and invites the reader to adopt the same perspective. He explains that even though grammar and rhetoric joined forces "against the barbarous subtleties and vermiculate divisions of the dialecticians," there was a long-standing dispute between grammar and rhetoric. This is relevant to both literary issues (the opposition between poetry and rhetoric is fictitious and vanishes when full definitions of grammar and rhetoric are kept in view) and theological questions (inexhaustible literal meaning in the patristic view versus multiple meanings cancelled by rhetorical functions in the Calvinist view is a parti pris *opposition that cannot be reconciled).*

It was John of Salisbury who turned the ancient Stoic use of etymology for philosophical and scientific purposes (grammar) toward rhetoric, urging the study of the origins and nature of things to increase understanding of words. This, as McLuhan observes, was a restoration of the "full status of the Ciceronian position," in which eloquence was a virtue and inseparable from wisdom, but rhetoric declined into empty verbiage once philosophy and rhetoric were separated.

Commentary on authors here is systematically related to the framework of the trivium that has been developed: Playfere's style is ascribed to the dominance of patristic exegesis; Bacon's Essays or Counsels Civil and Moral *are described as being founded on the colors of good and evil (see page 193); Hamlet's paralyzing circumspection is considered in relation to the rhetorical concept of civil prudence in the ideal prince; Machiavelli is characterized as consciously anti-Ciceronian.*

As for Nashe, his rhetoric is said to be, like Bacon's, inseparable from its moral aim and inseparable from the notion of colors of good and evil. Quotation of passages from Nashe begin here in anticipation of the following section of the work.

McLuhan continues to outline the work still to be done by literary scholars willing to apply the appropriate distinctions between grammar and rhetoric.

The mention of the impoverished view of rhetoric as "merely stylistic embellishment," a view that conveniently supports dismissive criticism of Nashe, is McLuhan's lead in to the concluding section of this work and the intensive scrutiny it will give to Nashe's writings.

And in a rare annotation to the holograph manuscript of this work in McLuhan's own hand, dating from the period when he was giving full attention to media ecology, he ponders the connection between features of rhetoric and the phenomenon of the characteristic flip between figure and ground in the operation of media.

—(Editor)

An interesting yet typical view of eloquence as a necessary art and practical virtue is given by Vincent of Beauvais (d. 1262) in his *Speculum Doctrinale*. Like Francis Bacon after him, he is ordering the arts with regard to their function for the relief of man's fallen estate. The principal evils of the fall are ignorance, concupiscence, and death. Three remedies are needed to combat these evils: Wisdom, Virtue, and Need:

> For the obtaining of these three remedies every art and every *disciplina* was invented. In order to gain Wisdom, *Theorica* was devised; and *Practica* for the sake of Virtue; and for Need's sake, *Mechanica*.... For the end and aim of all human actions and studies, which reason regulates, ought to look either to the reparation of the integrity of our nature or to alleviating the needs to which life is subjected.... Last found of all is Logic, source of eloquence, through which the wise who understand the aforesaid principal sciences and disciplines, may discourse upon them more correctly, truly and elegantly; more correctly, through Grammar; more truly, through Dialectic; more elegantly, through Rhetoric.[1]

Vincent, like John of Salisbury and the ancient Stoics, extends the term Logic to include all the arts connected with speech. In this extensive but lucid order of the encyclopedia of the arts, Cicero's ideal stands out very sharply. Eloquence, which implies wisdom, is a principal means by which the integrity of our nature is achieved once more, for eloquence operates on the passions of men via the imagination, controlling men for a common social good. Thus eloquence and political prudence are inseparable concepts for Cicero, for John of Salisbury, for Vincent of Beauvais and for Francis Bacon, to mention only a few.[2]

Introducing John of Salisbury, Taylor says: "Classical studies reached their zenith in the twelfth century. For in every way that century surpassed its predecessors; and in classical studies it excelled the thirteenth, which devoted to them a smaller portion of its intellectual energies" (11, page 143). John of Salisbury was a man of affairs, for whom, as for Cicero, letters were

1. Taylor, *The Mediaeval Mind*, II, pages 350–351.
2. Bacon's unity of Policy and Eloquence is everywhere in his works. For a passage almost identical with Vincent's on the function of rhetoric for the relief of man's estate see *The Advancement*: "...it is eloquence that prevaileth in an active life.... The duty and office of rhetoric is, to apply reason to imagination for the better moving of the will" (Everyman, page 146). See also *Works*, *op. cit.*, IV, pages 287–288; 373; V, pages 16; 75.

   In 1553 Thomas Wilson wrote a preface to *The Arte of Rhetorique* which carries the caption: "Eloquence first given by God, and after lost by man, and last repayred by God againe" (ed. G. H. Mair, Oxford, 1909, A vi[v]). His view is indirectly Ciceronian but directly patristic, and represented the commonly received opinion about the importance of eloquence in society. After the Fall "Whereas men lived brutishly in open feeldes ... God called them together by utterance of speech ..." (A vii).

   It seems not to have been noticed that Prospero and Caliban are very literal expressions of these conventional views: Caliban of fallen man in the brutish sub-vocal condition, and Prospero of the scholar-prince, the *doctus orator* of Cicero, the man of civic wisdom and eloquent prudence whose mastery of the arts has given him the power of white magic as discussed by Agrippa and Bacon:

   > And Prospero the prime duke, being so reputed
   > In dignity, and for the liberal arts
   > Without a parallel; those being all my study,
   > The government I cast upon my brother
   > And to my state grew stranger, being transported
   > And rapt in secret studies. (I ii, 72–77)

   Prospero says to Caliban:

a solace rather than an occupation. "Believe one who has tried it," he writes, "that all the sweets of the world, compared with these exercises, are wormwood" (*ibid.*, page 141). Not only does he seem to have a ready knowledge of all Latin literature, but he is the master of a style both easy and elegant.

John's attitude towards the dialecticians has already been discussed. What it is necessary to say here is that his *Metalogicus* is the principal contribution to the cause of Ciceronian eloquence before Petrarch.[3] Logic is understood as "logos," reason and speech, so that John treats the whole trivium under the head of logic (I, 10, 13). In chapter eleven of the first book, he defines art: "An art is a method which in a short time develops the ability to do things which are naturally possible." He develops the position conventionally: "Thus nature is the font of all the arts, since by its presence it brings about the practice and exercise of talent, which in turn produce art." It is the familiar position stated in *The Winter's Tale*:

> Yet Nature is made better by no mean
> But nature makes that mean; so, o'er that art
> Which, you say, adds to nature, is an art
> That nature makes. (IV, iii)

Appealing to antiquity as having achieved wisdom by means of the cycle of the arts, John points out that by means of the arts we achieve an exegesis of books and of nature: "to lift the mind to a knowledge of all things, and to be capable of resolving the knotty points of all possible problems" (I, 12). John gives a curious twist to the old Stoic use of etymology as a means to philosophical and scientific knowledge. Where grammar had been for them an instrument of science, John says let us study the origins and nature of things in order that we may "have a more ready understanding of words" (I, 7). He brings in this point, significantly, in order to show the inseparable character of wisdom and eloquence. He reconstitutes the full status of the Ciceronian position in order to defend eloquence against those who "maintain that the precepts of eloquence are unnecessary since

> I pitied thee
> Took pains to make thee speak, taught thee each hour
> One thing or other: when thou didst not, savage,
> Know thy own meaning, but wouldst gabble like
> A thing most brutish, I endow'd thy purposes
> With words that made them known. (I ii, 353–358)

Thus men became instead "of beastes, men: such force hath the tongue, and such is the power of Eloquence and reason ... And therefore the Poets doe feine, that Hercules beeing a man of great wisdome, had all men lincked together by the eares in a chaine ... For his witte was so great, his tongue so eloquent, and his experience such, that no one man was able to withstande his reason ..." [*loc. cit.*]. Though men are infirm: "I thinke in this one poinct they passe all other creatures living, that have the gift of speech and reason. And among all other, I thinke him most worthie fame, and amongst all men to be taken for halfe a God: that therein doth chiefly and above all other excell men, wherein men do excell beastes" [A vii^{v}].

Quintilian, discussing all the current definitions of eloquence, notes how Cicero identified eloquence, politics, and philosophy. Not disagreeing, but taking slightly different ground, Quintilian adds: "The definition which best suits its real character is that which makes rhetoric the science of speaking well. For this definition includes all the virtues of oratory and the character of the orator as well, since no man can speak well who is not good himself. [II, xv, 33–34]. This Stoic conception is basic to medieval and Renaissance thought about speech. The patristic modifications in no way impaired the doctrine.

3. C. S. Baldwin's *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic* gives the evidence that "no other medieval writer gave this work [Quintilian's] more attention" [pages 169–170].

eloquence is naturally either present or absent" (1, 7). Eloquence is given the status of a virtue: "In the rank of things to be desired, virtue and wisdom which ... differ more in word than in meaning, hold the primacy. Eloquence claims the second place for itself"(1, 7). There follows the Stoic doctrine, so strongly entrenched in the patristic position: "If therefore, the dignity of man excells the nature of other living things by the reason of the use of speech and the rational faculty, what is more universally useful, what more effective in obtaining renown, than to excell those who share our nature in the one endowment by which man surpasses other creatures?" (1, 7).

Like Cicero, John subordinates dialectics to eloquence, since logic is a mere handmaid to wisdom and eloquence. However, it is also very necessary to eloquence (1, 10). But that is no excuse for spending too much time on it. Dialectics can only serve the wise man to the extent of his wisdom. It cannot make him wise or learned (11, 9). Those who rest in the subject seem only to care to criticize and dispute, and end not by finding truth but in creating new errors (11, 7). The true knowledge which it befits the wise man to seek is knowledge of himself. When, therefore, John asks who are the truly wise and eloquent philosophers, he answers, those of the Academy, and especially Cicero (*Policraticus*, VII, 2). Was it not Cicero's eloquent wisdom in the *Hortensius* which gave St. Augustine to the Church? Cicero and the academicians with their strong emphasis on virtue as the way to happiness, strongly appealed to many Christians who distrusted systematic philosophy and theology.[4] The intellectual pride of the schoolmen was often contrasted with the pagan simplicity of Cicero. In turning to practical virtue and eloquence, many Christians felt that they were, like the grammatical theologians, returning to the primitive truth of the Fathers and the early Church. We shall not be surprised, therefore, to find rhetoric, quite as much as grammar, arrayed against the barbarous subtleties and vermiculate divisions of the dialecticians. Some humanists were opposed to the Schoolmen strictly on the grounds of theology. Others were equally hostile because they felt that the scholastic contempt for eloquence had brought man lower in the scale. If man was to rise above the brutes and to manage

4. John treats this question in the seventh book of the *Policraticus*, bracketing Cicero and St. Augustine. [Pike, *op. cit.*, page 221. See also pages 243ff. for [John's] Ciceronian ideal of erudition.] Noting the influences on Erasmus' *Education of a Christian Prince*, L. K. Born says: "The conclusion, to state the obvious, can only be that the Academic and Stoic schools exerted tremendous weight upon the views of Erasmus" (page 98). Born is not aware of the Ciceronian-Augustinian tradition which explains this "tremendous weight" without any supposition of Erasmus having discovered a personal preference for this portion of antiquity.

his political life to advantage, how could this be done save by eloquence? Frequently these positions are tacitly combined in one man. Milton is a notable instance.[5]

It does not follow, however, that a humanist like Erasmus approved the rhetorical program of a Poggio or a Valla. The seeming anomaly of humanist Churchmen quarreling with humanist rhetoricians is often a part of an age-old dispute between grammar and rhetoric even when both are arrayed against dialectics. This helps to explain many a tangled portion of sixteenth-century cultural history. It explains, for example, how a man like Bacon could place rhetoric above poetry; for eloquence is civil prudence and conduces directly to the relief of man's fallen estate. It is the great practical force for the government of men in society.[6]

It also explains the grounds of many exegetical disputes; for Calvinists flatly rejected traditional grammatica as a mode of exegesis and resorted to rhetorical exegesis. This ought to be the basis of a separate study, and a much-needed one. Thus Lancelot Andrewes, a patristic grammarian, attacks rhetorical exegesis: "Take not a figure and make of it a plaine speech; Seeke not to be saved by Synecdoche."[7] Since the grammarians traditionally considered the various levels of interpretation, and held that the literal sense intended by the author of Scripture is essentially inexhaustible, the Calvinists deliberately turned to rhetoric as the mode of exegesis. From this rhetorical point of view the Holy Ghost intended nothing more than persuasion by the use of figurative expressions. The figures of Scripture were viewed as elocution or ornament of a plain statement. Reduced to its plain sense, a passage of scripture must then be submitted to dialectical reasoning. Rhetorical exegesis was thus a mere preliminary to scholastic dialectical method among the Calvinists:

> Rhetoric was a tool with which Puritans could plane off the colors of speech from Scriptural utterances, leaving the smooth white surface of "that one entire and naturall sense." The intention of the parables, for instance, was "to explicate and clear up a Truth to the understanding by the

5. Milton's patristic affiliations and his grammatical concept of scriptural exegesis are parallel with his Ciceronian concept of the poet. The poet's function is "to imbreed and cherish in a great people the seeds of virtue and public civility, ..." (Willey, *The Seventeenth Century Background*, page 223). Hence he must be a man of vast erudition and of practical experience in public affairs. As thorough-going Ciceronians both Bacon's and Milton's careers in public service ought to be seen, not as aberrations, but as part of their deliberate program of self-education.
6. Bacon discusses poetry, approving the heroical poem as "truly noble" (*Works*, IV, pages 314-318). Bacon, of course, assumes that the poet will also avail himself of all the resources of rhetoric. Rhetoric, or eloquence, at any rate, is nobler than poetry if only because of its nobler function in the commonwealth. Considering moral and civil philosophy, "man either segregate or congregate and in society," Bacon most significantly repeats the warning of Cicero that all the special sciences "become barren, shallow, and erroneous" unless referred to moral and social man: "So we see Cicero the orator complaining of Socrates and his school, that he was the first who separated philosophy and rhetoric; whereupon rhetoric became an empty and verbal art" (*Works*, IV, page 373). This warning of the separation of head and heart which Cicero uttered is also repeated by the thoroughly Ciceronian Ascham in urging the care of both words and matter in *The Scholemaster* (ed. J. E. B. Mayor, page 181).

In his preface to *The Battle of the Books*, Swift speaks of wit unaided by erudition as "a brain that will endure but one scumming.... Wit, without knowledge, being a sort of dream, which gathers in a night to the top, ..." (*Works*, II, page 384). Again in *The Tale of a Tub*, it is clear that his foes, the moderns, are the dialecticians who profess to dispense with learning in favor of natural acuteness and method. Swift writes precisely as does John of Salisbury in attacking the Cornificiani, or Hooker in scorning the compendious short-cuts to learning of Ramus: "... We of this age have discovered a shorter, and a more prudent method, to become scholars, and wits, without the fatigue of reading

help of the senses," to appeal to the sensible faculties by means "of sensible things, such as are obvious to our eyes, ears, *etc.* and so lead us to a conception of spiritual things," but the minister's task when preaching upon them amounted to what might be called unscrambling them, to give "the Reddition or Interpretation of them," thereby to bring "more light to mens understandings." Talon's rhetoric, in other words, was a godsend to men who professed to believe in literal interpretation of the Bible,...: "Must wee actually sell all, taking up a Gibbet daily, lend freely, looking for nothing againe, turne the other cheeke to him which smiteth one, plucke out our eyes, cut off right hands, etc.?" Fortunately we need not, for rhetoric makes us understand that these expressions are figurative, conveying an abstract truth that is much less incommodious.[8]

Apart from exegesis, the influence of rhetoric is necessarily bound up with moral and political education, with preaching, and with the forms of secular literature.[9] Leaving the last to be considered in connection with Nashe, it may be convenient to indicate briefly the outlines of the other two.

Roger Bacon's demonstration in the *Opus Majus* that practical science is moral and civil science, although Senecan in bias, strongly supports the Ciceronian position of John of Salisbury:

> I have shown in the preceding parts that the knowledge of languages, and mathematics, and perspective as well as experimental science are extremely useful and particularly necessary in the pursuit of wisdom.... Now I wish likewise to go over the roots of the fourth science which is better and more noble than all those previously mentioned; and it is the practical one among them all, that is, the operative one, and it consists of our actions in this life and in the other life. In fact, all other sciences are called speculative. For although certain of them are active and operative, nevertheless, they are concerned with artificial and natural actions, not with moral actions, and they consider the truths of things and of scientific activities which have reference to the speculative intellect, and they are not related

or thinking" [*ibid.*, page 306]. Swift is entirely Ciceronian in his conviction that wisdom, erudition, and eloquence are one. Much more complex is the relation in which these traditional notions stood to his patristic position. A wholly new study of Swift is needed.

7. Cited by W. F. Mitchell in his *English Pulpit Oratory from Andrewes to Tillotson*, London, pages 159–160. Mitchell's work is full of useful material. The confusion of his book is owing to the absence of any previous work to assist him. Read in the perspectives of the present study, the materials of his work assume an order and importance which he seems not even to have suspected in them. Typical of the basic confusions which must necessarily arise in such studies which have not considered the long rivalries between grammar, dialectics, and rhetoric, is Mitchell's failure to distinguish between grammatical and dialectical modes of exegesis. (See, for example, pages 138; 144–145; 185.) It can almost be taken for a rule that, where Pliny is admitted for any purpose, the preacher is using grammatical exegesis in its patristic mode. Donne used both grammar and dialectics; but nearly everything in his sermons which has been called "metaphysical" is really grammatical exegesis. For evidence of this in Mitchell's own citations from patristic types of sermons, Donne's, as well as others, see pages 88; 114; 118; 120–121; 125; 137–138; 139–140;141; 162; 165; 171; 174; 189–193; 201; 225; 228; 232; 236; 246; 279ff. Elaborate conceits usually prove to be directly based on patristic exegesis, as for example Playfere's (Mitchell, page 171). Thus, there is nothing anomalous in Bishop Fisher's having used elaborate conceits a century earlier, for he, too, was a great patristic scholar. St. John Fisher cannot be accused of frivolity in introducing an allegory of four pages in which Christ's crucified body is compared to a book (*ibid.*, page 170). As already pointed out, the whole of baroque art rests on patristic exegesis.
8. Miller, *The New England Mind*, page 343. This, of course, explains the numerous rhetorics from Fenner's *Artes of Logicke and Rhethorike* to Smith's *Mysterie of Rhetorick Unveil'd* or Hall's *Centuria Sacra*, which offered a "Synopsis or Compendium of all the most materiall Tropes and Figures

> to things pertaining to the practical intellect; and it is called practical because it directs *praxis*, that is, the operation of good and evil ... because of the chief operations of man which are related to virtues and vices, and to the felicity and misery of the other life.[10]

Perhaps the most expeditious way of illustrating the powerful continuity of the Ciceronian concept of eloquent wisdom is simply to point to the long tradition of statesmen's manuals. Many of these are cited by L. K. Born in his useful introduction to his translation of Erasmus' *Education of a Christian Prince*. "That there is a continuous line of succession at least from the time of Isocrates with his *Ad Nicoclem* to the twentieth century is beyond question" (page 99). Unfortunately, Born has not seen that the Ciceronian-Augustinian concept of the *doctus orator* is what really gives consistency to the tradition. Thus Plato and Aristotle, on whom he fruitlessly dwells, have really no place in the central discussion, while Machiavelli is consciously antipodal to the tradition. No better evidence both of Machiavelli's full

---

contained in the Scriptures." A special study is needed to show how Calvinist exegesis in England was quite as effective in advancing the study of rhetoric as secular ambition. The Elizabethan passion for schemes and tropes was not merely profane. As Smith put it, "... the ignorance of Rhetorique is one ground (yea, and a great one) of many dangerous Errors this day." For, "all Science, and particularly, Rhetorique, where it is reduced to a blessed subordination and conformity to the teachings of the Spirit of Truth, is a good gift of God, proceeding from the Father of lights, and very conducent to the unfolding and right understanding of the Figurative and Tropical Elegancies of the blessed Book, which abounds with most excellent and divinest eloquence" (Miller, page 311). The Puritan passion for rhetoric helps to explain how for the wits of the Restoration schemes and tropes were associated with barbarism and enthusiasm. However, the Puritans, for the most part, cultivated rhetorical exegesis intensely while studiously preaching in the plain style. (See Miller, pages 331f.) The elaborate anaphoras of Donne's sermons Puritans branded as sensual eloquence: "It was, obviously, impossible to be a Ramist and still preach like John Donne; to English Puritans it seemed impossible, once they had become Ramists, to preach otherwise than in doctrines, reasons, and uses" (Miller, page 345).

Miller's treatment of Ramus is inconclusive, but at least he presents, for the first time, a series of texts bearing on his extraordinary influence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (pages 114–174; 201–330). Nothing conclusive can be done with Ramus until his Ockhamist antecedents have been fully investigated. The vogue of Ramus was prepared by Ockham. Miller is so little qualified in this respect that he supposes the Aristotelians to be nominalists and the Ramists to be realists (page 146). McKeon has shown the right lines of investigation ("Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," pages 30–31): "The tradition in which rhetoric dominated the arts continued into the Renaissance not only in the methods and doctrines of theology, but in a secular tradition which took one of two forms: either all philosophy and all subjects are assimilated to rhetoric, as in the doctrines of Majoragius and Nizolius, or the method of discovery is refurbished and transferred from rhetoric to revitalize and revolutionize dialectic, as in the doctrines of Rudolf Agricola and Petrus Ramus." What happened, in effect, was that Agricola and Ramus destroyed traditional logic in the name of Ockham, and destroyed traditional rhetoric for the sake of dialectics. Rhetorical invention and disposition (the first two parts of rhetoric) were modified and made the basis of dialectics or the reformed "logic." All that was left to rhetoric was elocution and delivery. They argued with Agricola that all previous rhetoric and dialectic had been corrupted by the historical accident that civil philosophy had come to maturity in Greece before the other arts. (See Agricola's *De inventione Dialectica*, Bk. II, chap. 18, Cologne, 1538; pages 538ff.) Thus Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and Boethius had all got off on the wrong foot by giving to rhetoric (civil philosophy) the things that belonged to dialectics. Ramus professed to make dialectics truly useful, and to remove it from all the vain subtleties of Aristotle, by referring it to its natural origins in the ordinary, daily processes of learning and speaking: "From this line of reasoning Ramus reached another of his distinctive conclusions: if logic makes deliberate what is natural in the intellect, then the productions of the best natural intellects, of the great poets, orators, and historians of classical antiquity, must be unerring exemplifications of the use of logic" (Miller, page 145). Hence it was that Abraham Fraunce illustrated his *Lawiers Logicke* (1588) from *The Shepheardes Calender* (W. G. Crane, *Wit and Rhetoric in the Renaissance*, page 56). "Reade Homer," he said, "reade Demosthenes, reade Virgill, reade Cicero, reade Bartas, reade Torquato Tasso, reade that most worthie ornament of our English tongue, the Countesse of Pembrookes Arcadia, and therein see the true effectes of natural Logicke which is the ground of artificiall" (Miller, pages 145–146). These doctrines had not only the greatest consequences in theology and philosophy, but profoundly influenced the forms and themes of English literature. For example, the complete severance of style and matter in the Ramist rhetoric was a directly contributing influence in bringing about that deliberate impoverishment of poetic imagery

knowledge of the Ciceronian tradition and his deliberate flouting of it could be found than in the *Contre-Machiavel* of Gentillet (trans. by Simon Patericke, London, 1577), who sets forth the traditional princely ideal of education based on morality and eloquent wisdom.[11] The Machiavellians despised civic or public eloquence and favored the cryptic or curt style which M. W. Croll has studied for us. Thus, the stylistic disputes of Ramus and Nashe, as will be shown, are based on the most radical opposition of views.[12]

The treatises which Woodward published under the title *Vittorino da Feltre and Other Humanist Educators* (Cambridge, 1921) all contribute to the picture of the Ciceronian ideal of eloquence. Vittorino and the other successors of Petrarch are patristic to a man. The Fathers certify their Ciceronianism and usually modify it considerably: "The purely imitative treatment of Cicero was not the aim of Barzizza and of the scholars whom he typifies, such as Zabarella, Vergerio, and Vittorino. In the widest sense, these men set before themselves the reconciliation of the ancient learning with the Christian life,

after the Restoration. It cooperated with Cartesian innatism to render imaginative or phantasmal experience frivolous at best.

9. McKeon points to further influence: "The tradition in which rhetoric had become a discipline of words, independent alike of philosophy and dialectic,... laid the foundations for many of the early theories in physics and mathematics, and symbolic logic, though unconcerned with its past, still repeats the elements of this heritage;... and political philosophy has never entirely lost the rhetorical turn from which its theories derived their modern concreteness and practicality" ("Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," page 31).
10. McKeon's *Selections*, II, pages 81–82. Roger Bacon here perfectly expresses the views of Francis Bacon. Bacon's *Essays or Counsels Civil and Moral* are entirely built up on the colours of good and evil. In the third chapter of the sixth book of the *De Augmentis* concerning "the foundations and office of rhetoric" Bacon treats of these colours in a way which is directly pertinent to an understanding of his essays (*Works*, IV, pages 454ff.). In *The Advancement* he calls rhetoric the art of arts (Everyman, page 66) since: "So Salomon saith, Sapiens corde appelabitur prudens, sed dulcis eloquio majora reperiet; signifying that profoundness of wisdom will help a man to a name or admiration, but that it is eloquence that prevaileth in active life" (Everyman, page 146). The important point to recognize is that this view of the matter was uninterruptedly current from Isocrates to Francis Bacon. Bacon often seems to state his positions confusedly as a result of being embarrassed by their lack of novelty.
11. See Patericke's translation, ed. 1608, pages 1; 12–13; 34; 189–190; 240–242; 309; 366. [In the holograph manuscript this note continues as follows—ed.] Gentillet defends the Fathers and the medieval Church against Machiavelli's charge of enmity to literature (page 112).
12. Born offers no insights into these matters, and fails to see how Rabelais' *Gargantua* is both a blow at the dialecticians and a defense of the Ciceronian concept of princely education. More's *Utopia* really belongs in the same tradition quite as much as Elyot's *Governour*, Castiglione's *Courtier*, Ascham's *Scholemaster*, or Spenser's *Faerie Queene*. In this connection, almost the whole of Ruth Kelso's *Doctrine of the English Gentleman in the Sixteenth Century* is relevant to a perspective of the Ciceronian tradition.

    Born, however, in tracing the history of the princely manuals, unconsciously attests to the integrity of the encyclopedic tradition. Isidore of Seville and Alcuin contributed to this literature (pages 102–104). Peter Damian and John of Salisbury were notable representatives (pages 109–114). And the *De Eruditione Filiorum Nobilium* of Vincent of Beauvais is a classic instance (ed. by A. Steiner, Cambridge, Mass, 1938).

thought and polity of their own day; they had no dream of a dead reproduction of the past."[13] Nothing is more indicative of the patristic sympathies of Vittorino than his aversion to dialectics except as an incidental preparation for rhetoric (page 60). Likewise Aeneas Sylvius warns us to "beware of logicians who waste time and ingenuity in verbal subtleties, in whose hands logic is a thing not of living use but of intellectual death. You will remember that Cicero reproached Sextus Pompey for too great devotion to Geometry, and affirmed that far too much time was spent in his day upon Civil Law and Dialectic ... which withdraws our energies from fruitful activity, is unworthy of the true Citizen" (*ibid.*, page 153).

This concept of the completely rounded citizen, the versatile and encyclopedic individual, which all historians have agreed is the Renaissance ideal, is nothing if not Cicero's ideal orator:

> To sum up what I have endeavoured to set forth. That high standard of education to which I referred at the outset is only to be reached by one who has seen many things and read much. Poet, Orator, Historian, and the rest, all must be studied, each must contribute a share. Our learning thus becomes full, ready, varied, and elegant, available for action or for discourse in all subjects. But to enable us to make effectual use of what we know we must add to our knowledge the power of expression.[14]

Like Roger Bacon, Aeneas Sylvius puts moral philosophy above mathematics and the physical sciences in the formation of the ideal prince: "There is a danger lest in our interest in natural, or external, objects we find but a lower place for those weightier things which concern character and action" (*ibid.*, page 156).

Approaching the question of how rhetoric could have become such a dominant interest of the sixteenth century, it is necessary to consider the fact that the Ciceronian ideal necessarily gave first place in education to the means of achieving eloquence. For eloquence was indispensable to the administrator and the prince. We have seen that this concept of learning

13. Woodward, *op. cit.*, page 10. See also pages 21; 27; 67; 185 for the fact that Vittorino's position was patristic. Woodward's failure to see the patristic tradition at work in these humanists is easily excusable when it is considered that, forty years later, many specialists in the field are still oblivious of it. Leonardo D'Arezzo, defining true learning and eloquence, strikes at the dialecticians: "True learning, I say: not a mere acquaintance with that vulgar, threadbare jargon which satisfies those who devote themselves to theology, *viz.*, the knowledge of realities—Facts and Principles—united to a perfect familiarity with Letters and the art of expression. Now this combination we find in Lactantius, in Augustine, or in Jerome; ..." (*ibid.*, pages 123–124). The Fathers are the types of the *doctus orator*, the statesman of Cicero.
14. D'Arezzo, *ibid.*, page 132.

was cherished throughout the Middle Ages because it had been baptized by St. Augustine and grafted onto the main stem of patristic culture. Thus the sixteenth century was far from having rediscovered the Ciceronian concept, although the new commercial developments greatly enlarged the scope of its application.[15] L. K. Born's statement concerning the concept of the perfect prince in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries is really applicable to the entire Middle Ages and to the Renaissance, as well:

> In the political thought of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the central figure about which the whole revolves is the prince. This emphasises the personal view toward rulership, which is characteristic of the period. Furthermore, in accordance with the mediaeval attitude, the writers of these centuries considered the real in terms of the ideal, and were interested in nothing less than the pattern of the perfect prince.[16]

Machiavelli and Castiglione are at the end of a long line of writers. However, Machiavelli still awaits the historical scholarship which is necessary to put him in his true perspective. Most writers have recognized that his Satanocratism or his violent scission of nature and grace, in which he is at one with Luther and Calvin, is thoroughly Christian. That is, Machiavelli, like Hobbes, Swift, or Mandeville, cannot be explained except in terms of Christian culture. There is nothing pagan about his skepticism concerning human nature.[17] He rather looked on nature as shut off from grace and as shut in upon itself, and abandoned to the interplay of its own distorted forces. Within this dying order, however, Machiavelli envisaged the ideal prince as a man devoted to political action, impressing his character upon the flux of events, and living solely for the commonwealth which alone is the expression of the integral laws of our now fallen nature.[18] There is much of the Old Testament attitude in Machiavelli—the attitude of trust in the prince as one who cooperates with God to bring good out of evil, having regard to the passionate and blind violence of men. Whether Machiavelli finally confounded political action with mere political technique and made

15. Samuel Daniel's summing-up of the ways in which the increasing commercialization of society enhanced the educational avenues to power is excellent: "A time not of that virilitie as the former, but more subtile, and let out into wider notions ... A time wherein began a greater improuement of the soueraigntie, and more came to be effected by wit then the sword; Equal and iust incounters, of State, and State in forces, and of Prince and Prince in sufficiencie. The opening of a new world, which strangely altered the manner of this ... by the induction of infinite Treasure, and opened a wider way to corruption, whereby Princes got much without their swords.... Leidger Ambassadors first imployed abroad for intelligences. Common Banks erected, to returne and furnish moneys for these businesses. Besides strange alterations in the State Ecclesiasticall: Religion brought forth to bee an Actor in the greatest Designs of Ambition and Faction" (In Alexander B. Grosart, ed., *The Complete Works in Verse and Prose of Samuel Daniel*, Vol. IV, page 77). It was in this world that scholars and schoolmasters came to assume the functions of civil prudence. Ruth Kelso points out that in the sixteenth century: "Of all professions, then, the fittest for gentlemen and for those aspiring to become gentlemen was the law" (*op. cit.*, page 51). This was basically Ciceronian. The difficulties encountered in extending the Ciceronian ideal of the learned statesman to the feudal aristocracy are evident in many arguments urged against those who held that studies are effeminate. See Elyot's *Governour* (Everyman, pages 49ff.) and Spenser's *Tears of the Muses*, ll. 79–90, and Ascham's *Scholemaster*, page 40.
16. L.K. Born, "The Perfect Prince" in *Speculum* 3 (1928), page 470.
17. See J. Maritain's *True Humanism*, pages 95–96; 147ff.; 208; 220. J. Allen shows how Marsilio of Padua states Machiavelli's and Hobbes' theory of the state long before them. (*Great Medieval Thinkers*, ed. F.J.C. Hearnshaw, pages 176–177.) Significantly, too, Wycliffe anticipates the same theories (pages 217ff.).
18. See H. Butterfield's *The Statecraft of Machiavelli*.

of the latter an end in itself is not a question which can be easily determined. It is only necessary to insist that Machiavelli is anti-Ciceronian—consciously so. He has no place for eloquence in his education since he has no trust in men's capacity to be persuaded to follow right reason, or any reason. The state must compel man to espouse a useful life free from the anarchy of the passions, and for this purpose eloquence is useless.

It is certainly not on these lines that the characters of Prince Hal and Hamlet were developed. Castiglione, however, cannot be regarded as the "source" of Hamlet's character, since the concepts of Castiglione were universally current in his century. One might as justly say that Castiglione was the source of Sir Philip Sidney.[19] On the other hand, Castiglione would certainly not have had the enormous vogue he did in the sixteenth century had he not been the spokesman for a large party. Hoby compares Cicero and Castiglione at some length, saying, among other things: "Cicero an excellent Oratour, in three bookes of an Oratour unto his brother, fashioneth such a one as never was, nor yet is like to be: Castilio an excellent Courtier, in three bookes of a Courtier unto his deare friend, fashioneth such a one as is hard to find..." (page 3). Castiglione himself says: "I am content, to err with Plato, Xenophon, and M. Tullius ... in imagination of a perfect commune weale, and of a perfect king, and of a perfect Oratour..."[20]

It is perfectly natural, therefore, that Elyot should have devoted two thirds of his *Governour* to discussing the virtues that became a gentleman who had authority in the commonwealth. It is equally natural that an educational system which arose in the sixteenth century to provide members for a governing class should be primarily concerned with "character" or the achievement of the social and political virtues. It is pointless to rehearse Elyot's familiar insistence on the need for eloquence and his encyclopedic program for the attaining of this traditional ideal. It is perhaps less commonly recognized how thoroughly Elyot envisaged that ideal in the light of the patristic tradition, as seen, for example, in his enthusiasm for *The Institution of a Christian Prince* of Erasmus (Everyman, page 48). Finally, the long series of manuals for intending statesmen, mostly written by

19. The obvious parallels between Hamlet and Castiglione have been indicated by W. B. D. Henderson in his Preface to the Everyman edition of Hoby's translation (pages xiii–xvi). Ascham highly approved Castiglione (*Scholemaster*, ed. Mayor, page 119). In *The Advancement*, Bacon significantly conjoins the concept of the ideal courtier to that of prince and orator: "But as Cicero, when he setteth down an idea of a perfect orator, doth not mean that every pleader should be such; and so likewise, when a prince or a courtier hath been described by such as have handled those subjects, the mould hath used to be made according to the perfection of the art..." (Everyman, page 203).

One of the most emphatic testimonies to the recognition of the function of the prince in uniting wisdom and eloquence is the *Papyrus Geminus*, published at Cambridge in 1522 as *Eleatis Hermathena seu de eloquentia victoria*, an entertainment in which Eloquence, Wisdom's child, with the help of Caesar, Cicero, and Servius Sulpicius, pleading in the Elysian fields for the release of her mother Wisdom, long kept in bondage by her enemies, nobles, women, sophists, and lawyers, wins a truce. Eloquence brings Wisdom to England where she is welcomed by Henry VIII and admired by the people. Henry, quite as much as James I, was a scholar-prince.

20. Everyman, page 13. Cicero's basic insistence that the orator be a versatile or encyclopedic amateur blended into Castiglione's major condition for the Courtier that he "eschue as much as a man may, and as a sharpe and daungerous rocke, too much curiousnesse and affectation and (to speake a new word) to use in everything a certain disgracing to cover art withall, and seem whatsoever he doth and saith, to doe it without paine, and (as it were) not minding it" (page 46). The habits of understatement and of easy nonchalance about one's attainments were incorporated in the gentlemanly code of the sixteenth century, thanks to Cicero. See Hamlet's

schoolmasters, the professional rhetoricians of the day, which followed Elyot, need only be referred to in order to focus the great influence of the rhetorical tradition.[21]

Turning to the medieval and Renaissance sermon, one encounters a development of rhetorical theory and practice of major scope. The manifestations of rhetoric in secular literature are much smaller in comparison, even if the entire bulk of vernacular prose and poetry of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries be thrown into the scale. This is natural enough when one considers that formal composition required formal education, and that the great majority of people who received formal training were in holy orders. There is, however, no reason to draw a sharp line between sermon eloquence and secular eloquence. Even when their objectives differed sharply—which was not always—their methods were the same. The same rhetorical techniques of invention, arrangement, amplification, and elocution applied to sermon, epic, and pamphlet alike.[22] For this reason a rhetor like Donne could easily shift late in life from poetry to pulpit; and for the same reason Lyly and Nashe were eager auditors of Henry Smith.[23]

Approaching the Chrysostom of sixteenth-century France, Michel Menot, whose sermon rhetoric is at once as medieval and patristic as that of John Donne, Gilson says, "Heureusement, nulle époque ne fut plus consciente que le moyen âge des fins qu'elle poursuivait et des moyens requis pour les atteindre:... et l'histoire littéraire aurait tout intérêt à chercher la clef de son art oratoire dans les *Artes Praedicandi* qu'il nous a laissés."[24]

We are in a period when Berengar of Tours, a friend of Abelard, attacked St. Bernard for neglecting the rules of rhetoric in his sermons. "St. Bernard's unpardonable crime consisted in perpetrating a mixture of literary genres.... There were people then in the twelfth century so much wrapped up in rhetoric, so full of the *Ars Poetica*, that in the face of the mysticism of St. Bernard they can put no better question than this: are these sermons composed according to the rules?... The Canticle is a nuptial song, a song of joy; and so a funeral oration ought not to be mixed up with it."[25]

I'll be your foil, Laertes. In mine ignorance
Your skill shall, like a star i' the darkest night
Stick fiery off indeed. (V, ii, 255–257)

Compare Hamlet's speech to the players with Castiglione, pages 56–57. Compare his jests with page 58. Compare his cautious fearfulness in accusing Claudius with page 71. It is part of the civil prudence of an ideal prince. It is also noteworthy that the full rhetorical doctrine of decorum enters the sphere of courtly manners, so that rhetorical and social decorum are identical: "...we have given the Courtier a knowledge in so many things, that hee may well varie his conversation, and frame himselfe according to the inclination of them he accompanieth himselfe withall..." (page 121). It was conceived that one function of the aristocratic governor was "to maintain civil obedience by gaining the good will of the lower classes to the upper." Kelso, *The Doctrine of the English Gentleman*, page 88.

21. Ruth Kelso deals with these, pages 118ff. Lyly's *Euphues* is, of course, prominent in the list. She does not include Brinsley's *Ludus Literarius*, whose advice on theme writing is pointed up with reference to the Ciceronian ends of education: "The principal end of making Themes, I take to be this, to furnish schollers with all store of the choicest matter, that they may thereby learn to understand, speak or write of any ordinary Theame, Morale or Politicall, such as usually fall into discourse amongst men and in practice of life; and especially concerning virtues and vices" (Campagnac's reprint, London, 1917; page 172).
22. The specifically pamphlet-like effects of many sixteenth- and seventeenth-century sermons has often been noted. Mitchell [in *English Pulpit Oratory*] cites such vivid effects in Henry Smith (page 212) at the same time that he admits the resemblance to St. Augustine. The explanation is easy. The Elizabethan pamphleteers received the same training as the preachers or the dramatists. Moreover, their tracts,

The full Ciceronian conception of the *doctus orator*, which is the basis of John of Salisbury's humanism in the twelfth century, is expressed by St. Bonaventure in the thirteenth:

> If however we consider speech by reason of its end, it exists in order to express, to instruct, and to move. But it never expresses anything except through the mediation of a form, never teaches except through the mediation of the light of conviction, never moves except through the mediation of virtue or power.... And accordingly Augustine concludes that he alone is the true doctor, who can impress form, infuse light, and give virtue or power to the heart of the hearer.... And from that it is clear how wonderful this contemplation is, by which Augustine in many books leads one by the hand to divine wisdom![26]

In the sixteenth century Erasmus speaks in precisely the same way of the function of rhetoric: "the mysteries of the Faith owe their power over the

as we shall see in Nashe, are mainly moral in aim, since rhetoric was inseparably bound up with the "colours of good and evil" and with *laus et vituperatio*. The *exemplum* had long been a major rhetorical device, whether in the brief form of the *chria* or in the longer form which occurs in Chaucer's *Pardoner's Tale*. (See Baldwin's *Medieval Rhetoric*, pages 234–236 and pages 245–247 for evidence of the large place given in sermon manuals to *exempla*.) The form of the *exemplum* permitted the use of many rhetorical figures including character and *prosopopoeia*. Crane has amply shown the inseparable nature of the character and the moral discourse (*Wit and Rhetoric*, pages 132–161). This union of interests is just as true of Nashe as of Overbury, Addison, Johnson, Crabbe, or Jane Austen. With the substitution of sentimental or rational ethics, the character necessarily disappeared. Thus Mitchell misconceives the function of the character in the sermon (pages 215–221).

The matter of sermon invention or obtaining of suitable matter for discourse varies greatly depending on whether the preacher preferred patristic or scholastic modes of exegesis. Donne's method of composition as described by Walton was patristic. (Temple Classics I, page 79.) That is, he expanded his text by a free grammatical commentary or *enarratio*. This was the method of Menot and of many medieval and Renaissance preachers. The amplification of the matter was in several modes, as *exempla*, parable or *simile*, *icon*, *indicatio* or authority, proverbs, and *anaphora*. These modes are listed by Erasmus in his *Ecclesiasticae* and taken up by Sherry (Crane, *op. cit.*, pages 99–100). The modes of amplification in the medieval *Artes Praedicandi* and *Ars Concionandi* analysed by Gilson (*Les ideés*, pages 94ff.) cover the same ground, stressing etymology, contraries, contemporary instances, concordant authorities, shifts from literal to allegorical or tropological explanation, and cause and effect.

It may seem strange that the scholastic divines, and the Calvinists especially, frequently used a rhetorical method of dividing and sub-dividing their sermons. We have already seen the Puritans using rhetoric in exegesis, however, and it is only necessary to recall that Ramus had amputated invention and disposition or arrangement from rhetoric and called it dialectics. The text is approached by a consideration of the circumstances who, why, when, where, to whom; Baldwin cites Alain de Lille's manual on this method (*Medieval Rhetoric* page 238). Gilson specifically contrasts it with the grammatical sermon and relates it to the Aristotelian categories (*Les ideés*, pages 125–126). The exordium was despised by these scholastic preachers, as Miller has shown (*op. cit.*, pages 332–333; 340). However, after the explication and confirmation, the Puritan preacher might use rhetorical figures in the application of his sermon (pages 347–349). The middle part of the scholastic sermon, the confirmation, was often a *questio disputata* in the full dialectical sense (Gilson, *op. cit.*, page 135). In the Middle Ages the frequency of preaching to clerics made it natural for two modes of division of text to arise even within the scholastic camp—an exoteric and an esoteric (*ibid.*, page 113).

23. Nashe says of Smith: "Hence alone did it proceed, that thou wert such a plausible pulpit man, that before thou entredst into the rough waies of theologie, thou refinedst, preparedst, and purifiedst thy minde with sweete Poetrie" (*Works*, I.193.4–7). Mitchell notes that "Smith shared to the full Donne's delight in allegory and cabbalistic speculation": (page 149). Obviously, Smith was in the patristic camp, and, therefore, a lover of poetry as understood by Boccaccio in his *Genealogia Deorum Gentilium*. Even under the Commonwealth patristic exegesis and oratory flourished at Oxford. Harris was praised because "the particular excellencies of Nazianzen, Basil, Chrysostome, Austin, Ambrose, Bernard, seemed all to encounter in him. He taught Rhetorick to speak in our mother-tongue, ..." (Mitchell, page 118). As already shown, Puritan preaching tended to scholastic modes and to the plain style. Perry Miller's lengthy treatment of this is conclusive (*op. cit.*, pages 331–362). See in particular his analysis of Wright's *Five Sermons in Five Different Styles* (1656) than which there could be no more immediate or convincing evidence of the full recognition, not only of different applications of rhetorical technique but of the theological assumptions behind each mode (pages 333–337).

minds and conduct of men, in large degree, to the grace and eloquence of their presentation."[27]

In the seventeenth century Donne's views both of the proper style of Scripture and of the proper style for preaching are the same:

> There are not so eloquent books in the world, as the Scriptures.... The style of the Scriptures is a diligent, and an artificial style; and a great part thereof in a musical, in a metrical, in a measured composition, in verse.... So the Holy Ghost hath spoken in those Instruments, whom he chose for the penning of the Scriptures, and so he would in those whom he sends for the preaching thereof: he would put in them a care of delivering Gods messages, with consideration, with meditation, with preparation, and not barbarously, not suddenly, not occasionally, not extemporarily, which might derogate from the dignity of so great a service.[28]

24. "La technique du sermon médiéval" in *Les ideés*, pages 95–96. Gilson gives a review (note 2, page 96) of scholarship in this field and finds it totally deficient. The fine work of G. R. Owst appeared subsequently. [Owst's *Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England* appeared in first edition in 1933, one year after the first edition of the Gilson title cited—ed.] Owst, however, is vague about the rhetorical theory of the *artes praedicandi* and in concentrating too much on parallels and anticipations of related vernacular literature, fails to bring down the bigger game which is on every hand. For, as Gilson shows: "Lire un sermon du moyen âge sans avoir présenté à la pensée toute cette technique, et sa raison d'être, c'est se condamner à n'y comprendre absolument rien" (page 104). See also page 149. Spurred by Gilson, Th.-M. Charland edited several of these *artes*. [*Artes Praedicandi*, Paris, 1936.]
25. Gilson, *The Mystical Theology of St. Bernard*, page 168. Consider, likewise, the careful attention to rhetorical decorum which governed Dante. In his *De Vulgari Eloquentia* Dante defines poetry as "nothing but a rhetorical fiction musically composed" (fictio rhethorica musice composita, Book II, ch. iv); and deplores the work of those who have taken but a shallow draught of rhetoric. (See also the *Convivio* II, 12; 14; 15; IV, 8.) Citing Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (Book III) in his tenth epistle, Dante calls the opening of his poem the proem and shows further how the poet and the orator must have much in common. Gelli, lecturing on Dante in 1562, approvingly summarizes Dante's celebrated letter to Can Grande: "Again, he shows that Comedy differs from Tragedy in the style of its diction, the language of Tragedy being lofty and inflated, while that of Comedy is unstudied and homely; whence he concludes: 'Et per hoc patet quod Comoedia dicitur praesens opus. Nam si ad materiam aspiciamus, a principio horribilis et foetida est, quia Infernus; in fine prospera, desiderabilis et grata, quia Paradisus. Ad modum loquendi, remissus est modus et humilis, quia locutio vulgaris, in qua et mulierculae communicant; et sic patet, quia Comoedia dicitur" (P. Toynbee, *Dantis Alagherii Epistolae*, page xxxvii). Dante scholarship has not yet begun to explore the implications of this doctrine of style which Dante received and applied with the same literal care as did poets of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The basic critical canons of Addison and Dr. Johnson, concerning poetic diction, differ little if any from those of Dante and John of Garland! See, for example, *Spectator* no. 285, and *The Lives of the Poets* (World Classics) I, pages 49–53; 152; 205; 212; 306–307; 310; 334. It is noteworthy that Addison's ideal critic (*Spectator*, no. 291) is modelled on Cicero's ideal orator: a man with "a good insight into all the parts of learning."
26. Wallis, *On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology*, page 9. Cicero's concept of the union of wisdom and eloquence was in no way diminished by St. Augustine, as already shown.
27. Quoted by W. H. Woodward, *Erasmus Concerning Education*, page 124. Although Erasmus is speaking of the language of Scripture, reiterating what had been, and was to remain, a commonplace, Woodward has no sympathy with this ideal and seems to be oblivious of its ancestry. He quotes Erasmus on the secular uses of rhetoric: "My greatest approbation is reserved for a rhetorical poem and poetical oratory ... the rhetorical art should transpire through the poem." He comments: "This is the evil influence of Lucan." (*loc. cit.*) Yet this was the poetic ideal of Europe in the sixteenth century. Woodward notes that Colet required eloquence as the characteristic product of scholarship for St. Paul's. (*loc. cit.*)
28. Quoted by Evelyn Simpson, *A Study of the Prose Works of John Donne*, page 237. Donne even draws some of his sermon allegories from rhetoric, as: "If we consider the manifold Topiques and places from which the sorrows of the wicked arise, ..." (Logan Pearsall Smith, *Donne's Sermons*, page 189). And more generally: "There (heaven) our curiosity shall have this noble satisfaction ... We shall not pass from Author to Author, as in a Grammar School, nor from Art to Art, as in an University; but as that General which united his whole Army, God shall create us all Doctors in a minute. That great Library, those infinite volumes of the Books of Creatures, shall be taken away ... the Scriptures themselves shall be taken away, quite away; no more preaching.... I shall know, not only as I know already, that a Beehive, that an Ant-hill is the same book in *Decimo sexto* as a kingdom is in Folio...." (*ibid.*, page 234).

However, Donne would have agreed with Erasmus that the sermon differs from the secular oration in having as its end teaching rather than delight.[29] This may seem to contradict the practice of Donne; but examination will reveal that, just as "the jerkiness and brokenness of Andrewes' sermons (*ibid.*, page 175) are the result of his primary interest in edification by exegesis, so the elaborate anaphoras and allegories of Donne are primarily a commentary on a text. The further prominent fact that distinguishes many sermons from profane prose is the habit of frequently citing Scripture or the Fathers. Professor Gilson was the first to set this practice in the important light it deserves. It is a basic mode of exegesis and of argumentation, which in the medieval sermon achieved a remarkable degree of precision. Just as the Fathers had by a concordance of texts from Old and New Testaments built up a Speculum of the Faith, so the medieval and Renaissance preachers used a careful concordance of texts as a mode of exegesis.[30]

Donne is quite explicit about his rhetorical aims in preaching. His intention was to arrange his rhetorical effects in such a way as "to trouble the understanding, to displace, and discompose and disorder the judgment ... or to empty it of former apprehensions, and to shake beliefe, with which it had possessed it selfe before, and then, when it is thus melted to poure it into new molds, when it is thus mollified, to stampe and imprint new formes, new images, new opinions in it" (Mitchell, page 191). Donne is here stating the Attic or anti-Ciceronian concept of style espoused by the Senecans. His words describe the aims set themselves by Montaigne and Bacon in their essays. In *The Advancement* Bacon contrasts the two modes of delivering knowledge as the modes of aphorism and orderly method:

> But the writing in aphorisms hath many excellent virtues, whereto the writing in Method doth not approach. For first, it trieth the writer, whether he be superficial or solid: for Aphorism, except they should be ridiculous, cannot be made but of the pith and heart of sciences; for discourse of connection and order is cut off; recital of examples are cut off; discourse of connection and order is cut off; descriptions of practice are cut off.... And lastly,

This is the method of amplification by allegory or extended metaphor. For a wide selection of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century opinion to the same effect, see Mitchell, *op. cit.*, pages 197ff. Henry Smith held that "to preach simply is not to preach rudely" (Mitchell, page 210).

29. Mitchell gives the relevant texts, pages 101ff. See also Gilson's *Les ideés* for the fact that sermon eloquence necessarily departed from the aims of Ciceronian eloquence, but that it often achieves an intensely organized life of its own (page 149). This fact in no way undermined the Ciceronian program, however, since encyclopedic education was equally important for the preacher and the statesman (see Mitchell, page 156). The endless reference of Jacobean sermons to James as the British Solomon is quite defensible in view of the Ciceronian ideal of the scholar-prince which was the pattern of education for the age. Henry Peacham in *The Valley of Varietie* (1638) says that we must bring the young prince "to the Rhetorick Schoole, and to learn to be eloquent:... a good Prince by the benefit of Eloquence, may easily keep his subjects in awe and order ..." (page 110).
30. *Les ideés*, pages 156–159. The examples of the technique must really be studied in order to be appreciated.

> Aphorisms, representing a knowledge broken, do invite men to inquire farther; whereas Methods, carrying the show of a total, do secure men, as if they were at farthest" (Everyman, page 142).

Both Montaigne and Bacon made compromises, gradually admitting examples, authorities, and descriptions, but persisting in their original intention of employing an aphoristic style in order to dislocate the mind from its customary courses.[31]

That Donne was consciously Senecan, Mitchell admits when he mentions Donne's especial devotion to the manner of Tertullian (page 108). Tertullian had for centuries been called "our Seneca" by Christians. However, Mitchell misses the entire aim of Donne's rhetoric when he apologizes: "to some extent, also, this characteristic reacted adversely on his prose, and combined with a partiality for Tertullian and Augustine, and even for Seneca, to make him indifferent to the cultivation of a flowing style."[32]

31. M. W. Croll devotes his "Baroque Style in Prose" to an analysis of the effects intended by the Attic stylists: "The anti-Ciceronian period was sometimes described in the seventeenth century as an 'exploded' period;... For example, here is a period from Sir Henry Wotton, a typical expression of the political craft of the age:

> Men must beware of running down Steep places with weighty bodies; they once in motion, *suo feruntur pondere*; steps are not then voluntary.

The members of this period stand farther apart one from another than they would in a Ciceronian sentence, there are no syntactic connectives between them whatever; and semicolons or colons are necessary to its proper punctuation. In fact, it has the appearance of having been disrupted by an explosion from within" (*Studies in English Philology*, pages 429–430).

It is easy to see how the aphorism was indispensable to this mode of composition employed by Bacon, Burton, Donne, and Browne. It is equally important to recognize that a statecraft, or theory of politics, as well as rhetoric, was the mainstay of the Attic style. As Croll says: "The negligence of the anti-Ciceronian masters, their disdain of revision, their dependence upon casual and emergent devices of construction, might sometimes be mistaken for mere indifference to art or contempt of form: and it is, in fact, true that Montaigne and Burton, even Pascal and Browne, are sometimes led by a dislike of formality into too licentious a freedom. Yet even their extravagances are purposive, and express a creed that is at the same time philosophical and artistic. Their purpose was to portray, not a thought, but a mind thinking, or, in Pascal's words, *la peinture de la pensée*" (*ibid.*, page 430).

Thus the "cutted period," asymetry of members, sudden shifts from plain to metaphorical statement, or from one metaphor to another, is the result of a style "always tending toward aphorism, or *pensée*, as its ideal form, ..." In brief, it is a Senecan style; ..." (*ibid.*, page 435).

Gabriel Harvey's anti-Ciceronianism links itself explicitly with this mode of composition: "The finest wittes preferre the loosest period in M. Ascham or Sir Philip Sidney before the tricksiest page in Euphues or Pap-hatchet" (Gregory Smith, *Elizabethan Critical Essays* II, page 274). It may seem that

202

Harvey is inconsistent here. How could Ascham be considered anti-Ciceronian and *Euphues* not? The answers will be given later.

32. Mitchell, *op. cit.*, page 183. See also pages 189–190. Owing to a complete failure to distinguish between the conflicting aims of patristic and scholastic culture within the medieval church, and therefore in the Renaissance, Mitchell perpetuates and increases the confusion of Miss Ramsay (*Les doctrines médiévales chez Donne*) and Miss Simpson. One can correct their basic misconceptions simply by pointing out the meaning of their own statements. For example, Miss Simpson cites Miss Ramsay to the effect that Donne's philosophy, far from being scholastic, "is largely Neoplatonic in character.... It was through St. Augustine, Gregory of Nyssa, the pseudo-Dionysius, and other Christian sources that Neo-Platonic ideas became familiar to Donne as to other theological students" (*op. cit.*, page 90). This is to say that Donne as a practitioner of grammatical exegesis is an out-and-out patristic theologian. His Jesuit training alone would confirm this fact. He was, of course, acquainted with the Schoolmen, but he never confused the two traditions as we do today.

When the full implications of this basic distinction are grasped, then it becomes plain that the task facing modern scholars is nothing less than the recasting of the whole of the histories of European literature since the fifteenth century. For example, the whole "golden age" of Spanish literature is an expression of patristic rhetoric and exegesis. Unless, however, this expression is seen as a basic revolt in method, as well as style, and seen in its full medieval perspective, such a task cannot even be begun. Borrowing from current historical statements of the supposed spread of Gongorism or Concettismo or the baroque from Spain and Italy to France and England, Mitchell goes so far as to say: "What Italy learned from Spain in this connection was to draw upon certain patristic and medieval writers who had been fond of particular devices and to imitate these devices; and the English preachers ... etc." (page 137). Apart from the assumption of a medieval homogeneity in this matter, the whole matter is misconceived by the supposition of a merely stylistic embellishment.

CHAPTER FOUR

THOMAS NASHE

CHAPTER FOUR

A. GRAMMAR

THOMAS NASHE

The application of Nashe as a test case for McLuhan's history of the trivium is undertaken by exploring the thesis that the conflict between Nashe and Gabriel Harvey parallels the clash between the school of Erasmus and the partisans of Scholasticism.

McLuhan broaches a variety of absorbing questions, emboldened by his vision of the interdependent trivial arts, advancing reasons why it is of no consequence if Nashe was not directly familiar with the texts of Rabelais of which his work is so often evocative, why Nashe proceeded with caution (he did not), why Nashe said nothing explicitly about patristic theology (it was unnecessary and dangerous).

Ramist rhetoric ("Ramistic reductio ad absurdum*"), McLuhan observes, was a great boon to the rationalists, "for, once all figures had been planed away from the text, it could mean anything or nothing." Leaving aside, once again, an intriguing connection with postmodernism, this state of affairs implies that the attacks on Nashe's works by his enemies is of a piece with uninformed readings of Nashe such as McKerrow's. Both ignore the cohesive force of his work, which McLuhan calls an "almost uninterrupted texture of patristic implication." Nashe, for his part, attacked Ramus by name and condemned his separation of words from matter. Nashe was fully conscious of and fully aligned in an ancient dispute, but, as McLuhan notes, that dispute cut across the lines between Roman Catholic and Protestant theology.*

As a stylist, Nashe combined high style with low images in the service of satire. In the same service, he invented fantastic etymologies, spoofing the etymological absurdities proposed by dialecticians for whom grammar was speculative rather than empirical. McLuhan mentions these facts here, reserving more complex issues pertaining to rhetoric for his concluding chapter.

Footnote 19 explains the reason for Nashe's contempt for plain style by reference to the technique deriving from Ramus whereby "[t]he rhetorician simply whittled away all the figures from a text, delivering a simple abstract statement which was as useful in one language as in another." In the typescript version of the dissertation, McLuhan's handwritten annotation summarizes this matter and sharpens the issue with McLuhan's own rhetorical application of terminology: "concept vs. percept," adding a phrase to recall that in the issue at stake, theology is inseparable from language study: "the heresy of paraphrase."

—(Editor)

4A

Nashe is here presented as a sort of test-case for the preceding study. If a writer so admittedly eccentric and original can be shown to be capable of being best understood in light of the foregoing study, then its usefulness for understanding other writers of the same period may very reasonably be granted. In this section, therefore, I propose to tackle directly the most obscure and also the most important problem connected with Nashe, his quarrel with Harvey. I shall show that the Harvey-Nashe quarrel is fully understandable in terms of much the same issues that pitted Reuchlin, Erasmus, Agrippa, More, Rabelais, Aretino, and Von Hutten against the bulk of their scholastic contemporaries. It will also be shown that the Martin Marprelate controversy is part of the same quarrel. Since, in recent years, few have understood the precise nature of the quarrels between Erasmus and the Schoolmen, it is small wonder that the Harvey-Nashe quarrel has remained unsolved. But more than this was necessary to perceive the basis of the opposition between Nashe and Harvey. At least a general knowledge of the position which Ramus occupied in the Calvinist camp is indispensable. Although McKerrow's admirable erudition did not include any insight into these matters, he has left much of the pertinent evidence in accessible form, so that it will be possible to deal with the whole matter in a relatively brief space.

McKerrow's general statement on the subject is worth quoting here as evidence of the kinds of difficulty which have hindered understanding:

> It is hopeless for us now to try to understand exactly the nature of this opposition between Harvey and Nashe. Many things may have contributed to it; religious differences may have counted for something; enmity between the friends or the patrons of the two may have made it a point of honour not to yield; a dozen minor reasons of which we know nothing may have increased the violence of the dispute. But above and before all, there was, I think, that ancient opposition between the old and the new, between servility and independence, between prejudice and the right of a man to that consideration which his abilities and achievements deserved. And it was Harvey who stood for the future and Nashe for the past. (5.67)[1]

1. All references to McKerrow's five volumes will be given in brackets [with periods separating volume, page, and line numbers]. There are no line references for the fifth volume.

Taking these statements in order, let us first note that McKerrow's despair was hardly justified, since no major controversy of the past centuries is incapable of being reconstructed for the contemplation of the historian. McKerrow's mistake was to suppose that a merely personal quarrel should have had the ramifications of this one. His next statement concerning "religious differences" is vague because he has not considered that such differences of Scriptural interpretation in the sixteenth century, involved grammar, dialectics, and rhetoric very intimately. As for the enmity between patrons, that, too, involved the trivium. McKerrow says: "The quarrel between Nashe and the Harveys seems in its origin to have been an offshoot of the well-known one between Edward de Vere, Earl of Oxford, and Sir Philip Sidney in 1579 ..." (5.73). The group around Sidney, composed of such familiar figures as Harvey, Spenser and Fraunce, was as Ramistic in theology and rhetoric as was Sidney.[2] The Italianate Earl of Oxford was an obvious mark for these militant Puritans to shoot at. At any rate, it is no accident that Lyly, whose *Euphues* is obviously patristic in style, should have made cause with Greene and Nashe against the Ramistic Harvey.[3]

McKerrow's next statement about "that ancient opposition between the old and the new" brings us to familiar ground, but not to ground that McKerrow understood, except in the perspectives of nineteenth-century thought. He would probably have ranked Erasmus, Rabelais, and Agrippa on the side of the "new," whereas they regarded themselves as ancients. Nashe, he admits, was certainly of the party of Erasmus and Agrippa: "I have been fortunate in finding certain works upon which Nashe drew largely for his scraps of classical knowledge, such as the *Parabolae* of Erasmus and the *De Incertitudine et Vanitate Scientiarum* ..." (5.115). Likewise, McKerrow recognizes some obscure bond between Rabelais and Nashe; but because Rabelais was "above all things, a man of clear and original intellect, who in the guise of jest put forward new and definite schemes of life and thought," "with Nashe it is far otherwise." Nashe was "purely conventional," a man of whom it can be said that "not once, in however trifling a matter, does he seem to have thought for himself" (5.130). With a basic misconception of

2. See Hardin Craig, *The Enchanted Glass*, pages 146; 154–156. "The vogue of Ramism in England is connected with that earlier Sir William Temple (1555–1627), fellow of King's College, Cambridge, and tutor in logic (1576–1585), secretary to Sir Philip Sidney (Sidney died in his arms at Arnheim), secretary to Essex, and in his later life a distinguished and efficient provost of Trinity College, Dublin.... In 1584 Temple issued an annotated edition of the *Dialectica* and, in the years following, was a controversialist of European note in behalf of Ramus against Aristotle. To say that Sir William Temple was a Ramist, or that Cambridge was a Ramist centre means that this particularly practical and intimate method of study became familiar to the important generation of Cambridge men during the time when Temple was at Cambridge" (page 149). Craig is not aware of the immediately exegetical function of Ramistic rhetoric and dialectics, and so overlooks its persistant relation to the most violently contested issues of the day. We have seen that Perry Miller's *The New England Mind* supplies this deficiency.
3. Again, the "rule" already proposed for Pliny holds here. Wherever Pliny is employed a patristic theologian is not far away. Before *Euphues* was begun, the Ramistic Wilson in his *Arte of Rhetorique* condemned its style as patristic and medieval. He is discussing the figures of "similiter desinens" and "similiter cadens": "S. Augustine had a goodly gift in this behalfe, and yet some thinkes he forgot measure... Notwithstanding, the people were such where he lived, that they tooke much delite in rimed sentences, and in Orations made ballade wise.... so that for the flowing stile and ful sentence , crept in minstrels elocution, talking matters altogether in rime ..." (*op. cit.*, page 203). (It is, incidentally, noteworthy that Wilson knew that the medieval ballad was cut out of the same stylistic cloth as the popular medieval sermon. Modern students of the ballad are crippled for lack of a historical knowledge of rhetoric.) Much more significant for the background of the Harvey-Nashe quarrel are the attacks made on the style of Lyly and the Fathers by John Hoskins in his *Directions for Speech and Style* (ed. Hoyt Hudson, Princeton, 1935). Hoskins, like Fraunce in his *Arcadian Rhetorike*, illustrates his figures

the aims of Rabelais, it was hardly possible to grasp his relation to Nashe, nor was it possible to understand the aims of Nashe himself. Since Rabelais was a monk like Erasmus fighting the dialecticians for the restoration of ancient *grammatica*, and the patristic scheme of encyclopedic and Ciceronian eloquence, whether or not Nashe was directly familiar with him is a question of small importance.[4] The question of particular "sources" of Nashe's method and style expands into the much larger question of his aims as a member of the patristic party within the Anglican Church. Nashe's opponents are readily designated within this major controversy as the Calvinist party with its scholastic method in theology and its rigorous Ramistic scheme in dialectics and rhetoric.

In this frame of reference, it is possible to see why McKerrow should have felt "it was the Harveys who stood for the future and Nashe for the past"; for the patristic party, although it had its greatest success in the Jacobean age, did not survive. That is why it is so hard today to understand what it stood for. But it is a mistake to suppose that in opposing Harvey Nashe appeared reactionary to his contemporaries; for in the sixteenth century Harvey seemed to be tied to the scholastic Ramus, whereas Nashe belonged to the part of the ancients who were defending the cause of the reformed grammatical theology of Erasmus.

One way in which Gabriel Harvey may be said to have belonged to the future is referred to by Hardin Craig:

> A characteristic of logical and rhetorical study in the Renaissance not to be forgotten is its affiliation with the doctrine of success. Gabriel Harvey, whose ambitious pantings are rendered audible by his vanity, continually reveals this popular academic ideal of the age. The following he quotes from "Smith": "Boldness, eloquence and winning manners lead to success."... Harvey believes in self confidence coupled with policy: "A grain of creditt with other; and A Dramme of confidence in yourself; is powerable to remoove mountaynes and states, and to work Miracles; being politiquely applied with reasonfull discretion." Be serpent and dove, lamb

from the *Arcadia*. For that matter, Sidney's own attack on the use of similitudes from Pliny is incomprehensible except as the attack of a Ramist rhetorician on the patristic modes of argument and ornament: "...for the force of a similitude not being to proove anything to a contrary Disputer," the use of it supposes one "more careful to speake curiously then to speake truly" (Smith, *Elizabethan Critical Essays*, I, page 203). He then proceeds to attack the learned courtiers who affect this mode of eloquence, preferring natural or plain speech to this mode. Note that he does not praise plain speech, but merely prefers it to patristic ornament. The key to this preference is to be found in Ramus's distinction between natural and artificial logic. See Perry Miller, *The New England Mind*, page 145.

Hudson says of Hoskins' having reduced rhetoric to mere elocution and delivery: "Hoskins's two subjects correspond exactly with those of the Ramist *Rhetorica* by Omer Talon ... one of the avowed sources of his work, while Johann Sturm, another of his masters, had written a work upon elocution alone" (page xvi). When Hoskins comes to the figure of "compar," he points to Lyly as the great abuser of it (page 16). He returns to it again and as examples mentions: "...such as in St. Augustine but often in Gregory the Divine, such as in the Bishop of W. ...and many places of *Euphues*; ..." (page 37). It is unquestionable, therefore, that the stylistic devices of Lyly were widely recognized as patristic and that they were not approved by Ramist rhetoricians. More evidence of this will be produced in connection with Nashe, himself.

In one of his many attacks on the Ramism of the Harveys, Nashe has Gabriel's old schoolmaster say that he detested Lilly's *Latin Grammar* (3.60.25–28). Again: "His Schoole-master never heard him peirse or conster but he cried out O acumen Carneadum! O decus addite diuis! And swore by Susenbrotus and Taleus that he would prove another Philo-Judaeus for knowledge and deep judgement..." (3.64.8–12). Lilly's Grammar was, of course, part of Colet's design for the restoration of "the old theology" detested by the Ramists. Carneades was the ancient equivalent of a medieval Schoolman. Talon's

and wolf, he says:... The following is what Harvey has to say about Bruno: "Jordanus Neopolitamus, (Oxonii disputans cum Doctore Vnderhil) tam in Theologia, quam in philosophia, omnia revocabat ad Locus Topicos, et axiomata Aristotelis; atque inde de quauis materia promptissime arguebat...." Later he adds, Gallant Audacity, is never owt of countenance: But hath ever A Tongue, and A Hand at Will."[5]

Hardin Craig has no trouble in showing the explicit links of this success doctrine not only with logic and rhetoric but with Machiavelli.[6] Behind Greene's gibes at the son of the ropemaker, as behind the extensive attacks of Nashe, are to be found a traditional logic, rhetoric, and politics in conflict with the English exponents of Ramus, Bruno, and Machiavelli. Unfortunately, Craig had not sufficiently considered the claims of the conflicting motives, in the sixteenth-century trivium to offer any help here. The scope and clearly recognized lines of this conflict at Oxford and Cambridge, as well as in London, are gradually becoming recognized. Thus, the work of Miss Yates and Miss Bradbrook has contributed at least to the indication of a profound quarrel of multiple manifestations.[7] But there is no way of clarifying that quarrel which by-passes the trivium with its manifold roots in the politics and religion of the sixteenth century. The attempted revolution in grammar, logic, and rhetoric of the English Ramists was seen to imply radical dislocations in the study of the classics and the Scriptures, and in philosophy. This revolution had powerful sponsors within the Church of England and was backed by "men of worship" in secular life. It was likewise opposed by a strong party in the Church, at the Universities, and in the State. Oxford tended to be outside the quarrel because neither Erasmus nor Ramus had a strong foothold there. Thus, Hooker dismisses him with contempt as the inventor of "that other new devised aid" which "doth shew them that have it as much almost in three days, as if it dwell threescore years with them."[8] This, as we shall see, is the charge repeatedly made by Nashe and made in *The Pilgrimage to Parnassus*. Between Nashe and the Parnassus plays there has long been held to exist some mysterious link. That link will be shown to

rhetoric was made in collaboration with Ramus. The joke comes with the mention of Philo, whom we have seen to be the founder of that patristic theology, the method of allegorical exegesis, which Ramus provided the technique to destroy. Nashe was of Philo's party. The reasons for Nashe's treating Harvey as a barbarian or destroyer of arts and learning will be made plainer on a later page.

Lest it should cause confusion that Donatus and Priscian should be lumped with "Aquinas, Scotus and the musty saw of antike Donate" (Marston's *What You Will*, II,ii,167) as equally scholastic and barbarous, it should be recalled that Lilly's and Colet's grammars had superseded them, at least in the form in which they had appeared in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. See Skelton's well-known lines in *Speke, Parrot* about breaking Priscian's head.

4. McKerrow cites the passage from Harvey in which it seems to be implied that Nashe had long been familiar with Aretine and Rabelays (5.98). Not knowing that both writers were deeply engaged in theological controversy, McKerrow fails to note the drift of Harvey's remarks in this passage. Harvey is attacking Nashe for having in *Christs Teares* attempted "a Harvest of ripest *Diuinity*." That this should follow on the heels of "the most desperate and abominable Pamflet of *Straunge Newes*" (*The Works of Gabriel Harvey*, ed. Grosart, two vols., London, 1884; I, page 273), Harvey tries to represent as an instance of the Machiavellian "policy" with which Nashe has charged him. McKerrow's query as to whether Nashe could have understood Rabelais had he read him (5.131) must be answered in the affirmative. Both Harvey and Nashe knew much better than McKerrow what the specific intentions and methods of Rabelais were. Even random passages which McKerrow cites from Harvey (5.85–86) prove his Ramism to the hilt. Harvey comes out boldly and invites Nashe to throw in his lot with the Ramists, "in an Age of Pollicy, and in a world of Industry" (5.85).

5. Craig, *The Enchanted Glass*, pages 140–141. Compare this passage with the ones from Harvey cited by McKerrow (5.85–86), where Harvey explicitly links his "Age of Pollicy" to "aspiring capacities," and

be their anti-Ramistic view of the arts. For St. John's College was the great bulwark of patristic and classical studies, just as Harvey was the least influential and the most vulnerable exponent of Ramism at Cambridge.[9]

Just how cautiously it was necessary to proceed in these controversies is evident, not only in the care with which the Parnassus plays skirt the immediate problems of current theology and Church discipline, but in the dangers and final disaster into which Nashe ran himself. Nashe puts the precise nature of the charges against him in *Lenten Stuffe*. The Inns of Court men (3.213.12–20) have given his works a rigorous scrutiny: "These bee they that use mens writings like bruite beasts, to make them draw which way they list, as a principall agent in church controversies of this our time complaineth" (3.215.3–6).[10] In view of this explicit admission, and in view of the final suppression (June 1599) of the works of Harvey and Nashe by ecclesiastical (not political) order, it is obvious that the major problem facing any student of Nashe is to explain how Nashe's writings could, in his day, have been regarded as mainly concerned with matters of "church controversies." That must be the business of the remainder of this section.

Nashe's writings present an almost uninterrupted texture of patristic implication, so much so that it is hard to know where to begin to illustrate this fact. Perhaps a few preliminary remarks about St. John's College will serve to make Nashe a defender of "the old theology," or the grammatical exegesis of Erasmus, Colet, Agrippa, and Rabelais, seem more comprehensible.

Speaking of Ascham, Nashe wrote that even though he wrote slightingly of Yarmouth men in his Scholemaster, yet "he was her Maiesties Schoolemaster, and S. Iohns man in Cambridge, in which house once I tooke vp my inne for seuen yere together lacking a quarter, and yet loue it still, for it is and euer was the sweetest nurse of knowledge in all that Vniuersity" (3.181–22–26). Earlier, in the *Anatomie of Absurditie*, Nashe praises Ascham again after delivering a lengthy attack on the Ramistic clergy and dons of Cambridge. Mulcaster, a Ramist, he scorns, "and makes me rather refer you to Aschame the antienter of the two; whose prayses, seeing

then announces his allegiance to the pragmatism of Ramus, finally inviting Nashe to join his camp. A passage in *Have With You* on Harvey's style emphasizes the intentional relation between his philosophy and his style: 3.42.15–44.37; 76.12–13. In particular "energeticall lines" and "resolute Aphorisms" (44.1–7). The relation to "resolute John Florio" is not accidental, but ties up this dispute with the Attic-Ciceronian controversy.

6. Nashe explicitly accuses Harvey of Machiavellianism or "policy" in his second epistle to the reader in *Christs Teares* (2.179.13–180.16). He scoffs at Harvey's pretensions to policy: 1.288.2–18; 327.15–30. (See Harvey's *Letterbook*, page 70, where he writes Spenser that some Cambridge men are as "cunninge" in Machiavelli "as university men were wont to be in their parva Logicalia." The latter work of Petrus Hispanus is a reference to the old scholasticism now banished to make way for the new doctrines of *praxis* and worldly success. We shall find Nashe attacking Machiavellian policy, Ramus, and "drifat duncerie" simultaneously. These represent the new scholasticism, as, indeed, Harvey implies above, and as Nashe vigorously urges in *Foure Letters* (1.316.31–317.20). We shall see that Nashe's sniping at this new "duncerie" is done from the position of a man fully aware of the classical program of the Fathers with its Ciceronian, encyclopedic implications, as well as its love of Pliny and allegorical exegesis. Thus, for example, when Nashe scoffs at Harvey's pride in the informal, personal character of his familiar epistles (1.296.26–34; 297.20–27) the entire philosophy behind that style is under attack, just as the joking about the son of the rope-maker is explicable by reason of Harvey's "heroicall" and "resolute" schemes of high policy.
7. M. C. Bradbrook, *The School of Night*, Cambridge, 1936; F. A. Yates, *A Study of Love's Labour's Lost*, Cambridge, 1936. As Miss Bradbrook points out (page 16) the "school" chafed against those exegetists of Scripture who held that the literal interpretation was divinely inspired. Ramist rhetoric was, of course, a godsend to the rationalists; for, once all figures had been planed away from the text, it could

Maister Grant hath so gloriously garnished, I will referre you to his workes, and more especially to his Schoolemaster, where he hath most learnedly censured both our Latine and Greeke Authors" (1.48.26–31). It is in this very significant context that Nashe marks out for especial attack the Ramists "who woulde seperate Arts from Eloquence, whose censures we oppugne, because it abhorres from common experience" (1.45.16–18). We have already discussed how Ramus broke up the arts, transferring, in the manner of Agricola, the first two parts of rhetoric to logic and treating what remained of rhetoric as mere cosmetic. Logic suffered even more as Nashe says: instead of "the subtiltie of Logique" there has been substituted "the rayling of Ramus" (1.45.4–5).

Now Ascham makes precisely the same points in his *Scholemaster*. In setting forth the traditional scheme of the arts necessary as propaedeutic to patristic theology, he notes how "Ramus and Talaeus even at this day in France" are given to "crossing spitefullie Tullies judgement."[11] Ascham, like Nashe, accuses them of "dissenting from the best mens judgementes, in liking onelie their owne opinions" when they separate arts from eloquence, and refuse to join "learning, discretione, and wisdome." (*loc. cit.*) Ascham is fighting against the separative spirit of the familiar medieval dialectician variety, and he is fighting for the encyclopedic ideal of the unified arts—of arts unified under eloquence and directed to preaching, on one hand, and to political prudence, on the other: "For he, that can neither like Aristotle in Logicke and Philosophie, nor Tullie in Rhetoricke and Eloquence, will, from these steppes, likelie enough presume, by like pride to mount hier, to the misliking of greater matters: that is either in Religion, to haue a factious hart:..." (*ibid.*, pages 151–152). He goes on to mention the example of a student who, pursuing the vicious method of Ramus, "studied diligentlie Origen, Basileus, and S. Hierome, onelie to gleane out of their workes, the pernicious heresies of Celsus, Eunomius and Heluidius..." (*loc. cit.*) We have only to put Harvey in the place of this student in order to see the whole force of Nashe's charges against him and the powerful party within the Church with which he was associated. If to be a Ramist in 1570 meant

mean anything or nothing. However, it is important to see only that the "school" was very much tied up with the current exegetical disputes, and with Ramus.

In his *Apology*, Sidney makes a specific pronouncement of his Ramist position with regard to Scriptural exegesis: "Certainly, euen our Sauiour Christ could as well haue giuen the morall commonplaces of vncharitableness and humblenes as the diuine narration of *Diues* and *Lazarus*: ..." However, these rhetorical embellishments of the *sacra pagina* are for the purpose of assisting "the memory and iudgment" (Smith, *Elizabethan Critical Essays*, I, page 166). Similarly, Sidney's attack on the scholastic moralists with their "*Genus* and difference" (page 165; also pages 161–162) and his defence of poets and orators as containing superior patterns of reason and virtue, is precisely the argument which Ramus brought against Aristotle and the Schoolmen. This aspect of Ramus is well set forth by Perry Miller (*The New England Mind*, pages 144–148), but the bearing of the argument on Sidney's *Apology* has not been noticed.

8. *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, I.vi.4. When Bruno disputed at Oxford, he may have employed the Ramist dialectic of dichotomies. At any rate, he complained of the "dull-witted Aristotelians" there (Yates, *op. cit.*, page 89).
9. This fact provides the relevant approach to Anthony Wingfield's *Pedantius* (ed. G. C. Moore Smith). Much more than casual academic satire is involved. Pedantius represents not traditional Ciceronian rhetoric, as Moore Smith holds (page xxvii), but rhetoric in the Ramist sense as a substitute both for grammar and for dialectics in exegesis. Dromdotus is the type of schoolman, equally disliked by the patristic or Erasmian exegetes. The pedant as understood in the satire of Erasmus, Reuchlin, Rabelais, and Aretino is the naïve schoolmaster still devoted to the later medieval grammatical treatises already discussed. Such a pedant will cite Alexander of Villedieu or the *De modus significandi* of

to Ascham religious dissent and political faction, it meant these very much more obviously to men of like mind in 1590.[12]

Nashe's warning about those who would separate arts and eloquence was anticipated by Ascham in a passage which has often been quoted but never, I think, understood: "Ye know not, what hurt ye do to learning, that care not for wordes, but for matter, and so make a deuorse betwixt the tong and the hart" (*op. cit.*, page 181). As in the passage against Ramus, he goes on to point out the dangers to religion involved in this divorce. It has commonly and correctly been supposed that Ascham is warning against the Puritans. More precisely, he is warning that the Puritans or Calvinists who use rhetoric instead of grammar as the mode of exegesis, in order to get rid of all figures of speech in Scripture, will bring Religion and learning to grief. But it was not safe even for Ascham to say this too bluntly. Perhaps that is why he falls back on the warning which Cicero made concerning the divorce between the heart and tongue which Socrates had so unfortunately instituted. Both Cicero and Ascham are opposed to that hostile view of eloquent language which was shared alike by Stoic dialecticians, medieval dialecticians, and Calvinist dialecticians of the Ramist stamp.[13]

Ascham's panegyric of St. John's, like that of Nashe, is directed against the Calvinist dialecticians both at St. John's and in the rest of the University. Like Nashe, his praise of St. John's as a restorer of the ancient learning is inevitably connected with the praise of Erasmus.[14] Ascham praises St. John's for divinity on one hand, and for its services to the commonweal, on the other (page 204). The Christian and Ciceronian ideals for Ascham, as for Erasmus and St. Augustine, were indivisible. There is, of course, nothing original about Ascham; and the great importance his *Scholemaster* had in the eyes of his contemporaries was owing to its being a powerfully-directed blow in an important Church controversy. As the Queen's tutor, who read Tertullian with her in the morning and Cicero in the afternoon, he was, indeed, a formidable opponent to the Ramists.

Thanks, probably, to his dear friend Watson, Ascham stayed on at St. John's during the reign of Mary, while Lever fled to sit at the feet of Calvin.[15]

Albertus. As such, this Holofernes type sponsors a grammar dominated by dialectics, and, therefore, one antipathetic to the patristic theologians.

10. Nashe's *Ile of Dogges* in The *Returne from Parnassus* is described in the same terms which Nashe here applies to the London lawyers. (It should not be forgotten that many of the lawyers were enthusiastic Ramists in logic and Puritans in theology. Witness Fraunce's *Lawiers Logike*.) Ingenioso says: "...our voyage is to the Ile of Dogges, there where the blattant beast doth rule and raigne Renting the credit of whom it please" (ed. W. D. Macray, page 150). Phantasma says: "*Canes timidi vehementius latrant*. There are certaine burrs in the Ile of Doggs called in our English tongue men of worship, certaine briars as the *Indians* call them, as we say certayne lawyers..." (page 152). As we shall see, a defeat for Nashe was a setback for St. John's College.

    Nashe returns to attack the lawyers in the same terms as we shall find him attacking the Calvinist clergy, as: "Latinlesse dolts, saturnine heauy headed blunderers... such as count all Artes puppet-playes, and pretty rattles to please children, in comparison of their confused barbarous lawe,..." (3.216.2–5).
11. Ascham, *op. cit.*, page 161.
12. It will not be necessary to go into details of theological controversy for this initial clarification of the Harvey-Nashe quarrel. The obvious facts as made available by Mullinger serve, however, to impress on us the urgency of these quarrels which naturally had their protagonists at Oxford and Cambridge. During the reign of Elizabeth, says Mullinger: "It had been decided that Cambridge should be mainly a school of divinity, and it had also been decided that the doctrine taught in her schools should be defined and prescribed beforehand" (James Bass Mullinger, *A History of the University of Cambridge*, page 134). The resulting situation was explosive. Frequently the expulsions of masters, lecturers, and students was inevitable. As we shall see, the praise which Ascham and Nashe heap on St. John's

Watson, like Ascham, was an ardent patrist "and scholars felt confident that under his rule no encouragement would be given to a return to the scholastic barbarism" (*ibid.*, page 45). Other colleges did not fare so well in 1553, as Ascham tell us. With deliberate caution, he proceeds to blame the setback of patristic studies in 1553 for the rise of Ramism at Cambridge after the death of Mary:

> ...the loue of good learning, began sodenly to wax cold; the knowledge of the tonges (in spite of some that therein had flourished) was manifestly contemned: and so, the way of right studie purposely peruerted: the choice of good authors of mallice confownded. Olde Sophistrie (I say not well) not olde, but that new rotten sophistrie began to beard and sholder logicke in her owne tong: yea, I know, that heades were cast together, and counsell deuised, that Duns, with all the rable of barbarous questionistes, should have dispossessed of their place and rowmes, Aristotle, Plato, Tullie, and Demosthenes, whom good M. Redman, and those two worthy starres of that vniuersitie, M. Cheke, and M. Smith, with their scholers, had brought to florishe as notable in Cambridge, as euer they did in Grece and in Italie:...[16]

To suppose that Ascham is here attacking medieval scholasticism is to ignore his own words and to miss the whole point. It is also to misunderstand the direction and purpose of Nashe's pamphlets. To those pamphlets we may now turn.

The first published work signed by Nashe was his preface to Greene's *Menaphon* in 1589. It brought a quick retort from Richard Harvey in his *Lamb of God* (quoted by McKerrow, 5.176–180). McKerrow, however, can find no reason for Harvey's anger beyond Nashe's "impudence" (5.76). Yet McKerrow tells us concerning Richard Harvey that: "The most noteworthy feature of his University career would seem to have been his partisanship of the Ramistic logic, in praise of which he wrote his *Ephemeron sive Paean, in gatiam perpurgatae reformataeque Dialecticae, 1583*" (5.72). Reading Nashe's preface

is praise for the patristic and classical learning which had got its start there under Bp. Fisher and Erasmus; yet St. John's was for long dominated by Puritan policy and doctrine. Let it be noted that Nashe has no word to say of William Whittaker, who was master of St. John's during his residence there. Whittaker was one of the foremost Calvinist theologians of Europe, the man who helped Whitgift prepare the Lambeth Articles of 1595, "the embodiment of the victory achieved by the Calvinistic party in the Church of England" (James Bass Mullinger, *St. John's College*, page 73). In other words, there was a party dominant at St. John's in Nashe's time against which every thought and sentiment of Nashe as a rhetorician, as a theologian, and as a patriot, was earnestly directed. In such a time, one had only to utter the name of Erasmus, Ascham, Petrus Hispanus, More, Ramus, or Aquinas, with an adverse or approving inflection, in order to rouse the fiercest passions which men are able to feel. The merest hint of one's attitude toward the parts of the trivium immediately stamped a man as a Puritan, a Lutheran, a papist, or an Anabaptist (*ibid.*, page 76). Is it any wonder, therefore, that Nashe proceeded with what seems to us today to be caution and vagueness? In point of fact, there is less of both than has been held. Nashe played an extremely dangerous game without much regard for safety.

Until the end of his life, the clashes between Calvinist scholastics and the upholders of the patristic program of Erasmus, Fisher, Colet, More, and Ascham were intense; and every pamphlet which Nashe wrote has a bearing on these matters at Cambridge, as well as on national politics. Although it is a point of relatively small importance, *Have With You* is probably *ad hoc* for the bitter election for the mastership of St. John's in 1595. "It was a crisis which was keenly watched by lookers-on without, and the whole university became aroused to lively interest in the election" (*ibid.*, page 88). After Whittaker's death in 1595, a strong effort was made within the college to get elected either Bois or Playfere, both eminent patristic theologians. Both men were set aside and Burghley put in Richard

with this in mind, one sees the matter become quite plain.[17] Nashe has two themes: the defense of poetry against ignorance, and the defense of theology and preaching against the same. In fact, this is one theme, as our long consideration of the patristic union of poetry, eloquence, and theology has shown. There is nothing incongruous, therefore, in Nashe's turning suddenly from the pseudo-eloquence of "bragging blanke verse" (3.311.29) to "Peter Ramus sixteene yeeres paines that so praised his petty Logicke" (3.313–1–2).

Nashe's familiar panegyric of St. John's in the preface serves a definite purpose, since it enables him with seeming disinterestedness to give a roll-call of Johnians celebrated for their devotion to Erasmus (that is, the Fathers and the classics), while he omits mention of the numerous Calvinist divines of John's, especially of the celebrated Whittaker, who was then master (3.317–24–31). These are the men who have "set before our eyes a more perfect method of studie" (3.317.30–31).[18] Let us recall that Ascham in precisely the same context—an attack on both the old and new scholasticism—uses almost the same phrase: "...the way of right studie purposely peruerted: ..." (page 203), and then proceeds to list almost the same Johnians as Nashe. From his praise of the great proficiency in languages and patristic divinity of the former Johnians, Nashe passes to blame of the incumbent Ramists: "...for I know not how it commeth to passe, by the doting practise of our Diuinitie Dunces, that striue to make their pupills pulpit-men before they are reconciled to *Priscian*; but those yeares which should bee imployed in *Aristotle* are expired in Epitomies, and well too, they have so much Catechisme vacation, to rake vp a little refuse philosophy" (3.318.2–9).[19]

Some clarification of the intentions of Nashe is provided by the *Parnassus* plays. They make it quite evident that we are confronted by a new phase of the familiar medieval and Renaissance rivalries between grammar and dialectics, between the rest of the arts seen under the domination of one or the other. When Philomusus and Studioso set out for Parnassus, they leave behind them, temporarily, the pleasures of the imagination:

"The firste lande that wee must travell in (as that oulde Hermite toulde me) is Logique. I have gotten Jack Seton's mapp to direct us through this

Clayton, a Calvinist (*ibid.*, pages 85–89). It is noteworthy that the sons of John Knox were fellows at St. John's in Nashe's time.

13. It does not matter much where one samples Nashe on this subject. He is always consistent: Harvey "is a preuerse *Ramisticall* heretike, a busie reprouer of the principles of all Arts, and sower of seditious paradoxes ..." (3.136.24–26). After the great success of Cheke, Mason, Watson, Redman, Ascham, Grindal, Lever, and Pilkington in ousting the Schoolmen and restoring "a more perfect methode of studie," (3.317.31) along comes a new set of "Diuinitie Dunces" (3.318.5) who scamper through the trivium with the aid of epitomies (by Ramus, of course) and turn out "pulpit-men before they are reconciled to Priscian; ..." (3.318.5–6). See also 3.313.

Ascham returns to the attack on the Ramists on the subject of epitomies. It is interesting to note that he says they belong "rather to matter, than to wordes" (page 171), reinforcing the suggestion that he had the Ramists in mind in the earlier statement. Whereas epitomies have a limited place in grammar schools: "Epitomie hurteth more in the vniuersities and studie of Philosophie: but most of all, in diuinitie it selfe" (page 172).

It may be helpful to cite here a few sentences from the epistle to the reader in the English translation of *The Logike of the Moste Excellent Philosopher P. Ramus Martyr*, London, 1581: "I shal in few wordes shewe the, the matter contayned in this booke, the methode and forme of the same, howe easye it is aboue all others to be apprehended, howe thou shalt applye it to all artes and sciences, and shortlie that no arte or science maye eyther be taught or learned perfectlie without the knowledge of the same.... [T]here is nothing appartayning to dialecticke eyther in Aristotles xvij. booke of logike, in his eight bookes of Phisike, or in his xiiij. bookes of Philosophie, in Cicero his bookes of Oratorie, or in Quintilian ... but thou shalt fynde it shortlie and after a perfecte methode in this booke declared."

cuntrie."[20] After refusing the misleading map of Peter Ramus proffered by Madido (page 9), Philomusus and Studioso encounter Stupido. Thanks to the helpful directions and shortcuts of Ramus, Stupido has been static on the road to Parnassus these ten years. He greets Philomusus and Studioso piously: "Welcome, my welbeloved bretheren! Trulie (I thank God for it!) I have spent this day to my great comfort. I have (I pray God prosper my labours!) analised a peece of an hommelie according to Ramus, and surelie in my minde and simple opinion Mr. Peter maketh all things verie plaine and easie. As for Setons Logique, truelie I never look on it but it makes my head ache!" (page 11). Seton's Logic was, of course, Aristotelian; but Ramus had reduced the whole art of enunciation of propositions to the ten places of rhetorical invention. The theological character of the satire in this part of the play is manifest from the fact that Stupido has been analyzing a sermon. Further, he is represented as an extreme Puritan (page 12; 14); but, interestingly enough, he alleges that Ramus' rhetoric has enabled him to "see the follie of theise vaine artes ... I have had a good man to my uncle, that never

---

[Page 3 of Dunn reprint] "This is that only perfecte methode which Plato and Aristotle dyd knowe ... (beyng suppressed by ignoraunce many yeres) raysed as it were from deathe by the ... [Pages 6–7 of Dunn reprint] ten places of inuention, with the disposition of the proposition, sillogisme, and methode. Euery place of inuention and euery sort of disposition is made so clere and manyfest with examples chosen out of the most auncyent Authors, that almost by thy self (yf thou haue any quicknes of spirite) thou mayest attayne in the space of two monthes the perfecte knowledge of the same". [Page 8 of Dunn reprinted edition]

Need there be any wonder that Ascham and Nashe dreaded this sort of thing as the new barbarism, and as worse than the old one which had at least required honest toil?

14. *Scholemaster*, pages 115; 183; 188; 193; 198ff. Nashe 3.316.29–318.9. Erasmus is praised in opposition to Ramus in the *Anatomie*, 1.26.5–28.5. He is brought into *The Unfortunate Traveller* with More and Agrippa to render scholastic divines of Wittenberg ludicrous. (2.245.20–255.11) Had it not been that the Calvinist divines of Cambridge were, consciously and belligerently, scholastics strongly opposed to the Fathers, Nashe would seem in such passages to be flogging a dead horse. But in his own day Emmanuel College turned out the founder of Harvard, as well as Thomas Hooker, John Cotton, Thomas Shepard, and others who were to lay the foundations of Puritan scholasticism in New England. (James Bass Mullinger, *A History of the University of Cambridge*, page 132)
15. James Bass Mullinger, *St. John's College*, pages 44–45.
16. Ascham, *Scholemaster*, page 203. He goes on to associate with this development another charge which Nashe never ceased to level at Harvey: "...than began simplicitie in apparell, to be layd aside: Courtlie galantries to be taken vp: ..."
17. A relevant but not important aspect of this preface, written for his fellow collegian, is the fact that Greene, like Lyly, was consciously exploiting the vogue of patristic style in his romances and pamphlets.

In view of Nashe's later attacks on the Ramism of the Harveys, it is well to remember his own statement that while at Cambridge, he went often to hear Richard Harvey lecture in philosophy (1.315.20–24), and that he mentions those who were esteemed the best in philosophy in his time (1.313.23–27). Having completed the trivium, Nashe had had nearly three years of philosophical studies when he left Cambridge (3.181.23–25).

18. When Harvey specifically retorted to this passage, he said that Bellarmine shall never satisfy the Protestants "nor Whittaker contente the Papistes" (Smith, *Elizabethan Critical Essays*, II, page 248). In other words, he brands Nashe a Papist for deliberately omitting to praise Whittaker. Harvey's meaning is deliberately obscured throughout by a mixture of caution and coquetry. There were ample political reasons for caution.
19. The notorious passage about "English Seneca read by candlelight" (3.315.30–31) is, of course, directed at secular poetry; but it is very pertinent to the main theological quarrel broached in this preface. That Ramistic rhetoric had important exponents in Spenser, Sidney, and Fraunce needs no reminder. It should, however, be plain that literary and theological quarrels were by this fact welded together. Seneca and the pagan moralists were sponsored by some Puritan divines such as Bishop Hall, as substitutes for the Fathers. The matter is complicated by the fact of Seneca's having been a favourite of Tertullian. (See Mitchell, *English Pulpit Oratory*, page 108.)

In this preface, it is clear that Nashe is attacking ignorant Calvinistic divines who defend their indifference to letters by proofs from Ramus' *Logic*. The English translator of his *Logic* makes the position clear: "Here I will speake nothing of the enuious, that thinketh it not decent to write any liberall arte in the vulgar tongue, but would haue all things kept close either in Hebrew, Greeke, or Latine tongues. I know what great hurt hath come to the Church of God by the defence of this mischeuous opinion: ..." (*op. cit.*, A viii). The point is that patristic, grammatical exegesis of Scripture depended, and will always depend, on a knowledge of the original tongues of Scripture, whereas Ramistic rhetorical

wore capp or surples ... and the same counsell that he gave mee I, as I am bounde in charitie, will give you. 'Studie not these vaine arts of Rhetorique, Poetrie and Philosophie; ...'"[21]

In this scene of *The Pilgrimage to Parnassus*, the quarrel between Seton and Ramus, which is so immediately relevant to Nashe, is directly linked with the Martin Marprelate affair. After Stupido praises Ramus, professes puritanism, and denounces poetry, rhetoric, and philosophy, he adds: "Why you shall not see a Rhetorician, a rimer (or poet as you call it) but he wears such diabolicall ruffs and wicked great breeches full of sin, that it would make a zealous professor's harte bleed for grife. Well, Mr. Wigginton and Mr. Penorie never wore such profane hose, but such plaine apparell as I do" (Page 12). The allusion is to the plain style of the Marprelate tracts with which Wigginton and Penry were ordinarily accredited.[22]

The question of style is clearly made a theological one. This explains why the Calvinist divines could, as Nashe said, "tearme our best Writers but babling Ballat-makers" (1.192.2–3), since the figures of patristic prose

exegesis not only dispensed with linguistic erudition, but was hostile to it. The rhetorician simply whittled away all the figures from a text, delivering a simple abstract statement which was as useful in one language as in another. It must be seen that the scholastic Ramus turned rhetoric to the task of destroying rhetoric in order to see why, from the viewpoint of a patristic humanist, he and his followers represented the new barbarism of "drifat duncerie." This is the background for Nashe's contempt for the plain style of Martin's pamphlets whereby "the minde of the meanest is fedde with this folly, that they impute singularity to him that slaunders privily, and count it a great peece of Art in an inkhorne man, in any tapsterly termes whatsoeuer, to expose his superiors to enuy. I will not deny but in schollerlike matters of controuersie a quicker stile may passe as commendable, and that a quip to an Asse is as good as a goad to an Oxe: but when the irregular Ideot, that was up to the eares in diuinity before euer he met with *probabile* in the Vniuersitie, shall leave pro et contra before he can scarcely pronounce it, and come to correct commonweales ..." (3.315.6.17). Nashe is not here talking merely of the ignorant religious enthusiasts of his day, but of those who dogmatically deny the need of erudition in theology even when they have access to it.

20. Ed. W. D. Macray, page 5.
21. *ibid.*, pages 11–12. With this passage compare *Pierce Penilesse* (1.192.1–196.14) in which Nashe designates the enemies of poetry as dul-headed Diuines "who deeme it no more cunning to write an exquisite Poem, than to preach pure Caluin ..." (1.192.5–7). In contrast to these makers of "dunsticall Sermons" (1.192.18–19) is the great patristic preacher "Silver tongu'd *Smith*, whose well tun'd stile hath made thy death the generall teares of the Muses ... Hence alone did it proceed that thou wert such a plausible pulpit man, that before thou entredst into the rough waies of Theologie, thou refinedst, preparedst, and purifidest thy minde with sweete Poetrie." (1.192.33–193.7). Here is the familiar patristic union of poetry and theology which has been observed in Boccaccio. It is in this context that Nashe then turns to rail on Richard Harvey the Ramist (1.195.23–196.14): "Thou that hadst thy hood turnd ouer thy eares when thou wert a Batchelor, for abusing of Aristotle ..." Nashe returns to attack Richard in the same way in *Strange Newes* (1.272.3ff.) and calls the "Fathers of the Church" to witness against him (1.273.12).

It is interesting to note in this passage that Nashe is specifically ridiculing Harvey's mode of scriptural exegesis. *Strange Newes* is itself done in the mode of a tropological exegesis upon the works of Harvey, this being part of the joke, since the Harveys abominated such exegesis. Similarly, in *Have With You* Nashe promises that "with a continuat Tropologicall speach I will astonish you, all too bee-spiced & dredged with sentences and allegories, not having a crum of any cost bestowed vpon it more than the Doctors own cooquerie" (3.41.7–10). In other words, Nashe is going to prove to the world that Harvey is a patristic theologian in spite of his professed Ramism.

22. Whether Nashe was the author of *An Almond for a Parrat* matters little in discussing a quarrel whose basis was so broad and inclusive. It is interesting, however, to compare with this passage a similar one in *An Almond* in which Geneva garments in religion, rhetoric and politics are associated with Penry, Ramus, and Martin. Penry is spoken of as one who "had scarce tasted, as we say, of *Setons modalibus*" when "he began to affect factions in art, and show himselfe openly a studious disgracer of antiquitie. Who then such an vnnatural enemie to Aristotle, or such a new-fangled friend unto Ramus" (3.367.37–368.2). The *Almond* contains several curious verbal resemblances to the preface to *Menaphon*: cf. 3.312.25 with 3.347.22; 311.14 with 347.34; 318.1–32 with 350.24–27; 315.32 with 356.11; 313.21 with 356.30; 318.30–32 with 358.5; 315.17–18 with 358.18; 318.4–8 with 358.33–36; 315.8–10 with 361.29–30; 315.14–21 with 365.27–28; 316.16–18 with 366.30–37; 318.1–32 with 367.37–38; 314.33–34 with 369.36; etc. Between the *Almond* and *Strange Newes* there are some curious links. One overlooked by McKerrow is the repetition of the phrase "goe for no paiment with you"—cf. 1.283.23—and 3.352.1. The mere repetition of the phrase is not notable but the context is interesting. In the *Almond*

used not only by Lyly, Greene, and Nashe, but by many preachers as well, were associated, as we have seen, not only with St. Augustine's "rhymed sermons," but with the minstrel's art of the Middle Ages—with Papistry, in short. It explains, likewise, the point of Nashe's satire at the beginning of *Strange Newes*. Nashe hastens to retort the charge on Harvey whose treatise has "a great many barefoote rimes in it, that goe as iumpe as a Fiddle with euery ballet-makers note" (1.265.10–20). "Barefoote rimes" means monkish, which is also the point of the charge of inkhornism: "With these two Hermaphrodite phrases, being halfe Latin and halfe English, hast thou puld out the very guts of the inkehorne" (1.265.22–24). In the epistle to the reader the same charge of medieval barbarism is implied against both Gabriel and Richard. The scholastic methods of Richard, "a certayne theologicall gimpando" (1.262.3–4) are described: "...I beheld ordinance planted on edge of the pulpit against me, and that there was no remedy but the blind Vicar would needs let fly at me with bel, book, and candle,..." (262.11–15). Richard, "the Ecclesiaticall duns" (262.28), blinded completely with Nashe's patristic learning (262.24–28), "gets an olde Fencer, his brother,... with his two hand sworde of Oratory and Poetry" (262.30–32). In short, Richard, perfectly aware of his inadequacy in patristic and classical lore, called in Gabriel against Nashe, since Gabriel was a professor of rhetoric. That the quarrel was patently for Nashe's contemporaries the old theological one between grammar and rhetoric (Erasmus and the Fathers), on one hand, and dialectical theology, on the other, is made explicit in Dekker's estimate of Nashe in *News from Hell*: "...thou that madest the Doctor a flat Dunce, and beat'st him at two sundry tall Weapons, Poetrie, and Oratorie:..." (5.152). Nothing was more natural than that Gabriel Harvey should say that: "The finest wittes preferre the loosest period in M. Ascham or Sir Philip Sidney before the tricksiest page in Euphues or Pap-hatchet."[23]

The next occasion on which Nashe praised St. John's was in *Strange Newes* (1.314.1–16). The context and purpose of the praise are the same as in the preface to *Menaphon*. Richard Harvey's "sheepish discourse of the Lambe of God" manifests that "Richard hath scumd ouer the schoolmen,

the context is the Scripture and the Fathers which Nashe says mean nothing to Martin and his party. In *Strange Newes* the context is "Tully, Horace, Archilochus, Aristophanes, Lucian, Iulian, Aretine," names associated with the party of the classical grammar and satire both associated with the patristic party and disapproved by the Calvinists. As for the difficulties in the passage of *Strange Newes* in which Nashe states that he was the author of *An Almond*, they seem to arise from a pun of Nashe's. "Dame Laws. Poet" (1.268.15–16) Dame Lawson was a notorious Martinist, or anti-prelatist (see McKerrow's note to 1.83.13). Nashe simply contracts Lawson to Laws. In order to signify that he both attacked Lawson and defended the English Church by Law established in *An Almond*. Nashe may very well have suspected Harvey (Works, I, 156) of implying that the Devil's Dam was the Church of England. Note Nashe's open charge that Harvey has been trying to embroil him with the authorities—ecclesiastical authorities, of course (1.307.34–35). The context is the usual one in which Harvey is charged with dunsticall inkhorn Calvinism as a counterblast to his scoffing at Nashe's grammar-school wit.

23. Smith, *op. cit.*, page 274. The reference to Ascham is self-protective, and is typical of the caution of Harvey. Ascham's rhetoric is avowedly Ciceronian, so much so that he almost disavows Quintilian, who had become associated with the "Attic" or anti-Ciceronian style even in Ascham's day: "...as Tullie goeth beyond *Quintilian*, *Ramus*, and *Talaeus*, in perfite Eloquence, euen so moch, by myne opinion, cum they behinde Tullie for trew iudgement in teaching the same" (ed. Mayor, page 152). Sidney represents the contrary opinion, as Harvey knew very well. It was by such transparent devices as these that writers protected themselves from the consequences of unorthodoxy in the sixteenth century.

Just as Ascham proceeds from his attack on Ramus to a defence of Pliny (page 153), so Harvey proceeds from an attack on Pliny to the praise of Ramus. Harvey attacks Pliny (i. e., patristic theology) *via* the similes of *Euphues*, alluding to the "Image of Diuinity" in passing (Smith, II, page 269). (Sidney's attack on "all Herbarists, all stories of Beasts, Foules, and Fishes" (Smith, I, page 202), has the same

and of the froth of their folly made a dish of Diuinitie brewesse which the Dogs would not eate" (1.312.22–27). The best lecturers in scholastic philosophy are next mentioned (313.23–31), one of whom was presumably a son of John Knox from St. John's.[24] Then Nashe breaks out in praise of "Thrice fruitfull S. Iohns" whose best scholars belonging to the patristic or anti-scholastic camp "haue not shakte off obscuritie" (314.1–3). Of course, Nashe says nothing explicitly of patristic theology. It was at once unnecessary and dangerous; but he proceeds immediately to the praise of Thomas Playfere, who was one of the most eminent of the patristic preachers and divines of the age.[25]

The Anatomie of Absurditie, which was probably written shortly before the preface to *Menaphon*, is also an attack on Calvinist positions in theology and the arts: "When men shall publiquelie make profession of a more inward calling, and shall waxe cold in the workes of charitie, and feruent in malice..." (1.22.13–15). Nashe then moves on to an attack on Harvey (not mentioned by name) whose Astrological Discourse has resulted in "the ignorant deluded, the simple misused, and the sacred Science of Astronomie discredited;..." (1.23.33–34). Then Nashe makes his usual joke about the Harveys' bringing back the "babling Ballets" of the Middle Ages "which euery rednose Fidler hath at his fingers end, and euery ignorant Ale knight will bring foorth ouer the pottle,..." (1.24.1–2). The scholasticism of the Calvinist divines was ironically urged against them as Papistry in its most vulgar form.

The attack develops with perfect consistency: "These Bussards thinke knowledge a burthen.... They contemne Arts as vnprofitable, contenting themselues with a little Countrey Grammer knowledge,..." (1.24.33–25.2). These Ramists with their facile contempt for arduous discipline in the arts are such a kind of poets "that *Plato* excluded from his Commonwealth, and *Augustine* banished *ex ciuitate Dei*..." (1.25.8–9). This last phrase was carefully weighed by Nashe, for he is just about to describe the full patristic concept of exegesis: "I account of Poetrie, as of a more hidden and diuine kinde of Philosophy, enwrapped in blinde Fables and darke stories, wherein

motivation. In the Ramist dialectic, the analogical arguments of the grammarian Pliny had no place.) Somewhat wryly, Harvey sneers at Nashe for attacking "we old Dunses" (Smith, II, pages 246; 255). He does not deny the charge of Ramism or scholasticism, but he writhes under it.

24. See McKerrow's note to 313.23.
25. See W. F. Mitchell, *op. cit.*, page 170–173. He shows that Playfere's manner was much the same as that of Andrewses. See McKerrow's note to 1.314.4 in which he mentions that Playfere, proposed in 1595 by the fellows of St. John's to succeed Whittaker, the Calvinist, was set aside for Clayton by Elizabeth. Nashe is exceedingly bold in reproving the court for this action (1.314.6–7). The relative power of the two parties in theology is evident from the fact that Playfere was given the Lady Margaret professorship in 1596. Apparently Burghley was not prepared to allow complete domination by either one, since he wished to keep the balance of power in his own hands. He was, himself, a Johnian, and presumably one of the Ascham-Nashe camp. (See Mullinger's *History of St. John's*, page 51.) It was not until the Stuart period that the Erasmian ideal recovered predominance in the English Church, and there was envisaged "a reformed Catholicism ... such as Chrysostom or Alfred could feel at home in, and David, Boniface, Chad, or Anselm not repudiate as alien" (Mitchell, *op. cit.*, page 139).

the principles of more excellent Arts and morall precepts of manners, illustrated with diuers examples of other Kingdomes and Countries, are contained: ..." (1.25.23–28). It was from this ancient concept of poetry as a polysemous natural theology that Philo and the Fathers, and Petrarch, Boccaccio, and Erasmus derived their method in poetry and theology. On the very next page Nashe explicitly confirms the anti-Ramistic direction of his argument: "...in Poems, the thinges that are most profitable, are shrouded vnder the Fables that are most abscure:... wher vpon Erasmus Roterdamus very wittelie termes Poetry, a daintie dish seasoned with delights of euery kind of discipline."[26]

Finally, Nashe delivers his direct blow: "It may be some dreaming dunce whose bald affected eloquence making his function odious ... will cry out that it breedes a scab to the conscience, to peruse such pamphlets; ..." The reason for their queasiness is simply that Nashe's pamphlets have exposed their scholastic barbarism: "...being indeed the display of their duncerie, and breeding a mislike of such tedious dolts barbarisme, by the view of their rhethoricall inuention" (1.27.22–29). The last phrase is important, for it refers to the Ramistic exegesis of Scripture and poetry whereby the figures, far from being allowed to conceal or convey profound wisdom, were held to be merely a cosmetic or condiment.[27]

This pamphlet concludes with another elaborate attack on the Cambridge Ramists who "make their bald eloquence a common by word, cockering themselues in their owne conceits, till they be scorned as cockscombes.... teaching manie times the thinges they vnderstand not, and perswading what they knowe not,... becomming the Maisters of the ignorant before they be the Schollers of the learned. There is no such discredit of Arte, as an ignorant Artificer,..." (1.44.29–37). Nashe proceeds to attack Ramus by name and to deplore, as Ascham did, his separation of words and matter.[28]

The passage in *Pierce Penilesse* in praise of the great patristic preacher, Henry Smith, naturally begins with a defense of Poetry (1.192.1–193.29) and concludes with an attack on the Ramism of Harvey (1.195.23–196.14). It was

26. (1.26.8–14) In 1591 Sir John Harington's *Apologie of Poetrie* prefixed to his translation of the *Orlando Furioso* likewise "treats poetry rather as a propadeutic to theology than as one of the fine arts" (J. E. Spingarn, *Literary Criticism in the Renaissance*, page 275). Noting specific resemblances to Sidney's *Apology*, Springarn is struck by the fact that: "He differs from Sidney, however, in laying particular stress on the allegorical interpretation of imaginative literature" (page 276). Needless to say, Harington knew that he was taking sides, not only in a literary, but in a theological controversy when he "discusses in detail, the mediaeval conception of the three meanings of poetry, the literal, the moral, and the allegorical" (page 276). A very useful discussion of "The Four Senses of Scriptural Interpretation and the Medieval Theory of Preaching," not noted earlier, is given by H. Caplan in *Speculum* 4 (1929), pages 282–290. The bibliography is particularly good.

Mr. Willey has, I think, misconceived the *Mythomystes* of Henry Reynolds (*The Seventeenth Century Background*, pages 209–210). Reynolds is far from being a friend of Bacon's mode of exegesis: "What shall we make of such willing contradictions, when a man to vent a few fancies of his owne shall tell vs first, they are the wisdome of the Auncients, and next, that those Auncient fables were but meere fables ... and then scornefully and contemptuously (as if all Poetry were but Play-vanity) shut vp that discourse of his of Poetry with *It is not good to stay too long in the Theater*" (J. E. Spingarn, *Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century*, I page 177). Reynolds' attack on "the moderns" is an attack on tropological or moralistic exegesis of the Ramistic and Calvinist kind. Somewhat guardedly, he attacks Sidney, Spenser, and Daniel because they reduce poetry to morality and ethical patterns of virtue, neglecting the ancient functions of poetry as divinity and as expression of the arcana of the universe (*ibid.*, page 147). Pico della Mirandola, the life-long model of Thomas More, is his ideal exegetist (page 151). The moderns have eviscerated the precious depths of ancient wisdom by their arrogant notion of literal and moral interpretation. Suppose, he says, a great scholar and spirit were

not merely the ideals of ancient *grammatica* as the basis of Scriptural exegesis which Nashe was asserting. In a passage of *Strange Newes* he states the plenary ideal of Ciceronian eloquence, showing his full awareness of the way in which the Fathers had adapted Cicero to the needs of Christian preaching (1.292.33–296.27). And it is most worthy of note that the men with whom Nashe's style was most frequently compared are especially brought forward as orators to be considered within the scope of this scheme of eloquence (1.284.1–285.20). Lucian, Petrarch, Aretine, Pasquil "admirably blest in the abundant gifts of art and nature," they interfused "delight with reprehension" in their inventions (1.285.11–14). So the preacher must beware lest he expound "all Lawe and no Gospell" or "all gall and no spleene" (1.285.4–5). Nashe is even more explicit in *Christs Teares*, itself an elaborate sermon in the patristic manner, when he mentions the "many cow-baby-bawlers and heauy-gated lumberers" who have stumbled into the ministry "vnder thys colledge or that Halls commendation" (2.123.24–26), persecuting their audiences with "balde Sermons" (2.123.27): "They boldly will vsurpe Moyses chayre, without anie study or preparation.... They sweat, they blunder, they bounce and plunge in the Pulpit, but all is voyce and no substance:... Scripture peraduenture they come of thicke and three-folde with, but it is so vgly daubed, plaistred, and patcht on, so peeuishly speckt and applyde, as if a Botcher (with a number of Satten and Veluette shreddes) should cloute and mend Leather-doublets and Cloth-breeches."[29]

The way to change this, says Nashe, is obvious: "Turne ouer the auncient Fathers, and marke how sweete and honny-some they are in the mouth and how musicall and melodious in the eare. No Orator was euer more pleasingly perswasiue then humble Saint Augustine.... It is superaboundance of witte that makes Atheists: wil you then hope to beate them down with fusty brown-bread dorbellisme?"[30]

True eloquence is founded, not only on a knowledge of grammar and rhetoric, of poets and orators. If one is to convince atheists, says Nashe employing the age-old patristic argument: "All antique hystories you must haue at your fingers-end. No Phylosophers confession or opinion of God

to undertake a worthy and profound exegesis of ancient myth and the Scriptures: "...I would faine know who they are that would be ... fit readers now a dayes of such a Treatise?" (page 172). Making it quite clear that he is strongly anti-Ramist and Calvinist, and that he belongs to the school of Alexandrian exegesis, he cites St. Augustine (page 174).

27. See 1.272.25–273.21, where Nashe delivers a full-dress attack on the Ramistry of Richard Harvey, supporting his attack with ludicrous examples of exegesis achieved by the help of Ramus. In *Christs Teares*, Nashe is much concerned with patristic exegesis, as we shall see. He makes it a flat condemnation of the Ramistic method: "Scripture as it may be literally expounded and sophisticallie scande, may play the Harbinger as well for Hell as Heauen, and sooner feedes Despayre than Faith" (2.39.35–40.3). "Literally expounded" signifies rhetorical exegesis, while "sophisticallie scande" designates a dialectical organization of this literal by-product. Earlier Nashe cites St. Jerome as the exponent of the simple style of grammatical exegesis. Agrippa was, of course, the exponent of the Alexandrian school of exegesis in which full play is allowed to allegory. Nashe implies this fact in citing Agrippa and in hinting that his *Lenten Stuffe* is in the same mode (3.221.6–24). This pamphlet is, indeed, a remarkable *tour de force* of allegorical method, by itself testifying to Nashe's considerable study of exegesis.

In *Christs Teares* Nashe points out "If but one lyne (thy house shall be left desolate unto thee) included all this, what doth the whole Scripture include?... It is a quiuer of short Arrowes, which neuer shewe theyr length till they be full shotte out,... a close winded clue, conducting those that deale vnaduisedlie with it, into the Minotaurs Laborinth of payne euerlasting" (2.79.30–80.3). Nashe has, himself, been conducting an elaborate exegesis. He then turns to reprove the excesses, as well as the blindness of the "Cabalizers" (2.80.4–12), showing a practitioner's familiarity with this highly technical branch of learning.

that you are to be ignorant in. Ethnicks with their own Ethnick weapons you must assayle. Infinite laborinths of bookes he must runne thorough, that will be a compleate Champion in Christs Church" (2.125.1–6). Then, with direct reference to the compendious methods of universal application of Peter Ramus: "Let not sloth-fauouring innouation abuse you. Christ when he sayd, you must forsake all and follow him, meant not you should forsake all Artes and follow him" (2.125.6–9). For "Humaine Artes are the steppes and degrees Christ hath prescribed and assign'd vs, to climbe vp to heauen of Artes by, which is Diuinity."[31]

It is small wonder that the publication of *Christs Teares* should have brought Nashe into the serious trouble which McKerrow notes (5.25). In view of the power of the Calvinists in Cambridge and in London, and in view of Nashe's violence in assaulting every principle of exegesis and preaching they held, to say nothing of his flaunting the contrary principles and practice in his pamphlets, it is truly wonderful that Nashe survived as long as he did. Written about the same time, and published only a few months later, *The Unfortunate Traveller* really repeats the same attacks as *Christs Teares*. The mode of the attacks is different; but this celebrated "narrative" is noth ing if not a blow struck in a heated theological controversy. Setting aside the lengthy burlesque exegesis which Nashe provides for the armorial devices of the knights who oppose Surrey (2.271.21–278.3), let us proceed to the basic episodes of the work, the account of the Munsterites and the celebration at Wittenburg: "Peace, peace there in the belfrie, seruice begins: vpon their knees before they ioine fals Iohn Leiden and his fraternitie verie deuoutly, they pray, they howle they expostulate with God to grant them victorie, and vse such vnspeakable vehemence a man wold thinke them the onley wel bent men vnder heauen" (2.234.5–10). Nashe then begins a lengthy exegetical argument which is directly aimed at the Calvinists of England. The Munsterites were no very remote or obscure type of the doctrines and men who were gaining ground at Cambridge and in London: "These Anabaptists had not yet forsooke all and followed Christ, they had not forsooke their owne desires of reuenge and innouation..." (2.239.26–28). That the very

Christs Teares, like most of Nashe's works, contains a bitter attack on "hotte-spurd Diuines" (2.124.5–6)—that is, the Ramists "that count a little smattring in liberall Artes and the reading ouer the Bible with a late Comment, sufficient to make a Father of Diuines" (2.122.7–9). There is a passage in *Love's Labour's Lost* which seems to reflect directly on the pretensions of Ramism: Armado says, "I have promis'd to study three years with the Duke." Moth retorts: "You may do it in an hour sir" (I.ii, 33–34).

28. With these passages compare the preface to *Menaphon* concerning "abject abbreuiations of Arts" (3.318.11) which recommended Ramus to "the upstart discipline of our reformatorie Churchmen, who account wit vanitie, and poetry impiety:..." (3.321.1–3). See also 3.313.1; 318.1–32. It has too long been held that the Puritan attack on learning and eloquence was merely the misdirected piety of simple enthusiasts. It was the learned attack on learning that alarmed Nashe and his contemporaries. The learned attack was organized by a representative of a degenerate scholasticism; so the sixteenth century quarrel has many features in common with that of the Middle Ages.
29. (2.123.28–124.4). The reference seems to be to Harvey again, and to Greene's attack on the ropemaker's sons in his *Upstart Courtier*. Nashe is merely glancing aside for a casual joke at Harvey's Ramism and its allied cult of heroic virtue. He is saying that no more can a good sermon be made on Ramistic lines than a gentleman be made by means of such a plan of education.
30. See 2.124.23–32. Again Nashe makes plain that a principal charge against the Ramists is their scholastic barbarism. In the dedication to *Have With You* he accuses "Astrological Dick" Harvey of barbarism and of ignorance of the Fathers. He puts it ironically by saying that Harvey is so humble and self-denying that he has put "aside all worldly encumbrances and plesant conversing with Saint *Austen, Ierome, Chrisostome*" and mortifies himself by traversing "the subtile distinctions twixt *short cut* and *long taile*" (3.8.25–31).

armament of the Munsterites is intended to ridicule the intellectual equipment of the English Calvinists is fairly plain: "Verie deuout Asses they were, for all they were so dunstically set forth ..." (2.233.9–10). Harvey is thrown in amongst them (2.241.11).

The transition to Wittenburg from the "Munsterian conflict" is by way of praising Surrey and poets: "As sweet Angelicall queristers they are continually conuersant in the Heauen of Arts: ..." (2.242.20–21). That Nashe is alluding to divinity is evident from the context and from his earlier explicit assertion that divinity is the heaven of arts (2.125.9). It is in this connection that Erasmus and More are introduced (2.245.20–26). Nashe had previously brought in "that aged father Erasmus" (3.316.30) along with Elyot and More, as a preliminary to his attack on the theological abuses of Cambridge. Their witty and satirical eloquence is pointed to, and their determined advocacy of the old patristic theology is implied. There is no need here for a detailed exposition of what happens at the "verie solemne scholasticall entertainment" (2.246.12). It is a very full illustration of Nashe's position as a supporter of the party of Erasmus and the Fathers against Ramus and the Calvinistic schoolmen. The point about the "rather ruthfull oration ... peecemeale stolne out of Tully" (2.246.23–25), is that Ramistic rhetoric naturally lent itself to patchwork.[32] Whereas true eloquence according to Cicero was the product of learning and wisdom, Ramus taught that one need only seek the forms of natural reasoning in the poets and orators, to which, if need be, one added the cosmetic of phrase and elocution. One has only to look at the style of the *Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum*, in which scholastic theologians are represented as affectedly trying to snatch a grace beyond the reach of art, to see the purport and technique of Nashe.[33] The description of Vanderhulke's appearance, like that of the Anabaptists, is a figurative representation of the dunsticall barbarousness of their intellectual equipment. The play of *Acolastus* "filthily acted" (2.249.25) exhibits the incompetence of these dialecticians even at the grammar-school level. These scholastic revels are ended by Agrippa's conjuring up Cicero at the request of Erasmus.

31. See 1.125.34–36. *Cf.* Nashe's praise of Lancelot Andrewes for his vast erudition and for his "powerfull preaching like Paul out of his chaire;... the absolutest Oracle of all sound Deuinitie heere amongst vs: hee mixing the two seuerall properties of an Orator and a Poet both in one, which is not onely to perswade, but to win admiration" (3.105.15–22). See also 1.307.23–28. The subordination of the arts to divinity, as well as traditional caution concerning excess in poetry and dialectics, is expressed by Nashe in *The Anatomie* (1.48.31–49.9). To the same effect is the exemplum from the confessions of St. Augustine (2.88.9–33).
32. "No inuention or matter haue they of ther owne, but tack vp a stile of his stale galymafries ... I pitie *Nizolius* that had nothing to do but pick thrids ends out of an olde ouerworne garment" (2.251–22–27). For some useful information about Nizolius, see Izora Scott, *Controversies over the Imitations of Cicero*, pages 103; 105; 119. R. P. McKeon makes it clear how Nizolius, presumably an extreme Ciceronian, could, like Harvey, be ranked with the Ramists. In his *De Veris Principiis et Vera Ratione Philosophandi contra Pseudophilosophos*, Liber III, cap. 3 (Parma, 1553), page 211, "...he argues that dialectic is a part of rhetoric, since it consists of only one of the five parts of rhetoric, namely discovery ... and finally he holds that rhetoric is a generall art and science under which are subsumed all other arts and sciences ..." "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," page 31, n. 1. Ramus made a similar claim for dialectics, but, like Nizolius, identified dialectics with a portion of rhetoric. The result was much the same in practice. Both claimed their art as the mode of Scriptural exegesis.
33. See Moore Smith's edition of [Wingfield's] *Pedantius* on Harvey's Ramism and his notions of oratory: pages xxxiv–xxxvi. With the Wittenburg oration compare the *Epistolae*, ed. Stokes, *op. cit.*, pages 221ff. The familiar Nashe technique of combining the high style with low images is constantly used by the authors of the *E. O. V.*, but with much less finesse than Nashe. Cf. *ibid.*, pages 349; 361; 366; 431. Another important feature which Nashe shares with the satirical technique of the *E. O. V.* is the

The way in which Nashe has set the stage at Wittenburg leaves nothing in doubt. The modern defenders of the old theology are brought together to witness the new barbarism of the reformers. But the actors and stage properties here are exactly what we find throughout Nashe's writings. Nashe was, thus, a fully enlightened protagonist in an ancient quarrel whose origins we have carefully noted in the time of Abelard and John of Salisbury. It was not a quarrel between Catholic and Protestant, but a dispute about methods of exegesis in theology and preaching, concerning which some Catholics and Protestants held patristic views and some held to scholastic positions. Thus Nashe could claim Erasmus, More, Rabelais, Aretino, and Agrippa on his side without being accused of Catholic views; and he could, with perfect consistence, describe the Calvinist position of the Harveys, with its seemingly "advanced" character, as nothing but "drifat duncerie" borrowed from medieval scholastic philosophy. Thus McKerrow is wholly wrong in saying: "The conclusion of the whole matter is to be found in the order of Whitgift and Bancroft given on June 1, 1599,..." (5.110). The Civil Wars which lay just ahead did not conclude the matter. It is not yet concluded, nor is it likely to be; but the ecclesiastical order against "all Nashes bookes and Doctor Harvyes bookes" can now be seen in its true significance.

The particular techniques which Nashe employed in his conduct of this dispute remain to be indicated in the section on rhetoric.

4A

226

introduction into Vanderhulke's oration of absurd etymologies. The dialecticians had treated grammar as a speculative study rather than an empirical one. Fantastic etymologies resulted. Etymology was a traditional mode of dialectical definition and argument which these dialecticians also considered to be a means of rhetorical ornament.

CHAPTER FOUR

B. DIALECTICS

THOMAS NASHE

If the rivalry between dialectics and rhetoric was, as noted earlier, so often and so essentially a rivalry with respect to authority, it is relevant to learn in this chapter, with respect to methodology, and the full implications of this for a revitalized and integrated trivium, the proportional analogy that McLuhan presents:

EXEMPLUM : RHETORIC :: INDUCTION : LOGIC.

—(Editor)

This section should contain a discussion of the stages by which the dialectics of Peter Ramus emerged from the tradition of William of Ockham. Such a problem is for the professional philosopher to solve. At present R. P. McKeon is engaged on such a study of Ramus, and the results of his investigation cannot but be of the greatest assistance to the literary historian. This section should also contain a description of the status of Aristotelian logic at Oxford and Cambridge in this period; but preliminary work by the professional logician likewise remains to be done in this matter. It is sufficient to note here that Nashe's defence of Aristotle is always with reference to Ramus. It never commits Nashe to the monopoly position which Aristotle held in some of the late medieval schools[1] But the responsible historian should guard himself from repeating the opinion that "the authority of Aristotle" was absolute at any time in the history of European thought.[2]

It might be well to note briefly that Nashe was fully aware of the traditional quarrels between grammar and dialectics or poetry and philosophy. He applauds Aristophanes for sustaining the poets' side in the ancient dispute (1.285.9–12). Similarly, in his reference to "Chaucer, Lydgate, Gower, with such like, that liued vnder the tyranny of ignorance" (3.322.22–23). Nashe means not ignorance of dialectics but of classical grammatica. So, when Nashe praises the poets for having cleansed English of barbarism (1.193.15–20), he means the dunsticall, inkhorn terms of scholastic grammatica and dialectics (1.316.3–317.10). Nashe may even be alluding to the old tradition of *translatio studii* in speaking of Art as "a banisht Queene into this barraine soile, hauing monarchizd it so long amongst the Greeks and Romanes, ..." (1.317.5–7). The words "dunce" and "barbarism" are not loose terms of vague application with Nashe. His observation that "overflowing barbarism" had "withdrawne to her Scottish Northren chanell" (1.316.35–36) is a reference to the inveterate scholasticism of Scotland in his own day.[3] Milton uses the word "barbarous" in this sense in his sonnet:

1. See Nashe's statement, 1.27.4–13.
2. G. B. Phelan has recently drawn attention to the fact that "the tangle of conflicting philosophical doctrines current in the thirteenth century" were "doctrines stemming, for the most part, from Plotinus much as our modern systems stem from Kant." "St. Thomas and the Modern Mind" in *The Modern Schoolman* 20 (1942), page 40. The synthesis effected by St. Thomas between Plato and Aristotle failed completely, so far as later medieval and Renaissance thought were concerned, to bring order into that chaos. Proportionately, Aristotle failed to have any influence on the ancient world. Modern thought, such as that of Ramus, Bacon, and Descartes, stems from the Platonic and Plotinian branches of medieval philosophy.
3. The same point is urged in *The Returne from Parnassus* (Macray, op. cit., page 60).

I did but prompt the age to quit their clogs
By the known rules of ancient liberty,
When straight a barbarous noise environs me
Of owls and cuckoos, asses, apes and dogs.

The previous sonnet, "A book was writ..." on the same theme contrasts the scholastic learning of the Scots with that taught once at Cambridge by Sir John Cheke. Like Nashe, Milton is lamenting the hostility to ancient grammatica.[4]

Like Erasmus, More, and Rabelais, Nashe represents the medieval romances as written under the tyranny of ignorance. And S. L. Wolff notes (*op. cit.*, page 459) that Nashe makes no use whatever of the Greek romances so dear to Sidney and others. Sir Sidney Lee is right, I believe, in suggesting (D. N. B.) that in *The Unfortunate Traveller* Nashe is satirizing medieval romances. It is part of his attack on Duns and Dorbel and the Calvinists. Whether it is, also, an attack on the cult of heroic virtue fostered by Bruno and the Ramist rhetoricians is an important question which must be reserved for more investigation. But it is in this connection that Harvey's persistent efforts to pin medievalism on Nashe for his pamphlet of the Seven Deadly Sins (*Pierce Penilesse*) must be seen. Nashe in his turn dubs Harvey "the factor for Fairies and night Vrchins, in supplanting and setting aside the true children of the English, and suborning inkehorne changlings in their steade,..." (1.317.26–29).[5]

As for Nashe's practical skill in dialectical argument, there is abundant material in his writings to make it a special study. The very form of much of his satire committed him for the most part to rhetorical argument, to praise and blame and to paradox for the sake of ridicule. A good example of dialectical proof is to be found in *Christs Teares* (2.34.8–19). Moreover, the frequency of *sententiae* in that sermon lends it, more than any of Nashe's other work, a dialectical character; for maxims and sentences, as Aristotle pointed out in his rhetoric (II, 21), are the conclusions of enthymemes and their premises after the syllogistic form has been done away. But the very

4. In *A Knight's Conjuring*, Dekker represents Nashe as newly arrived in the Elysian fields, and telling Marlowe, Greene, and Peele "that Barbarisme was now growne to bee an Epidemiall disease" (5.152). St. John's patrist, "learned Watson," is also present.
5. Nashe makes explicit the relation between this banter about romances and the current theological controversy in *The Anatomie* (1.11.1–15).

forms which Nashe chose to employ in his satire cut him off from the sententiousness so dear to the anti-Ciceronians.

The relative absence of the sententious form from Nashe's work led McKerrow to suppose that one sententious passage in *The Anatomie* must have been lifted by Nashe from somebody else (1.42.11–43.26). Yet the whole passage is cleverly constructed so as to conclude with an apparently casual abolition of the claims of Ramus (1.43.29–34). In view of the very special use that Nashe is making of this series of sentences (and that he is fully aware of his change of mode and pace is evident from his remark: "Heed what *Chrisippus* saith in his prouerbs, ...") it matters not at all whether they are original with him or not. Moreover, in the lengthy discussion concerning physical health which precedes these strictures concerning integrity of mind and studies, Nashe is introducing a dialectical disputation (1.39.27–42.37) which he concludes: "... Why am I so large in disputing of the diet of our bodies ..." (1.42.2–3). Throughout his work Nashe employs the *exemplum* as a mode of proof, as 1.18.5–19.36, where there are a whole group in series for argumentation. All rhetoricians recognized that the *exemplum* was to rhetoric what induction was to logic.[6]

A curious illustration of Nashe's full awareness of the philosophical aspect of his craft occurs in *Christs Teares*. Before killing and eating her own child, Miriam, the Jewish matron, is given a long *prosopopoeia* (2.71.21–75.21) on which Nashe lavishes a series of sophistries: "Not hate, but hunger, taught Miriam to forgette mother-hood. To this purport conceite her discoursing with herselfe" (2.71.18–20). Sophistry was recognized as an art necessary for all good men to master in order that they might detect and refute it. Just as sophistry serves to heighten horror in *Christs Teares*, it serves to heighten comedy in *Have With You* (3.59.21–60.5) and is also a means of scoffing at Harvey's reputedly insufficient training in logic (1.278.22–26).

6. A few of the very numerous occasions on which Nashe employs the *exemplum* in the mode of rhetorical argumentation are as follows:

   1.32.18–33.17; 38.20–39.26; 174.33–175.12; 356.33–357.14; 371.10–372.24; 383.8–28;

   2.39.15–41.7; 210.1; 268.33–269.5;

   3.168.19–25.

CHAPTER FOUR

C. RHETORIC

THOMAS NASHE



Nashe's status must be determined in the "character and purpose of his rhetoric," McLuhan affirms, an observation recalling the foundational principle of the literary criticism he learned from I. A. Richards and others at Cambridge: analysis guided by context and purpose. He offers massive documentation from Nashe's texts, amid which, somewhat obscured, is the demonstration of how Nashe traps Harvey and protects himself, the notion of figures of emotion (added to the previously presented distinction between figures of speech and figures of thought), the criteria for finding method and clarity in Nashe.

Passing reference to the second sophistic movement of Roman literature (circa 0–400 CE), made much earlier in the work, is now made explicit in several passages and assumes a privileged place in the closing lines, where James Joyce is dubbed "a successful devotee of the second sophistic." McLuhan's phrase "fantastic grandness," used earlier in the chapter to characterize the second sophistic, constitutes a link between Joyce and Nashe. For McLuhan the advent of Joyce is a harbinger of hope that Nashe, and all Elizabethan literature can be revitalized by the recognition that they are most profitably studied in the context of a revitalized trivium.

—(Editor)

Nashe regarded himself as a professional orator and so did his contemporaries. In a familiar passage of *Foure Letters*, Harvey offers a "friendly" hand to Nashe urging him to "an Experimente of profounde and diuine arte, as I would compassionately recommend to euery amiable minde, disguised with hellishe passion: the foulest deformity of any fayre wit" (*Works*, 1, page 216). He is alluding to the paradoxical disguise which Nashe assumed as the Devils orator in *Pierce Penilesse*, and also to the fact that Nashe's vein was, indeed, passion. To be *tragicus orator* was his professed aim: "Know it is my true vaine to be *tragicus Orator*, and of all stiles I most affect and strive to imitate *Aretines*, not caring for this demure soft *mediocre genus*..." (3.152.7–10).[1] Harvey's phrase "diuine arte" signifies his full awareness that Nashe is a skirmisher in theology, employing a specific mode of eloquence associated with a specific mode of theology. Harvey makes this more plain, after a mock reference to Nashe's "dreadfull inuincible termes, steeped in *Aquafortis*, and Gunpowder." (page 216) He says: "Good Lorde, what fantasticall panges are these? Who euer endighted in such a stile, but one diuine *Aretine* in Italy, & two heauenly *Tarletons* in England: the sole platformers of odd Elocution,... Two of them, that so wantonly played with the highest and deepest subiectes of spirituall contemplation ... know their local repose: and seriously admonish the third, to be aduised how he lauish in such dalliance" (page 217). The menace in these words is unmistakable: Aretine and Greene are dead, and Nashe is in danger. However, the matter of main interest is this. Harvey accuses Nashe of using the high style for high matters of divinity which it would be best that he left alone. He goes on to say that there are many other subjects of rhetorical invention though they "arreare not vayne Hyperboles of the reuerende mysteries of God" (page 217).[2]

Next comes the plea that Nashe should turn his rhetorical skill and his devotion to divinity to other purposes: "Good sweete Oratour, be a diuine Poet indeede: and vse heauenly Eloquence indeede:..." (page 217). That is, Harvey says that Nashe should turn from divinity or theology to divine poesy. In the second sense "divine" is figuratively used: "...employ thy golden talent with amounting vsance indeede: and with heroicall Cantoes honour

1. See 3.312.15–29 where Nashe speaks of *Menaphon* as in middle style, and scoffs at the efforts of "seruing-men" to achieve the *sublime dicendi genus*. (3.314–7–8). Nashe's statement about being *tragicus orator* is to be taken literally, in so far as it signified in his time themes of passion treated in the high style. "Passion" in all its modes was the bane of the "Attic" party of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The attack on rhetoric was thus part of the stoic creed of the Atticists. The familiar pathos and ethos distinction was basic for the Renaissance (see Varchi quoted by Spingarn in *Literary Criticism in the Renaissance*, page 41) and lies behind the advice which Harvey gave Nashe in urging him to change his style. (*Works* I, page 217)
2. Harvey's own statement in *A New Letter of Notable Contents* is fairly plain about the repeated collocation of divinity and Aretine, Rabelais, Julian, Lucian, etc. Nashe is "the *Diuels Oratour*, and *Christes Chauncellour*. Though *Greene* were a Iulian, and *Marlow* a Lucian: yet I would be loth, He should be an Aretin: that Paraphrased the inestimable bookes of Moses, and discoursed the Capricious Dialogues of rankest Bawdry:..." (*Works*, I, pages 289–290).

right Vertue, & braue valour indeede: as noble Sir Philip Sidney and gentle Maister Spencer haue done, with immortall Fame: ..." (pages 217–218).

This invitation must have produced a snort of scorn from Nashe who understood its implications very well. Both the *Faerie Queene* and the *Arcadia* are epics written with definite political bearings in "an Age of Pollicy." Something of what is in Harvey's mind is expressed a little further on. He is lamenting that he should have been involved in controversy: "Alas he is pitifully bestead, that in an Age of Pollicy, and in a world of Industry, (wherein the greatest matters of Gouernement, and Valour, seem small to aspiring capacities) is constrained to make woeful Greene, and beggarly Pierce Pennylesse, (as it were a Grashopper, and a Cricket, two pretty musitians, but silly creatures) the argumente of his stile: ..." (pages 222–223).

Putting aside for the moment the relation of this to Sidney and Spenser, is it strange that Nashe should have ridiculed the profound Machiavellian who wrote: "... Fortune is a fauourable Lady to some forward aduenturers: they may easely swim, that are holden vp by the chinne; ..." (page 227). But serious implications lay behind Nashe's ridicule. Harvey goes on to say that while his deserts have been overlooked [*sic*], the real point at issue is not his own fortune but the method of training aspiring capacities: "... no Education to the Trainement of Cyrus: nor any proceeding, to the emploiment of Cesar" (page 227). Sidney held Xenophon's *Cyrus* to be an heroic poem: "For Xenophon, who did imitate so excellently as to give vs *effigiem iusti imperii* ... made therein an absolute heroicall Poem" (G. Gregory Smith, *Elizabethan Critical Essays*, 1, page 160). Poetry exceeds philosophy because it is more utilitarian: "... the one giueth the precept, and the other the example" (*ibid.*, page 163).[3] It is for this very Ramistic reason that Milton held Spenser a "better teacher than Aquinas." For according to Ramus philosophy is for use. If poetry is more useful than philosophy, it is also more philosophical. This is Sidney's claim. It is also the meaning of the following passage from Harvey's third letter which bears on the warning advice to Nashe which has been cited: "Pregnant rules auail much; but visible Examples amount incredibly: Experience, the onely life of perfection & onely perfection

3. Sidney even regards More's *Utopia* as an heroic poem: "... for that way of patterning a Commonwealth was most absolute, though hee perchaunce hath not so absolutely perfourmed it: for the question is, whether the fayned image of Poesie or the regular instruction of Philosophy hath the more force in teaching: ..." (*ibid*, page 166).

It is noteworthy that Sidney's assertion, that "the ending end of all earthly learning being vertuous action, those skilles that most serve to bring forth that haue a most iust title to bee Princes ouer all the rest" (page 161), is superficially Ciceronian. All arts should subserve "the highest end of the mistres knowledge, by the Greekes called *Arkitecktonike*, which stands (as I thinke in the knowledge of a mans selfe, in the Ethicke and politick consideration ..." (*loc. cit.*). Learning does not subserve eloquence, as with Cicero, but the architecture of one's fortune, and those of the state. Hence the importance of the Poets and Orators of antiquity, according to Ramus, for all the best patterns of reason and action are exhibited in their works. It must be insisted that Sidney's blend of Ramism with the common arguments in defence of poetry constitutes a document whose elucidation remains to be given.

It has not been noticed that Gosson's *Schoole of Abuse* (1579) must have caused Sidney serious embarrassment since it is professedly a Ramist tract dedicated to a Ramist. The very title of the work advertises its Ramistic basis: "... ouerthrowing their Bulwarkes, by Prophane writers, naturall reason, and common Experience ..." (Smith, *op. cit.*, I, page 61). What was meant by "Naturall reason" to a Ramist is exactly what Gosson alleges: "... revealed theology, which was the supreme example of the argument inartificial. Ramus explained that such arguments are of little use for investigating the nature of things, but are of great value in civil and human affairs, where much must rest upon testimony" (Miller, *The New England Mind*, page 130). "Profane writers" and "common experience" are likewise urged in a Ramistic sense which need not be explained here. If one examines *The Defence of Poetry* by Thomas Lodge, written in direct reproof of Gosson, the opening sentences are a patristic

of life. Whatsoeuer occasion causeth me to be mistaken, as ouer-much addicted to Theory, without respect of action;... I neuer made account of any study, meditation, conference, or Exercise, that importeth not effectual vse, & that aymeth not altogether at action: as the singular marke, whereat euery Art, and euery vertue is to leuell" (pages 227–228).

An important divergence existed between the rhetorical aims of Nashe and those of the Ramist party. The Ramists were frankly substituting poetry for philosophy and ethics. Of course, expression or elocution is, in this scheme, merely adventitious. Poetry excels philosophy because in it one finds the virginal, archetypal patterns of natural, unsophisticated reason: "But it is that fayning notable images of vertues, vices, or what els, with that delightfull teaching, which must be the right describing note to know a Poet by:..." (Sidney, [Smith, *op. cit.*,] page 160). Nashe asserts the more traditional view that the function of poetry is to praise virtue and blame vice, to whip the follies of the age and to render abuses ridiculous. It is for this reason, as we shall see, that he was correctly dubbed "young Juvenall." The important fact which enables us to see why his position should have been assailed by Harvey is that Ramistic philosophy and theology were strongly opposed to these doctrines of Nashe and his party.[4] It is an ironical reflection that the theory and practice of Sidney should have been carried out by Scudéry, Davenant, Chamberlayne, Blackmore, and Richardson (for Sir Charles Grandison and his Victorian melodramatic progeny are the middle-class versions of these aristocratic patterns) while the seemingly eccentric Nashe is in the line of Butler, Dryden, Boileau, Pope, Johnson, Crabbe, and Austen. Until a great deal more study has been given these questions, we are not likely to appreciate the significance of a large part of European literature,—not even so basic a part of it as *Don Quixote*.

The subject of satire or *vituperatio*, which divided the ranks of the rhetoricians in Nashe's day, has an ancient history. Before Christian times the diatribe had become almost a literary genre, as M. Oltramare has shown in *Les Origines de la diatribe romaine*.[5] More important for an understanding of how Nashe's technique of railing could in itself be the badge of a theological

gauntlet flung in Gosson's face. The arguments against the Ramistic concept of authority or testimony are carefully stated in the grammatical mode of Pliny and the Fathers (Smith, *op. cit.*, I, page 63). "Erasmus will make that the path waye to knowledge which you disprayse; and no mean fathers vouchsafe in their seriouse questiones of deuinitie to inserte poeticall sensures." Immediately following this is the charge of futility against "your dunce doctors" (page 67). Then Lodge alleges Augustine: "...his zeale was in setting vp of the house of God, not in affectate eloquence;..." (page 70). David, Isaiah, Job, Solomon, Josephus, St. Jerome, Origen, Cassiodorus, Ambrose, Lactantius, and Paulinus "voutsafed poetical practises" or "say that all the beginning of Poetrye proceeded from the Scripture" (page 71). Even Donatus, the favourite of Erasmus, and his model in exegesis, is alleged in behalf of poetry and comedy (page 80). Lodge casts the same gibe at Gosson as Nashe later did at Harvey: "Out of what booke patched you out Cicero's Oration?" All this makes manifest the theological basis of this quarrel in the clash between grammar and dialectics.

4. Nashe explicitly replies to Harvey's attack on his mode of satire in *Strange Newes: "Tully, Horace, Archilochous, Aristophanes, Lucian, Iulian, Aretine*, goe for no paiment with you; their declamatory stiles, brought to the grand test of your iudgement, are found counterfeit, *they are a venomous and viperous brood of railers*, because they haue broght in a new kind of a quicke fight, which your decrepite slow-mouing capacitie cannot fadge with" (1.283.22–28). The theological implications of this passage have already been mentioned.
5. Geneva, 1926. See pages 45ff., in particular.

party is the testimony of M. Marrou that the Fathers freely borrowed the rhetorical methods of the Greeks and Romans for the vivid exhortation to virtue and the vilification of vice (*Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique*, pages 528–529). Likewise, the literary vendettas of the Fathers were urged by Filelfo in justifying his furious invectives against Poggio.[6] It is no accident that invectives of Erasmus, More, Rabelais, Aretine, and Agrippa proceed from the defenders of patristic theology any more than that the anti-patristic and anti-Ciceronian writers should have presented a solid front against "railing."[7] J. M. Campbell points up the development of the diatribe in relation to the rhetoric of the second sophistic, showing how it contributed to the aims and methods of patristic eloquence, as well as how it clashed with the Attic schools of rhetoric.[8]

The diatribe, developing from the dialectical disputation of the dialogue form, became a popular form of declamation after the death of Alexander (page 5). "In the emptiness of the times it took to moralizing: pouncing upon the follies of men, reprehending them or ridiculing them. In this declamatory censoriousness it often hit upon a pathetic tone which now reminds one of a comedy and now of tragedy" (page 6). Campbell traces the development of this form "from Athens to the flourishing, populous cities of Asia Minor" (*loc. cit.*) where it became one of the most basic modes of Asiatic eloquence. He shows that of the two kinds of Asianism, the diatribe was naturally attracted to the second. The first sort, represented by Hegesias, was characterized by short sentences, and its devices of word order and assonance were of the kind we know from *Euphues*. It passed into the rhymed sermons of St. Hilary and St. Augustine (*ibid.*, pages 7–8).

The second Asiatic style led back to the old sophistic prose, to the "pathos and fantastic grandness" of Gorgias, Hippias, and Alcidamus, "varying in its degree of abuse according to the personality employing it" (page 9). It is well described by Cicero in *Brutus*, chap. 286, and by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in the *De Compositione Verborum*, chap. 18. Lucian was one of the most interesting links between this mode of florid prose with its satirical intention, as it was cultivated by St. Chrysostom and St. Basil, for example, in the fourth

6. Dawson, *The Making of Europe*, page 57.
7. Vives would seem to have been an exception, since he was a patrist who was vehement in his warnings against the use of rhetoric for such purposes (pages 116–117; 175–177; 184–185). His position is in many respects an equivocal one which needs clarification. The Ramists tended to regard him with approval (Smith, *op. cit.*, II, page 236). See F. A. Yates (*Love's Labour's Lost*, pages 39–40) for a typical anti-Ciceronian diatribe against diatribes by William Vaughan. The epistle of Richard Harvey to the Lamb of God carries a diatribe against invective in which Lucian, the model of Erasmus and More, is linked with Rabelais (McKerrow, 5.177). "*Rabelays* is no good reformer of Churches and States: if Saint *Augustine* be vnsufficient, *Lucian* is more vnmeete: ..." (5.178). The linkage of Rabelais, St. Augustine, and Lucian indicates the general lines along which the issues were drawn between the Ramists and the patrists. Harvey's long preliminary complaint against Martin's invectives would seem to be a red herring to draw off the charges of Puritanism against him; for it is not Martin but Nashe he is really striking at. Martin's low style had nothing in common with Rabelais and Lucian. In his *Plain Perceval* Richard hit out at the anti-Martinists: "...light fingred younkers, which make euery word a blow, and euery booke a bobbe" (5.75). It is important, then, to recognize that the frequent complaint against the styles of Lyly, Greene, and Nashe is not the discomfited whining of heavy-freighted pedants, but a clash between antipathetic notions of rhetoric, and, therefore, of theology—of theology and, therefore, of rhetoric (1.11.1–15). This explains why Gabriel Harvey is at pains to discredit Nashe's rhetorical aims and pretensions by associating them with what had little credit among men of learning in his day: "His gayest floorishes, are but Gascoignes weedes, or Tarletons trickes, or Greenes crankes, or Marlowes brauados: his iestes, but the dregges of common scurrilitie, or the shreds of the theater, or the of-scouring of new Pamflets, ..." (5.92). However, Harvey has borrowed these comparisons from Nashe who had said of Richard Harvey in *Pierce Penilesse*: "The Whole Vniuersitie hyst at

century. "Like his immediate predecessor, Menippus the satirist; the illustrious Neo-Platonist, Porphyry, in the third; and the orator, Libanius, in the fourth century, Lucian was Syrian by birth."[9]

Now, Libanius was the teacher of St. Chrysostom; and the importance of Lucian in the eyes of Erasmus, Aretino, More, and Nashe was directly related to the influence and congruity of his mode of satirical eloquence on the production of patristic eloquence. "During the sixteenth century sixty-five editions (in Greek or Latin) ... bore ample witness to the estimation in which he was held by the learned world" (*ibid.*, page xx). It is worth noting again that the dialogue form which Lucian preferred, and which Erasmus imitated, is directly linked to the old sophistic disputation which became the diatribe or satirical or panegyrical declamation. We shall return to discuss the specific rhetorical devices which Nashe shared with these writers.

In *Strange Newes* Nashe retorts to Harvey's charge: "Wherein haue I borrowed from *Greene* or *Tarlton, that I should thanke them for all I haue?*" (1.318.34–319.1). He goes on to mention his devotion to *Euphues* while he was at Cambridge, but he insists "that the vaine which I haue ... is of my owne begetting, and cals no man father in England but my selfe,..." (1.319.9–11). This, of course, is not to claim that his style may not have had fathers outside England. But Nashe is about to make what for us is an important declaration: "Thou saiest I profess the art of railing: thou shalt not say so in vaine, for, if there bee any art or depth in it, more than *Aretine* or *Agrippa* haue discouered or diu'd into, looke that I will sound it and search it to the vttermost, but ere I haue done with thee ile leaue thee the miserablest creature that the sunne euer sawe" (1.320.8–13).[10] In the same place Nashe gives a very specific notion of the function of his satire: "I feare-blast thee nowe but with the wind of my weapon. With the wast of my words I lay wast all the feeble fortifications of thy wit" (1.321.29–32).

In this last passage Nashe uses several figures. The metaphors of the first sentence are expanded into allegory in the second. *Paromoeon* (alliteration) occurs in both; and *polyptoton*, in the second, where "wast" is used in two senses. Metaphor, allegory, *paromoeon*, and *polyptoton* are the warp and

him, *Tarlton* at the Theator made iests of him, and *Elderton* consumd his ale-crammed nose to nothing in bearbayting him with whole bundles of ballets" (1.197.6–9).

8. *The Influence of the Second Sophistic on the Sermon Style of St. Basil the Great*, Washington, 1922.
9. H. Williams, in preface to *Lucian's Dialogues*, London, 1903; page xiii.
10. Note that Nashe follows this statement of his allegiance to the patristic satirical camp by challenging Harvey to prove that in *Pierce Penilesse* he was assaulting the Calvinist divines (1.320.23–321.9). Nashe is enjoying his triumph because the very allegorical modes of statement which Nashe employs require the techniques of exegesis which the Ramists execrate. The Ramists must practise on him the exegesis they deny to exist in order to detect his satire. Thus, much of Nashe's satire is by means of fable, enigma, and allegory in order to protect himself; but it is even more a refined means of insult and of raising exasperation.

woof of *Euphues* and of patristic eloquence."[11] There is, however, one figure here which may be said to characterize the sentence more than these and which justifies Nashe in disclaiming the influence of Lyly and Greene. It is hyperbole, the mark of the high style, and a figure of which Nashe was the master. It is not too much to say that if all the hyperboles were removed from Nashe's writings, they would lack their most distinctive feature. This fact was clearly recognized by his contemporaries in associating him with Aretino and Rabelais. In a letter to Spenser, Harvey cites Lucian, Petrarch, Aretino, and Pasquill as men "whose chiefest endeuour and drift was to haue nothing vulgare, but in some respecte or other, and especially in LIUELY HYPERBOLICALL AMPLIFICATIONS, rare, queint, and odde in euery pointe, and, as a man woulde saye, a degree or two at the leaste aboue the reach and compass of a common Schollers capacitie. In which respecte notwithstanding, as well for the singularitie of the manner as the Diuinitie of the matter, I hearde once a Diuine preferre SAINT JOHNS REUELATION ..."[12]

Another frank account of Nashe's style and aims occurs in *The Returne from Pernassus*. Ingenioso says that Nashe "I, heare is a fellow, *Iudicio*, that carryed the deadly stock[ado] in his pen, whose muse was armed with a gag-tooth and his pen possest with *Hercules* furies" (Macray, page 87). Later, Ingenioso says he is bound for the Ile of Dogges:

> There shall engoared venom be my inke,
> My pen a sharper quill of porcupine,
> My stayned paper, this sin loaden earth:[13]

When Aretino is mentioned, it is in connection with the hyperboles of John Marston:

> Tut, what cares he for modest close coucht termes,
> Cleanly to gird our looser libertines.

11. Nashe is nowhere more lavish of *paromoeon* or the "Letter leapper" (1.309.9) than in the long passage of *Christs Teares* where he is defending the full resources of profane eloquence in divinity: "... nay, what place is it in the Scripture, where the holie Ghost doth not stoope himself to our capacities, by humaine Metaphors & similitudes?... Vaunt you yee speake from the holy Ghost neuer so, if you speake not in the compasse of his five sences, hee will despise you, and floute you" (2.128.23–30). See the whole passage (2.123.28–129). With Nashe the "Letter leapper" is not to exhibit facility or curiosity but passion. It is a figure of emotion. The emotion is usually scorn or contempt. See especially:

    1.282.14–17; 304.20–21; 307.3–4; 307.23–24; 309.9; 309.25; 326.23–24;

    2.11.4; 11.7–9; 67.1–10; 122.19–20; 123.24; 124.1–4; 233.12–13; 314.20;

    3.42.15–25; 109.6–7; 123.4–5; 124.11; 160.12–13; 164.32–33; 185.16–24; 185.29–34; 194.3–35; 195–201; 201.8–204.9; 311.23–312.25; 321.3.

    Since Nashe uses this figure mainly for emotional emphasis, it naturally occurs most frequently in his satirical passages, in combination with hyperbole, ecphrasis, and paradox.

12. Smith, *op. cit.*, I, pages 114–115. In his note to page 47.17 Smith gives from the marginalia of Harvey the remark: "Aretinus voluit albis equis praecurrere, et esse vnicus in suo quodam hyperbolico genere:..." (I, page 35 9). Nashe did not fail to point out Harvey's inconsistency in approving the divinity and lively hyperboles of these men in 1580 and then abusing Nashe for imitating them in 1590: "... their declamatory stiles, brought to the grand test of your iudgement, are found counterfeit, *they are a venemous and viperous brood of railers*, because they haue broght in a new kind of quicke fight, which your decrepite slow-mouing capacitie cannot fadge with" (1.283.23–28). Nashe then cites Harvey's earlier praise of them (1.283.31–284.14) and proceeds to justify the Ciceronian tradition of satire and eloquence by which they were motivated (1.284.15–286.25).

Giue him plaine naked words stript from their shirts
That might beseeme plain dealing Aretine:

.....

Brings the great battering ram of tearmes to towns
And at the first volly of his Cannon shot,
Batters the walles of the old fustie world. (*ibid*, page 86)

This is to say, that for a sixteenth-century judge, Nashe and Marston had a good deal in common. Perhaps more than enough has been said to indicate that the *locus* of any solution for the problem of the professional and artistic status of Nashe must be sought in the character and purpose of his rhetoric. Although this is a subject of great extent, the most relevant facts can be stated quite briefly.[14]

In the first place Nashe had a definite philosophy of rhetoric and a precise notion of its function in the society of his day. He was consciously the moral satirist, employing, like Juvenal, the grand style. Sometimes he used the grand style in conjunction with low images; but when this occurs it is in accordance with a strict rhetorical decorum. In the second place Nashe borrowed his rhetorical equipment and purposes mainly from the great patristic exemplars of the styles of the second sophistic. Without a clear perception of his militant adherence of this patristic legacy, no method or clarity can be found in his work.

Concerning Nashe's philosophy of rhetoric something has already been said under *Grammar*. Nashe adopts the Ciceronian position that the orator must please: "*Tullie* never ouerreached himself in railing so much as in flatterie" (1.284.17–18); and "*Horace, Perseus, Iuuenall*, my poore iudgment lendeth you plentifull allowance of applause; yet had you,... mixt ... mirth and pleasure, your vnsugred pilles ... would not haue beene so harsh in the swallowing" (1.284.33–285.2).[15] In abusing the Calvinist sermons, Nashe notes of them: "... no wit to mooue, no passion to vrge, but onelye an ordinarie forme of preaching, blowne vp by vse of often hearing and speaking; and you shall finde there goes more exquisite paines and puritie of witte, to

13. Macray, *The Pilgrimage to Parnassus*, page 151. Ingenioso enters "with Iuuenall in his hand" and delivers a statement of the moral aims of satire, which, as we shall see, are those of Nashe, as well. Aretine is expressly associated with Juvenal (pages 80–81).
14. This, however, can only be done at the expense of scrapping more than nine-tenths of the material which has been gathered to illustrate this portion of the study of Nashe's prose. For example, dozens of rhetorical figures which are prominent in his writings will not be mentioned. Similarly, a complete digest of all the rhetorical figures as defined and illustrated by Wilson, Sherry, Rainolde, Puttenham, Peacham, Hoskins, Fraunce, Fenner, Day, and Butler, has been omitted. Maurice Evans' work has made this somewhat less necessary.
15. *Cf.* "Men are men, and with those thinges must be mooued... They must haue a little Sugar mixt with their soure Pylls of reproofe.... Turne ouer the auncient Fathers ... No Orator was euer more pleasingly perswasiue then humble Saint *Augustine*" (2.124.17–27).

I have not had time to re-examine differences of opinion about the vernacular; but the Ramist position gave more ground for optimism in this matter since copy and elocution were held by the Ramists to be matters very inferior to invention and judgment, or disposition. It is interesting to see Chapman taking this ground in his defence of his vernacular Homer. He despises Virgil for his slick elocution whereas Homer is "not onely all learning, gouernment, and wisedome ... but all wit, eleganeie, disposition and iudgement." (Smith, *op. cit.*, page 299. See also page 300.) This Ramist notion dominates the period of "neo-Classicism."

Partial confirmation of the probability that the Ramist-Ciceronian controversy lies behind the controversies about the vernacular is provided by the difference about rhyme between Campion and Daniel. Campion begins by announcing his staunch Ciceronianism: "... man excells all other creatures, in reason and speech: ..." (Smith, II, page 327). Next, rhyme is condemned on the authority of Cicero

the writing of one such rare Poem as *Rosamund*, than to a hundred of your dunsticall Sermons" (1.192.13–19). Harvey, the inkhorn dunce, supported only by Calvin and Ramus, cannot possibly achieve anything: "Squeise thy heart into thy inkehorne and it shall but congeal into clodderd garbage of confutation,... thou canst not sprinkle [thy soule] into a sentence, & make euerie line leap like a cup of neat wine new powred out, as an Orator must doe that lies aright in wait for mens affections."[16] Again: "When Christ said, *the kingdome of heauen must suffer violence*, hee meant not the violence ... of tedious inuectiue sermons without wit ..." (2.234.16–19). Many other remarks of Nashe to the same effect are directed against the doctrine of the plain style affected by the Calvinists, as 3.315.7–10 and 3.345.16–31. In the last place, Nashe says to Martin, "I will neuer subscribe to thy periode prescisme." "Prescisme" is at once directed against style and doctrine. Contrasting his style with Harvey's, Nashe says: "I ... make my stile carry a presse saile ..." (1.301.3–5).[17]

Wherever one looks in Nashe, one encounters the figures of the high style: metaphor, allegory, hyperbole, paradox, ecphrasis, and the dramatic devices which the rhetoricians referred to as prosopopoeia. Defending *Christs Teares*, his tour de force in the patristic manner which he published just before *The Unfortunate Traveller*, he says: "The ploddinger sort of vnlearned Zoilists about London exclaim that it is a puft-vp stile, and full of prophane eloquence:... I answer, that my stile is no otherwise puft up, then any mans should be which writes with any Spirite; ..." (2.183.22–30). He then alleges the doctrine of decorum: "[W]hom would not such a deuine subiect put a high rauishte Spirite into? For the prophanesse of my eloquence, so they may tearme the eloquence of Sainct *Austen*, *Ierome*, *Chrysostome*, prophane, since none of them but takes vnto him farre more liberty of Tropes, Figures, and Metaphors, and alleadging Heathen examples and Histories" (2.183.30–36).[18]

Nashe is frequently as explicit as a handbook of rhetoric in describing the function of elocution or rhetoric in composition. In reporting the events which befell "a Gentleman of good worship" (1.378.13–14), he says:

242 [*ibid.*, page 330.17–24]. Daniel replies with straight Ramist doctrine, not words but matter, not art but action and experience are the criteria: "It is not the contexture of words, but the effects of Action, that giues glory to the times:... and in all ages, though they were not Ciceronians, they knew the Art of men, which onely is Ars *Artium* ... they had the learning of Gouernement, and ordring their State; Eloquence inough to shew their iudgements" [*ibid.*, page 371.16–24]. Not only is practical experience here opposed to eloquence, but judgment is opposed to elocution or the "contexture of words." We need only recall that Ramus had split invention and judgment off from the traditional rhetoric, making them a separate art–an art which was really inseparable from practical experience.

There is a sidelight in this quarrel which is of great significance with regard to the earlier portion of this study in which I traced the *translatio studii* from Rome to England. Campion partly bases his arguments against rhyme on the conventional view that it belongs to the period of the Goths and Huns, the period of scholastic barbarism during which learning and language "lay most pitifully deformed till the time of Erasmus, Rewcline, Sir Thomas More, and other learned men ..." [*ibid.*, page 329.12–28]. Let us reflect that Nashe uses these arguments again and again in attacking Harvey and the Ramists or Calvinists. They represent the new barbarism. Because of the gravity of these charges, Daniel makes a great effort at refutation and produces a full-dress defence of the Middle Ages! He begins by showing that there was a genuine *translatio studii* from Roman to medieval times, and Petrarch is his proof [368.4–32]. Many others preceded Reuchlin and Erasmus [369.1–31]. He even brings in Bede, Aldhelm, and others [369.32–370.12]. Finally, Walter Map, Bracton, Roger Bacon, and William of Ockham are men of the greatest genius who "haue left behinde them monuments of most profounde iudgement and learning in all sciences! So that it is but the clowds gathered about our owne iudgement that makes vs thinke all other ages wrapt vp in mists ..." [370.16–19]. It seems that the heat of

"But to leaue amplifications and proceed:..." (1.380.35). So he proceeds to more amplifications, finally asseverating that "I borrowe no essential part from stretcht out inuention..." (1.382.3–4). That is, Nashe says he has amplified a simple theme "no bigger than an old Praeface" (1.382.22) by the virtuosity of his art: "...onely for the recreation of my Readers, whom loath to tyre with a course home-spunne tale,... heere and there I welt and garde it with allusiue exornations & comparisons:..." (1.382.5–9). "...since Truth is euer drawne and painted naked, and I haue lent her but a leathren patcht cloake at most to keepe her from the cold: that is, that she come not off too lamely and coldly" (1.382.14–18).

Nashe's concept of the decorum governing the use of figures is to be found in many places: "...for how euer I let fall my stile a little, to talke in reason with thee that hast none, I do not meane to let thee scape so" (1.197.24–26). As this implies, Nashe recognized that invective required the high style as well as panegyric. In fact, he has just completed a panegyric before this statement (1.193.5–194.3). He laughs at Harvey's efforts at managing invective: "...he barkt against mee as one of the enemies of the Lambe of God, and fetcht allusions out of the Buttery to debase mee" (1.262.21–23). And "...still he fetcheth Metaphors from Conny-catchers, & doth nothing but torment vs with tautologies" (1.299.28–30). As already indicated, Nashe's own invective is a combination of hyperbole with metaphors and comparisons fetched from the basest things: "We want an *Aretine* here among vs, that might strip these golden asses...and after he had ridden them to death with railing, leaue them on the dunghill for carion" (1.242.15–18).[19]

How decorum of image and subject is observed by Nashe in a much wider sense can be seen in the speech of Jack Wilton, the reformed prodigal. His speech is, at least, rhetorically decorous in its persistent aischrologia and scatologies. Jack Wilton, the Machiavellian fox, has contempt for everybody (2.210.20–21). The very description of his clothes by low metaphors indicates moral disapproval (2.227.10–33). Since Jack Wilton is probably an elaborate burlesque on the aspiring capacities of resolute politicians of the Harvey stamp, it is easier to understand why Nashe represents

partisan controversy could make even a sixteenth-century humanist relate historical facts when he was caught off guard. But only a Ramist and a Calvinist, aware of his debt to medieval scholasticism, could have uttered these words.

16. See 1.307.23–28. This last sentence contains much of Nashe in short compass. There is both praise and blame. The blame is delivered by hyperbole, and the vehicle of the hyperbole is an extended metaphor or allegory. The contempt is expressed by low images and underlined by parimion or alliteration. These figures occur in the last half of the sentence as well, except that the images are noble rather than ignoble.
17. See also 1.192.13–15 [quoted earlier], and 1.282.32–34: "Coldly and dully *idem per idem*, who cannot indite? But with life and spirit to limne deadnes it selfe, *Hoc est Oratoris proprium.*" "To limne deadnes it selfe" is a figure of paradox which we shall see typically combined with hyperbole and even enigma as a feature of the high style as understood by the orators of the second sophistic.
18. The last point about examples from history deserves a chapter to itself. In discussing Nashe's wide historical reading, McKerrow seems not to understand that such examples are a major resource of the rhetor (5.125). Woodward is, likewise, puzzled when confronted with the widespread insistence on history among the humanists who regarded it as indispensable training for the man of affairs. (*Desiderius Erasmus Concerning the Aim and Method of Education*, pages 128–132). For texts which explain the difficulties of McKerrow and Woodward, see the *De Ratione Studii* of Vives (trans. by F. Watson in *Vives and the Renascence Education of Women*, pages 241–250); Bacon, *Works* IV, pages 301–302; Peter Heyleyn cited by F. Watson in *The Beginnings of the Teaching of Modern Subjects in England*, pages 53–58; Braithwait, *ibid.*, page 69; Ross, *ibid.*, pages 60–61; and Milton's *Tractate on Education*. John Locke held the same views (S. S. Laurie, *Studies in the History of Educational Opinion from the Renaissance*, pages 215–216). In his discussion of "The Supremacy of Rhetoric" in Greek and Roman

him at once as reformed (2.217.12–13; 227.9–10) and depraved. For it is in art, as in the world, that we must, says Nashe, "let our speech accord with our life" (1.46.10–11).[20]

In the same tale the Earl of Surrey is accorded a speech or prosopopoeia in which he speaks in the high style befitting his rank and his poetic skill (2.243.9–245.19). The oration of Cutwolfe is naturally of a piece with the fantastic and hyperbolic villainies of his life (2.320.24–327.1). The running imagery of *Christs Teares* is, for reasons of decorum, unlike the rest of Nashe's imagery. It is mainly fetched from Scripture. Similarly, the hyperboles are seldom ludicrous here, and there is pathetic, rather than comic apostrophe. "I have nothing to spend on you but passion. A hundred vnfortunate farewels to fantasticall Satirisme" (2.212.3–5).[21]

Nashe uses the doctrine of decorum in arguing that the terrors of the night are more than those of day. (He is having a thoroughly good time slicing up the pretensions of "The School of Night," turning their own rhetoric inside out.)

> By night time came the Deluge ouer the face of the whole earth; by night time *Iudas* betrayed Christ, *Tarquin* rauisht *Lucretia*.
>
> When anie Poet would describe a horrible Tragicall accident; to adde the more probabilitie and credence vnto it, he dismally beginneth to tell, how it was darke night when it was done...
>
> Hence it is, that sinne generally throughout the scripture is called the workes of darknesse;... (1.386.4–13).

Decorum, or art, and nature are the same. Frequently Nashe makes witty allusions to rhetorical decorum when one would least expect it, as: "Now is the tyme that all Riuers must runne into the Sea, that whatsoeuer I haue in witte or eloquence must bee drayned to the delineament of wretchednesse" (2.63.1–3).[22] A few lines later he calls on God to "enlarge myne inuention and my memorie, sincerely and feelingly to rehearse the disornamenting of

education, J. F. D'Alton gives an excellent account of the subordination of history to rhetoric (*Roman Literary Theory and Criticism*, pages 491–524).

19. Since there is no need to insist on the obvious, I shall merely list a few of the very numerous instances of this aspect of Nashe's art:

    1.9.20–27; 27.24–26; 35.10–18 (with this allegory compare the famous 1.158.23–24 and note that the latter is used twice in *The Pilgrimage to Parnassus*, page 8, lines 34–36 and page 21, lines 38–40);

    1.221.5; 261–263; 306.14–15 (compare 1.158.13–14 where the same figure is used with a different intention and without the low image); 349.19–33; 361.29–373.36;

    2.227.10–33; 228.21–231.4; 231.5–232.2; 232.18–233.33; 255.30–31; 327;

    3.33.33–36; 34.1–36; 93.20–94.35; 98.20; 112.20–44; 126.10–16; 132.17–19; 133.12–13; 134.18–21.

    This is probably the best point at which to indicate Nashe's affinity with Juvenal. Strangely, when McKerrow was considering who Greene might have meant by "yong Iuuenall, that byting Satyrist" (5.143–4) he did not consider other references to Nashe as Juvenal than that of Francis Meres (5.148). This note can be much shortened by referring to a fine study of *The Grand Style in the Satires of Juvenal* by Gertrude Scott (Northampton Mass., 1927). The purpose of the grand style, and the decorum determining its use is "ad permovendos et convertendos animos" (page 12). As Nashe put it, "... no speech or words of any power or force to confute or perswade but must bee swelling and boystrous" (2.184.4–6). This genus *grande* is proper to the highest poetry and oratory, as Cicero showed (page 13), and as Horace and Longinus agreed (pages 14–15). The generic figure of *enargia*, comprising all the devices of vivid description, dominates the satires of Juvenal (pages 20–21) and of Nashe. Juvenal was a professor of rhetoric until middle life (page 21). Through a misunderstanding of the

thys mother of Citties" (2.63.25–27). This is to say, send me all the power of rhetorical *enargia* and ornament that I may show Jerusalem stripped of ornament. Thus Nashe achieves paradox and hyperbole, figures which themselves are decorously applicable to a lofty theme.[23] A similarly witty allegory based on the doctrines of rhetoric is decorously employed against Harvey: "... [F]or no more is *Pierce Pennilesse* to be cald the Deuils Orator for making a Supplication to the Deuill, than hee is to bee helde for a Rhethoritian, for setting foorth *Gabrielis Scuruei Rhetor*, wherein hee thought to haue knockt out the braines of poore *Tullies Orator*, but in veritie did nothing else, but gather a flaunting vnsauory fore-horse nosegay out of his well furnished garland" (1.267.32–268.7). In short, in attempting to knock out Cicero's brains with his Ramist manual, Harvey picks Cicero's brains instead, and struts forth in the rhetorical flowers of Cicero, which, on him, are "vnsauory." A further illustration of the decorum which governed Nashe's imagery in confuting the rhetoric of Harvey occurs in *Have With You*: "Rhetoricall figure? And if I had a hundred sonnes, I had rather haue them disfigur'd & keep them at home as ciphers, than send them to schoole to learn to figure it after that order" (3.120.3–6).[24]

A subject of this sort is difficult to discuss except in relation to a continuous *explication de texte*, and there is no space left for that. However, a curious illustration of Nashe's fidelity to decorum, even in small matters, occurs in *Lenten Stuffe*. Lamenting his lack of "my notebook," he produces an allegorical hyperbole:

> For besides the loud bellowing prodigious flaw of indignation stird vp against me in my absence and extermination from the vpper region of our celestiall regiment, which hath dung mee in a maner downe to the infernall bottome of desolation, and so troubledly bemudded with griefe and care euery cell or organ-pipe of my purer intellectual faculties, that no more they consort with any ingenuous playful merriments, of my note-books and all books else here in the countrey I am bereaued, whereby I might

ancient doctrines of *laus et vituperatio*, Miss Scott is puzzled by the fact "that in some cases the vivid descriptions I have classed as *enargia* are used purely for humorous effect, since a description may be made vivid as well for the purpose of ridicule as for expressing lofty passion. The picture of woman's cruelty, vi.486, and even more the description of a consul's triumph in X, 36ff. are entirely humorous and for this reason would be excluded by Cicero's definition of the grand style" (page 23).

A device which Juvenal shares with Nashe is hyperbole. Nashe's will be mentioned later. Juvenal uses it for indignation (page 34) but "often indulges in hyperbole which is intentionally overstretched ... he makes his satire humorous by using the external form of lofty style in expressing a thought which is not lofty ..." (page 35). Similarly, invective leads him frequently to produce illiberal jests (page 44) by lending the grand style to the lowest subjects (page 45). Nashe gets many of his most familiar results by this technique. Without mentioning any of his serious or panegyrical hyperboles, consider the following passages:

2.213.24–31; 223.11–18; 226.1–12; 227.10–33; 229–231; 232.18ff.; 247.26ff.; 267.27–28; 268.3–5; 271.21–278.3; 305.20–35; 310.18–31; 324; 325–326; 327;

3.34.5–6; 77.30–34; 93.20–94.35; 98.20; 134.15–32; 200.4–29; 365.32–37.

Miss Scott's account of Juvenal's use of epic for comic effect is, also, relevant to Nashe (pages 46–90). The whole of Nashe's *Lenten Stuffe* is in this vein: "*Homer* of rats and frogs hath heroiqut it ..." (3.176.20). The only example of this burlesque manner, so typical of Nashe, which can be found in Horace is "the episode of the town and country mouse,—obviously a parody of epic style" (page 23).

Miss Scott notes another device dear to Juvenal and Horace in obtaining vividness, namely "little dramatic scenes" which may or may not be in dialogue style (page 23, note). These are especially

> enamell and hatch ouer this deuice more artificially and masterly, and attire it in his true orient varnish and tincture;... and bestow such costly coquery on this *Marine magnifico* ..." (3.175.26–176.8).

The running imagery here, which unites the incidental images, is from the sea and ships and the lives of Yarmouth folk. Hence, the "prodigious flaw" which has sunk his fortunes. Hence "hatch ouer this deuice." The colors of rhetoric are wittily identified with the hues of the red-herring and his panegyrical theme.[25]

In the prosopopoeia or speeches of *Summers Last Will* Nashe employs the usual dramatic and rhetorical decorum. Will Summer uses low imagery and speaks prose. Spring is represented as irresponsible, and praises poverty. Solstice praises contentment and freedom from ambition. Harvest uses yokel imagery and speaks prose. Bacchus is given prose. Having made Will Summer drink, the latter rises to give an oration against wine, in verse. The wine, as it were, confers a new person upon him, and hence a new decorum. Winter attacks learning. Almost every device of sophisticated oratory occurs in this little-read play.

Although the matter of the patristic models for Nashe's prose has already been alluded to, and to some extent described, a somewhat fuller account will serve to round off the present discussion of Nashe. Enough has been said of the very important place occupied by patristic theology and rhetoric, not only in the minds of Renaissance humanists, but of their medieval predecessors; and it has not been thought necessary to explain how the patristic vogue passed so rapidly after the Jacobean age that literary historians are today lacking most of the data relevant to an understanding of the Renaissance literary art.

The studies of St. Chrysostom and St. Basil by Ameringer and Campbell are quite sufficient for the present purpose.[26] It will be most convenient to note the salient characteristics of Basil and Chrysostom and to illustrate the same features from Nashe *en passant*. Let us begin with ecphrasis.

St. Basil explains the utility of ecphrasis in panegyric: "Come let us

characteristic of Nashe, and provide many of his most effective touches: "Hold vp thy hand, *G. H.*..." (1.261.23–34). See also:

1.272.3–5; 276.4–5; 277.15; 280.15–23; 280.24–281.27; 286.26–30; 288.27–29; 292.13–15; 293.5; 298.20–23; 305.25; 305.35–306.2; 308.18–20; 314.21–33; 315.9–34; 317.34–36; 331.14–15; 368.25–28; 384.4–13;

2.207.1–10; 208.19–21; 209.17–18; 227.2–5; 234.5; 241.14–16; 269.33–36; 310.18–19; 320.4–5;

3.20.9–34; 42.35–37; 98.33–99.3; 158.35; 167.4–5; 172.7–9; 168.34–35; 170.16–17; 183.28–30; 201.6–8; 216.19–20; 218.15–27; 219.28–36; 345.16–25; 346.38; 373.32–34; 369.6.

It is noteworthy that there are few of these in *Christs Teares*. Nashe employs them mainly for invective. An exception is 2.69.6–10.

20. On the character of pages as sots, see 1.205.2–33.
21. See 2.56.2ff.; 71.15; 80.32–81.11. Serious apostrophe occurs elsewhere, of course; e.g., 2.320.4–21. Because of his own strict adherence to rhetorical decorum in all departments of composition, Nashe is able to flay Harvey as "the galimafrier of all stiles in one standish, as imitating euerie one, & hauing no seperate forme of writing of thy owne; ..." (1.317.29–31). This is strictly true, since Harvey affected the plain style and the "strong lines" of the pregnant Attic wit at the same time as he attempted to meet Nashe with his own weapons of invective.
22. Precisely the same hyperbolic apostrophe occurs in *The Unfortunate Traveller*, except that the decorum of ridicule or invective alters the imagery to base matters: "O orificiall rethorike, wipe thy euerlasting mouth, and affoord me a more Indian metaphor than that, for the braue princely bloud of a Saxon. Oratorie, vncaske the bard hutch of thy complements, and with the triumphantest troupe in thy treasurie doe trewage vnto him" (2.248.10–15).

recall thus publicly the deeds of these men ... describing their courageous exploits, as if in picture.... let us move the nobler souls, those more akin to the martyrs, to emulation."[27] The Fathers also use ecphrasis for vituperatio, as well as panegyric: "Chrysostom's vehement denunciations of the theatre suggested descriptions like the following, a character sketch of a youth impersonating a young girl, of an old man in the role of a slave, and of shameless actresses."[28] Perhaps most interesting of all to a student of Nashe, the Fathers frequently introduce descriptions of unmitigated physical realism in describing the sufferings of the martyrs.[29] One has only to sample these patristic horrors to see instantly the source and propriety of many scenes from *Christs Teares* and *The Unfortunate Traveller*.[30]

Ecphrasis is a figure which includes metaphor, comparison, paradox, enigma, and hyperbole, to mention only the prominent figures. Campbell, speaking of metaphors in the Fathers, says: "The abundance of metaphors in the Old and New Testaments likewise contributed to the Christian use of that figure.... But even so, St. Gregory of Nyssa is a veritable sophist in his use of metaphor;... while St. John Chrysostom surpasses both in prodigal exuberance" (page 98). It is the prolonged metaphor, or allegory, that most concerns the student of Nashe. This figure, in which he abounds, is an integral part of the texture of patristic sermons. The Fathers used the allegorical metaphor for purposes of exegesis and explanation: "The theological conflicts of the Fourth century affected even the laity so intimately that the abstract terms, the specialized language of philosophy and theology, necessarily found entrance into popular sermons and, in clarifying ideas so represented, the metaphor was a most efficacious instrument" (Campbell, pages 97–98). This sort of thing is the source of Donne's "metaphysical" wit. Nashe employs it in a variety of modes besides that of hyperbole; but it is for exornation, rather than for explanation.[31]

Paradox and enigma are almost inseparable from hyperbole in their nature, and can best be illustrated in connection with it. As Campbell shows (page 96), the prolonged metaphor tends to be enigmatic; and on the other hand, "Originally hyperbole was a kind of metaphor.... a specialized form of

23. Paradox, called "the wonderer" by Puttenham, is very frequently used in connection with hyperbole by the Elizabethans. They often alleged the example of St. Paul before Agrippa: Acts 26: 7–23. An excellent example in the mode of invective occurs in *Hamlet*: "Ay, truly; for the power of beauty will sooner transform honesty from what it is to a bawd than the force of honesty can translate beauty into his likeness: this was sometime a paradox, but now the time gives it proof" (III, i, 110–115). In the mode of panegyric the hyperbolic description of Cleopatra's barge is capped with a paradox:

    With divers-colour'd fans, whose wind did seem
    To glow the delicate cheeks which they did cool,
    And what they undid did. (II, ii, 203–205)

    Here, paradox and hyperbole combine with a kind of prosopopoeia not noted before—the ascription of human faculties to the sub-rational.

24. A most interesting passage follows this expressed scorn for the rhetoric of Ramus. It is ironically argued that from the point of view of Ramist rhetoric, if a man can never say anything worthwhile, at least he can never be tied down to any incriminating statements (3.120.7–23). Nashe is quite clear about the fact that the Ramists have made a complete and fatal divorce between invention and elocution, between matter and words.
25. Earlier in the same work Nashe uses the same maritime imagery to describe his state: 3.156.15–22. This decorum governs the whole work, though seldom so obviously as in 3.175.15–16. Apropos of Nashe's complaint about not having his notebooks or tools for composition, one need only say that this is a conventional rhetorical disclaimer such as prefaced the full tide of ornate eloquence in *Christs Teares*: 2.10.11–15; 15.29–30. Here, too, it precedes one of the most audacious of Nashe's highly-wrought effects.

implied comparison—the comparison of an object to the same characteristic in another object magnified many times. In the typical hyperbole of the later rhetoric the element of exaggeration obscures the basic metaphor. In its striving for startling effects, the hyperbole takes on a sensational quality closely akin to the contemporary paradox" (page 69). Ameringer shows how characteristic these effects are of Chrysostom, who "regarded this figure, which is artistically defective, as very suitable for setting forth the wonderful and supernatural character of the Christian religion. The mysteries of the Faith, the sacraments, the miracles, all offered a rich fund of themes, which were, humanly speaking, paradoxical." He proceeds to illustrate.[32] An example of how paradox (its brief form is oxymoron) becomes enigma is given from a sermon on the Passion: "Our weapons were not stained with gore, we stood not in battle array, we received not wounds, we saw not war, and yet we won the victory! The contest was the Lord's, but the crown is ours!" (page 38). Ameringer points out, apropos of the hyperbole, that "the paradox is, so to speak, only a more subtle form of exaggeration" (page 39). Chrysostom uses paradox and hyperbole where Nashe uses them, "under the influence of some strong emotion, such as pity, grief, indignation, or admiration" (page 39). St. Basil introduces them both for praise and blame: "... the excess of drunkards ... the insatiableness of an extravagant wife ... the prowess of the Forty martyrs ... and in his desire to be emphatic he becomes picturesque" (pages 70–71).

An excellent example from *Christs Teares* combines allegory, paradox, hyperbole, and enigma. The words are a prosopopoeia spoken by Christ: "When Heauen (in stead of starres) shall bee made an Artillerie-house of Haylestones, and no Plannet reuolue any thing but prostitution and vastitie, then shall you know what it is, by saying *you would not, to make your house vnto you be left desolate*" (2.47.20–24).[33]

Nothing could be easier than to illustrate Nashe's use of hyperbole for praise and blame, for panegyric and invective, and also to show his deliberate association of hyperbole and panegyric with paradox. The classic case is in *Lenten Stuffe*: "Homer of rats and frogs hath heroiqut it; ..." (3.176.20–178.26).

Apropos of his being "a workman without his tooles" (3.176.4–5), it may be said that McKerrow might have saved himself many a conjecture in his notes had he recognized that, not only Nashe, but everybody else in Nashe's day, accepted the rhetorical doctrine of imitation as expounded by Ascham (*Scholemaster*, page 184). This method was employed by Virgil, and as such recommended itself to Pope (*Essay on Criticism*, I, ll. 130–140) as well as to Spenser and Milton. Such works as the *Adagia* and *Similia* of Erasmus were not, therefore, the sources of Nashe's reading; but they were certainly the tools with which he worked when actually engaged in composition. Such collections of sentences and comparisons were indispensable in amplification as they understood it in the Renaissance. Both invention and elocution depended on these huge collections digested under headings for decorum. For example, McKerrow notes that the *Politica* of Lipsius is "a book which is practically composed of quotations from the classics" (5.120). (So are the essays of Montaigne, Bacon, Jonson, and other Atticists.) Lipsius was none the less regarded as a learned and original man by his very learned age.

26. Campbell's work has been cited. That of T. E. Ameringer preceded it by one year: *The Stylistic Influence of the Second Sophistic On the Panegyrical Sermons of St. John Chrysostom*, Washington, 1921.
27. Campbell, *op. cit.*, page 129. Campbell discusses ecphrasis as it was practised in the scholastic schools: "The vividness, the studied amassing of details, which the sophistic training fostered in metaphors and comparisons, inevitably produced graphic descriptions in orators keenly responsive to pagan standards. This love for the picturesque which the later rhetoric carried to such extremes was not satisfied by even so untrammeled a figure as the sophistic comparison. Accordingly it developed a new device ... The ecphrasis aimed to portray a proper object in such elaborate and forceful detail that a vivid picture resulted in the mind of the audience" (page 128). The range of subjects is from external nature to paintings, temples, gardens, feasts, and battles. All of these occur in the Fathers of the fourth century.

Nashe shows that he is thoroughly familiar with the whole literature of paradox; and, in view of the heroic paradox he is about to produce, he despises philosophers who "come sneaking in with their paradoxes of pouertie, imprisonment, death, sickenesse, banishment, and baldnesse, and as busie they about the bee, the storke, the ape, the asse, the foxe, and the ferret" (3.176.27–32). Nashe has higher aims: "Small thinges we may expresse by great, and great by smal, though the greatnesse of the redde herring be not small (as small a hoppe on my thumbe as hee seemeth)" (3.185.34–186.2). Consonant with the high style, Nashe follows this panegyrical paradox with a comparison which is also an enigma: "It is with him as with great personages, which from their high estates and not their high statures propagate the eleuaute titles of their Gogmagognes" (3.186.2–5).[34]

Of hyperbole, mixed with other figures, of course, there is a great deal. It is inevitably to be found in places of panegyric and invective, so I shall list some of these. First, praise:

1.6.15–32; 25–30; 211.34–215.34; 314.4–18; 374–375;
2.9.8–24; 89.25–31 (an amusing instance of invective against panegyric);
242.6–25; 243.17ff.; 264–266; 324–326;
3.156.10ff.; 168.34–35; 175ff.; also Preface to *Menaphon*, *passim*.

Although Nashe rightly says that contention is not his only style (1.259.8–18), there is much more of it than of anything else. I include here some instances in which Nashe discusses his methods and aims:

1.259.8ff.; 285.1–8; 285.24–30; 320.3–13; 321.22–35; 324.16–27; 361.29–373.36;
2.12.1–27; 13.2–4; 180.16–35; 80.15–26; 202.1–3; 234.18–19; 264.19–266.22;
3.11.23ff.; 18–19; 93.20–94.35; 105.28–106.16; 213.1–220.27; 314.29–315.13.
Between 1.242.25 and 244.10 Nashe passes back and forth from blame to praise.[35]

28. Ameringer, *op. cit.*, page 92. Ameringer also shows how the comparison became ecphrasis (pages 78–80) and how the Fathers use it beyond measure for panegyric and blame in accordance with the doctrines of rhetorical vituperatio (pages 86ff.).
29. Ameringer, *Op. cit.*, pages 96–97; Campbell, page 138.
30. The frightful scenes in *Christs Teares* occur at: 2.37.23ff.; 60–62; 63–80; 79.26ff. In *The Unfortunate Traveller*: 2.228.21–231; 231.11–232; 232.18–241. This series of horrors is interrupted by a gorgeous ecphrasis on a Roman garden which, Nashe says, almost restores the ravages of the Fall of man. Then enters a "hotspurd plague" and much worse horrors: Esdras and Heraclide, 2.287–295. At 310.18 Nashe says: "Descriptions, stand by, here is to be expressed the furie of Lucifer when he was turnde ouer heaven barre for a wrangler." The execution of Zadoch (315.22ff.) is artistically contrasted with the ecphrasis of St. Peter's feast (317). The execution of Cutwolfe crowns the crop of patristic horrors: 327.6ff. A more detailed study would prove to the hilt that *The Unfortunate Traveller* is a by-product of the patristic studies which Nashe undertook in order to produce *Christs Teares*. The two works are cut from the same cloth.
31. An example which is typical of dozens also illustrates how difficult it is to distinguish allegory and comparison and simile. Speaking of Aretino, he says: "But I will write to his ghost by my carrier, and I hope hele repaire his whip, and vse it against our English Peacockes, that painting themselues with church spoils, like mighty mens sepulchers, haue nothing but Atheisme, schisme, hypocrisie, and vainglory, like rotten bones lie lurking within them" (1.242.18–23). Since Nashe commonly is working in either the invective or panegyrical vein, there are few of his allegories, comparisons, or similes which do not partake of the character of hyperbole.
32. Ameringer, *op. cit.*, I, pages 35–36. Crashaw should be kept in mind here, as well as all the "baroques" artists.

I shall give some instances of hyperbole so that the deliberate relation of this figure to praise and blame, and Nashe's rhetorical aims and practise in general, may be ascertained:

1.190.11–191.6; 192.16–20; 192.24–26; 193.13–29; 194.14–22; 194.23ff.; 195.11ff.; 197.7–9; 197.21–23; 197.28–199.3; 199.31–200.34; 204.20–207.5; 215.18–25; 216.2–21; 239.21–240.9; 242.15–27; 242.28–244.10; 257.3–6; 262.3–263.25 (this series comprises allegories as well); 271.7–31; 282.11–17 (first praise of Spenser, then blame for Harvey); 287.17–25; 289.20–22; 293.27–29; 299.31–35; 301.12–15; 307.1–5; 307.21–22; 308.5–17; 315.1–6; 321–322; 323.1–5; 341.1–18; 341.25–28; 345.26–30; 349.19–350.2; 359.36–360.16; 361.11–15; 361.29–373.36; 379.19–23; 380.10–12; 385.25–29;

2.9.1–11.26; 27.27–28; 35.13–19; 35.36–36.16; 37.23–35; 49.5–29; 59.2–19; 69.6–10; 69.11–36; 79.26–28; 135.1–2; 151.16–19; 180.18–20; 183.1–12; 209.6–8; 213.24–31; 216.3–13; 217.25–34; 223.11; 226.1–12; 228.25–231.4; 242.6–25; 243.17ff.; 246–253; 254.14–255.4; 264–268; 270.10–11; 279.31–33; 305.20–35; 324–327;

3.7.4–17; 34.1–36; 93.20–94.35; 98.20; 105.28–106.16; 126.10–16; 132.17–19; 154.30–155.4; 158.5–34; 172.33–34; 174.14–175.12; 183.18–22; 183.23–27; 183.28–184.9; 184.10–17; 184.18–27; 184.27–34; 185.1–2; 185.4–7; 185.7–15; 185.16–24; 185.25–34; 186.10–14ff.; 187–190.7; 191.1–12ff.; 192.1ff.; 193.6–29; 195.10–16; 220.9–17; 220.20–24; 226.1–19 (*Lenten Stuffe* ends in a blaze of hyperboles; 311.14–312; 322.20–324; 329ff. The preface to the *Arcadia* is full of hyperboles, pursuant to the decorum imposed by the subject).

The *Almond* is also well stocked with hyperboles. From the above instances, it can be seen very quickly that Nashe's hyperboles are not only in the mode of praise and blame, but often are a means to the ecphrasis which is so frequent in the greatest of the patristic writers.

By supplying here a group of Nashe's allegories, I hope to offer the evidence which will enable anybody to test whether or not he deliberately employed them in connection with hyperbole for praise and blame:

250

33. "*Prosopopoeia*—the representation of a person speaking directly.... A figure allowing so rich an opportunity for display of dramatic talent was not to be lost on the Sophists of the second sophistic" (Campbell, page 58). The Fathers use it in abundance. Nashe's writings are almost a continuous prosopopoeia, with himself as the speaker. In *Christs Teares* he says: "The more to penetrate and inforce, let vs suppose Christ in a continued Oration thus pleading with them" (2.21.28–29). See also:

    1.202.3–9; 205.14–18; 240.33–241.30;

    2.15.13–14; 71.15–75.21; 243.9–245.19; 287–295; 320.24–327.1.

    Jack Wilton's telling his story in the first person is also an instance. Of prosopopoeia in the sense of "pathetic fallacy" Nashe provides many examples, as:

    2.38.4–35; 49.5–29;

    3.156.24–158.9; 160.5–24; 182.9; 183.8–9; 186.5–9; 186.10–26; 189.20–190.7; 216–219.

    Bestiaries and fables are prosopopoeias, as in Spenser's *Mother Hubbards Tale*, which is for this reason entitled *Prosopopoia*. Compare Nashe 3.201.8–204.9.

34. Ingenioso in *The Returne from Parnassus* says, "... everie John Dringle can make a booke in the commendacious of temperance, againste the seven deadlie sinns, but that's a rare wit that can make sommthinke of nothinge ..." (page 54). The same point is made enigmatic by allegory and hyperbole in Nashe's epistle to the reader of *Lenten Stuffe*. He gives John Dringle a prosopopoeia (3.151.13–15), refers to the literature of paradox, and then: "Euery man can say Bee to a Battledore, and write in prayse of Vertue and the seuen Liberall Sciences, thresh corn out of the full sheaues, and fetch water out of the Thames; but out of drie stubble to make an after haruest, and a plentifull croppe without sowing, and wring iuice out of a flint, that's *Pierce a Gods name*, and the right tricke of a workman" (3.151.29–152.5).

1.9.18–27; 161.18–29; 161.30–35; 179.18–28; 198.7–24; 199.16–19; 201.13–15; 216.5–21; 242.15–27; 243.23–26; 256.33–34; 259.6–7; 261.15–18; 262.8–11; 262.11–18; 262.25–30; 262.30–37; 263.7–19; 265.11–13; 265.22–24; 266.14–16; 268.1–7; 269.26–28; 271.17–18; 272.3–5; 280.10–19; 282.27–31; 285.27–30; 286.33–287.4; 287.13–16; 291.24–30; 291.15–16; 291.34–292.4; 292.7–12; 293.1–5; 294.32–35; 298.20–23ff.; 300.2–3; 301.5–8; 301.12–15; 302.4–6; 302.13–16; 305.4–6; 307.1–5; 317.1–10; 321.22–35; 342.5–6; 345.12–25; 346.3–5ff.; 356.28–32; 361.11–15; 376.1–4; 376.19–26; 377.32–37; 382.14–18;

2.9.9–11; 10.3–4; 10.5–7; 13.14–19; 16.21–23; 16.24–25; 57.10–26; 63.1–3; 98.17–99.7; 123.8–10; 123.28–129; 157.18–21; 180.33–34; 183.19–20; 184.6–20; 202.7–22; 209.15–17; 210.7–10; 236.21–30; 238.3–7; 271.3–4; 271.21–278.3;

3.11.19–21; 32.20–26; 42.25–35; 101.33–36; 109.9–17; 153.14–22; 154.30–155.4; 156.12–13ff.; 159.14–23; 160.7–15; 167.4–15; 172.7–9; 175.20–26ff.; 176.1–19; 182.12–19; 215.4–5; 216.13–16ff.; 217.19ff.; 247ff.; 282.1547ff.; 311.23–24; 320.30–34; 332.1–31; 333.4–16.

Since comparisons or similitudes are an inseparable feature of panegyric and vituperation, and since their character in this connection is controlled by the doctrine of rhetorical decorum, I can do no less than offer a group list representing the whole range of Nashe's work:

1.9.24; 10.7; 11.21–28ff.; 16.13–21; 20.18–22; 22.1–4; 24.6–7; 26.5–14; 27.33–36; 30.10–16; 31.10–14; 32.27–36; 33.18–34.26; 41.7; 184.26ff.; 241.3–8; 241.30–33; 276.34ff.; 278.27–30; 282.20–23ff.; 307.26–27ff.; 327.15–30; 354.5–31; 355–356; 357.15–19; 362.2–5; 370.17–25; 373.24ff.; 376.9–11ff.; 377.32–37; 377.17–23; 379.19–23; 380.10–12; 382.8–9; 382.28–32; 385.25–29;

2.9.16–18ff.; 13.14–19; 16.10–16; 20.12–21.11; 21ff.; 28.12–14; 31.12–14; 31.9–17; 69.19–36; 96.17–31; 98.17–99.7; 100.5–9; 102.31; 104.11; 107.34–108.10; 113.24–35; 123.18–22; 123–129; 132.28–133.29; 179.10ff.; 180.16; 181.1ff.; 184.3–6; 228.20–231.4; 231.11–232.2; 236–237; 247.26ff.; 305.20–35; 326.1–13; 327;

3.7.9–11; 33.27–30; 61.32; 77.30–34; 93.20–94.35; 98.20; 105.28–106.16; 109.8–17; 121.22–122.13; 123.4–5; 133.12–13; 134.15–32; 158.10–14; 183.10–14; 183.10–22; 186.2–5; 187.8–35; 191.33–34; 223.28–224.2; 234.26–27; 311.21–22; 313.25–314.12; 314.24–29; 318.17–28; 320.30–34; 330.11–34.

Nashe is constantly pursuing the high style, full of enigmatic discourse:

1.216.5–21; 322.31–34; 287.14–16; 363.32–368;

2.10.11–15; 185.12ff.;

3.21.18–22; 18.23–19.15; 147.20–152.19; 213.1–220.27.

Another example of allegory becoming enigma is in *Strange Newes* 1.305.3–6. See also 1.221.13–226.28; 2.10.9–11; 3.216.19–27. A witty paradox occurs in *Summers Last Will* where Christmas, deprived of mirth by the Puritans, makes an oration against festivity [3.284–287]. See also 3.67.2–15. Cutwolfe's panegyric on revenge is a notable instance [2.324–326].

35. One of the many rhetorical devices incidental to praise and reproof was the character. There are several modes of this figure. Icon or effictio tends to stick to external description:

1.162.30–63.6; 166.16–167.10; 167.11–20; 167.21–168.27; 168.33–169.28; 169.29–170.25; 170.26–171.6; 173.4–20; 173.21–176.10; 175.13–27; 183.18–25; 199.31–200; 205.2–33; 209.5ff.; 379.1–381.14;

2.227.10–33; 232.18–233.9; 247.26ff.; 271.21–278.3.

Notatio employs other devices besides external description. The effictio 2.232.18–233.9 concludes as notatio: 233.10–31, where the psychological motivation of the character is substituted for the appearance and actions. See also:

1.169.29–70.25; 170.26–171.6; 175.13–27; 175.28–176.10; 176.11–22; 176.23–177.3; 177.4–23; 177.24–178.15; 183.18–25; 205.2–33.

Since this study must come to an end somewhere, there can be little discussion allowed to Nashe's frequent use of figures of words, though it is a matter of interest and importance. For example, paranomasia is a regular feature of his allegories and comparisons, and is not merely ornamental.[36] Polyptoton is more important because it was a figure popular with the Fathers for purposes of exegesis and emphasis.[37] Most interesting of all is anaphora, since it characterizes much patristic oratory of the fourth, as well as the sixteenth, centuries.[38]

It might be reasonably admitted to be an important evidence for the patristic sources of Nashe's style that he should have used this figure in only one work, *Christs Teares*; but here he used it lavishly. One anaphora on the word "gathered" extends nearly ten pages (2.27–35.6). Others occur at 2.24–25; 42.33–44.9; 45.13–32; 55.9–17; 56–59.

Nashe's knowledge of the Fathers, and the rhetorical decorum they observed in the use of this figure, led him to restrict anaphora to the one performance piece in which he avowedly sets out to gather in a "harvest of divinity." There is one notable exception, however. It occurs in *Have With You* (3.33.9–26). Nashe is jokingly retorting to the scoffs which Harvey had heaped on this harvest of ripe divinity, so he produces an anaphora on "tongues" (not without Scriptural allusion), to which Carneades retorts: "... no more of this plaine English." The joke is that Nashe has just delivered a passage of very ornate patristic English of the kind Harvey despised, and Carneades calls it the sort of English the Puritans approved.

And so, I interrupt what I hope to be able to conclude another day. It is impossible not to be conscious of the many defects of this study; but it is, likewise, impossible to have surveyed the territory in question without acquiring a vivid sense of its largely unexplored character. In applying some basic facts concerning the trivium and the patristic motivations of the *translatio studii* to Thomas Nashe, we have seen that supposedly nonexistent vistas and sanctions are the primary features of his work. What is true of Nashe is equally true of his contemporaries. One is, therefore, faced with the fact that while much excellent and indispensable work has been done

---

The characters of manners, virtues, vices, etc. are often designated as ethopoeia. For example,

2.81.12–92.27 (Ambition is represented as a great courtier); 108.5.15ff.; 114.31ff.; 117; 129.23ff.; 132.17ff.; 134.36–135ff.; 136.5–144; 144.33ff.; 147.8ff.; 148.3ff.; 155.13ff.

Note that when Nashe promises a Latin oration in praise of English actors, he says: "I will there note and set downe, with the manner of theyre habites and attyre" (1.215.34–35). A propos of character in general as used for praise and reproof, see:

1.217.16–18; 284.25–26; 286.15–25; 287.5–33; 288.2–18 (where he gives a character of Greene in order to exhibit the meanness of Harvey); 357.37–358.24 (an instance of description of a person's passion which leaves no room for characterization—the familiar contrast of *ethos* and *pathos*: see also 2.71.7–75.21);

2.63.28–65.9; 209ff.; 210.22ff.; 217.14ff.; 225.11ff.; 225.27–226.22; 242.2–243; 255.14–21; 255.23–256; 259.30–260.12; 261.3ff.; 264.19–266.22; 271–278;

3.147.20–149.4 (seems to be a bitter attack on Essex);

3.280.1500ff. (character of Winter); 254.670ff. (character of dogs).

36. Such an instance as 2.210.20–21 (also line 27), for example, serves the decorum of representing the slippery character of Jack Wilton. See also 2.207.10; 209.9; 217.25–26; 230.27; 257.14–15; 258.24–25; 259.10–12; 271.1–2; 299.23; 308.16; 309.15–16, all from the same work. That decorum determined Nashe's use of this device (some rhetoricians call it "antanaclasis," reserving "paranomasia" for the play on sounds rather than meanings) is evident from the frequency with which they occur in another work of comic vituperatio, *Have With You*: 3.5.1–12; 6–7; 32.20–26; 33.9–26; 34.1–4; 129.4–10; see also 3.182.31–35; 185.29; 186.5–7; and 1.384.34–385.

on the Elizabethan period, we have scarcely begun to see its intellectual and literary life in an Elizabethan light. Many facts contributed to make it an age of rhetoric, and even of conflicting rhetorics; but we have long persisted in viewing it in the light of the violent reaction against what Huxley called "that pestilent cosmetic, rhetoric." It required, perhaps, the advent of such a successful devotee of the second sophistic as James Joyce, to prepare the ground for a scholarly understanding of Elizabethan literature.

37. See Mitchell, *op. cit.*, pages 160–161. The Puritans especially abominated this and the related figure of anaphora (Miller, *op. cit.*, page 345). The figure of polyptoton was a favorite with the Fathers of the second sophistic (Campbell, *op. cit.*, page 74), and it is frequent in Nashe, especially in *Christs Teares*: 2.10.9–11; 35.19–20; 52.32–33; 56.19–21; 136.32–34; 179.28; 183.19–20. See also 1.335.9–10; 2.286.16; 323.1–2; 3.32.20–26; 195.24–26.
38. Campbell, *op. cit.*, pages 34–38. Anaphora is really a term for a group of figures which includes epiphora, symploce, ploce, diaphora, epanalepsis, anadiplosis, epizeuxis, diacope, and traductio. However, the sense in which it is here used is that of «repetitive paranomasia. "A word may be repeated in a series of contexts without involving any save its basic meaning. When Andrewes uses this figure, Mitchell calls it "characteristically 'metaphorical'" (page 152). He quotes passages from Henry Smith which illustrate deliberate mastery of the figure (pages 211–212).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography of McLuhan's references is an expanded version of his original Bibliography of Principal Works Cited. Titles omitted from the latter but referred to in McLuhan's text appear here preceded by an asterisk. Titles are cited here in full form but may appear in the text in shorter form. Information regarding reprints and editions postdating those cited by McLuhan has been included here to the extent possible. For works by Aristotle, St. Augustine, Francis Bacon, Erasmus, Milton, and others where McLuhan does not refer to specific editions, titles only are given here. —ed.

* Abelard. *Sic et non.*

* Abelson, Paul. *The Seven Liberal Arts: A Study in Mediaeval Culture.* New York: Russell & Russell, 1906.

* Agricola, Rudolf. *De inventione dialectica.* Cologne, 1538.

* Agrippa, Henry Cornelius. *De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum et artium*, 1530. In Richard F. Popkin, ed. *Agrippa Opera.* Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1970. (2 vols.) See also James Sandford, ed. *Of the Vanitie and Uncertaintie of Artes and Sciences*, 1569. Repr.: Catherine M. Dunn, ed. Northridge, California: California State UP, 1974. [See also Morley, Henry —ed.]

* Aldhelm. *De gestis regum anglorum.* Rolls Series, 1, page 30.

* Allen, J. W. "Marsilio of Padua and Mediaeval Secularism." In F. J. C. Hearnshaw, ed. *The Social and Political Ideas of some Great Medieval Thinkers* (London: Dawsons of St. Paul, 1923), pp. 167–191.

Allen, Percy Stafford. *The Age of Erasmus.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914.

* Ambrose, St., *Exameron.*

Ameringer, Thomas E. *The Stylistic Influence of the Second Sophistic on the Panegyrical Sermons of St. John Chrysostom: A Study in Greek Rhetoric.* Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1921. (Patristic Studies, 5)

* *Anglo-Saxon Chronicles.* Everyman's Library.

* Ariosto. *Orlando Furioso.* Trans. Sir John Harington, 1591.

* Aristotle. *De sophisticis elenchis*, Trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge. London: Oxford UP, 1928.

* ——. *Ethics.*

* ——. *Poetics.*

* ——. *Politics.*

* ——. *Posterior Analytics.*

* ——. *Prior Analytics*, Trans., A. J. Jenkinson.

* ——. *Rhetoric*, Trans., W. Rhys Roberts.

* ——. *Topics*, Trans., W. A. Pickard-Cambridge.

* Arnobius. *Adversus nationes.*

Arnold, E. Vernon. *Roman Stoicism.* Oxford: Oxford UP, 1911. London: Methuen, 1934; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958.

Ascham, Roger. *The Scholemaster.* John Eyton Bickersteth Mayor, ed. London: Bell and Daldy, 1863. [This is the first edition; McLuhan refers to an edition of 1934 —ed.]

• Augustine, St. *De civitate dei.*
• ———. *Enchiridion.*
• ———. *Confessions.*
• ———. *De trinitate.*
• ———. *De doctrina christiana.*
• ———. *De utilitate credendi.* In Migne, Jacques Paul. vol. 42, col. 68.
• ———. *De magistro* (see Leckie)
• Bacon, Francis. *The Advancement of Learning.* G. W. Kitchin, ed. London: Dent; New York: Dutton, 1915.
• ———. *Essays or Counsels Civil and Moral.*
• ———. *Filum labyrinthi.*
• ———. *The New Atlantis.*
• ———. *Novum organum.*
• ———. *Wisdom of the Ancients*
• ———. *The Works.* Spedding, James, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Heath, eds. Longmans: London, 1858.
• Bacon, Roger. *Opus Majus.*
Baldwin, Charles Sears. *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic to 1400.* New York: Macmillan, 1928; Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959.
———. *Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic Interpreted from Representative Works.* New York: Macmillan, 1924. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959.
———. *Renaissance Literary Theory and Practice: Classicism in the Rhetoric and Poetic of Italy, France, and England 1400–1600.* New York: Columbia UP, 1939.
Beauvais, Vincent of. *Vincent of Beauvais, Eruditione filiorum nobilium.* A. Steiner, ed. Cambridge, Mass., 1938. Repr.: New York Mediaeval Academy of America, 1970. (Publication no. 32)
• ———. *Speculum historiale.* Venice, 1494.
Bede. *Opera historica.* Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb Classical Library. (2 vols.)
Bentwich, Norman. *Philo-Judæus of Alexandria.* Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1910.
• Bérard, Victor. *Introduction à l'Odyssée.* Paris: Société d'Édition «Les Belles Lettres», 1924. (2 vols.)
• Berengar(ius). *De sacra coena (Berengarii Turonensis opera quae supersunt tam inedita quam edita, I, De sacra coena adversus Lanfrancum liber posterior.* Berlin: Visher, 1834.
• Bonaventure, St. *Eruditio didascalia.* In Migne, Jacques Paul. vol. 176; 740–838.
———. *On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology.* Charles Glenn Wallis, trans. Annapolis: The St. John's Press, 1938.
Boniface, St. *De metris.*
• Born, Lester Kruger. "The Perfect Prince: a Study in Thirteenth- and Fourteenth-Century Ideals." *Speculum* 3 (1928), 470–504.
• ———. *The Education of a Christian Prince.* New York: Columbia UP, 1936.
• Bradbrook, Muriel C. *The School of Night: a Study in the Literary Relationships of Sir Walter Raleigh.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1936.
• Brehaut, Ernest. *An Encyclopedist of the Dark Ages.* New York: Columbia UP, 1912.
• ———. *History of the Franks.* New York: Columbia UP, 1916.
Bréhier, Emile. *Les idées philosophiques et réligieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie.* Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1925; 1950.
Bréhier, Louis. *L'Art Chrétien: son développement iconographique des origines à nos jours.* Paris: H. Laurens, 1918, 1928.
• Brinsley, John. *Ludus literarius or The Grammar Schoole.* Ernest Trafford Campagnac, ed. Liverpool & London: Liverpool UP & Constable, 1917.
• Burgess, Theodore C. "Epideictic Literature." *University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology* 3 (1902), 89–261.
Butterfield, Herbert. *The Statecraft of Machiavelli.* London: G. Bell & Sons, 1940.

Campbell, James Marshall. *The Influence of the Second Sophistic on the Style of the Sermons of St. Basil the Great.* Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1922.

Campbell, Thomas. *The Life and Times of Petrarch*, 2nd ed. London: Henry Colburn, 1843. (2 vols.)

* Capella, Martianus. *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii.* Adolfus Dick, ed. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1925. Repr.: Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1969. Trans. William Harris Stahl, Richard Johnson, E. Burge, *Martianus Capella and the Seven Liberal Arts.* New York: Columbia UP, 1971–77.

* Caplan, Harry. "The Four Senses of Scriptural Interpretation and the Mediaeval Theory of Preaching." *Speculum* 4 (1929), 282–290.

* Cassiodorus. *Institutiones divinarum et saecularum lectionum.*

* Castiglione, Baldassare. *The Book of The Courtier.* Trans. Sir Thomas Hoby, 1556.

* Chambers, Raymond Wilson. *On the Continuity of English Prose from Alfred to More and his School.* Oxford: Oxford UP, 1932.

* Chapman, George. *Ovid's Banquet of Sense*, 1595.

Charland, Thomas Marie. *Artes praedicandi; contribution à l'histoire de la rhétorique au moyen âge.* Paris: J. Vrin, 1936.

* Chénu, Marie Dominique. "La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle." *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge.* Paris, 1927; Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1957. [The latter, a revised and expanded version, no longer contains the passage discussed by McLuhan.—ed.]

* Cicero. *Brutus* and *Orator.* Trans. G. L. Hendrickson and H. M. Hubbell. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard-Loeb Library Edition, 1939, 1971.

* ——. *Ad Herennium.* Trans. Harry Caplan. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1977.

* ——. *De finibus.* Trans. H. Rackham. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard-Loeb Library Edition.

* ——. *De inventione.* Trans. H. M. Hubbel. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard-Loeb Library Edition, 1968.

* ——. *De officiis.* Trans. W. Miller. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard-Loeb Library Edition, 1913, 1951.

* ——. *De oratore.* Trans. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1959. (2 vols.)

* ——. *De natura deorum* and *Academica.* Trans. H. Rackham. Harvard-Loeb Library Edition, 1933, 1967.

* ——. *Hortensius.*

* ——. *Topica.*

Clark, Donald Lemen. *Rhetoric and Poetry in the Renaissance: A Study of Rhetorical Terms in English Renaissance Literary Criticism.* New York: Columbia UP, 1922; New York: Russell & Russell, 1963.

Clerval, Jules Alexandre. *Les écoles de Chartres au moyen âge.* Paris: A. Picard, 1895.

* Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. *Biographia Literaria.* Introduction by Arthur Symons. London & Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., (Everyman's Library), 1906. Repr.: 1921.

* ——. *Essays and Lectures on Shakespeare.* Everyman's Library.

* Colson, Francis Henry. *M. Fabii Quintiliani institutionis oatoriae, liber I.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1924.

* Cornutus, L. Annaeus. *On the Nature of the Gods.*

* Coville, Alfred. *Gontier et Pierre Col et l'humanisme en France au temps de Charles VI.* Paris: E. Droz, 1934.

* ——. *Recherches sur quelques écrivains du XIVe et du XVe siècle.* Paris: E. Droz, 1935.

* Cowley, Abraham. *Davideis*, 1654.

Craig, Hardin. "Shakespeare and Formal Logic." In *Studies in English Philology in Honor of Frederick Klaeber*, Kemp Malone and Martin B. Ruud, eds. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1929), pp. 380–96.

——. *The Enchanted Glass: The Elizabethan Mind in Literature.* New York: Oxford UP, 1936.

* Crane, William G. *Wit and Rhetoric in the Renaissance: The Formal Basis of Elizabethan Prose Style.* New York: Columbia UP, 1937; Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964.

Croll, Morris W. See Lyly, John.

——. "'Attic Prose' in the Seventeenth Century." *Studies in Philology* 18 (1921), 79–128.

——. "Attic Prose: Lipsius, Montaigne, Bacon." *Schelling Anniversary Papers.* New York, 1923, pp. 117–50. Repr.: New York: Russell & Russell, 1967.

——. "Marc-Antoine Muret and Attic Prose." *PMLA* 29 (1924), 254–309.

* ——. "The Baroque Style in English Prose." In *Studies in English Philology in Honor of Frederick Klaeber*, Kemp Malone and Martin B. Ruud, eds. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1929), pp. 427–456.

Curry, Walter Clyde. *Chaucer and the Medieval Sciences.* New York: Oxford UP, 1926.

D'Alton, John Francis. *Roman Literary Theory and Criticism.* London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1931; New York: Russell & Russell, 1962.

——. *Selections from St. John Chrysostom.* London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1940.

* Damascus. *On the Principles of Nature.*

* D'Andeli, Henri. *The Battle of the Seven Arts.* Introduction by Louis John Paetow. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1914.

Dawson, Christopher Henry. *The Making of Europe.* London: Sheed & Ward, 1932.

De Lacy, Phillip, and Estelle Allen De Lacy, eds. *Philodemus: On Methods of Inference.* Philadelphia: The American Philological Association, 1941.

* Denifle, Heinrich, and E. Chatelain, eds. *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis.* Paris: Delalain, 1889–1897. (4 vols.)

Dickinson, John. *The Statesman's Book of John of Salisbury. Introduction and translations of Books IV, V, VI, and portions of VII and VIII.* New York: A. A. Knopf, 1927.

Donaldson, John William. *The New Cratylus: or Contributions toward a more Accurate Knowledge of the Greek Language.* London: J. W. Parker, 1859.

* Donatus, Aelius. *Ars Donati quam Paulus Diaconus exposuit: nunc primum ex Cod. Vaticano-Palatino 1746 monachi archicoenobii Monti Casini in lucem proferunt.* Ed. A. M. Amelli. Montis Casini. Ex Typ. Archic., 1899.

Draper, William H. Translation of Petrarch's *Secretum.* London: Chatto & Windus, 1911.

Duff, John Wight. *A Literary History of Rome in the Silver Age from Tiberius to Hadrian.* London: E. Benn, 1927.

Duhem, Pierre Maurice Marie. *Études sur Leonardo da Vinci.* Paris: A. Hermann, 1906–09. (3 vols.)

* Elyot, Thomas. *Governour.* Ernest Rhys, ed. London: J. H. Dent; New York: E. P. Dutton, 1907.

* Erasmus, Desiderius. *Adagia.*

* ——. *De pueris instituendis.*

——. *Education of a Christian Prince.*

——. *Encomium moriae.*

* ——. *Unus Christus magister*

——. *Similia.*

Evans, Elizabeth Cornelia. "Roman Descriptions of Personal Appearance." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 46 (1935), 43–84.

Evans, Maurice. *Elizabethan Language Conditions.* Doctoral dissertation, Cambridge University, 1939.

Fairweather, Wm. *Origen and Greek Patristic Theology.* Edinburgh: Clark, 1901. [McLuhan cites an edition published in New York in the same year —ed.]

Faral, Edmond. *Les arts poétiques du XIIe et du XIIIe siècle: Recherches et documents sur la technique littéraire du moyen âge*. Paris: Édouard Champion, 1924; Paris: Librairie Honoré Champion, 1971.

* Firmicius Maternus. *De errore profanarum religionum.*

* Fraunce, Abraham. *The Arcadian Rhetorike: or the Praecepts of Rhetorike made Plaine by Examples, etc.*, 1588.

* ——. *The Lawiers Logike, Exemplifying the Praecepts of Logike by the Practice of the Common Lawe*, 1588. [McLuhan cites an edition by William Dunn Macray (Oxford, 1886).—ed.]

Friedländer, Ludwig Heinrich. "Das Nachleben der Antike in Mittelalter." *Errinerungen, Reden und Studien*. Strasbourg: Trübner, 1905, pages 272–391.

Garland, John of. *Poetria magistri Johannis Anglici, De arte prosayca, et al.* Giovanni Mari, ed. *Romanische Forschungen* 13 (1902), 883–965.

Garnett, Richard. *Prose of Milton*. London: Scott, 1894.

* Gautier de Lille. *Alexandreis.*

* Gentillet, Innocent. *Contre-Machiavel*. See Patericke, Simon.

* Gerson, John. *De modis significandi*, 1426.

Gilson, Étienne. *Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien*. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1930; 1951.

* ——. *Les idées et les lettres*, 2nd ed. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1932.

——. *Héloïse et Abélard*. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1938; 1948; 1964.

——. *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*. Trans. Dom Illtyd Trethowan and F. J. Sheed. New York, 1938.

——. *Dante et la philosophie*. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1939; 1953.

——. *The Mystical Theology of St. Bernard*. London: Sheed & Ward, 1940.

——. *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*. Trans. A. H. C. Downes. London: Sheed & Ward, 1936; New York: Scribner's, 1940.

——. *God and Philosophy*. New Haven, Conn: Yale UP, 1941.

* Glaber, Raoul. *Historiae libri quinque*. In Migne, Jacques Paul. vol. 142, 609–699.

Glover, Terrot Reaveley. *Life and Letters in the Fourth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1901. (Used in this work as quoted by Sandys, 1903.)

Gordon, George Stuart, ed. *English Literature and the Classics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912. Repr.: New York: Russell & Russell, 1969.

——. *Medium Aevum and the Middle Ages*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925.

* Gosson, Stephen. *Schoole of Abuse*, 1579.

Grabmann, Martin. *Die Entwicklung der Mittelalterlichen Sprachlogik*. Fulda: Druck und Kommissions-Verlag, 1922. [McLuhan cites an edition published in Munich, 1936.—ed.]

* Gratian. *Concordance of Discordant Canons*, c. 1140.

* Greene, Robert. *Upstart Courtier*, 1592.

* Greenlaw, Edwin Almiron. *Studies in Spenser's Historical Allegory*. London: Oxford UP, 1932.

Gregory of Tours. *History of the Franks*. See Brehaut, Ernest (1916).

* Groot, Gerrit de. *Devotio moderna*. In *Opera Omnia*. Cologne, 1759.

* Grosart, Alexander B. See Harvey, Gabriel.

* ——, ed. *The Complete Works in Verse and Prose of Samuel Daniel*. London: Aylesbury, 1885–96. (5 vols.) Repr.: New York: Russell & Russell, 1963.

* Guizot, François Pierre Guillaume. *Histoire de la civilisation en France depuis la chute de l'empire romain*. Paris: Didier, 1828. (4 vols.)

Gwynn, Aubrey. *Roman Education, from Cicero to Quintilian*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926. Repr.: New York: Russell & Russell, 1964.

Haarhoff, Theodore Johannes. *Schools of Gaul; a Study of Pagan and Christian Education in the Last Century of the Western Empire*. London: Oxford UP, 1920.

* Hadas, Moses. *Ancilla to Classical Reading*. New York: Columbia UP, 1954. Repr.: 1957.

Halm, Karl. *Rhetores latini minores*. Leipzig: Teubner, 1863.

• Harington, Sir John. *Apologie of Poetrie* (preface to his translation of Ariosto)

Harvey, Gabriel. *The Letter-Book*. Edward John Long Scott, ed. London, 1883–84.

———. *The Works of Gabriel Harvey*. Alexander B. Grosart, ed. London, 1884. (3 vols.)

• Haskins, Charles Homer. *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1927.

Hearnshaw, Fossey John Cobb, ed. *The Social and Political Ideas of some Great Medieval Thinkers*. London: Dawsons of St. Paul, 1923.

• Hendrickson, G. L. "The Peripatetic Mean of Style and the Three Stylistic Characters." *American Journal of Philology* 25 (1904), 125–46.

• ———. "The Origin and Meaning of the Ancient Characters of Style." *American Journal of Philology* 26 (1905), 249–90.

• Hesiod. *Theogony*. In *Hesiod: the Homeric Hymns and Homerica*. Trans. H. G. Evelyn-White. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard-Loeb Library Edition, 1924.

Hippocrates. *Hippocrates and the Fragments of Heraclitus*. Trans. W. H. S. Jones and E. T. Withington. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard-Loeb Library Edition. (4 vols.)

Holman, Sister Mary John. *Nature-Imagery in the Works of St. Augustine*. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1931. (Patristic Studies, volume 33)

• Holyday, Barten. *Technogamia (1618)*. Sr. M. Jean Carmel Cavanaugh, ed. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1942.

• Hooker, Richard. *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, 1594.

• Horace. *Horace: Satires, Epistles, Ars Poetica*. Trans. H. R. Fairclough. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard-Loeb Library Edition.

Hoskins, John. *Directions for Speech and Style*. Hoyt Hudson, ed. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1935.

Hroswitha. *The Plays of Roswitha*. Trans. Christopher St. John. London: Chatto & Windus, 1923.

Hrosvitha, *The Non-Dramatic Works of Hrosvitha. Text, Translation, and Commentary by Sister M. Gonsalva Wiegand*. Doctoral dissertation, St. Louis University, 1936.

• Hugh of St. Victor. *Opera Omnia*. In Migne, Jacques Paul. vol. 176.

• Hyma, Albert. *The Christian Renaissance*. New York: Century, 1925.

• Isidore of Seville. *Etymologiae*.

• Isocrates. *Isocrates*. Trans. Geo. Narlin. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard-Loeb Library Edition. (3 vols.)

Jaeger, Werner. *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*. Trans. Gilbert Highet. New York: Oxford UP, 1939.

• James, Montague Rhodes. "Latin Writings in England to the Time of Alfred." In A. W. Ward and A. R. Waller, eds., *The Cambridge History of English Literature* (New York: Macmillan, 1933), pp. 72–96.

Jebb, Richard Cleaverhouse. *The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos*. London: Macmillan, 1893. (2 vols.) Repr.: New York: Russell & Russell, 1962.

• Jewel, Bishop. *Oration against Rhetoric*. Trans. with introduction by Hoyt Hudson. *The Quarterly Journal of Speech* 14 (1928), 374–392.

• John of Garland. See Garland, John of.

• John of Salisbury. See Salisbury, John of.

• Jones, Richard Foster. *Ancients and Moderns; a Study of the Background of the Battle of the Books*. St. Louis: Washington University, 1936.

Jowett, Benjamin. *The Dialogues of Plato, translated into English with Analyses and Introductions*. New York: Chas. Scribners, 1895. (4 vols.)

Kantorowicz, Hermann U. *Studies in the Glossators of the Roman Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1938.

Kelley, Maurice. *This Great Argument; a Study of Milton's* De Doctrina Christiana *as a Gloss upon* Paradise Lost. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1941.

Kelso, Ruth. *The Doctrine of the English Gentleman in the Sixteenth Century*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1929. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964.

Ker, William Paton. *Essays on Medieval Literature*. London: Macmillan, 1905.

* Korzybski, Alfred. *Science and Sanity*. Lancaster, Pa.: Science Press, 1933.

Labriolle, Pierre de. *History and Literature of Christianity from Tertullian to Boethius*. Trans. Herbert Wilson. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1925; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968.

Laurie, Simon S. *Studies in the History of Educational Opinion from the Renaissance*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1905.

* Leach, Arthur Francis. *Educational Charters and Documents 598 to 1909*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1911. Repr.: New York: AMS Press, 1971.

——. *The Schools of Medieval England*. London: Methuen, 1915.

Leckie, George G. *Concerning the Teacher*. Trans. of St. Augustine's *De magistro*. New York: Appleton Century Co., 1938.

* Lipsius. *Politica*.

* Lodge, Thomas. *Defence of Poetry, Music and Stage Plays*, 1579/80.

* Lombard, Peter. *The Book of Sentences*.

* Lucian. *Lucian*. Trans. A.M. Harmon. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard-Loeb Library Edition, 1913. (8 vols.)

* ——. *Lucian's Dialogues*. Trans. Howard Williams. London: Methuen, 1903.

* Lyly, John. *Euphues*. Morris W. Croll & Harry Clemons, eds. New York, 1916. Repr.: New York: Russell & Russell, 1964.

McKeon, Richard Peter. *Selections from Medieval Philosophers*. New York: Scribners, 1930. (2 vols.)

——. "Renaissance and Method in Philosophy." In McKeon, *Studies in the History of Ideas* (New York, 1935), v3, pp. 37–114.

——. "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages." *Speculum* 17 (1942), 1–32.

McKerrow, Ronald B. See Nashe, Thomas.

Macray, William Dunn. *The Pilgrimage to Parnassus: With the Two Parts of the Return from Parnassus*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1886.

* Macrobius. *Saturnalia*.

* Mandeville, Bernard. *Fable of the Bees*.

Mandonnet, Pierre Félix. *Siger de Brabant et l'Averroïsme latin au XIIIe siècle*. Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de l'Université, 1908–1911. (2 vols.)

——. *Dante le théologien; introduction à l'intelligence de la vie, des œuvres et de l'art de Dante Alighieri*. Paris: Desclée De Brouwer & Cie, 1935.

Mangan, John Joseph. *Life, Character and Influence of Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam, Derived from a Study of his Works and Correspondence*. New York: Macmillan, 1927.

* Manitius, Max. *Geschichte der Lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters*. Munich: Beck, 1911–1931. (2 vols.)

Maritain, Jacques. *An Introduction to Philosophy*. Trans. E. I. Watkin. London: Sheed and Ward, 1930.

——. *Les degrés du savoir*. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer & Cie, 1932.

——. *True Humanism*. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1938.

* Marlowe, Christopher. *Faustus*.

* ——. *Massacre at Paris*.

Marrou, Henri Irénée. *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique*. Paris: E. de Boccard, 1938; 1958.

* Marston, John. *What You Will*, 1607.

* Matthew of Vendôme. *Tobias*.

* Maurus, Rhabanus. *De clericorum institutione*. In Migne, Jacques Paul. vol. 107, 293–420.

Migne, Jacques Paul, ed. *Patrologiae cursus completus, sive bibliotheca universalis ... omnium sanctorum patrum*. Series Latine. Paris, 1844–1864. (221 vols.)

Miller, Perry. *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century*. New York: Macmillan, 1939.

* Milton, John. *Paradise Lost.*

* ———. *Paradise Regained.*

* ———. *De doctrina christiana.*

* ———. *Tractate on Education: Of Education.*

Mitchell, W. Fraser. *English Pulpit Oratory from Andrewes to Tillotson: A Study of its Literary Aspects.* London: Society for the Promotion of Christian Learning, 1932.

Mommsen, Theodore Ernst. "Petrarch's Conception of the Dark Ages." *Speculum* 17 (1942), 226–242.

* Montaigne, Michel de. *Essais.*

* More, Louis Trenchard. "Boyle as Alchemist." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 2 (1941), 61–76.

* Morley, Henry. *The Life of Henry Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim.* London: Chapman and Hall, 1856.

Mullinger, James Bass. *A History of the University of Cambridge.* London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1888.

———. *St. John's College.* London: F. E. Robinson & Co., 1901.

* Nashe, Thomas. *The Works of Thomas Nashe.* Ronald B. McKerrow, ed. 1904–1910. Repr.: Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958; 1966.

* Nizolius, *De veris principiis et vera ratione philosophandi contra pseudophilosophos,* Liber III. Parma, 1553.

* Nolhac, Pierre de. *Petrarque et l'humanisme.* Paris: H. Champion, 1907.

* Norden, Eduard. *Die Antike Kunstprosa vom VI. Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance.* Leipzig: Teubner, 1923, 4th ed. (2 vols.)

* Ockham, William of. *Summa totius logicae.*

Oltramare, André. *Les origines de la diatribe romaine.* Geneva: Imprimeries Populaires, 1926.

* Ong, Walter J. "The Province of Rhetoric and Poetic." *The Modern Schoolman* 19 (1942), 24–27.

Osgood, Charles Grosvenor. *Boccaccio on Poetry* (translation of Books fourteen and fifteen of the *Genealogia deorum gentilium*). Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1930.

Ozanam, Antoine Frédéric. *History of Civilization in the Fifth Century.* Trans. Ashley C. Glyn. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1867; London: W. H. Allen, 1868. (2 vols.)

———. *The Franciscan Poets.* London: D. Nutt, 1914.

Paetow, Louis John. See D'Andeli.

———. *The Arts Course at Medieval Universities with Special Reference to Grammar and Rhetoric.* Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1910.

Panofsky, Erwin. *Studies in Iconology.* New York: Oxford UP, 1939.

* Paré, Gérard, Adrien Brunet, Pierre Tremblay. *La Renaissance du XIIe siècle: les écoles et l'enseignement.* Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1933.

Patericke, Simon. Trans. of *A Discourse upon the meanes of wel governing and maintaining in good peace, a kingedome, or other principalitie.* London, 1608. [Trans. of Gentillet's *Contra-Machiavel.*—*ed.*]

* Perkins, William. *Art of Prophecying,* 1607.

Petrarch, Francis. *Opera Omnia.* Basileae, 1581.

———. *(Secretum) Petrarch's Secret or the Soul's Conflict with Passion.* William H. Draper, ed. London: Chatto & Windus, 1911. Repr. 1978.

* Phelan, Gerald B. "St. Thomas and the Modern Mind." *The Modern Schoolman* 20 (1942), 37–47.

* Philodemus. *On Methods of Inference.* Edited with a translation and commentary by Phillip De Lacy and Estelle Allen DeLacy. Philadelphia: The American Philological Association, 1941.

* Philostratus. *Erotic Epistles.*

Pike, John Brown. *Frivolities of Courtiers and Footprints of Philosophers.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1938.

Plato. See Jowett, Benjamin.

* Pliny the Elder. *Naturalis historia. Natural History.* Trans. H. Rackham, W. H. S. Jones, and D. E. Eichholz. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard-Loeb Library Edition. (10 vols.)

Poole, Reginald Lane. *Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning.* London: Society for the Promotion of Christian Learning, 1920.

* Pope, Alexander. "Essay on Man."

* ——. *Characters of Women.*

* Porphyry. *Isagogue.*

Prantl, Carl. *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande.* Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1855–70. (4 vols.)

* Prudentius. *Psychomachia.*

* Quiller-Couch, Arthur. *The Oxford Book of English Prose.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925.

* Quintilian. *Institutio oratoria.* Trans. H. E. Butler. London: Heinemann, 1921–1922. (4 vols.)

* Rabelais, François. *Gargantua and Pantagruel.*

Raby, Frederick J. E. *A History of Christian-Latin Poetry.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, Volume I, 1927; Volume II, 1934.

* Ramsay, Mary Paton. *Les doctrines médiévales chez Donne: le poète métaphysicien de l'Angleterre (1573–1631).* London, New York: H. Milford, Oxford UP, 1917.

* Ramus, Peter. *Dialecticae.*

——. *In Ciceronis oratorem, Lib. I.*, col. 241; Basle, 1569.

——. *P. Rami Scholae in Liberales Artes.* Basilea, 1569.

Rand, Edward Kennard. *Ovid and his Influence.* New York: Longmans, Green, 1925.

——. "Suetonius in the Early Middle Ages." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 37 (1926), 1–48.

——. *Founders of the Middle Ages.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1928; 1941.

——. "The Classics in the Thirteenth Century," *Speculum* 4 (1929), 249–69.

Rénaudet, Augustin. *Préréforme et humanisme à Paris pendant les premières guerres d'Italie (1494–1517).* Paris: E. Champion, 1916.

Reynolds, Henry. *Mythomystes.*

Roberts, W. Rhys. *Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism.* New York: Longmans Green & Co., 1928. Repr.: New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1963.

Robin, Léon. *Greek Thought and the Origins of the Scientific Spirit.* London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1928.

Robinson, Richard. *Plato's Earlier Dialectic.* Ithaca, New York: Cornell UP, 1941; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953, 1966; Toronto: Oxford UP, 1984.

Roger, Maurice. *L'enseignement des lettres classiques d'Ausone à Alcuin.* Paris: Picard, 1905.

* Saintsbury, George. *A History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe from the Earliest Texts to the Present Day.* Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1922.

* Salisbury, John of. *The Frivolities of Courtiers.* See Pike, J. B.

* ——. *Metalogicus.* In Migne, Jacques Paul. vol. 199, 823–946.

* ——. *Polycraticus.* In Migne, Jacques Paul. vol. 199, 326–822.

* ——. *The Statesman's Book.* See Dickinson.

* Salutati, Coluccio. *Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati.* Francesco Novati, ed. Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano, 1891–1911. (5 vols.)

* Sandford, James, ed. See Agrippa, Henry Cornelius.

* Sandys, John Edwin. *A History of Classical Scholarship from the Sixth Century B.C. to the End of the Middle Ages.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1903. (3 vols.)

Schramm, Percy Ernst. *Kaiser, Rom und Renovatio.* Leipzig/Berlin: Studien der Bibliothek Warburg, 1929.

Scott, Inez Gertrude. *The Grand Style in the Satires of Juvenal.* Northampton, Mass.: Smith College Classical Studies, 1927.

Scott, Izora. *Controversies over the Imitation of Cicero in the Renaissance.* New York: Columbia UP, 1910.

Seebohm, Frederic. *The Oxford Reformers.* London, New York: J. M. Dent & Sons; E. P. Dutton, 1929.

* Selden, John. *Table Talk*, 1689.
* Shakespeare, William. *Henry V.*
* ———. *Love's Labour's Lost.*
* ———. *The Tempest.*
* ———. *The Winter's Tale.*
* Sidney, Sir Philip. *An Apology for Poetry.*
* ———. *Astrophel and Stella.*
* ———. *The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia.*

Simpson, Evelyn. *A Study of the Prose Work of John Donne.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924.

Smith, G. Gregory. *Elizabethan Critical Essays.* London: Oxford UP, 1904. (2 vols.)

* Smith, Logan Pearsall. *Donne's Sermons; selected passages.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1919.
* Spain, Peter of. (Petrus Hispanius) *Summulae logicales.*
* Spenser, Edmund. *The Faerie Queene.*
* ———. *Mother Hubbards Tale.*
* ———. *Mutability Cantos.*
* ———. *Prosopopoeia.*
* ———. *Teares of the Muses.*

Spingarn, Joel Elias. *Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908–09. (3 vols.)

———. *A History of Literary Criticism in the Renaissance with Special Reference to the Influence of Italy in the Formation and Development of Modern Classicism.* New York: Columbia UP, 1908; 2nd ed., revised, 1925.

* Sprat, Thomas. *The History of the Royal Society of London for the Improving of Natural Knowledge.* London: J. Martyn, 1667.

Springer, Sister Mary Theresa of the Cross. "Nature-Imagery in the Works of St. Ambrose." Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1931. (Patristic Studies, volume 30)

St. John, Christopher. See Hroswitha.

* Stern, Julius. *Homerstudien der Stoiker.* Lörrach: C.R. Gutsch, 1893.

Stokes, Francis Griffin, ed. See von Hutten.

Swift, Jonathan. *Works of the Rev. Jonathan Swift, D. D. arranged by Thomas Sheridan.* Rev. and Corr. By John Nichols. London: n.p., 1808. (19 vols.)

Suetonius, *De grammaticis.* In *Suetonius.* Trans. J.C. Rolfe. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard-Loeb Library Edition. (2 vols.)

Tatham, Edward Henry Ralph. *Francesco Petrarca, the First Modern Man of Letters, his Life and Correspondence; a Study of the Early 14th Century (1304–1347).* London: Sheldon Press, 1925.

* Taylor, Henry Osborn. *Thought and Expression in the Sixteenth Century.* New York: Macmillan, 1920. (2 vols.)

———. *The Mediaeval Mind.* London: Macmillan, 1925. (2 vols.)

* Theodulf of Orleans. *De libris quos legere solebam.* In Migne, Jacques Paul, vol. 105.
* Theophrastus. *Characters.*
* Thierry of Chartres. *Heptateuchon.*
* Thomas Aquinas, St. *Summa theologica.*

Thomas, E. Crewdson. *History of the Schoolmen.* London: Williams & Norgate, 1941.

* Thomas More, Saint. *Utopia.*

Thurot, Charles. *Notices et extraits de divers manuscrits latins pour servir à l'histoire des doctrines grammaticales du moyen âge.* Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1868.

Tooke, Horne. *The Diversions of Purley*, 2nd ed. London, 1829. (2 vols.)

Toynbee, Paget. *Dantis Alagherii epistolae.* Oxford: Oxford UP, 1920.

Tuve, Rosemund. "Imagery and Logic: Ramus and the Metaphysical Poets." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 3 (1942), 365–400.

* Valerius Maximus. *Facta et dicta memorabilia.*
* Valla, Lorenzo. *Annotations on the New Testament.*

• Varro, Marcus Terentius. *De lingua latina.* Trans. Roland G. Kent. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP; London: W. Heinemann, 1938. (2 vols.)

Vincent of Beauvais. See Beauvais, Vincent of.

Vives, Juan Luis. *De causis corruptarum artium.*

——. *De tradendis disciplinis.*

• Von Hutten, Ulrich, and Johann Jaeger. *Epistolae obscurorum virorum* (or *The Letters of Obscure Men*), 1516–7. *Epistolae obscurorum virorum: The Latin Text with an English Rendering, Notes, and Historical Introduction by Francis Griffin Stokes.* London: Chatto & Windus, 1925.

Wallis, Glen. See Bonaventure, St.

• Ward, Adolphus William, and Alfred Rayney Waller, eds. *The Cambridge History of English Literature.* New York: Macmillan, 1933.

• Watkin, Edward Ingram. *Catholic Art and Culture.* London: Sheed & Ward, 1944.

Watson, Foster. *The English Grammar Schools to 1660: their Curriculum and Practice.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1908.

——. *The Beginnings of the Teaching of Modern Subjects in England.* London: Sir I. Pitman & Sons, 1909.

• ——. *Vives and the Renascence Education of Women.* New York: Longman's Green, 1912.

• ——. *Vives: On Education: a Translation of the* De tradendis disciplinis *of Juan Luis Vives/ together with an Introduction by Foster Watson.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1913.

• Wireker, Nigel. *Speculum stultorum.*

Whitehead, Alfred North. *Science and the Modern World.* London: Pelican Books, 1938.

• Whiter, Walter. *A Specimen of a Commentary on Shakespeare.* London, 1794. Repr.: London: Methuen, 1967.

• Willey, Basil. *The Seventeenth Century Background.* London: Chatto & Windus, 1934.

• Wilson, Thomas. *The Arte of Rhetorique: Eloquence First Given by God, and after Lost by Man, and Last Repayred by God againe.* George Herbert Mair, ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909.

• Wingfield, Anthony. *Pedantius.* George Charles Moore Smith, ed. Louvain: A. Uystpruyst, 1905.

Wolff, Samuel Lee. *The Greek Romances in Elizabethan Prose Fiction.* New York: Columbia UP, 1912.

Woodward, William Harrison. *Desiderius Erasmus concerning the Aim and Method of Education.* Cambridge, 1904. New York: Columbia University Teachers College, 1964.

——. *Vittorino da Feltre and other Humanist Educators: Essays and Versions: an Introduction to the History of Classical Education.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1921.

• Wright, Abraham. *Five Sermons in Five Different Styles,* 1656.

• Wust, Peter. "Crisis in the West." In Jacques Maritain et al., eds., *Essays in Order* (New York: Macmillan, 1931), pp. 65–152.

• Yates, Frances A. *A Study of* Love's Labour's Lost. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, *1936.*

• Zeno. *Orator.*

INDEX

Abelard, Peter, 28, 42, 57n.44, 97, 103, 106, 107, 132–35, 146, 148, 159n.64, 161, 170, 173, 174n.13, 175, 197, 226
Abelson, Paul, 104n.3, 105, 121
Addison, Joseph, 198n.22, 199n.25
Adler, Mortimer, 62
Aethelwald, 83
Agobard, 106n.6
Agricola, Rudolf, 55n.42, 71n.37, 105n.4, 164, 171n.6, 192n.8, 214
Agrippa, Henry Cornelius, 7, 17, 63n.12, 146, 157n.61, 180, 181, 182nn.36, 40, 209, 210, 213, 218n.14, 223n.27, 225, 226, 247n.23
Alberic of Rheims, 148
Albert (Albertus Magnus), 143n.27, 146, 155n.57, 177, 215n.9
Albert of Saxony, 170n.5, 177
Albinus, 89
Alcidamus (*fl.* 424 BC), 238
Alcuin, 7, 81, 86–90, 91n.38, 93, 94, 103, 104, 106n.6, 154n.53, 193n.12
Aldhelm of Malmesbury, 83, 84
Alexander of Hales, 159n.67, 177
Alexander of Villedieu, 182, 214n.9
Alexander the Great, 137
Allegorical exegesis, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23–25, 29, 34, 89n.32, 91, 96n.51, 138, 141, 162n.77, 163, 213n.6, 239, 247, 249n.31
Allen, William, Cardinal, 3
Ambrose, St., 32–34, 73, 152, 155, 159n.67, 160n.69, 237n.38
Ameringer, Thomas E., 246, 248
Analogists, 26–27, 36, 49, 84n.13, 174n.14
Analogy, 26, 27, 29, 31, 36, 52, 65n.19, 143, 145, 174n.14
Anaxagoras, 18
Andrewes, Lancelot, 190, 200, 225n.31, 253
Anglo-Saxon Chronicles, 81
Anomalists, 26–27
Anselm, St., 88, 107n.9, 132, 133, 159n.67, 175, 221n.25
Anti-Ciceronian movement, 8, 66n.23, 196, 200, 201n.31
Aphorisms, 57n.45, 114–15, 165n.85, 200, 201, 213n.5
Aphrodite, 23
Apollo, 18, 23
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 17, 65n.20, 70n.32, 88, 92, 93, 105n.4, 133n.6, 142n.27, 155n.57, 159n.67, 164n.84, 170n.6, 173n.12, 174n.14, 175–177, 180, 182, 216n.12, 236
Archesilaus, 54
Archilochous, 237n.4
Ares, 18
Aretino, Pietro, 209, 212n.4, 214n.9, 223, 225, 235n.2, 237n.4, 239, 240, 249n.31
Aristophanes of Byzantium, 23, 237n.4
Aristotle, 30n.52, 35–40, 42, 43, 46–50, 52, 54, 56n.43, 57, 58, 61, 62, 64, 65, 70n.32, 91, 92, 93n.42, 105n.4, 112, 113, 115, 118, 119, 135, 138, 139, 143, 148, 150, 156n.58, 158, 160, 163, 169–171, 172n.7, 174, 177, 178n.23, 180–183, 192, 198n.25, 214, 218n.13, 219n.22, 229, 230
Arnobius, 33, 164n.84
Arnold, E. Vernon, 6, 20, 22n.27, 23n.22, 24, 25nn.30–32, 28n.42, 51n.34, 53n.35, 54, 62, 63nn.9–12, 64, 65nn.19, 22, 71n.36
Ascham, Roger, 190n.6, 193n.12, 195n.15, 196n.19, 201n.31, 213–217, 218n.3, 220, 222, 248n.25
Asiatic style, 42, 238
Attic style, 42, 53, 63n.12, 66n.23, 69n.31, 71n.37, 97n.53, 112n.6, 115, 115n.15, 121n.29, 201n.31, 213n.5, 220n.23, 235n.1, 238, 246n.21, 248n.25
Audomarensis, 141
Augustine of Canterbury. See Augustine, St.

Augustine, St., 6, 7, 15, 17, 22, 24, 26, 31–35, 39, 56n.43, 58, 62, 66n.23, 67, 71–74, 81–85, 88, 92, 93, 99, 103, 105, 107n.9, 111, 113n.9, 132, 139, 143–145, 147, 149, 150, 152, 154, 155, 156nn.58–61, 157, 159, 160n.69, 162, 163n.81, 174, 178nn.23, 26, 181, 184n.46, 189, 194n.13, 195, 197n.21, 198, 201, 202n.32, 210n.3, 215, 220, 223, 224n.30, 238
Austen, Jane, 118, 198n.22, 237
Authority, 132, 174, 201, 229
Averroes, 177
Avicenna, 174

Bacon, Francis, 6, 7, 15, 16, 49, 56n.43, 57n.45, 73n.45, 87n.27, 88n.27, 89n.32, 96n.50, 105n.4, 119n.22, 120n.24, 134, 140, 141n.26, 145–148, 150, 155, 160n.68, 164n.84, 169n.3, 170n.5, 174n.14, 187, 190, 193n.10, 196n.19, 200, 201, 222n.26, 229n.2, 248n.25
Bacon, Roger, 56n.43, 142n.27, 144–146, 191, 194
Baldwin, Charles Sears, 150
Bartolomaeus Anglicus, 141
Barzizza, Gasparino, 193
Basil, St., 238, 246, 248
Basileus, St., 214
Beauvais, Vincent of. See Vincent of Beauvais
Becket. See Thomas à Becket
Bede, (The Venerable Bede) 82–87, 91n.38, 116n.17, 159n.67
Benedict, St., 159
Benedict Biscop, St., 85
Bentwich, Norman, 28nn.40–41, 29nn.43–45
Berengar(ius) of Tours, 106n.9, 197
Bernard of Chartres, 131, 134, 135
Bernard of Clairvaux, St., 95, 139, 140, 159, 162, 197
Bible, 86, 92, 195, 200, 247. See also Scriptural exegesis
Boccaccio, Giovanni, 64n.17, 147n.39, 155–157, 198n.23, 222
Boethius, 32, 55, 61, 104–106, 107n.9, 180, 192n.8
Boileau, Nicolas, 183n.45
Bonaventure, St., 7, 17, 24, 35, 44, 56n.43, 88, 90, 103n.1, 133n.6, 140, 142–145, 147, 159n.67, 173n.12, 174n.14, 181, 182n.36, 198
Boniface, St., 84, 85, 221n.25
Book of Life, 7
Book of Nature, 7, 16, 140, 141n.26, 142, 145, 188
Bossuet, Jacques, 96
Bowyer, James, 29n.47
Bradbrook, Muriel C., 212
Brehaut, Ernest, 81n.2
Bréhier, Emile, 19
Brinsley, John, 197n.21
Brunet, Adrien, 131, 132n.3, 133n.7
Bruno, Giordano, 171n.5, 212, 230
Brutus, 74
Bude, 151, 161
Burckhardt, Jacob, 62
Buridan, Jean, 170n.5, 177
Butler, H. E., 70n.35, 237
Butler, Samuel, 170
Bryson, 50

Caesar, Julius, 27, 117
Calvin, John, 170, 195, 215, 242
Calvinism/Calvinists, 171, 190, 242
Campbell, James Marshall, 238, 246, 247
Campbell, Thomas, 64n.17
Campion, Edmund, 3, 241n.15
Capella, Martianus, 89n.32, 103, 111
Caplan, Harry, 222n.26
Carneades of Cyrene, 6, 54, 210n.3, 252
Carolingian renaissance, 6, 81, 86. See also Charlemagne
Cartesian revolution, 16, 31, 143n.32
Cassiodorus, 103, 111, 141, 237n.3
Castiglione, Baldassare, 42, 67, 72n.37, 148, 193n.12, 195, 196
Cavanaugh, M. Jean Carmel, Sister, 138n.17
Celus, 214
Ceolfrid, 85
Chaldeans, 20
Chambers, Raymond Wilson, 3, 86
Chapman, George, 181n.36
Charisius. See Flavius Sosipater Charisius
Charlemagne, 81, 86, 88, 89, 90nn.35–36, 97n.55, 103. See also Carolingian renaissance
Chatelain, E., 90
Chaucer, Geoffrey, 93n.42, 111n.3
Cheke, John, Sir, 217n.13, 230
Chénu, Marie Dominique, 175n.15, 176n.18
Chrétien de Troyes, 91
Christian culture/theology, 14, 16, 22, 33, 52, 58, 71, 73, 88, 115n.15, 138, 139, 142, 145, 161n.73, 165, 169, 172, 173, 180

Chrysostom. See John Chrysostom, St.
Chryssipus, 23, 52, 91
Cicero, 5–8, 20, 25, 27, 30, 32, 33, 42, 44, 45, 53, 54–58, 61, 62, 64–66, 68–74, 88, 94, 96n.53, 98, 103n.1, 105, 106, 111, 112, 119, 147n.39, 148, 149, 152, 153, 155, 157, 158, 160, 163n.81, 174, 187, 189, 190n.6, 193, 194, 196, 215, 222, 225, 238, 240n.12, 245
Ciceronian ideal of the orator, 7–8, 32, 40n.7, 49, 56n.43, 62n.8, 64–7, 70–1, 98, 119, 135, 148, 149, 155, 159n.64, 162n.77, 164n.85, 182n.40, 187, 188, 190n.5, 192, 194, 195n.5, 198, 200n.29, 201n.31, 211, 241n.15, 244n.19. See also anti-Ciceronian movement
Clayton, Richard, 217n.12
Cleanthes, 23
Clement (Scotus), 28, 33, 89, 91n.36
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 29n.47, 118n.21
Colet, John, 7, 28, 96n.50, 161n.76, 162, 164n.84, 165, 166n.95, 180, 181, 213, 216n.12
Colors of good and evil, 111, 112n.4, 116, 117n.19, 198n.22, 230, 244–45n.19, 247, 248
Colson, Francis Henry, 27n, 150
Commonplaces, 41, 95n.49
Comte, Auguste, 27
Condillac, Pierre de, 27
Convenevole, 153
Corax, 40, 61
Cornutus, L. Annaeus, 25
Cosmology, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 51, 82n.8
Cotton, John, 218n.14
Coville, Alfred, 160
Cowley, Abraham, 95n.49
Crabbe, George, 118, 198n.22, 237
Craig, Hardin, 211, 212
Crane, William G., 115
Crassus, 74
Cratylus, 15, 16, 17, 26, 57n.45, 182n.36, 183n.43
Croll, Morris W., 193
Curry, Walter Clyde, 114
Cynewulf, 83
Cynics, 19, 163
Cyprian, St., 73
Cyrus, 65

D'Ailly, Pierre, 177
D'Alton, John Francis, 69n.31
Damascius, 58
Damascus, Pope, 116
Damiani, Peter, 73n.45, 157, 193n.12
D'Andeli, Henri, 136n.14, 138, 139
Daniel, Samuel, 195n.15, 222n.26, 241n.15
Dante, 29, 91, 92, 154n.53, 199n.25
D'Arezzo, Leonardo, 194n.13
Dawson, Christopher Henry, 72n.38
De Groot, Gerrit, 140, 159, 160, 177
Dekker, Thomas, 220
De Lacy, Estelle Allen, 51nn.31, 32
De Lacy, Phillip, 51nn.31, 32
De la Porée, Gilbert, 104
De Lille, Alain, 198n.22
De Lille, Gautier, 137
Denifle, Heinrich, 90
Descartes, René, 8, 17, 65n.20, 68, 96n.53, 145, 146, 161n.69, 170n.5, 183, 229n.2
De translatione studii, 88, 99, 120, 151, 159n.67, 229, 242n.15
Deusdedit, 82
De Vere, Edward, 210
Dewey, John, 184n.46
Dialectics
as basis of early rhetoric, 45n.14
as basis of scientific method, 17
assimilation to logic by rhetoric, 105
discussion of by Cicero, 55–57
history of, 39–43
in relation to rhetoric, 39–43
in Shakespeare, 45n.20
linked to grammar for Abelard, 173
linked to grammar for Stoics, 51
Plato's concept of, 46–47
Plato's preference for in ethics, 18
revival of in 12th century, 6, 15
scope and usefulness of in Aristotle, 48
Socrates' concept of, 45
Stoic concept of, 51, 54
strife with grammar, 6, 61–62, 66, 121n.29, 132, 133, 160, 169, 171, 179, 211, 217, 220, 229
strife with rhetoric, 61, 66, 220
subordination of dialectics and rhetoric to grammar, 104
subordination of dialectics to rhetoric, 56
subordination of grammar to, 44, 57n.45
subordination of rhetoric to, 44, 55n.42, 105
Dickinson, John, 148
Diogenes, 55
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 238
Dominici, Giovanni, 159

Donatus, Aelius, 6, 7, 19, 31, 33, 72, 91, 106n.9, 135, 137, 155n.55, 166n.95, 169, 173n.12, 212n.3, 237n.3
Donne, John, 6, 95n.49, 96, 105n.4, 134, 160n.68, 192n.8, 197, 198n.22, 200, 201, 202n.32, 247
Dorp, Adam, 177
Downes, Alfred Howard Campbell, 92n.41
Dryden, John, 6, 105n.4, 180n.29, 237
Duns Scotus, Johannes, 133n.6, 164n.84, 166, 176, 177, 182n.40, 216, 230

Eberhard of Bethune, 182
Education
  history of, 5–8, 18, 19, 25, 29–31, 44, 54, 71, 73, 81ff., 93, 95, 103, 105, 118, 137, 161, 197
Egkuklios paideia. See Encyclopedia of the arts
Einhard, 93
Eleusian mysteries, 23
Eleutherius, 83
Elias, Peter, 148
Elyot, Thomas, 193n.12, 195n.15, 196, 197, 225
Empedocles, 40, 58
Emporius, 111
Encyclopedia of the arts, 15, 72, 88n.27, 136n.12, 166, 187
Epicureanism/Epicureans, 19, 50, 51, 163
Erasmus, Desiderius, 7, 8, 15, 20, 28, 33, 34, 42, 57n.45, 62, 67, 71n.37, 90n.35, 96nn.50, 53, 97n.53, 103n.1, 133, 134, 139, 140, 145, 152, 155, 157, 159, 160–166, 170, 171, 173, 176n.16, 179–181, 189n.4, 190, 192, 196, 198, 200, 209–213, 214n.9, 215, 216n.12, 217, 221n.25, 222, 225, 226, 230, 237n.3, 238n.7, 239, 242n.15
Erigena, Johannes Scotus, 91n.36, 105, 106n.6
Ethics, 19, 20, 93n.42
Ethopoeia. See Mimesis
Ethos, 61n.3, 112, 113, 113n.8, 114n.9, 115, 117, 117n.19, 118n.21, 235n.1, 252n.35
Etymology, 15–16, 19, 20, 22–26, 30, 49, 84, 133, 188, 226n.33
Eucleides, 50
Euhemerist exegesis, 33
Eunomius, 214
Euphues/Euphuism, 4, 166, 210, 220n.23, 238, 239, 240. See also Lyly, John
Evans, Elizabeth Cornelia, 113, 114
Evans, Maurice, 69n.31

Fairweather, William, 28n.39
Faral, Edmond, 111, 117
Fichet, Guillaume, 160
Figures of emotion, 30, 242–51
Figures of speech, 30, 40n.14, 242–51
Figures of thought, 30, 40n.14, 54n.39, 111, 112, 117, 121, 133
Figures of words, 252
Filelfo, Francesco, 238
Firmicius Maternus, 33
Fisher, John, St., 28, 165, 191n.7, 216n.12
Flavius Sosipater Charisius, 31
Francis of Assisi, St., 159, 176
Fraunce, Abraham, 105n.4, 171n.6, 192n.8, 210, 215n.10, 218n.19, 241n.14
Freud, Sigmund, 157n.61
Fulbert of Chartres, 106
Fulgentius, 19

Galen, 114
Gardiner, L. J., 91
Garland, John of. See John of Garland
Garnett, Richard, 61n.3
Gentillet, Innocent, 193
Gerbert of Aurillac, 42, 97. See also Sylvester, Pope
Gerson, Jean, 161, 177, 178
Gibbon, Edward, 97n.53
Gilbert de la Porée. See De la Porée, Gilbert
Giles of Rome, 176, 177
Gilson, Étienne, 24, 25n.39, 36, 81n.5, 87, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 103n.1, 132, 145n.34, 150, 152, 158, 159, 161, 163nn.81–83, 176, 177, 182, 183, 197, 200
Glaber, Raoul, 99n.58
Glover, Terrot Reaveley, 19n.7
Gordon, George Stuart, 152n.48
Gorgias, 40, 43, 45, 238
Gosson, Stephen, 236n.3
Grabmann, Martin, 183n.43
Grammar
  and alchemy, 7, 17
  and legal studies, 153
  and science/scientific method, 6, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 27, 32, 33, 57n.45
  and Stoic physics, 51, 82
  as allegorical exegesis of history, 29
  as allegorical exegesis of nature, 16
  as foundation of medieval culture, 32
  as subtext in Abelard and other dialecticians, 103

Grammar (cont.)
golden age of, 31, 132
in decline, 57n.45
in relation to astronomy, 19
in the ascendancy, 15, 134
linked to dialectics for Stoics, 51
method of eclipsed by mathematics, 17
Quintilian's ideal for training in, 31
reasons for decline of in Middle Ages, 136–39
revival of in Renaissance, 7, 164, 166
Stoic concept of, 51
strife with dialectics, 6, 61–62, 66, 121n.29, 132, 133, 160, 169, 171, 179, 211, 217, 220, 229
strife with rhetoric, 190
subordination of by dialectics, 44, 57n.45
subordination of dialectics and rhetoric by, 104
Grandison, Charles, Sir, 237
Gratian, 55, 57n.44, 132
Greene, Robert, 210, 212, 216, 218n.17, 220, 224n.29, 230n.4, 240, 244n.19
Gregory of Nyssa, St., 162, 202n.31, 247
Gregory of Tours, 81
Gregory the Great, 159
Gregory IX, Pope, 176
Grocyn, William, 165
Grosart, Alexander B., 195n.15
Grosseteste, Robert, 104, 144, 145, 170n.5
Guillaume de Machout, 111n.3
Gwynn, Aubrey, 30, 54, 69, 70

Haarhoff, Theodore Johannes, 81
Hadrian, 82
Harington, Sir John, 222n.26
Harris, James, 27, 198n.23
Harvey, Gabriel, 42, 105n.4, 201n.31, 210–213, 220–222, 226, 230, 231, 235–238, 240, 242, 243, 245, 252
Harvey, Richard, 210, 211, 216, 220, 221, 226
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 134
Hegius, Alexander, 164
Héloise, 95, 133
Helvetius, 214
Hendrickson, George Lincoln, 69n.31
Hera, 23
Heracles, 23
Heraclitus, 15, 22, 62, 63
Herbert, George, 105n.4
Hermogenes, 5, 26
Hesiod, 17, 23, 24
Hilary of Poitiers, St., 93, 113n.9, 164n.84, 238
Hildebert of Lavardin, 99n.58, 153n.51
Hippias of Elis, 40, 41, 45, 238
Hippocrates, 114, 115n.15
Hispanus, Petrus. See Peter of Spain
Hobbes, Thomas, 105n.4, 146, 165n.85, 183n.43, 195
Hoby, Thomas, Sir, 196
Holman, Mary John, Sister, 33n.58
Holyday, Barten, 138n.17
Homer, 17–20, 23, 163
Hooker, Richard, 190n.6, 212, 218n.14
Horace, 96, 156n.58, 164, 237n.4, 241, 244n.19
Hoskins, John, 210n.3
Hroswitha, 94, 96, 97
Hrosvitha. See preceding entry
Hugh of St. Victor, 103, 132n.3, 140, 141, 142n.27, 143, 144n.32, 159, 175n.14
Humanism, 7, 63n.13, 124n.36, 134n.9, 142n.27, 160n.68, 170, 182
Hutchins, Robert Maynard, 62
Huxley, Thomas Henry, 253

Irnerius, 122, 132
Isidore of Seville, 72, 84n.13, 103, 105, 111, 122, 141, 142, 155n.58, 159n.67, 172, 193n.12
Isocrates, 6–8, 30, 45, 62, 64, 65n.20, 111, 159n.67, 160

Jacopo da Voragine, 116
Jacopone da Todi, 157, 159
Jaeger, Werner, 63
James, Montague Rhodes, 85
James, William, 184n.46
Jebb, Richard Cleaverhouse, 47n.19, 61
Jenkinson, A. J., 48n.22
Jerome, St., 6, 7, 31, 33–35, 62, 67, 72, 81, 87n.26, 88, 90n.35, 116, 139, 157n.61, 160n.69, 162, 163n.81, 165, 166, 172n.7, 178n.23, 194n.13, 223n.27, 224n.30, 237n.3
Jewel, John, Bishop, 82n.40
John Chrysostom, St., 115n.15, 157n.61, 164n.84, 221n.25, 224n.30, 238, 239, 246–248
John of Garland, 113n.8, 165n.88, 199n.25
John of Salisbury, 65n.20, 96n.53, 123n.36, 131, 134–36, 147–50, 154n.53, 155n.55, 157n.61, 160n.68, 163n.81, 172, 187–89, 190n.6, 191, 193n.12, 198, 226

Johnson, Samuel, 53, 68, 96n.53, 118, 198n.22, 199n.25, 237
Jonson, Ben, 69, 96n.53, 195n.4, 112n.6, 248n.25
Jowett, Benjamin, 15n.22, 21, 26n.35
Joyce, James, 253
Jung, Carl, 157n.61
Juvenal, 241, 244n.19

Kempis. See Thomas à Kempis
Ker, William Paton, 86
Knox, John, 217n.12
Korzybski, Alfred, 17, 27

Labriolle, Pierre de, 31–34, 71, 72nn.39, 44
Lactantius, 93, 156n.58, 159n.67, 194n.13, 237n.3
Lambert of Auxerre, 104
Language
  and physics, 22
  as expression of rational intentions, 182
  as harmonizer of the intellectual and the physical, 16
  as one with thoughts and things, 53
  hostile view of eloquent, 215
  of nature, knowledge of lost at fall of Adam, 16
  relationship of to nature, 21, 51, 136
Latimer, Hugh, 3
Laus et vituperatio. See Colors of good and evil
Leach, Arthur Francis, 6
Leckie, George G., 35n.63
Lever, Thomas, 215
L'Evoque, Richard, 148
Libanius, 115n.15, 239
Liberal arts (seven), 8, 32, 73n.45, 86n.22, 89n.32, 133, 134n.9, 136, 147n.39
Light (physical and spiritual), 144–45
Linacker, Thomas, 165
Lipsius, 8, 68, 248n.25
Livy, 114
Lodge, Thomas, 236n.3
Logic. See New Logic and Old Logic
Logos, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 51, 52, 62, 63, 64, 145, 150n.44, 170n.5, 174n.14, 188
Lombard, Peter, 132, 173n.9, 175n.15
Longinus, 244n.19
Longus, 112
Lucan, 25, 116, 117, 199n.27
Lucian, 97n.53, 112n.6, 162n.77, 223, 235n.2, 238–240
Lully, Raymond, 7

Luther, Martin, 34, 88n.27, 159n.67, 161–163, 164nn.84, 85, 165, 170, 195
Lyly, John, 4n.1, 113n.9, 197, 201n.31, 210, 211n.3, 218n.17, 220, 240. See also *Euphues*/Euphuism

McKeon, Richard Peter, 57, 58n, 61, 103, 104, 105, 106nn.5, 7, 107n.10, 115, 118, 119, 133, 134nn.8–9, 229
McKerrow, Ronald B., 4, 5, 209–211, 216, 224, 226, 231
Macauley, Thomas, 147
Machiavelli, Niccolo, 8, 42, 192, 195, 196, 212, 213n.6
Macrobius, 19, 20, 156n.58
Mandeville, Bernard, 97n.53, 148, 195
Mandonnet, Pierre Félix, 20n.9, 92, 176
Mangan, John Joseph, 164
Manitius, Max, 72, 84
Mantuanus, 95
Maritain, Jacques, 177n.19, 195n.15
Marlowe, Christopher, 171, 172n.7, 230n.4
Marprelate, Martin, 209, 219, 242
Marrou, Henri Irénée, 15, 17, 18n.4, 30, 31, 32, 72, 238
Marsile of Ingen, 170n.5, 177
Marsilio of Padua, 195n.15
Marston, John, 240, 241
Matthew of Vendôme, 111n.3, 117, 137
Matthew, St., 178
Maurus, Rhabanus, 82n.8, 93, 104, 106n.6, 141
Medieval culture
  alleged barbarism of, 152
  as mediator between antiquity and Renaissance, 5, 7–8, 15, 23, 27, 29, 33, 58, 61, 66, 68, 72, 95, 96, 99, 115, 175, 195
  Ciceronian ideal in, 44, 61n.2, 194–95
  conflict within begins in 9th century, 93
  doctrine of decorum in antiquity and, 96
  genius of anticipated in St. Ambrose, 33
  grammatical basis of, 6, 15, 32
  heritage from antiquity, 23
  influence of Stoicism in, 25
  logic in early, 105
  self-confident about improving on antiquity, 90
  triumph of dialectic over grammar in, 57n.44
Mediocre arts, 56

Menippus, 239
Menot, Michel, 197
Metaphysics, 46, 51, 54, 55n.42, 66–67, 103, 133, 169n.3, 170n.6, 176, 178, 247
Metrics, 83, 86, 137
Michelet, Jules, 62
Middle Ages. See Medieval
Migne, Jacques Paul, 32n.55
Milton, John, 29, 61n.3, 63n.12, 71, 95, 96n.51, 105n.4, 155n.55, 170nn.5, 6, 172n.8, 178n.26, 180n.29, 190, 229, 230, 236, 248n.25
Mimesis (as imitation of other persons' characteristics), 113
Mirandola, Pico della, 17, 146, 157n.61, 180, 222n.26
Mitchell, W. Fraser, 200, 201
Mnemonics, 41, 137
Montaigne, Michel de, 8, 66nn.22, 23, 68, 71n.37, 120n.24, 200, 201, 248n.25
Moral significance/moral wisdom/morality, 18, 19, 50, 52, 174, 191
More, Thomas, Saint, 3, 7, 28, 96n.53, 112n.6, 148, 160, 161, 165, 171n.6, 179, 180, 193n.12, 209, 218n.14, 222n.26, 225, 226, 230, 236n.3, 238n.7, 239, 242n.15
Morhof, Daniel Georg, 61
Morley, Henry, 181
Mulcaster, Richard, 213
Muret, Marc Antoine, 8
Muretus, 68, 71n.37
Mythology, 19, 23, 24, 25, 32, 33, 58, 155–56, 157n.61

Nashe, Thomas
References to Nashe's writings listed below are those named in the text; scores more appear, designated only by numerical reference to the McKerrow edition of Nashe.—ed.
Agrippa's satire as source for, 180
Almond for a Parrat, 219n.22, 250
Anatomie of Absurditie, 213, 218n.14, 221, 225n.31, 230n.5, 231
and the cycle of the liberal arts, 86n.23
as journalist, 4
Christs Teares, 213n.6, 223n.27, 224, 230, 231, 240n.11, 242, 244, 246n.19, 247, 248, 249n.30, 250n.33, 252
develops aims and interests of patristic school, 134, 160n.68
Foure Letters, 213n.6
Have With You, 213n.5, 216n.12, 219n.21, 224n.30, 231, 245, 252
Nashe, Thomas (cont.)
in 19th century scholarship, 3–4
in relation to rivalry between dialectics and rhetoric, 42
Lenten Stuffe, 223n.27, 245, 248
on art and nature in poetry, 180n.29
on Cicero, 66n.23
Pierce Penilesse, 219n.21, 222, 230, 235, 238n.7, 238n.10, 245
quarrel with the Harveys, 106n.4, 209ff.
Returne from Parnassus, 215, 240, 250n.34
rhetoric of, stylistic disputes with Ramus, 193
skill in dialectical argument, 230–31
Strange Newes, 219nn.21, 22, 237n.4, 251n.34
Summers Last Will, 246, 251n.34
techniques of ridicule in, 179
tracts moral in aim, 198n.22
Unfortunate Traveller, 218n.14, 230, 242, 246n.22, 247, 249n.30
New Logic, 104, 105n.4, 107, 177
Newton, Isaac, Sir, 146, 181n.35
Nicolas de Clamanges, 160
Nizolius, 192n.8, 225n.32
Nolhac, Pierre de, 152n.49
Nominalism, 31, 50–1, 171n.5, 176, 177, 183n.43. See also Ramism
Norden, Eduard, 62, 72, 81
Notker Balbulus, 89, 90

Odo, 94
Old Logic, 104, 105, 177
Oltramare, André, 237
Ong, Walter J., 70n.32
Orator/oratory. See Ciceronian ideal
Origen, 28, 33, 34, 72n.44, 157n.61, 164n.84, 165, 214, 237n.3
Osgood, Charles Grosvenor, 155nn.56–58, 156
Otto I, Holy Roman Emperor, 94
Overbury, Thomas, 198n.22
Ovid, 131, 155, 156n.61, 181n.36
Owst, G. W., 198n.24

Paenetius of Rhodes, 54, 98
Paetow, Louis John, 70n.33, 121, 136, 137, 164, 181
Pallas, 18
Paracelsans, 7
Paré, Gérard, 131, 132n.3, 133n.7
Parsons, Robert, 3

Pascal, Blaise, 66n.22, 68, 85n.20, 179, 201n.31
Pasquil of England, 223, 240
Patericke, Simon, 193
Pathos, 112, 113, 114nn.9, 11, 115, 116, 117, 118n.21, 121, 235n.1, 252n.35
Patristic culture/theology, 7, 17, 22, 28, 29, 32, 92, 96, 97n.53, 99n.58, 120n.26, 139, 141, 142nn.26, 27, 143, 145, 149, 155, 157, 159, 161, 162, 163, 165, 170, 173, 175, 189, 196, 197, 213, 214, 221, 222, 225, 238, 241, 246. See also Scriptural exegesis
Paul, St., 181, 247n.3
Paulinus Aquileinsis, 91n.36
Paulus Diaconus, 90n.36
Penelope, 18
Perkins, William, 173n.9
Persephone, 23
Perseus, 241
Persius, 25
Peter of Spain, 104, 183n.43, 213n.6, 216n.12
Petrarch, Francis, 7, 15, 62, 63n.12, 64n.17, 90n.35, 91n.39, 95, 97n.53, 99n.58, 123n.36, 133, 142n.26, 147, 149–155, 157, 162, 163n.81, 164, 165, 172, 178n.26, 188, 193, 222, 223, 240
Philo of Alexandria, 22, 24, 28, 29, 52, 143, 144n.32, 147, 181, 212n.3, 222
Philodemus, 51
Philostratus, 112
Plato, 15, 16, 18, 21, 24, 26, 28, 40, 42, 44–48, 54, 56n.43, 62–65, 115, 133, 139, 140, 160, 174, 178n.23, 181, 182, 183n.43, 192, 196, 218n.13, 229n.2
Platonism, 28
Plautus, 87n.26
Playfere, Thomas, 216n.12, 221
Pliny the Elder, 22, 27, 33, 91, 150, 155, 191n.7, 210n.3, 213n.6, 220n.23, 236n.3
Plotinus, 58, 73, 229n.2
Poggio, Valla, 158, 190, 238
Pope, Alexander, 93n.42, 118n.21, 177, 237, 248n.25
Porphyry, 104, 106, 239
Poseidon, 18
Posidonius, 52
Post-Renaissance, 8
Practical criticism, 30
Prantl, Carl, 105, 106n.9, 183n.43
pre-Socratics, 18
Priscian, 6, 31, 88, 106n.9, 111, 122, 137, 143n.27, 176, 181, 212n.3, 217n.13
Probus, 94
Prodicus, 40
Prosody, 30, 83
Protagoras of Abdera, 40, 43, 44, 63n.12
Prudentius, 137, 138
Pullus, Robertus, 148
Pyrrhon, 50
Pythagoras, 58, 133

Quadrivium, 87n.24, 88, 141, 145n.35
Quarrel of the ancients and the moderns, 62, 68, 140, 146, 177, 180, 210
Quintilian, 5, 6, 27, 30, 31, 61, 65, 70, 71, 72, 74, 105, 111, 113, 119, 122, 150, 188n.2, 220n.23

Rabelais, François, 20, 72n.37, 162n.77, 170, 180, 181n.32, 193n.12, 209–211, 212n.4, 213, 214n.9, 226, 230, 235n.2, 238n.7, 240
Raby, Frederick J. E., 72, 81
Ramism, 211, 216, 222, 230, 237
Ramus, Peter, 8, 49, 55n.42, 61, 71n.37, 105n.4, 134, 170, 171n.6, 172n.7, 184n.46, 192n.8, 193, 198n.22, 209, 211, 212, 213nn.5, 7, 214, 215, 216n.12, 217–219, 220n.23, 222, 223, 225, 229, 231, 236, 242
Rand, Edward Kennard, 74n.46, 116, 131
Renaissance, 7, 8, 20, 24, 29, 40n.7, 56n.43, 58, 68, 162, 166, 170
Reuchlin, Johann, 20, 96n.50, 97n.53, 146, 151, 157n.61, 170, 180, 181, 209, 214n.9, 242n.15
Reynolds, Henry, 222n.26
Rhenanus, Beatus, 164
Rhetoric
  and legal studies, 120–23
  Aristotelian vs. Ciceronian basis of, 105
  assimilation of dialectics to logic by, 105
  early phase of grounded in dialectics, 45n.14
  in relation to dialectics, 39–43, 49
  in relation to science, 114–15
  in relation to Sophistic ideal, 43
  in 16th century, 5
  like cookery, 47, 49n.24
  source of modern misconception about, 49
  strife with dialectics, 61, 66, 220

Rhetoric (cont.)
strife with grammar, 190
subordination of dialectics and rhetoric to grammar, 104
subordination of dialectics by, 105
subordination of dialectics to, 56
subordination to dialectics of, 44, 55n.42, 105
subordination of logic to rhetoric, 106
Richer (Richard of Aigle), 106
Robert of Melun, 148
Roberts, W. Rhys, 49n.24, 62n.6, 65n.20
Robin, Léon, 40, 41, 43, 44n.11, 45nn.14–15, 50, 51n.28, 52, 58nn.47–51, 64, 65n.18
Robinson, Richard, 45, 46, 47
Roger, Maurice, 32, 72n, 84n
Roscellinus, Johannes, 42
Rupert of Deutz, 139, 140

Salisbury, John of. See John of Salisbury
Salutati, Coluccio, 96n.50, 97n.53, 157–159
Samminiato, Giovanni da, 158
Sandys, John Edwin, 18, 22, 23, 25, 26n.33, 83, 86
Savonarola, Girolamo, 157, 159
Scepticism/sceptics, 50
Scholasticism, 57n.45, 90n.35, 96n.53, 105n.4, 132, 138, 140, 142, 143, 145, 146, 151, 152, 156, 157, 158n.64, 159, 161, 163, 165, 170, 173, 175, 176, 177n.19, 178, 179, 181, 183, 189, 211, 216, 222, 225, 230
Schoolmen. See preceding entry
Scipio, 64
Scott, Inez Gertrude, 69n.31
Scott, Izora, 71n.37
Scotus. See Duns Scotus
Scriptural exegesis, 7, 15, 16, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 35, 55n.42, 82n.8, 83, 92, 93, 96n.51, 97n.53, 104, 132, 157n.61, 170n.5, 178, 190, 210, 213n.7, 214n.7, 218n.19, 223. See also Patristic theology
Second sophistic, 121n.26, 238, 239n.8, 248n.26, 250, 253
Sedulius, 137
Seebohm, Frederic, 33n
Selden, John, 172n.9
Semantics, 14, 30
Seneca, 19, 20, 63, 65n.19, 67n.26, 111, 155, 158, 174, 201, 218n.19
Servatus, 94
Servius, 19, 31
Sextus Pompey, 194
Shakespeare, William, 45n.20, 67, 93n.42, 118n.21, 180n.29
Shepard, Thomas, 218n.14
Sidney, Philip, Sir, 105n.4, 113n.9, 116n.17, 117, 170, 171n.6, 180n.29, 196, 201n.31, 210, 214n.7, 218n.19, 220, 230, 236, 237
Smith, G. Gregory, 211, 236
Smith, Henry, 197, 198n.23, 200n.28, 222
Smith, Logan Pearsall, 134n.10
Socrates, 15, 16, 26, 40, 44, 45, 47, 53, 56n.43, 65, 96n.53, 215
Solomon, 16, 28
Sophistic disputation, 239
Sophistic prose, 238. See Second sophistic
Sophistry, 231
Sophists, 40, 41, 43–45, 48, 63, 64, 65
Spedding, James, 146, 147
Spenser, Edmund, 95, 105n.4, 113n.7, 116n.17, 117, 155n.55, 178n.26, 180n.29, 193n.12, 195n.15, 210, 218n.19, 222n.26, 236, 240, 248n.25
Sprat, Thomas, 105n.4, 172n.9
Springer, Mary Theresa of the Cross, Sister, 33n.58
St. John, Christopher, 95n.48, 97n.54
Stapleton, Thomas, 3
Statius, 116
Stern, Julius, 18n.4
Stilo, 26
Stoicism/stoics, 19, 20, 22–27, 29, 42, 50–54, 56n.43, 63–65, 71, 115n.15, 123n.36, 147n.39, 148, 150, 170n.5, 187, 188
Stokes, Francis Griffin, 179
Strabo, 133
Stubbs, William, 83
Sturm, Johann, 211n.3
Suetonius, 30, 93, 114, 155n.58
Swift, Jonathan, 53, 96n.53, 112n.6, 138, 161n.69, 190n.6, 195
Sylvester, Pope, 98, 103, 106, 107. See also Gerbert of Aurillac
Sylvius, Aenaes, 194
Symonds, John Addington, 62

Tacitus, 114
Taine, Hippolyte, 188
Talaeus, Audomarus, 55n.42, 191, 211n.3, 214, 220n.23
Talon, Omer. See preceding entry
Tataretus, Petrus, 178
Tatham, Edward Henry Ralph, 153, 154nn.53–54

Taylor, Henry Osborn, 55n.41, 93n.44, 97, 98, 99, 103, 106nn.6–8, 121, 122, 132nn.4–5, 140, 141, 143, 145, 146, 187
Terence, 33, 96, 164
Tertullian, 6, 32, 72, 81, 201
Theagenes of Rhegium, 18
Theodulf of Orleans, 91n.36
Theophrastus, 50, 113, 160
Thierry of Chartres, 135, 136n.12
Thomas à Becket, 148
Thomas à Kempis, 140, 159
Thomas Aquinas, St. See Aquinas, St. Thomas
Thomas, E. Crewdson, 87n.24
Thomas of Canterbury, 147
Timon, 40
Tisias, 40
Tooke, Horne, 182n.43
Translatio studii. See *De translatione studii*
Tremblay, Pierre, 131, 132n.3, 133n.7
Trivium, 5, 87n.24
  as servant of history and historical meaning, 141
  history of inseparable from rivalry among its divisions, 42–43
  internal dynamics in period from Abelard to Erasmus, 136ff.
  judgment on fragmentation of by dialecticians, 149
  oriented to needs of grammar in Erasmus, 134
  oriented under dominance to dialectics in Abelard, 134
Tullius, 196, 214
Tully, 98, 237n.4, 245
Tuve, Rosemund, 55n.42, 105n.4

Ulysses, 19
Urquhart, Thomas, 27
Utilitarianism, 147

Valerius Maximus, 111, 120n.24, 180n.31
Valla, Lorenzo, 61, 71n.37, 165, 190
Varro, Marcus Terentius, 6, 22, 23, 26–28, 30, 91, 122, 136, 142n.27, 155, 156n.58
Vincent of Beauvais, 90, 103, 141–143, 145n.35, 155n.57, 187
Virgil, 19, 20, 87, 93, 94, 95, 112n.7, 131, 152, 157, 163, 174, 241n.15
Vives, Juan Luis, 8, 57n.45, 61, 88n.27, 146, 151, 171n.6, 174n.14, 178, 179, 180n.29, 238n.7
Von Hutten, Ulrich, 209
Voragine, Jacopo da, 116

Wallis, Glen, 144n.33
Walter of Chatillon. See De Lille, Gautier
Warton, Thomas, 5
Watson, Foster, 169, 215, 216
Whitehead, Alfred North, 143n.32
Willey, Basil, 57n.45
William of Condes, 135
William of Ockham, 105n.4, 107n.10, 133n.6, 170n.5, 176, 177, 178n.23, 182n.43, 184n.46, 192n.8, 229, 242n.15
William of Shyreswood, 104
Wilson, Thomas, 105n.4, 170, 171n.6, 187n.2, 210n.3, 241n.14
Winchester, Bishop of, 85
Wingfield, Anthony, 214n.9, 225n.33
Wolff, Samuel Lee, 115, 116, 230
Woodward, William Harrison, 193
Wordsworth, William, 68
Wust, Peter, 111n.12
Wycliffe, John, 142n.26, 170, 195n.17

Xenocrates, 50
Xenophon, 65, 196, 236

Yates, Frances A., 212

Zeno, 6, 23, 39, 53, 63
Zeus, 23